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"In the Dominican Republic, the rebel soldiers called 
the Peace Corps Volunteers 'Hijos de Kennedy ' - 
Children of Kennedy*"
-HARRIS WOFFORD -
("The Future Of The Peace 
Corps, " The Annals Of The 
American Academy Of Political 
And Social Science* May i960, P. 13C
ABSTRACT
The first part of this dissertation traces the roots of the Peace 
Corps idea in American history, its development during the Presidential 
campaign of 196O and its establishment as a government agency by John 
F. Kennedy in I961, The Peace Corps' battle for autonomy within the 
Federal bureaucracy arid its struggle to win legislation on Capitol Hill 
are also analysed. The style and nature of this new institution, the 
principles and policies on which it functioned, its relationship to 
President Kennedy and the calibre of the men who staffed it, complete 
the study of the Peace Corps organisation in Washington.
The second half of the thesis deals primarily with the Volunteers 
who served overseas. Recruitment, training and selection methods are 
assessed as are the programming techniques by which young Americans were 
placed in Jobs in Third World countries. The various trials, tribulations 
and triumphs experienced by the Volunteers are discussed and described.
The American press and the public's view of the Volunteers' work overseas 
is summarised as is the Peace Corps' role in politics and American foreign 
policy. Finally, a comprehensive evaluation is made of Kennedy's Peace 
Corps and its impact on the United States and the world. Overall, the 
intention is to investigate and explain how the Peace Corps came about, what 
it accomplished - in America and overseas - and why, in two years, it came to 
be regarded as the most visible embodiment of the idealism of Kennedy's Hew 
Frontier,
FOREWORD
"Like an Odyssey, the Peace Goips moved from adventure to adventure, 
crisis to crisis, point to point," wrote Harris Wofford, one of the agency's 
founding fathers. "It was a Socratic seminar writ large, the one rule being 
to follow the question where it led, the next step known by careful attention 
to the step just taken." In many ways, this description could be applied 
to my research on the Peace Corps. It began with the aim of analysing how 
a campaign idea became a government organisation; however, as one question 
followed another, this turned out to be only half my story. On reaching 
American shores - and particulary the Peace Corps Archives in Washington - 
I discovered an enormous amount of previously unused material on the 
Volunteers and their activities overseas. This became the second part of 
my thesis and doubled its length. However, since the evidence was 
substantially new and the story previously untold, perseverance seemed the 
best policy.
My pursuit of sources took me from the Denis Brogan Centre For 
American Studies in Glasgow to the Kennedy Library in Boston and the Johnson 
Library in Texas, In the process, I received the advice and assistance of 
scores of people. I would like to thank Lord Harlech and the Kennedy 
Memorial Trust for granting me a year's scholarship to Harvard Hoivartty in 
academic session 1970-9. While there, under the supervision of Professor 
Frank Freidel, I was able to conduct the greater part of my research. I 
would also like to express my undying gratitude to all those who submitted 
themselves to a personal interview with me; a list of their names appears 
in the bibliography. A special debt is owed to Sargent Shriver, Bill 
Josephson, Warren Wiggins, Bill Kelly and Harris Wofford for spending hours 
in conversation. To Harris Wofford, in particular, I owe thanks for showing 
me - through his knowledge, sensitivity and humour - the essence of Kennedy's 
Peace Corps, Others who offered unioue insight were Don Romine, Paul Tsongas,
^ Harris Wofford; "The Future Of The Peace Corps, " The Annals o'i' the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, (flaV, 1966)
Ruth Saxe, Charles Peters and Thomas Quimby,
At the Kennedy Library, Will Johnson was a constant source of 
strength and Debbie Green, of enthusiasm. My special appreciation also 
goes to Joe Manno at the Peace Corps Archives in Washington and the ever- 
helpfal Freedom of Information Officer there, Genoa Godbey, For his 
valued counsel on a number of matters - not least, the rigours of 
conducting a modem research programme - I ’-/ish to thank Dick M-ahoney; 
and for applying her editorial skills on my behalf, Elizabeth Me Cormick. 
Fihally, I will always be grateful to my parents and Anne Marie for 
their support and understanding and to Eilish Hughes for typing the 
rough drafts of this dissertation and for encouraging me to fulfil the 
goals I had set for myself.
Gerard T, Rice 
June a, 1900.
A. NOTE ON SPURGES
A few weeks after the Peace Corps had been established, Sargent Shriver, 
its first Director, told his staff that "Students and writers interested in 
researching the Peace Corps should be encouraged to do so, especially if their 
product will make a research contribution to the Corps," Without exception, 
everyone I met or deait with in regard to this dissertation followed Shriver*s 
instructions enthusiastically. In particular, the archivists in the John.
F. Kennedy Memorial Library and the Peace Corps Library and Records office 
provided me not only with the relevant historical materials but with 
unstinting encouragement and support. Without them, this "research contribution" 
would not have been possible.
As far as primary evidence is concerned, this work rests on three 
major sources. The John F. Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston has the 
official record of the Peace Corps as a government agency, 1901-3. This 
consists of internal memoranda, the Peace Corps* weekly reports to the 
President and records of the Director's staff meetings. Complementing these, 
the personal and organisational papers of two former Peace Corps staff 
members, William Josephson and Gerald Bush are also lodged at the Library.
I found both of inestimable value. In addition, the Library holds transcripts 
of num&jL ous oral history interviews of which I made extensive use.
In the Peace Corps Archives in Washington D.C., I was given full access 
to previously classified documents relating to the agency-'s origins, policies, 
programmes and performance. There are litera'*.ly hundreds of thousands of 
papers available for inspection. In particular, I relied on the Evaluation 
Reports of Peace Corps country programmes. Written by the agency's own 
"evaluators", these are lengthy, detailed and often brutally frank reports 
on every aspect of the Peace Corps as it functioned overseas. Many contain
Director's Staff Meeting. March 30, I96I
G argent Shriver and. other senior staff members' hand.w.ritten comments in the 
margin. I am indebted to the,ACTION agency for declassifying nearly sixty 
of these reports on my behalf.
As well .as these two sources, I was dependent upon published 
government documents, newspapers and periodicals, and secondary works on 
the Peace Corps. I also paid a short, but profitable, visit to the Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Library in Austin, Te:cas. However, my third major source 
came in the form of personal meetings and interviews with over sixty 
former members of the Kennedy administration, the Peace Corps organisation 
and the Volunteers themselves. I have limited quotations from these 
conversations to shorn phrases which were recorded verbatim and to facts 
and hypotheses which can be supported either by context or documentary 
evidence. However, these interviews allowed me the privilen^ )^ - of a fresh, 
and vital perspective on John F. Kennedy's Peace Corps and - to a great 
extent - provided the insight necessary to make this small contribution 
to its history.
THE PEACE CORPS: I960 - 1980
#
"We 11^  they may ask you -what you have done in the sixties for 
your country, and you will be able to say, I served in the Peace 
Corps'Q"
-JOHN F* KEbTNEDY «
(Remarks To The Peace Corps 
Staff, June 14> 19&2)
"The Peace Corps is one of the finest programs ever evolved 
by the United States and gives Americans a chance in many 
nations to put our best foot forward, to harness the 
tremendous goodwill, and the genorosity^ and tie dedication 
and the idealism of the American people »"
-JB M Y  GARTER-
(Remarks To The Peace Corps 
Staff, May 23, 1979)
On. March 1, 1901)the Peace Corps will celebrate its twentieth
anniversaryo Over those two decades its fortunes have fluctuated
greatly* Advocated by John F* Kennedy during the I960 Presidential
campaign and established within the first hundred days of his
administration, it became - according to his biographer, Theodore G«
Sorensen - "the most stirring symbol of Kennedy’s hope and promise*"^
Yet, In the later 1960's and throughout the 1970’s it seemed as if that
promise might go unfulfilled* However, as the 1980’s approached,
the- Peace Corps rallied under President Carter and embarked upon
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what was termed its "second Springs" Of course, strictly 
speaking, what happened to the Peace Corps after 1963 is not part of 
this history* Nevertheless, in order to place Kennedy’s 
Peace Corps in proper context, it is worthwhile making a brief, overall 
assessment of the agency in, the years between I960 and 1980©
The Peace Corps is a government agency which sends young Americans 
into the Third World to work at grassroots levels and help poorer
3
peoples help themselves* In the process, it is hoped that the people 
who work in the Peace Corps - the iVolhnteer ~ will supply 'a needed 
technical service^ give foreign nations the opportunity to get to know 
Americans and allow Americans to become more thoroughly acquainted 
with other cultures and mores* As defined by the Peace Corps Act of 1961, 
these became imown as the "Three Aims", The Peace Corps recruits, 
selects, supervises and provides material support for its Volunteers; 
they must be .American citizens, eighteen years-old or over and either 
possess, or be capable of being trained in, a skill,!he vast majority 
of Volunteers are university or college graduates with a ^chelor of 
Arts degree; however, no academic qualification is necessary for 
ser^ rice * When selected by the Peace Corps, applicants undergo a 
three month period of intensive training in a basic skill and then 
serve a two year stint in a designated country* The intention is to
provide manpower which will help countries satisfy their 
essential human needs •» education, health^nutrition, energy 
and general community development© As Sargent Shriver, the first 
Director of the Peace Corps put it: "There is nothing complicated 
about what the Peace Corps is trying to accomplish* The Volunteer 
is a catalyst for self-help projects that will produce something 
of value that was not there before he arrived* It is that simple*"'^
In the Kennedy era, the Peace Corps was regarded both at home 
and abroad as an outstanding success on a foreign policy stage 
increasingly beset by problems and dissent. Kennedy praised the 
Peace Corps for contributing a "fresh, personal meaning to our
5
diplomacy." By the time of his assassination, over 7000 Volunteers 
were serving in 44 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin .America and the 
Far East. Despite the death of the President who had inspired it 
with his invocation to "ask not what your country can do for you, 
but what you can do for your country", the Peace Corps continued to 
expand. Indeed, in 2.966, it reached its zenith with 15, 556 
Volunteers involved in various kinds of work in more than 7000 
separate locations. On the domestic front, hardly a word of 
criticism was heard; the Peace Corps was adjudged a nonpartisan 
issue by both left and right* Overseas, it was one of the few 
American government organisations not associated with the Central 
TntellAgenGs ,Agency* Moreover, it was constantly being requested 
to increase its presence in foreign lands * ^
Much of the Peace Corps' excellent reputation was attributable 
to the extraordinary qualities of leadership possessed by Sargent 
Shriver, its Director between I96I and 1966* With a genius for 
organisation and an uncompromising Idealism, he supplied the energy and 
the aptitude not only to create the Peace Corps, but to make it the most 
admired government institution in Washington* Even Shriver’s most severe
critics conceded that he " epitomised the New Frontier better than
7anyone else among Kennedy’s cadres." Shriver personally demanded of 
both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson that the Peace Corps should have 
independent status and not be used as an arm of American foreign 
policy* In achieving these goals, he supervised an operation which 
in inception, style and character was unique in American history©
In a sense, the early 1960's was the perfect time for the Peace 
Corps* There was widespread affluence, the black revolution had not 
yet begun and Vietnam was only a rumble on the horizon. As William 
Manchester noted5 "The liberal hero of the hour who in the 1930’s had 
been the angry young woricman, in the 1940’s the C,I*, and in the 
1950*3 the youth misunderstood by his mother, had become, in 
the early 1960’s^  the dedicated Peace Gorpsman battling hunger and 
disease with the tools of peace.
However, with Sargent Shriver*s departure in 1966, difficulties 
emerged that were to plague the Peace Corps until the present day©
The American wa.r effort in Vietnam eventually led to conflict 
within the Peace Corps* A substantial number of Volunteers Wgan 
to see a contradiction between striving to "serve" the native peoples 
of one Third World country while the American government attacked and 
killed the native peoples of another* Jack Vaughn, Shriver’s successor, 
found it well-nigh impossible to maintain an idealistic, uninvolved stance 
for the Peace Corps* Volunteers were censured and brought home between 
1966 and 196s for making political statements indicting their homeland 
as an "imperialist aggressor©" The Committee of Returned Volunteers, 
formed in 1964, became an important spearhead of the general anti-wa 
protest movement© In the light of the Vietnam war overseas and the 
apparent discovery of what Michael Harrington called "the Other America.’* 
at home (that is, the ill-educated, deprived, poverty-stricken minority 
groups), the clarity of national purpose that had characterised the 
Kennedy years faded in the heat of a new and more troubled style of
politics© Peace Corps recruitment numbers fell as more 
and more young people devoted their time and energy to 
underprivileged Americans through the domestic programme. Volunteers 
In Service To America (V.I.S.T.A.) Besides, on college campuses - 
the traditional heartland of Peace Corps recruits - there developed 
a sceptical attitude towards American altruism; this soon spread 
abroad* Accordingly between 1966 and 1973, the Peace Corps was 
obliged to leave sixteen countries©
The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 was another serious blow 
to an already weaken^^LPeace Corps# His neurotic dislike for John 
Kennedy is well-documented* To Nixon, the Peace Corps remained as 
a physical manifestation of "Camelot" and the effete liberalism 
which he felt Kennedy had represented* He especially disapproved of 
some Volunteers* vociferous criticism of American policy in Vietnam*
Nixon had poured vitriolic abuse upon the Peace Corps proposal during the 
i960 Presidential campaign; ten years later, he found fiimself with 
an opportunity to deactivate it. He did this subtly, but 
nonetheless effectivelyt.
In July 1971, Nixon created a new Federal agency entitled ACTION,
which was to serve as an umbrella for all domestic and overseas
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voluntary programmes including the Peace Corps* He sacked Jack 
Vaughn - an experienced staff member of the Kennedy era - and 
emasculated the,Peace Corps * autonomy by an Executive Order that gave 
total control of its policies to the ACTION Chief© He also robbed it 
of its impartial, nature by giving its top staff positions to his 
political appointees© Both Directors of ACTION during the Nixon era, 
Joseph Ho Blatchford (1971 - 73 ) and Michael P© Balzano (1973-76), 
were staunch Republicans and ardent Nixon supporters© With the 
catchphrase of "New Directions", they succeeded in distorting the 
original thrust of the Peace Corps* They no longer concentrated on 
the so-called "’B ,A. ' generalist" type of Volunteer working at ; a' grassroots 
level. 'Insteady they:'sought older, more^qpalifiad personnel with specific 
technical skills for use in sophisticated urban programmes
Experienced Peace Corps staffers had learned from the past that not only 
were specialists extremely difficult to recruit, but-despite 
their expertise - often did not have the enthusiasm, adaptability 
and ultimately, the people-to-people impact of the well-trained, 
dedicated generalist©
Under Nijcon, Peace Corps staff and Volunteers were
demoralised© Furthermore, the agency lost its independence and
became incarcerated in a massive new bureaucracy© (APIENBIZ l)
President Gerald Ford (who, as a congressman, had voted for the
Peace Corps in 1961), did nothing to halt the decline© The
Peace Corps* budget was cut by a colossal 47 per cent and, by 1976^
Volunteer numbers had fallen below 6000 - a drop of 60 per cent from
the 15, 000 of 1966. In Washington and overseas, the Peace Corps
was regarded as just another technical assistance organisation©
Moreover, many members of the public were uncertain as to whether
it was still in existence# With his well-renowned instinct
for the jugular, it seemed that Richard Nixon had succeeded in
11strangling the Peace Corps.
Ironically, the mother of the man who became President in 1976 - 
Jimmy Garter - had been a rather senior Peace Corps Volunteer in 
India in the late 1960*s* Encouraged by "Miss Lillian", Carter set 
about the daunting task of not only restoring the Peace Corps to 
health, but suiting its policies and programmes to the much-changed 
world order of the late 1970*s and 1980*s^Vietnam, Watergate and the G©I#A. 
revelations had fostered a cynicism in the Third World towards the 
much ~ vaunted idealism of the United States© Some countries
refused Peace Corps participation in their affairs and there was a 
definite feeling amoiig Third World leaders that American assistance 
was paternalistic and rooted in self-interest. Simultaneously, 
there had been a strong and steady development of nationalistic 
consciousness amon'S the emerging states* Also, they had gained 
substantial economic and hence, political power -perhaps- best 
epitomised by the Organisation of Petroleum Ebcporting Countries (O.P.E.G.)*
This led many underdeveloped countries to establish indigenous
self-help programmes rather than submissively depend upon the
offerings of Western voluntary services©
. In America too,critics»of the Peace Corps argued that it had
become an anachronism, a hold-over from the Kennedy years when
New Frontiersmen believed that the best and the brightest of
American youth could go forth among-the poverty-stricken nations
and bring them salvation. Two of the most virulent critics were
Kevin Lowther (a former Volunteer) and G© Payne Lucas (one of the
first Peace Corps administrators) who claimed in their book.
Keeping Kennedy’s Promise, that "the great majority of Volunteers
have been sent abroad without sufficient skill, without sufficient
langirage ability, without sufficient cultural awareness - and
without a clear or critical.job assignment. They are the unmet
hope of the Peace Corps," Lowther and Lucas argued that the goodwill
and belief in American amateurism ("can-doism") characteristic
of the Peace Corps in the Kennedy years, had done little to help
satisfy the real development needs of the Third World© This
revisionist interpretation shocked and upset Sargent Shriver and
many other Peace Corps officials. Indeed, one of them wrote Lucas
12a 300-page rebuttal. However, Sam Brown, appointed by Carter 
as Director of ACTION in 1977, agreed with Lowther and Lucas©
Moreover, he added the charge that Kennedy’s Peace Corps had been 
an instrument of American cultural imperialism© "Fifteen years ago, 
we felt we knew everything, could do anything, were always right," 
said Brown© "That was Camelot and Camelot gave us Vietnam©
13Now we no longer believe we can go out and change the world"
In 1977, many political observers viewed Brown as the perfect 
personality to guide the Peace Corps into its "second Spring©" The 
organiser of the Vietnam Moratorium and the Students - for-Mc Carthy 
crusade in 1963, Brown was seen as the symbol of the end of the era 
of upheaval — the radical young war protestor turned government servant,
He was sympathetic to the sensitivities of the Third World, ana a
keen disciple of the controversial economist B.P© Schuimacher, who
believed that aid should concentrate on people and be labour-intensive
rather than technically-oriented and capital-intensive©^^ Couching
his statements in the language of the New left. Brown spoke
encouragingly of focusing the Peace Corps* resources on "basic human
needs" and placing it "on the cutting edge of social and economic
change©" His progressive inclinations were well-illustrated by his
choice of Peace Corps Directors a black^female professor of psychology
from Howard University named Carolyn R© Payton©
Yet, despite all the good omens, a brief honeymoon period of
great expectation was followed by just as much turmoil and disappointment
as before. Brown’s background made him a target of both liberals
and conservatives; his former allies on the left, like Congressman
Michael Harrington, accused him of "selling out";those on the right,
like House Republican Whip Robert Michels, depicted him as a
wild-eyed socialist* Charges of maladministration, political
15cronyism and chronic ineptitude were laid against Brown© Critics 
pounced on his mooted plans for Volunteers to protest against 
multinational corporations in the Third World and for unemployed 
black youths from Harlem to go to Jamaica as a people-to-people 
project. It was even rumoured that Brown intended to send a Peace 
Corps contingent to communist Cuba. To many, it seemed as if he was 
subverting the essential non-political nature of the Peace Corps. 
Certainly, his decision to withdraw Peace Corps ser-^ /ices from 
Nicaragua, Chad and Afghanistan was based on his personal distaste 
for the political complexion of their governments. Brown’s strident, 
often oversimplistic criticism of Kennedy’s Peace Corps as " a 
missionary band out to save the world"' did not help him.
Not only did it irritate the Congress - where the Peace Corps had many 
longstanding advocates - but also the Peace Corps staff, many of whom 
remained loyal to the ideals inspired by Kennedy. Matters came to a
head when Brown clashed with Carolyn, fhyton over the future direction 
of the Peace Corps© Under shameful and well-publicised circumstances,
16
Payton was sacked in November 1978© Once again, the Peace 
Corps was leaderless and in a state of complete disarray©
Throughout the first half of 1979 there was bitter debate in the 
Congress as to whether the Peace Corps should be taken away from 
Brown, out of ACTION, and made autonomous within an international 
Development Cooperation Administration - a new unit proposed under 
President Garter's foreign aid reorganisation plan. Many people 
felt that, in the best interests of the Peace Corps, such an 
extreme measure was necessary. For example, former Volunteer 
of the Kennedy era. Senator Paul S. Tsongas of Massachusetts, 
claimed that the Peace Corps needed %  fresh start*.*, out 
of politics *
Thus, in the summer of 1979, the Peace Corps was at its 
most momentous juncture since its inception in I96I; one 
congressman even feared, " The Peace Corps may not survive 
There was argument within the agency, debate in the Congress 
and a general confusion in the public mind regarding the future 
relevance of the Peace Corps. Sargent S.hriver entered the 
controversy and defended what the Peace Corps had represented 
under Kennedy* "Ne were seekers. We were hopers^" he said,
"We committed ourselves intellectually in the past to a concept of 
conduct and purpose and we are now wondering whether we were 
righto And if right, are we out of date now?" In conclusion,
Shriver raised thefundamental ^ destion At issue: "Is there any
substance to the Peace Corps idea today or are we just survivors 
of Camelot?
On iJlay 16/1979, President Garter took decisive steps towards 
resolving the crisis with an Executive Order re-establishing the 
Peace Corps as an autonomous agency within ACTION© Carter 
endowed the Peace Corps Director with total power over the budget, 
programmes, and support functions necessary to the efficient maintenance 
of the organisation© Moreover, he explained that " The purpose of 
this order is to strengthen the vitality , visibility and 
independence of the Peace Corps while preserving its position as 
a joint venture with our domestic volunteer service programs 
withto the framework of ACTION."2° continued In the Congreee
until, on July 31, 1979 it confirmed the President’s decision
by voting to keep the Peace Corps in ACTION, but with independent
decision-making powers* Both Houses reaffirmed their confidence in
Carter’s proposal by immediately authorising the Peace Corps a budget
of 105*4 million dollars for fiscal year 1980, a 40 per cent
21increase over the last figure of the Ford, administration©
In the summer of 1979, Carter appointed a new Peace Corps
Director, Richard D. Celeste. Celeste, who helped organise the
Youth-For-Kennedy movement in I960 and was an administrator in the
I^ace Corps in 1963, immediately stressed his commitment to the
New P’rontier ethos of public service ard pragmatic idealism.
However, he clearly recognised that the Peace Corps would have to
adapt to the needs of the modern world. Nevertheless ha envisioned
an exciting future for the Peace Corps. "As we move into the 1900’s,"
"said Celeste, "I believe many of our citizens will commit their
personal experience and energy to work as joint, ventures in village-
level development efforts throughout the Third World." Working off
a base of 6,300 Volunteers in 63 countries. Celeste spoke of making the
Peace Corps more "ihternational", by working with the United Nations
and ’indigenous service organisations; more "reciprocal", by inviting
native counterpart volunteers to work in the United States; and more
oriented towards "appropriate technology " by making extensive use of
host countries’ resources and skills © With a healthy respect for both
the strengths and weaknesses of the agency in the past. Celeste promised
a Peace Corps evolving towards "a fresh sense of partnership and
mutual respect because these days the leaders of tne Third World
countries in which we operate have a clear idea of how they want
22to develop and how we can work alongside them,"
The Peace Corps in 1980 did not appear as the pioneering,
exciting new idea that it had done in I960© In fact, the
agency never really recovered the glamour and appeal of the Kennedy
era© Yet, in twenty years despite political machinations, leadership
crises and radically changing global conditions, some 90,000 young
Americans gave two years of their lives in service to the world’s
underprivileged - the largest American non-military overseas
operation in history© In many ways, 1979-80 was as crucial a
period for the Peace Corps as 1960-61# The confusion within and
without the agency was resolved and the steady decline in funding and
in Volunteer numbers was arrested. Perhaps even more significantly,
with renewed Presidential support and public interest, and with a
vigorous young Director, the Peace Corps looked more maturely robust
than at any time since its heyday in the early 1960’s* As Vice-
President Walter Mondale remarked in May 1979î
"Today the Peace Corps has resuod its priority in our 
government*,« for this administration believes in the 
importance of voluntary efforts. Whether in the fight to 
rebuild our cities, the delivery of social services or 
assisting the Third World, we are committed to tapping the 
energies of dedicated volunteers.,. President Carter has 
rekindled the dream of President Kennedy,"23
The history of John F* Kennedy’s dream, 1961-3, and how it became
reality is the subject of the following dissertation. However,
there can be no doubt that the Peace Corps remains relevant to the
modern world and it is fitting that it should be seen in that
context* In many ways, the Peace Corps was the New Frontier's
most original, most visible bequest to history - certainly its
most idealistic* Even in the early 1960's, President Johnson
sensed that Kennedy’s new agency was a link with both the American
past and the future * "History is going to be written about your
movement, " he told a group of Peace Gorpjsmen, "about what you
have done, about the contributions you have made, what you have
done to defeat the ancient enemies of mankind - disease, hunger,
poverty and illiteracy, bigotry, hatred and prejudice© You will
have kept afire the torch of service that has been part of America’s
2 /
tradition from the time we were born*"
PART I
THE PEACE CORPS / ORGANISATION
CHAPTER ONE
PRECEDENTS OF THE PEACE CORPS
”I recall feeling myself a very instrumental part of what I thought 
would be the beginnings of an historical precedent on a significant 
scale. The Peace Corps denoted an idea and a movement ,,„.the 
organisation was incidental, c. the idea is the crux. It emerged 
long before the Peace Corps,.,.The American Peace Corps was only 
the form that carried forth this idea at this stage of history,"
- PEACE CORPS VOLTMTEER -
(Quoted in Evaluation Report On Recruiting 
by David Gelman and Patricia Me Dermott, 
May 1965)
President Kennedy proudly claimed that the concept of the Peace
Corps was "entirely new," Certainly the idea of the United States
government recruiting, training, selecting and financing Americans
to do philanthropic work in the Third World was original. However,
numerous individuals and voluntary organisations, had provided relevant
precedents. In Democracy In America, first published in 1835, the
eminent French scholar, Alexis de Tocqueville, noted that Americans
were happiest when doing things for others. "These Americans are
an unusual people, " he wrote. "3/hen they see a problem - a canal to
be dug or a school to be built - they immediately form a group or a
committee, whatever is necessary to get the job done." During the
debate on the Peace Corps bill in the House of Representatives in
1961, Congressman Henry Reuss of Wisconsin - one of the new agency’s
founding fathers - counted Saint Benedict, Frederick Jackson Turner,
Henry Thoreau, Theodore Roosevelt, William James and Franklin. D.
Roosevelt among its spiritual precursors, "Each idea," concluded
Reuse,;%the humanitarianism of the missionaries, the frontier of
Turner, the ’obedience to the heart’ of Thoreau, the strenuous life
of Roosevelt, William James’s ’moral equivalent of war’ and the world
fellowship of F.D. R, - each hi3 played its part in the fashioning oL 
2
the Peace Coips." It was a significant point. Viewed in the broad 
sweep of history, the Peace Corps continued traditions and adapted 
methods already established by religious missions, private voluntary 
organisations and government agencies. "Wars come out of tempers, 
not out of circumstances," the Reverend Charles Jefferson told the 
one hundredth anniversary meeting of the American Board of Foreign 
Missions in I9IO: "Our best defense is not weapons, but the goodwill 
of islands of human beings around the world, healed in our hospitals,
3 .
taught in our schools. " On such principles, John F. Kennedy founded 
the Peace Corps in I96I.
Christian missionaries were the most obvious predecessors of 
Peace Corps Volunteers, From the very discovery of the New World, 
Franciscan friars demonstrated the effectiveness of the grassroots, 
people*to-people approach which came to distinguish the Peace Corps. 
By working with natives on equal terms, teaching them useful skills 
and imparting improved medical techniques, the missionary fathers 
fulfilled their religious beliefs while making friends and raising 
living standards. Sixteenth century Ameri.can Indians praised and 
admired the friars who want about "poorly dressed and barefooted 
like us; they eat what we eat, they settle down among us, and their
4
intercourse with us is gentle. " New England missionaries continued 
in the Franciscan vein. In I648, John Eliot proposed that the 
poverty-stricken Indians of Massachusetts should be taught "letters. 
Trades and Labours, as building, fishing, Flax and Hemp dressing,
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planting orchards etc.," in order to settle and pacify them. From
1809 onwards, Christian evangelists from the United States travelled
overseas not only to preach the Gospel, but to build schools, teach
trades, and educate doctors and nurses. It was significant that
the first American missionary group to Hawaii, which sailed from
New England on Cctober 24., 1819, included two teachers, one doctor,
on© printer and a farmer. With- the intention of "raising up the
whole people to an elevated state of Christian civilisation," they
6initiated all types of community development projects.
In 1386, the Student Volunteer Movement was formed from a 
student conference in Massachusetts. Backed by charitable contri­
butions from their home parishes, a few thousand college graduates 
travelled to underdeveloped countries in the three decades before 
World War One, They followed the religious precept of "the 
evangelisation of the world in this generation. " However, they
took plumbing, literacy, education and health care - as well as
7
Protestantism - to the peoples of Asia. ; In the early twentieth 
century, Sam Higginbottom, a Presbyterian minister, took modem
agricultural techniques to India, in addition to his religious zeal.
His notable success proved a persuasive factor in the decision of
the national mission councils of India to undertake technical
8
assistance as a relevant manifestation of Christian witness. Of 
course, American missionaries in China provided medical care and 
training, assisted in agrarian reform and taught useful languages, 
skills and various subjects throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. As the historian J.K. Fairbank has pointed 
out, the "missionary enterprise" in China endeavoured in countless 
ways to improve the lives of the natives in this world as well as
9
to prepare them for the next.
Many voluntary religious organisations established themselves 
in modem times : Catholic Relief Services, the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee, the National Lutheran Council, the Church 
World Service and so forth. Indeed, as Kennedy set up the Peace 
Corps in I96I, there were over thirty-three thousand missionaries 
abroad, under the auspices of some four hundred religious bodies. 
Moreover, Norman J. Parmer, one of the Peace Corps’ first overseas 
administrators, suggested that Volunteers only carried out "in 
greater nuu'bers =nd without .religious connotations much of the; same
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work which church and church-inspired groups have done for many years. ’’ 
Given.this, it was slightly ironical that the First Amendment, with 
its demand for the complete separation of church and state, prevented 
the Peace Corps from contracting directly with religious organisations 
- much to the chagrin of American missionaries.
Yet, in a way. Peace Corps Volunteers could not escape the 
connection, with their religious forbears. Some congressmen deemed 
the Peace Corps a pre-emption of the church’s role overseas and objected 
to this "fédéralisation of the missionary movement," Others only 
wished Volunteers would display a little of the ardour so characteristic 
of religious groups, "The missionary is dedicated to the spreading
of the philosophy of religion," said Frank Moss, Democratic Senator
from Utah, "the Peace Corps man must be dedicated, among other
things, to spreading a philosophy of government." Senator Stephen
Young (D,, Ohio) demanded that Volunteers show "the zeal of hardy
missionaries,... by example, they will win friends for America and
our way of life," Viewing the Volunteers as latter-day apostles,
Senator Stuart 'Symington (D, , Missouri) concluded, "there is
nothing better than to have young . Americans spread the doctrine
of free, enterprise, and carry abroad word of what our country stands
for?^ Of course, Volunteers were strictly forbidden to preach or
proselytise in any manner whatsoever. Nevertheless, Congress and
the public wished upon them the missionary zeal of their holy
ancestors - even if it was to be spent propounding "Americanism"
rather than a religious faith. Peace Coips officials also were
conscious of the missionary precedent. Indeed, in a I963 report
critical of a programme in Morocco, staff member Kenneth Love claimed
the Peace Corps sometimes lacked the dedication so necessary for
working among the uneducated and destitute of north Africa. "After
all, " he said wistfully, "We were going to be the Franciscan friars 
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of overseas aid, "
However, the philanthropic impulse in the American past was
by no means confined to the religious milieu. As the New York Times
observed irr-an editorial in March I96I ^ the Peace Corps "spirit"
could be traced back to the days when "the great procession of
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covered wagons rolled across our continent. " Once a frontiersman 
had erected his own bam he moved into the next field and helped a 
neighbour. On meeting the very first group of Peace Corps Volunteers 
to go overseas - road surveyors bound for Tanganyika - President 
Kennedy was reminded of the frontier ethos. "I’m particularly glad 
that you are going there to help open up the back land," he told
U
them. Sargent .'Shriver agreed that the Peace Cores was "a milestone
on the way to a new era of American pioneering, ” Certainly, the 
notion of the "doer" rather than the "adviser" appealed to Yankee 
traditions of industriousness and self-reliance.
Besides, the Biblical maxim, "from those to whom much is given, 
much is required" was deeply imbedded in the American Protestant 
heritage. In the nineteenth century, as Frederick Merk wrote, 
"Philanthropy for public purposes was encouraged as part of the
16
American tradition." For example, in 1820, before he embarked upon
his great career of service to the infirm at home, Dr. Samuel Gridley
Howe of Massachusetts went overseas to impart knowledge of up-to-date
medical methods and western agricultural improvements to peoples of 
17
the Near East, On the domestic front, Andrew Carnegie, Jane Addams, 
Frances Perkins, Herbert Lehman and Henry Morgenthau Jr, provided 
obvious examples of the deeply-held altruistic convictions of nine­
teenth century Americans, This tradition of "noblesse oblige" was 
not lost on John Kennedy when he assumed leadership of the richest 
and most powerful country in the world. He often reminded his 
contemporaries that "Western Europe and the United States really are 
islands of prosperity in a sea of poverty. South of us live hundreds 
of millions of people on the edge of st-aivation, and I thi.-.k it is 
essential that we demonstrate..,, our concern for their welfare. " 
Kennedy felt the Peace Corps gave America the opportunity to be of 
assistance, "not merely in the- cold field of economic help, but in
the human relations which must exist for a happy understanding between 
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people. "
In the twentieth century, there was a proliferation of voluntary 
assistance organisations. These were to prove highly significant for 
the Peace Corps, Not only did they contribute useful advice and 
experience, but they also provided individuals who were to play 
important roles in the development of the new agency. Harris Wofford, 
one of the major architects of the Peace Corps, helped set up the 
International Development Placement Association. In the early 1950's ,
this organisation sent a small number of technically-skilled graduates to the
Xtiird Worldo Wofford later described it as "a little pilot program of the! Peace 
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Corps," Albert Sims, first head of the Peace Corps' Division of University
Relations, spent eight years at the International Institute of Education in charge
of its overseas exchange programmes. Senator Jacob Javits of New York, one of
the few leading Republicans to endorse the Peace Corps in 1961, claimed he >
had been part of a private effort to send young Americans to help the poor
..peoples of Latin America just after World War Two, "I have been on this
wicket for years," he told his colleagues.. Likewise, John Braderaas (D., Ind.)
informed his fellow congressmen that,, while in college, he had embarked on a
"Peace Corps type" venture among the Aztecs. Of course, he voted in favour of
21the Peace Corps bill. One of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Senate,
Claiborne Pell (D., R.l*), had served as a Vice-President of the International 
Rescue Committee, In turn, this private body backed M.E„D,I.G,0,, the 
overseas medical aid mission which numbered among its members Dr. Tom Dooley. 
Harlan Cleveland, formerly a top official in the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration and later, Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organisations, lent all his experience to the Peace Corps during 
its formative period. Cleveland’s background and his continued interest in 
people-to-peo^ programmes ensured that the Peace Corps would not be without a 
friend in the State Department,
Cleveland had also been a member of one of the most well-known private 
voluntary organisations in America - the Experiment In International Living. 
Launched in 1932, by Dr. Donald B. Vfatt, the Experiment encouraged cross- 
cultural exchange through the placement of young Americans with native 
families overseas. Although only established on a small scale, some of the 
"Experimenters" proved major influences on the evolution of the Peace Corps.
Henry Reuss, the Democratic congressman who introduced the first Peace Corps 
legislation in S^oO, was married to a former Experimenter; moreover one 
of his children actually took part in the Experiment's summer
programme in I960. The Peace Corps' first Chief of Private Organis­
ations and a key adviser in I96I, was Gordon Boyce, a former President 
of the Experiment In International Living. Another Experimenter who 
had led groups to Europe in the late 1930's contributed more to the 
development and execution of the Peace Corps than any other single 
individual: this was Sargent Shriver, Director and inspiration of
the new organisation.
Numerous other private bodies had given a lead to the Peace Corps 
in the kind of task it was to undertake overseas. In I96O, the 
Quaker-sponsored American Friends Service Committee expressed its 
aim of world peace and understanding by extending its previously 
American-based camps to Indi.a and Africa. Through these Voluntary 
International Service Assignments, young Americans shared work-loads 
and community services with native peoples. The International Farm 
Youth Exchange sent young people to underdeveloped countries to help 
improve agricultural techniques. Operation Crossroads Africa, 
established in 1957 by a Harlem minister, James H. Robinson, was 
one of the most effective promoters of understanding between Americans 
and Africans, The Operation's volunteers paid half their own costs 
for a summer's work-ana-study tour of an African country; the other 
half came from donations. Although they were not technically-skilled, 
volunteers were encouraged to participate in community development 
projects in Africa. The emphasis was on people-to-people contact 
by whatever means possible. Significantly, James Robinson went on 
to seirve as the first Vice-Chairman of the Peace Corps' National 
Advisory Council. Furthermore, in addressing a group from Operation 
Crossroads Africa in 1962, President Kennedy chose to amend slightly 
his earlier statement that the Peace Corps was "entirely new."
Indeed, he conceded, "This group and this effort really were the
22
progenitors of the Peace Corps."
The Cooperative for American Remittances Every,; he re (C.A.R. E.),
the National 4“^ Club Foundation, Project Hope, Volunteers for
International Development, and the African-American Institute were
among fifty other voluntary and non-profit private agencies engaged
in assistance programmes to the Third World, At the same time, many
universities and colleges developed their own voluntary aid schemes.
These ranged from brief periods of service during vacations to years
of work overseas at the graduate level. Harvard, Yale. Columbia,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Williams and the University
of California were only a few of the larger educational institutions
involved. In the postwar era, the volunteer working in the villages
and jungles of the Third World, became something of a folk-hero.
The achievements of Dr. Tom Dooley, who brought advanced medical
techniques to the peoples of Southeast Asia, were particularly well
publicised. In I960 a "pop" record which sung the praises of "Tom
Dooley" sold over two million copies. Indeed, during his first public
announcement on the Peace Corps, John Kennedy remarked on how struck
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he had been by the "selfless example of Dr. Tom Dooley."
However, Dooley's admirable but lone performance was not the most 
accurate forerunner of the Peace Corps programme. A private group 
entitled International Voluntary Services (I.V.S.) was a closer 
prototype. Founded by Christian leaders from various countries in 
1953, I.V.S, contracted with both governments and private agencies.
Like the Peace Corps it was non-denomin^tional; also, like the Peace 
Corps, it sought to make an impact at grassroots levels. Its volunteers 
were college graduates on a two-year contract, they were paid only 
subsistence wages and trained in a specific skill. Between 1953 
and 1961, I.V.S. sent nearly two hundred young Americans overseas to
24
work in native communities. Peace Corps Volunteers were identical in 
almost every respect; the major difference being that they were direct 
employees of the United States government. However, I.V.S. was so 
similar in every other way that proponents of the Peace Corps in I96O,
cited it as a working example of their idea. In proposing what he 
at that time called a "Point Four Youth Corps," Henry Reuss used the 
work of I.V.S. in Vietnam as an argument in his favour:
"The May, I96O report of the I.V.S. team in Vietnam gives an 
exciting account of how the dozen or so young Americans 
comprising the team have been conveying agricultural 
know-how to the Vietnamese on a shirt-sleeve basis. Those 
who have become disillusioned with our foreign aid program 
will find themselves singing 'three cheers for the red, 
white and blue' when they hear about what these young 
Americans are doing in Vietnam, It may well be a model for 
what the Point Four Youth Corps seeks to accomplish." 25
Advocates of the Peace Corps also pointed out that many European 
countries had enjoyed considerable success with their assistance 
programmes. Some of these were partially- financed by national 
governments. For instance, Australie's Volunteer Graduate Associa­
tion, West Germany's Council for Development Aid and Holland's Bureau 
for International Technical Assistance, Of particular distinction 
was Britain's Voluntary ^Services Overseas (V,S,0.). Founded by 
Alec Dickson, a former United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (U,N,E.S,C,0,) worker, V.S.O. was financed by 
a small grant from the government as well as private contributions.
It began sending British youngsters (aged between 18 and 24) overseas 
in 1958. They were given a very brief training and were required 
to serve for two years. Although it was a very limited operation 
(there were only eighty-five workers overseas in 1960), V.S.O.’3 
similarities to the proposed Peace Corps, and its success, made it
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one of the more timely precedents of the latter organisation.
The steady growth of private voluntary agencies, in number and 
strength, was an important factor in persuading the United States 
government to institute the Peace Corps, In I960, U.N.E.S.G.O,'3 
Coordination Committee listed 133 work camps in 32 countries with 
80 different organisations as patrons. Almost all of these were 
private in sponsorship and funds. However, that Americans were in 
favour of the effort was beyond question. Between 1940 and I96O,
they donated over three billion dollars to private assistance organis- 
on
ations. This seemed to indicate that the public would not be averse
to the formation of a national voluntary service agency. The
generally excellent record of the private bodies helped. the Peace
Corpà' supporters put even more pressure on the government to make
the idea official policy - and to back that policy with Treasury
funds. Indeed, Sargent Shriver went so far as to claim, "It was the
success of these private efforts which led to the development of the 
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Peace Corps idea, "
The Federal government sometimes contracted with private agencies 
and universities to carry out specific technical and educational 
services overseas. Indeed, by I960, over fifty universities had
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such contracts in thirty-seven countries. However, in the main, the 
United States government did not consider grassroots assistance 
programmes to be its responsibility. The first significant suggestion 
of a government-sponsored "peace army" limited its scope to working 
within the continental United States. In 1904; during an address 
to the Universal Peace Conference in Boston, the philosopher 
William James proposed that the government should conscript young men 
to work among the deprived people of America, James argued this 
would not only ameliorate the -/conditions of the poor, but would 
provide an outlet for baser, aggressive instincts which, he claimed, 
were an intrinsic part of man's nature. He extended his abstract 
in 1911 in an essay entitled The Moral Equivalent Of War. "The war 
against war, " he wrote, "is going to be no holiday excursion or 
camping party," For the greater good of American society, James 
suggested young men should be packed off to:
"coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in 
December, to dishwashing, clothes-v/ashing, and window-washing, 
to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke­
holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers, would our gilded 
youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the 
childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into 
society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas^ They 
would have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the 
immemorial human warfare against nature. " 30
Not surprisingly, James's plan for a "peace army" was totally disregarded
by the government. Conscription was repugnant to the American public
and this rendered the plan politically unfeasible.
Ironically, about the time of James's pronouncement of a
"Moral Equivalent of War," hundreds of young American school-teachers
and missionaries were answering President William Me Kinley’s call
to "educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilise and Christianise
them. " Following the Spanish -.vWar of I898, the "Tbomasites" -
named after the ship, the U.S.S. Thomas, in which, they sailed - went
to the Philippines to help develop an education system there. Many
were young college graduates imbued with the desire to teach the
natives about democracy and Protestantism; others were veterans of
the Spanish War. By 1902, there were over a thousand of them in the
Philippines, Despite their messianic spirit, the Thomasites endeared
themselves to the natives by teaching in the barrios (the local
communities), living in makeshift homes and enduring hardships with 
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them. They were noteworthy as the first technical,assistance volunteers 
to be linked with the government - although this association was 
tenuous. Since the Philippine Islands had the official status of an 
"unincorporated territory", the Thomasites received little direct 
Federal support. As "volunteers" they commanded no salaries but 
rather lived off funds sent by American religious bodies and charities. 
The Thomasites were representative only of a private response to 
what had been little more than an informal Presidential exhortation. 
Nevertheless, they remained in the Philippines until 1933 and their 
example was not entirely forgotten. During the congressional 
hearings on the Peace Corps in I96I, Sargent Shriver was advised by 
Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, to keep the Thomasites in mind as "a source of consider-
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able knowledge and experience, " Furthermore, in one of the very first 
Peace Corps programmes, hundreds of teachers were assigned to the 
Philippines^
During the years of the Great Depression, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's youth organisation programmes bore a certain resemblance
to the Peace Corps. Although the Civilian Conservation Corps had
a somewhat militaristic style, with its members wearing uniforms
and living in large camps, its notion of young Americans in service
to the community was inherent in the Peace Corps, The Conservation
Corps was limited to projects in American public parks and it was
aimed primarily at the unemployed; yet, Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,
Special Assistant to President Kennedy, argued that in its origins
at least, the Peace Corps was "undoubtedly suggested by Roosevelt's 
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C.C.C," The National Youth Administration, although again limited to 
the domestic scene, came even closer to the ideals of the Peace Corps. 
Over two million students and nearly three million jobless youths 
took on a wide range of activities - building schools and hospitals, 
teaching illiterate adults, exterminating rats and digging roads. 
Besides, the Youth Administration did not have the paramilitary 
characteristics of the Conservation Corps. In January, 1961, an 
Editorial Research Report, investigating the Peace Corps proposal 
noted that "N.Y.A. youths performed a kind of domestic Point Four 
senrice at a time when economic conditions in some parts of the 
United States differed little from those in underdevelooed countries
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today. " An interesting footnote on the National Youth Administration 
was that one of its young officials in Texas went on to play a vital 
part in the survival of the Peace Corps as an independent agency; 
he was Lyndon B. Johnson.
As war broke out in Europe in 194-0; H. G, Wells wrote of a 
New World Order in which dedicated scientists and teachers would
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replace marching soldiers. The closest contemporary model was 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Civilian Public Service which allowed 
conscientious objectors to substitute "useful service" within 
the domestic community for combat duty. However, the programme 
was a minor one and consisting as it did of "pacifists" who 
were refusing to fight for their country, did not evoke the most 
favourable of public responses. Indeed, the most vehement criticism 
of the Peace Corps in I96O was that it might allow young . Americans 
to "dodge the draft. "
A seri.es of developments after the Second World War obl.iged the 
United States to focus greater attention on its assistance programmes 
to the Third World. In the new and dangerous nuclear age, America 
became locked in a global struggle with the Soviet Union. Foreign 
policy strategists feared that the underdeveloped countries, in 
their dire need, would fall prey to communism, "The periphery of 
the Free World will slowly be nibbled away," warned John Kennedy^
"The balance of power will gradually shift against us.
The key areas vital to our securi.ty will gradually undergo 
Soviet infiltration and domination.... through Sputnik 
diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-covert 
aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, 
increased prestige, or influence, and the vicious blackmail 
of our allies," 36
In this atmosphere, the idea of technical assistance took on different 
connotations; as well as an expression of American idealism, it also 
became an instrument of an avidly anti-communist foreign policy. 
Kennedy was not alone in his interpretation of economic aid as 
"a method by which the United States maintains a position of influence 
and control around the world and sustains a good many countries which
would definitely collapse, or pass into the Communist bloc." To an 
extent, the Peace Corps was seen in this context, 37
Idealism and self-interest were inextricably entwined in most 
postwar American foreign policy initiatives. The billions of 
dollars doled out to the Third World under President Truman’s Point 
Four programme evinced a generosity hitherto unknown in history; yet, 
there is little doubt that its major motivation was to fight communism. 
It began as a bold attempt at "shirt-sleeve diplomacy" and its great 
appeal lay in its people-to-people, "grass-roots" approach. However, 
in many cases the intended benefits did not "trickle down" to the 
lower echelons of society. As the anti-communist struggle intensified 
under President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in the 1950’s.
Point Four concentrated more on governments than people. Throughout 
this period, critics attacked the International Cooperation 
Administration (l.G.A. was Eisenhower’s foreign aid agency) and its 
policy of massive capital investment accompanied by a few expert 
advisers. Thus it was somewhat ironic that several of the Peace 
Corps' most oustending administrators - men like Warren Wiggins and 
William Josephson - came from I.G.A.
As the decade wore on, opinion grew in favour of a government- 
backed assistance programme which would have a direct impact on 
native peoples. Congressman Henry Reuss was in the vanguard of a 
number of groups-and individuals who declared the bankruptcy of 
American aid policies:
"Our grandiose Eisenhower-age economic type aid projects 
weren’t really working. For example, in Cambodia I was 
struck that our principal and very expensive - some thirty 
million dollar - aid project to Cambodia was something 
designed to curry favour with Prince Sihanouk - an enormous 
superhighway from Phnom Penh....I pointed out that this had 
no impact at. all on the average Cambodian who couldn't ever 
use this highway, and that great military projects like this 
were the mark of decadence. This is what the Roman Empire 
built, in its last days....the Roman Empire built these vast 
highways.... and then, to their; embarrassment, the barbarians 
came down those highways and sacked Rome." 38
A group of World Federalists advanced the idea of a national voluntary 
"peace force" in 1950, In the same year, the Public Affairs Institute 
published a pamphlet proposing American "work centers" in the Third 
World. The United Automobile Workers, led by Walter Reuther, put 
forward a blue-print for young American engineers, teachers, doctors, 
nurses and agricultural specialists to use their energies and talents 
"to assist and train the people of underdeveloped countries,"
David Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
had a plan for a youth public service programme based largely on 
New Deal models. President Olpin of the University of Utah, urged 
the State Department to sponsor "missions" of young Americans to
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help the poorer peoples of the world. After visits to several Asian 
countries in the 1950’s, Sargent Shriver submitted one of the more 
adventurous people-to-people schemes to President Eisenhower:
"I proposed a plan of sending three-man political action 
teams to Asia, Africa and Latin America. These teams were 
to consist of vigorous and imaginative young labor leaders, 
businessmen and politicians. They would offer their services 
at a grass-roots level and work directly with the people, 
contributing to the growth of the economies, to the democratic 
organisation of the societies and the peaceful outcome of 
the social revolutions under way, "
The Republican administration ignored Shriver’s suggestion. However, 
in later years he recalled, "The Peace Corps offered the possibility 
of realizing, in a new form, this old idea, "40
One of the most audible proponents of a "peace army" was 
Heinz Roliman, an industrialist refugee from Nazi Germany who had 
settled in North Carolina. In 1954, his book, World Construction, 
proposed that millions of skilled Americans should be conscripted 
by the government and sent to help Third World peoples "and thus 
make it possible for them to achieve their own necessities," Rollman’s 
plan bore a likeness to the Peace Corps, For example, conscripts 
would be "carefully screened", trained in a technical skill, and 
given material support in the field. However, Rollman envisaged
his "peace army" playing a vigorous anti-commuhist role overseas. 
Indeed, he advised that any young men with "left wing political
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sympathies" should be immediately dismissed from service. This 
thorny question of political involvement was one which was to plague 
the Peace Corps.
Rollman, at this point a Democrat, sent a copy of his book 
to many congressmen and political figures. He even won the sanction 
of the doyen of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt. In I96I, the Republican congressman from 
North Carolina, Charles Jon.@ig, went so far as to acclaim Rollman
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as "the father of the Peace Corps," Certainly, Rollman gave some 
minor publicity to the idea of a people-to-people overseas programme; 
but, in practical terms, his earnest plea did li.ttle more than 
add another voice to an already crowded wilderness. He lacked a 
public platform, popular support and, most importantly, the energy 
and commitment of a prominent politician.
In the later 1950's, two members of the U.S. Congress at last 
aroused political interest in the Peace Corps idea. They began by 
making speeches to college groups about the possibility of a 
"Point Four Youth Corps" or a "Peace Corps." One of these men was 
Henry Reuss; the other, was the Democratic senator from Minnesota, 
Hubert Humphrey. Reuss traced his interest in the Peace Corps back 
to 1957 when, as a member of the Joint Economic Committee, he 
travelled to Southeast Asia to evaluate how American tax dollars 
were being spent overseas. He was not impressed by the capital- 
intensive projects then in operation. However, while in Cambodia, 
he chanced upon a ItN.E.S.G.O. team consisting of a few peoole from 
America and other countries. Reuse was struck by the effect these 
young teachers were having as they made their way through the jungle, 
setting up small schools in local villages.
"This seemed to me such a good idea," said Reuss, "that out of it,
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I generated the general concept of the Peace Corps," For the next 
three years, he spoke about a "Point Four Youth Corps" at student 
conferences and wrote articles in numerous magazines. Finally, 
in January, 19o0, he introduced the first Peace Corps-type 
legislation. His bill, H.R. 9&38, sought a study of "the advis­
ability and practicability of the establishment of a Point Four 
Youth Corps, "
Hubert Humphrey was one of the most highly-respected figures 
in the Democratic Party and a member of the influential Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. He recalled that, in 1957, he too 
had suggested the enlistment of talented young men and women in 
an overseas operation for education, health care, vocational 
training and community development:
"I envisioned a program of national service in an international 
endeavor. This was not to be a substitute for Selective 
Service, for the military. It was to be another dimension of 
American aid to the less fortunate - not in the form of massive 
economic aid but, rather, personal aid in the form of training 
and education," 44
Although Humphrey’s scheme was always warmly received on college
campuses, it did not inspire much enthusiasm in the State Department
or the Senate, "Some traditional diplomats quaked at the thought
of thousands of young Americans scattered across the world," he
noted, "and‘many senators,including liberal ones, thought it a
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silly and unworkable idea," Nevertheless, Humphrey had his staff, 
led by Peter Grothe, investigate the prospect of a Peace Corps.
After months of research, they concluded there was tremendous 
popular support for the idea and that it would be politically viable. 
Thus, in June, I960, Humphrey presented in the Senate not just a 
proposal for the study of a "Peace Corps", but a full-fledged bill 
to send "young men to assist the peoples of the underdeveloped 
areas of the world to combat poverty, disease, illiteracy and 
hunger. " 46
Humphrey, an experienced parliamentarian, realised it was too
late in the session for his bill to have any hope of passing into
legislation; but that had not been his main objective, "I wanted
the bill to be printed and appropriately referred," he said, "so
that it could be the subject of discussion and intensive study in 
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the coming months. " In this respect, he was successful. Indeed, 
some of the specific details of his bill, S. 3675,were incorporated 
into the Peace Corps as established in I96I. For example, it 
was a "separate agency" working in cooperation with the Department 
of State and I.C.A., volunteers served for two years and, in the 
first year, only five hundred entered the field. In other ways, 
the bill was not quite so accurate. He wanted to limit service 
to those under years old and he suggested it should be an 
alternative to the draft; neither of these conditions applied to 
the Peace Corps, However, although Humphrey's bill was not an 
identical precursor, it was close enough to have a telling effect 
on the Peace Corps' establishment. Besides this, it focused the 
congressional and the public eye on the Peace Corps idea at a 
crucial moment - just before the Presidential election of 1960.
Henry Ileuss'3 bill actually had mure legislative success than 
Humphrey's. In August, I96O, the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
added a rider to the Mutual Security Act which authorised ten 
thousand dollars for a study of a "Point Four Youth Corps." This 
study was to be carried out by a non-governmental research group, 
university or foundation. The contract was awarded to the Research 
Foundation at Colorado State University which reported its findings 
to the Congress in February, I96I. However, in a lengthy discussion 
of the Peace Corps idea, the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
criticised the Republican administration for having failed to take 
"vigorous action in this direction" beforehand. The Committee 
concluded that, should the study support the proposal, the Congress 
would expect the Executive branch to make a "serious and constructive 
effort to put the program into effective operation." 4®
The Congress's commitment to the Peace Corps idea before I96I 
was limited to this authorisation for a study of its general feas­
ibility. Also, it tended to view the proposal from an anti-communist 
perspective. Hubert Humphrey told his colleagues, "The United 
States enjoying good relations with non-Gommunist countries and 
helping them along to economic self-sufficiency is much more
persuasive to the Soviet Union than the most articulate statement
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prepared for a foreign ministers' summit conference." Yet, the 
discussion and attention centred on the Peace Corps in Congress 
gave legislators an introduction to the idea at an embryonic 
stage and even established a small base of support. Moreover, it 
was significant that the eventual Peace Corps Act of 1961, did not 
substantially differ from the basic models offered by Reuss and 
Humphrey. The objectives of the Point Four Youth Corps, as Reuss 
saw them, were :
"To make technical manpower available to United States agencies 
and to private agencies carrying out economic, medical, 
educational and community development programs in underdeveloped 
friendly countries; second, to assist in broadening the under­
standing by the peoples of other nations of the Ideals and 
aspirations of Americans, through close contact with young 
Americans participating in the Point Four Youth Corps; third, 
to offer our young people the opportunity to serre their 
country in a stimulating way, while broadening tneir understand­
ing of the problems facing other peoples and nations, and 
thereby helping them better to understand American policies 
and purposes abroad. " 50
Essentially, Reuss's description encapsulated what became known as 
the "Three Aims" of the Peace Corps Act: to supply trained manpower, 
to give foreign peoples an understanding of Americans and to give 
Americans an understanding of other peoples and cultures.
Sargent Shriver was very conscious of the Congress's early 
interest in the Peace Coips. Indeed, during hearings in August,
1961, he told the House Foreign Affairs Committee "All of us 
connected with the Peace Corps are well aware of the fact that the
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Peace Corps is, in a very real sense, a child of this House, "
However, although Henry Reuss and Hubert Humphrey desajm/e to be
considered among the Peace Corps' founding fathers, neither they
nor anyone else had really applied consistent or concentrated
political pressure on behalf of the idea. "If it had been just
left to us" admitted Henry Reuss, "the Peace Corps idea would still
52
be cluttering up the legislative corridors." It only became an issue 
of national political importance during the Presidential campaign 
of i960. The man who brought it to its zenith was the junior 
senator from Massachusetts and the Democratic Presidential nominee, 
John F. Kennedy,
Sargent Shriver believed the real importance of the Peace Corps
lay in its attempt to create "a sufficient number of people in this
country who know people in other countries so that we won't want
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to go to war, so we'll know them as human beings." Although none of 
the precedents of the Peace Corps had its scope, some at least, 
shared Shriver's vision. Moreover, the success of the missionary, 
private and governmental efforts, engendered an atmosphere conducive 
to the new proposal in I96O. The discussion of the idea in Congress 
heightened tha effect. The ethos of the Peace Corps •- voluntary 
service on behalf of others - was evident in many movements and 
individuals in the American past. Helping people to help themselves 
“ albeit for idealistic or self-interested reasons - was one of the 
strongest American traditions. As one Volunteer suggested, the 
Peace Corps spirit emerged long before the actual organisation - 
"the Peace Corps was only the form that carried forth the idea at
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this stage of history. "
CHAPTER TWO
THE MSETBFG OF IDEA AND FATE IN A CREATIVE HOUR
"The truth is that the Peace Corps owes much of its success 
to its birth in. a political campaign,.. .Because of the 
response of the American people President Kennedy decided to 
establish the Peace Corps as one of his first major acts* 
This is an example of what Martin Buber calls 'the meeting 
of idea and fate in a creative hour.' It is the way ideas 
are b o m  in American politics."
-  SARGiaVT SHRIVER -  
(Point Of The Lance. n.12)
According to Theodore Sorensen, John F, Kennedy's chief aide, the
Peace Corps was the "only important new proposal to come out of the I960
campaign.^ " The idea had been in the air for a long time, but it only
came to fruition when Kennedy proposed it during the race for the
Presidency. Logically speaking, a "domestic fbace Corps" should probably
have come before an overseas organisation. That it did not, owed much
to Kennedy's preference for foreign affairs. In the spring of 1959, he
told Harris Wofford (a member of his campaign team and a central figure
in the development of the Peace Corps) that he wanted to run for President
because he hoped to initiate a foreign policy that would establish "a
2
new relationship with the developing nations, " Th.e Peace Corps was 
Kennedy's first step in this direction. Ironically, it came about as 
much by accident as design, and, as Sargent Shriver pointed out, it owed 
"much of its success to its birth in a political campaign."
Wednesday, November 2, I960, was yet another strenuous day in 
Senator John Kennedy's campaign for the Presidency of the United States. 
The election was less th^n one week in the offing and Kennedy had taken 
to working a twenty hour-a-da^ sfnedule. lie began his hectic itinerary 
in Los Angeles before moving on to San Diego, San Jose, Oakland and 
then, finally, San Francisco where he was to deliver a speech at the 
city's Cow Palace auditorium in the evening. In addition to the by now 
mandatory exhortation to "get this country moving again," Kennedy's 
campaigning that day had been marked by his emphasis on the issue of
3
"peace" and the means of securing it. Tiie huge rally at the Cow Palace
was by far the most important event of the day and an enormous crowd
of between thirty and forty thousand people crammed the hall on a mild
autumn night.^ None but the closest of aides had any prior knowledge of
the topic of Kennedy's speech, but they knew he had employed his bast
writers - Theodore Sorensen, Richard Goodwin and Archibald Cox - for
5its composition under his own specific direction.^ Since the candidate
had been insistent there should be no "leaks" to the press in advance,
staffers sensed something "new in the wind" but few knew exactly what
., 6 it was.
The audience greeted Kennedy with tumoLtucus applause, and: it was 
several minutes before he could launch into his speech entitled
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"Staffing A Foreign Policy For Peace." "One week from tonight," began 
Kennedy, "the next President of the United States will be turning to 
the arduous tasks that lie ahead - selecting a Cabinet - and preparing 
a program for peaue." Borrowing from Clemenceau, Kennedy criticised the 
Eisenhower administration and its methods of diplomacy. "In this nuclear 
age," he warned, "peace is much too serious a matter to be entrusted 
to either generals or summit conferences. We need a stronger America, 
militarily, economically, scientifically, and educationally. We need a 
stronger free world, a stronger attack on world poverty; stronger U.N., 
a stronger U.S. foreign policy - and, above all, a stronger foreign 
policy staff that is dedicated to peace." "Commenting further on the 
weaknesses in "vital, areas" of the Republican foreign, policy machinery, 
Kennedy attacked its "ill-chosen, ill-equipped and ill-b.riefed ambassadors" 
and the generally poor quality of the Foreign Service. In particular, 
he railed, against the failure of American diplomats to learn the 
indigenous languages of the countries to which they were assigned.
Kennedy unleashed a torrent of statistics: 70 percent of all new Foreign 
Service office-rs had no language skills whatsoever, only three of the 
forty-four Americans in the Embassy in Belgrade spoke Yugoslavian, not 
a single American in New Delhi could speak Indian dialects and only two 
of the nine ambassadors in the Middle East spoke Arabic, He also pointed 
out that there were only twenty-six black officers in the entire Foreign 
Service corps - less than one per cent,
Kennedy next assailed the Eisenhower administration for not paying 
enough attention and respect to the newly independent countries of the 
Third World. "These are nations that vote in the Ü.N.," he said, "they 
can affect our security." Indeed, placing America's grave deficiency in
a Gold War context, he claimed that “diplomats skilled in the languages and
customs of the nation to whom they are accredited - teachers, doctors,
technicians, and experts desperately needed in a dozen fields by
underdeveloped nations - are pouring forth from Moscow to advance the
cause of world communism,“ Kenn,edy was adamant: "We have to do better,"
Kennedy then addressed the problem of the paucity of America
technicians actually at work with the peoples of the developing world
“outside the normal diplomatic channels." Again he made an unfavourable
comparison with the Lenin Institute which produced thousands of young
people willing to serve at grassroots levels in the emerging countries.
He noted that Asia had more Soviet than American technicians and-, that the
trend was already extending to Africa, "Where," he asked, "are we going
to obtain the technicians?" He reflected upon the potential of skilled
American.personnel “building goodwill, building the peace." Adroitly and
eloquently, Kennedy brought his rhetoric to a climax by proposing a
new government organisation - a Peace Corps:
" There is not enough money in all America to relieve the 
misery of the underdeveloped world in a giant and endless 
soup kitchen. But there is enough know-how and enough 
knowledgeable people to help those nations help themselves.
I therefore propose that our inadequate efforts in. this 
area be supplemented by a 'peace corps' of talented young 
men willing and able to serve their country in this fashion 
for three years as an alternative to peace-time selective 
service - well-qualified through rigorous standaxds - 
well-trained in the language, skills and customs they will 
need to know - and directed and paid by the International 
Cooperation Administration Point Four Agencies, We cannot 
discontinue training our young men as soldiers of war - but 
we also need them as ambassadors of peace."
Kennedy stressed that although Peace Corps service might be considered 
as an alternative to the military draft, no conscription would be 
involved, “This would be a volunteer corps," he said. Also, he insisted 
that the Peace Corps would be open to women and to young Americans from 
"every race and walk of life," He was convinced that America was "full 
of young people eager to serve the cause of peace.... I have met them on 
campaigns across the country." Having underlined the idealism inherent 
in the proposal, Kennedy returned to the pragmatic political benefits.
"I am convinced," he concluded, "that our young men and women, dedicated
to freedom, are fully capable of overcoming the efforts of Mr. Khruschev's
missionaries who are dedicated to undermining that freedom."^
Kennedy’s speech received an uproarious standing ovation from the
people of San Francisco and the cheers continued long after he had left
the Cow Palace auditorium. Pierre Salinger, Kennedy's Press Secretary,
later described San Francisco as "the most appropriate forum for the
exposition.of the Peace Corps idea,"^ In choosing the venue for his
announcement, Kennedy had been aware that no American city was more
outward-looking or receptive to new ideas However, the enthusiastic
reaction was by no means confined to the West Coast. The New York Times
gave the speech a front-page headline of "Kennedy Favors U.S. 'Peace Corps'
10To Work Abroad," Newspapers nationwide followed suit with reports extolling 
the virtues of the concept. During the last few days of the campaign,
Kennedy focused the public eye on the Peace Corps by mentioning it on 
two different occasions, in the Chicago Auditorium on November 4, he 
recommended "letting young Americans serve the cause of freedom as 
servants of peace, as the communists work for their system." Again, on 
election eve itself, he referred to "a Peace Corps of young men and 
women who will be willing to spend two or three years of their lives as 
teachers and nurses working in different countries.spreading .the cause 
of freedom."
President-Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon immediately assailed
Kennedy's plan. Both took particularly strong exception to the prospect
of the Peace Corps as a substitute for "a tour of duty in the uniformed 
19service," ^ Indeed, this complaint of draft evasion became the major
criticism of the proposition. Richard Nixon used it to substantiate his
charge that Kennedy was inexperienced and reckless in foreign affairs.
According to Nixon, the Peace Corps was another example of Kennedy's
"fast and flashy technique of proposing a program that looks good on
13the surface but which is inherently dangerous," Kennedy retorted with 
the suggestion that, rather than an "alternative". Peace Corps duty
would actually be a "supplement" to the Selective Service.Nevertheless,
the Republicans remained unrelenting in their accusation that Kennedy
was providing an "escape hatch for those who did not want to serve in
1 5the armed forces." Thus, in the last week of the campaign, the Peace 
Corps became a minor "party" issue. Moreover, the idea was so popularly 
acclaimed that Vice-President Nixon was forced to make a counter-proposal. 
On November 6, he promised that if he was elected, one of his first acts 
would be to "increase the effectiveness of our recruiting programs for 
service abroad, provide more accurate training facilities for those 
going abroad,,^  and provide improved incentives for making a career out 
of such service.
On November 3, I960, in the closest-run Presidential election of
the twentieth century, Kennedy's popular vote margin of victory over
Nixon was a mere 112,881 out of a record 68,838,565 votes oast
even in the excitement of Kennedy's triumph, his espousal of a "Peace Corps"
at the Cow Palace was not forgotten by the American electorate. Between
the election and the inauguration, Kennedy's office received more mail
on that subject than on any other and Pierre Salinger was bombarded with
enquiries by the press - clear evidence that the new proposal had fired
18the imagination of many Americans . While i\ was unlikely that the Peace
Corps had converted large numbers of Republicans to Kennedy, it may have
had a persuasive effect on independent voters and,, especially, young
voters. In such a close-fought election, the introduction of a fresh,
popular idea like the Peace Corps, could have had a telling influence on
the final result.
Certainly, Vice-President Nixon interpreted Kennedy's proposal as
19"superficial and obviously concocted solely for campaign purposes." In 
the bitter aftermath of the election. Republicans arraigned Kennedy for 
using a "gimmick", a publicity stunt to win attention to himself at a 
crucial moment in the campaign, Fredrick Dutton, Deputy-Chairman of the 
Committee of Citizens For Kennedy and Johnson, admitted there was the 
aspect of getting some "political mileage out of it....it had highP
content." Senator William Fulbright, another member of the Committee of
Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson, also described the Peace Corps as an
20idea with "great public appeal." With a week to go until voting day, the
Kennedy campaign team was aware of the political benefits to be gleaned
from the introduction of a distinctive new proposal. As far as issues
were concerned, there seemed little to choose between Kennedy or Nixon.
Premier Khruschev compared the candidates to Tweedledum and Tweedledee,
Moreover, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the Harvard historian and one of Kennedy's
academic advisers, had deemed it necessary to publish a small volume
outlining the specific differences between the two. Kennedy, or Nixon -
21Does It Make Any Difference? asked Schlesinger. In. opinion polls taken 
in Ihte October, the two candidates were neck and neck. If anything,
Nixon had the advantage. As Vice-President, he had been in the public 
spotlight for eight years. Kennedy was not so well-known, Dave Powers, 
(Kennedy's closest friend and assistant) recalled that most people knew 
Kennedy was the junior Senator from Massachusetts, a Roman Catholic of 
Irish descent, a Harvard graduate and a millionaire's son - but not
09
much else.
Besides, in the last week of October, Nixon had introduced his
biggest campaign asset - President Eisenhov/er Until this point,
Eisenhower had not openly endorsed Nixon; thus, when the President began
actively campaigning on his behalf, it was a shattering blow to the
Kennedy camp. Indeed, on the very evening of the Cow Palace address,
Kennedy had confided his greatest concern to an old war-time friend,
Paul Pay, "Last week Nixon hit the panic button and started Ike speaking,"
said Kennedy, "and with every word he utters I can feel the votes leaving 
23me," In that last week of the campaign, Kennedy badly needed a new, 
attractive proposal. ■.
John Kenneth Galbraith, the Harvard economist and another of 
Kennedy's academic advisers, admitted they had been searching for "new 
material" throughout the autumn of 1960, The liberal Peace Corps idea 
was deemed especially appropriate because it held out the potentiality
of attaining maximum media coverage as well as winning the votes of 
young people, undecided Humphrey and Stevenson Democrats, and wavering, 
left-of-centre Republicans. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. might also have tutored 
Kennedy on the advantages Franklin D, Roosevelt had gained from his
9/
proposal of a Civilian Conservation Corps in his first Presidential race. ^
In addition to publicity considerations and political advice, there was 
a memorandum circulating the Kennedy campaign headquarters to the effect 
that Nixon was about to propose a programme for sending young American
college graduates to the Third World to "teach the native peoples basic
25skills to assist them in fitting poverty, disease, illiteracy and hunger,"
Nixon never did advocate' such a plan but the rumour that he intended to
do so may have incited Kennedy to quick and decisive action. Certainly,
Kennedy would have enjoyed the irony in making his first major pronouncement
on the Peace Corps in his opponent's home state.
Thus, in bringing the concept to national prominence exactly one
week before the Presidential election, Kennedy was perhaps displaying a
penchant for the opportunistic. Undoubtedly, it was an excellent political
strategem. Ralph Dungan and Dave Powers, two of the professional "pols"
in the Kennedy team, admitted that in the vital run-in to the election,
the Peace Corps was the sort of issue "everyone was looking for."^^ However,
Kennedy’s interest in, and his final adoption of the idea was not as
simplistically Machiavellian as Nixon and other Republicans charged. As
Pierre Salinger insisted, the speech at the Cow Palace was the culmination
27of an idea which had been "gradually building" in Kennedy's mind. it was 
not just a last-ditch, electioneering stunt. Throughout I960, Kennedy 
had been subject to widespread exposure to various Peace Corps-type plans 
and indeed, he had shown consistent interest in them.
Vftien Kennedy announced his candidature for 'bhe Presidency on January - 
2, i960, the Peace Corps was not on. his list of potential campaign 
proposals. However, Theodore Sorensgn recalled 'that Kennedy had been a 
longtime admirer of the work done overseas by the Mormons, the Quakers 
and other voluntary reliigious services. Moreover, Sorensen traced Kennedy’s
interest in the general subject of technical aid to the Third World back
28to the early 1950's, Henry Reuss, who served with Kennedy on Congress's
Joint Economic Committee, remembered discussing a "Point Four Youth
29Corps" plan with him "several times" before 1960. However, when Reuss
introduced his bill calling for a study of the programme in January, I960,
(CO-introduced in the Senate by Richard Neuberger of Oregon), there was
no evidence of any significant enthusiasm on Kennedy's part. Of course,
this could be explained by his near total immersion in the Presidential
campaign which had already begun,
Kennedy'3 first direct association with the Peace Corps came on
February 21, i960. While appearing on a, college television show in New
York, he was questioned on the Reuss-Neuberger bills.Kennedy was obliged
to answer that he did not have a comprehensive knowledge of the legislative
proposals but that he definitely favoured more opportunities for young
Americans to do needful work in the developing countries. After the show,
Kennedy - annoyed at having been caught off-guard by the question -
ordered one of his brightest young staff members, Richard Goodwin, to
investigate the "Youth Peace Corps" idea. This proved to be the beginning
of a specific Kennedy interest.
In March, I960, Goodwin wrote to Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard
Law School, who was acting as a channel of communication between Kennedy
and his academic "brains trust" at Harvard. Goodwin asked Cox to "discuss
the idea with'some of the Cambridge group, get some reactions, and - if
they think the idea is a good one ~ soma specific questions as to how to 
31proceed." Cox was briefed that Kennedy envisioned "several thousand 
college graduates" working at minimum pay for the United States government 
in technical and scientific jobs in the Third World. He was as yet unsure 
of the finer points of how to finance, train and select these students but 
"The whole idea would be to appeal, to the imagination and interest of college 
graduates, give them an opportunity to make a real contribution to world 
peace and to receive valuable training and responsibility." With a 
view to political commodities, Goodwin concluded, "the idea of a 'Youth
For Peace' program might have propaganda advantages," Cox later recalled
that although this letter "stimulated some discussion" at Harvard among
Kennedy'3 "think tank", in the spring of I960, the Peace Corps remained
32a "peripheral" rather than a central concern.
In April and May, during the hard-fought primaries against Hubert
Humphrey in Wisconsin and West Virginia, Kennedy again found himself
confronted by the Peace Corps idea. A Wisconsin newspaper poll showed
a very favourable response when Humphrey offered a "Peace Corps" as one
33of his canipaign pledges. Although Humphrey lost to Kennedy in both states, 
he made sure there was some "serious discussion" of the potential of 
such a programme. "Since I was not to get the Presidential nomination," 
Humphrey wrote in his memoirs, "I was determined thah Kennedy adopt as
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many of nry proposals as possible - for example, the Peace Corps." Of 
course, in June, I960, Humphrey introduced in. the Senate, his bill for a 
Peace Corps. He knew that - legislatively speaking - it was doomed from 
the very beginning; however, he wanted to focus Congress's eye on the 
idea. Moreover, during the summer, he transfe.rred all his research materials 
and details of the Peace Corps to Kennedy's office, Kennedy was much 
impressed by the solid groundwork done by Humphrey and his staff. Indeed, 
his speech at the Cow Palace, with its proposals for draft exemption and 
three-year overseas service stints, owed a great deal to Humphrey's plan.
When Kennedy accepted his party's Presidential nomination in July, 
he stood on a Democratic platform which stated that America must attempt 
to change her "image" in the Third World by giving more technical and 
less military aid. The manifesto also maintained that those chosen to 
represent America abroad would have to improve their language skills and 
increase their cultural awareness.At the same time, the Research Unit 
of the Democratic Party compiled a report for Kennedy on the Peace Corps. 
Solis Horwit^, a leading member of the Research Unit, claimed that its 
favourable findings "really gave the positive push to the Peace Corps 
idea,"^^ In early September, Kennedy asked both Congressman Reuss and 
Professor Samuel Hayes of the University of Michigan (who had extensive 
experience in international economic programmes), to prepare "position
papers" on a national youth, service programme. By the end of the month,
they had returned affirmative opinions to Kennedy along with some
38particulars on which he could construct a plan. However, Kennedy remained 
wary of a total commitment to the Peace Corps idea in the form of an 
outri^t proposal. He feared it might prove a liability and leave him 
open to the charge of political immaturity.
The warm response to a speech given by Senator Lyndon B, Johnson
of Texas, Kennedy's running-mate, on September 22, I96O, helped nudge
Kennedy towards a full endorsement of the Peace Corps, At the University
of Nebraska, Johnson called for a "Volunteers for Peace and Humanity
program sponsored by our government....that would shatter the forces of 
39communism." The detai3,.s of his plan were by no means fully developed and he 
skirted, ai’ound. the logistics of sending young Americans into the Third 
World. As Bill Moyers, his chief campaign aide conceded, "it was not a 
well-done speech..but it got a great reception,That ni^t the politically 
astute Johnson telephoned Kennedy and told him the f eace Corps would not 
prove too great a political, risk. He urged Kennedy to make a formal 
proposal.
However, Kennedy was still not fully convinced of the feasibility 
of the programme. Hence, he chose a minor and a very safe platform for 
his first public exposition of the idea. On October 5, I960, he was 
scheduled to give a "Message To The Nation's New Voters," arranged by the 
Young Democrats. Inspired by Senator Humphrey, this organisation ’rad 
already taken up the idea of a "Youth Corps" in I960, They had spoken of 
it at student meetings and rallies and had specifically mentioned the 
possibility of a proposal in their literature. In talks to university 
and college groups, Richard Murphy, national Director of the Young 
Democrats, and Charles Manatt, the College Programme chief, always spoke 
of the Democratic Party's intent to establish an overseas service 
organisation as one of the major reasons why young people should vote the 
Democratic t i c k e t T a k i n g  advantage of this enthusiastic audience, Kennedy 
vowed that if elected, he would"explore thoroughly the possibility of 
utilising the services of the very best of our trained and qualified
young people to give from three to five years of their lives to the 
cause of world peace by forming themselves into a Youth Peace Corps, going 
to the places that really need them and doing the sort of work jobs 
that need to be done."^^
This "message" was nothing more than a guarded first step. It 
promised only to explore the "possibility" of a Peace Corps. Certainly, 
Kennedy's office received some mail on the speech and the delimited 
Young Democrats sent copies of it to college newspapers and Students-For 
-Kennedy groups. However, his remarks received no national attention and 
the general reaction was modest. Kennedy could not yet be sure that the 
idea would not prove a political liability. During the famous "debates" 
with Richard Nixon in October, I960, Kennedy discussed the Third World, 
communism, and the need for new foreign policy initiatives; but there 
was no specific mention of a Peace Corps. Indeed, his next reference to 
it came almost entirely by accident,. Yet, ironically, it resulted in 
Kennedy's wholehearted commitment to a proposal of the Peace Corps.
At about 2 a.m. on October I4 , I960, Kennedy flew into Michigan from
New York where he had just completed his third debate with Nixon. Dave
Powers, who was with Kennedy, remembered "it was very late and we were 
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?11 exhausted,"^ Nevertheless, Kennedy had agreed to say a few brief 
words to the students at the University of Michigan who had waited up 
to greet him. Since there was no prepared text or press release, it 
was expected that he would offer them the statutoiy campaign cliches 
and Democratic slogans. However, on arrival at Ann Arbor, Kennedy found, 
to his astonishment, some ten thousand young students anxious to see him. 
They chanted his name as he mounted the steps of the Student Union 
building. Moved by this tremendous reception, Kennedy launched into an 
extemporaneous address. He threw out challenges to students: how many 
would be prepared to give years of their lives working in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America?' How many would serve as volunteer teachers, doctors 
and engineers for the cause of freedom? He spoke of the need for them 
to make a personal contribution, of the greater effort to be made and 
of the value of sacrifice on behalf of others. The audience responded
wildly to his impromptu exhortations and, as the tired and hoarse 
Kennedy made his way to bed, he told Dave Powers that he felt he had 
"hit a winning number."'^
The enthusiasm which he encountered at Michigan made a deep 
impression on Kennedy. Inspired by his speech, several of the students 
there formed an organisation called Americans Committed to World 
Responsibility and held seminars to discuss the Peace Corps idea. On 
November 4? Kennedy met with representatives of this group in Toledo, Ohio. 
Indeed, Kennedy mentioned them during the Cow Palace address as evidence 
that there was an available pool of talented and idealistic youths willing 
to serve in. the Third Worldc "When I suggested at the University of 
Michigan lately," said Kennedy, "that we needed young men and women 
willing to give up a few years to serve their country in this fashion, 
the students proposed a new organisation to promote such an effort.""^ ^
Although the incident at Ann Arbor was a turning point for Kennedy, 
his remarks there attracted not the slightest national attention. Since 
the late-night speech had been unscheduled, Kennedy's press entourage 
completely missed out on it. Indeed, journalist Russell Baker, who was 
covering the Kennedy campaign in Michigan for the New York Times, reported 
"nothing that was new,"^^ However, the cru.civl factor was that Kennedy, ever 
the intuitive politician, had been finally persuaded by the students at 
Michigan to make a formal proposal of a "Peace Corps" before the campaign 
ended,.
Sargent Shriver, himself a Kennedy campaign worker, later wrote that
"No one is sure why Kennedy raised the question in the middle of the
17night at the University of Michigan." Possibly, Kennedy associated the 
Peace Corps with Michigan because he knew that Professor Samuel Hayes 
of the university’s International Studies Department had a deep interest 
in the idea. Hayes, in the report which he submitted to Kennedy in 
September, i960, had been one of the first to enunciate the need for 
"middle-level manpower" in the Third World. This may have impressed 
Kennedy and suggested a line of approach to him at Michigan. However, Dave 
Powers stressed that Kennedy always held a deep affection for young people
and that he had been particularly warmed by the enthusiasm of the 
Michigan students. Thus, on the spur-of-the-moment he spoke to them of 
something which he felt would be inspirational. "It was a college speech
/ g
to a college group," said Powers.^ Whatever his motivation, after Michigan 
Kennedy ordered his speech-writers to prepare a major address on the Peace 
Corps.
Between October I4 at Ann Arbor and November 2 at San Francisco,
Kennedy did not publicly mention the Peace Corps. Nevertheless, he clearly 
alluded to it on October 18 in Florida, when he promised that a Democratic 
administration would step up the effort to "educate the future leaders 
of Africa and Asia and Latin America. The youth of these areas are 
desperately in need of the training which will enable them to man the 
governments, and run the economies of the developing nations." Again, 
on October 29, he told an audience in Pennsylvania, "We need young men 
and women who will spend some of their years in Ijatin America, Africa 
and Asia in the service of f r e e d o m . T h e  Michigan episode had persuaded 
Kennedy to make a definite commitment to the Peace Corps, but he bided his 
time and awaited the Cow Palace and the perfect moment for his announcement.
As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. noted, both John Kennedy and his brother 
Robert (who managed the 1960 campaign) were "great improvisers."^^ They 
left the campaign schedule loose enough to allow for "picking up" on new 
issues even at a very late stage. Therefore, althou^i Kennedy did not 
decide upon a formal proposal of the Peace Corps until mid-October, his 
schedule was flexible enough to incorporate it in a major speech. Despite 
Nixon's accusations, there was nothing particularly cynical about this,
The Cow Palace address was intended to amplify the responsive chord which 
Kennedy had struck - almost inadvertently - at Michigan. He was an 
instinctive politician with an acute sense of the feasible and the popular.
To that extent, his espousal of the Peace Corps was opportunistic.
However, throughout I96O, Kennedy had shown considerable - albeit intermittent 
- interest in the idea and this flowered under the hothouse circumstances 
surrounding the race for the Presidency.
Furthermore, the Peace Corps idea would have been likely to appeal
to Kennedy on deeper, more personal grounds. In I96O, other politicians - 
including Richard Nixon - had a chance to adopt the concept. Yet, only 
Kennedy chose to propound it. For him, it was not just a campaign issue, 
but more a symbol for many of his deep-felt and long-held sympathies and 
beliefs. Kennedy's political and legislative interests during his fourteen 
years in the Congress suggested that, while his promotion of the Peace 
Corps was not inevitable, it was certainly quite probable. Indeed,
Theodore Sorensen described the Peace Corps as the "lake" into which a
51
lot of "streams" running together flowed.
One "stream" was Kennedy's personal empathy with the poor and
oppressed of the underdeveloped world. As a young man he had travelled
extensively through Europe, Asia and Latin America. At first hand, he
had seen economically and politically enfeebled cultures. His sympathy
was further inspired by his paternal ancestors' history of oppression and
want in colonial Ireland. "I grew up in a community where the people were
barely a generation away from colonial rule," he wrote to Prime Minister
Nehru of India. "I can claim the company of many historians in saying
that the colonialism to which my immediate ancestors were subject was
more sterile, oppressive, and even cruel than that of India. The legacy
52
of Clive was on the whole more tolerable than that of Cromwell." As
Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committe on African Affairs and as a member
of the Sub-Committee on Latin American Affairs, Kennedy was an outspoken
and articulate'advocate of Third World causes. "Call it nationalism, call
it anti-colonialism, call it what you will," Kennedy warned his colleagues in
the Senateg "The word is out and spreading like wildfire in nearly a thousand
languages and dialects - that it is no longer necessary to remain forever 
53in bondage,,"
His travels across Asia in 1951 had persuaded Kennedy that nation­
alism was the most vital political emotion in the Third World. Throughout 
the decade, he opposed "imperialist" nations and "imperialist" wars.
He warned against American support of the colonial French presence in 
Southeast Asia and, in one of the most controversial speeches of the 1950's, 
he advocated independence for Algeria. "The single most important test
of American foreign policy'today is how we meet the challenge of 
imperialism," he told the Senate in July, 1957. "On this test more than
any other, this nation shall be critically judged by the uncommitted
millions in Asia and Africa.
Kennedy consistently argued that America would have to pay more
attention to the winds of change blowing through the developing countries.
Under Eisenhower, the foreign policy of the United States was rigid in
its monocular view of the world as an east-west Cold War, with Europe
as the main battlefield. Little consideration was given to the emerging
nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America whose main concem was the
north-south confrontation. North represented white, European colonialism;
south stood for black. Third World freedom. In June, 1956, Kennedy
criticised the Republican administration for allowing the reputation of
55the United States to be "hitched, to the chariot of the conqueror,"
Urging Ameri.cans to extend a helping hand to the underdeveloped countries,
Kennedy stressed, "We can never escape the fact that we are dependent
upon the decisions of people who have hated, as their ancestors before
them hated for centuries, the white men who bled them, beat them,
exploited them and ruled them.,"
Kennedy voted against the b?'d.l to stop Point Four aid to the Third
World; he was involved in the Friends of Vietnam movement; he helped
finance African students* journeys to the United States through the
Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation; and, he urged the Federal government to
introduce more scholarship programmes for peoples of the underdeveloped 
57countries. He realised that the barriers of ignorance and poverty 
between the rich nations and the poor would have to be broken do;m before 
mutual respect and understanding could be established. The Peace Corps 
was entirely consistent with this notion. As President Abboud of Sudan 
noted in 1961, "Throughout his years in Congress, Kennedy consistently 
displayed an interest in the emerging nations. Not only in his adherence 
to principle, but in his specific contributions."^^
A. second "stream" running into Kennedy’s eventual plan for a Peace 
Corps, was his desire to renew, freshen and reinvigorate America’s
foreign assistance programmes. During his congressional career, Kennedy
persistently criticised, the Uni bed. States* failure to make the basic
distinction between the type of aid needed for Western Europe, where an
expanding industrial process was already under way, and the Tb.ird World
where technical, grassroots assistance was needed in addition to capital.
To Kennedy, American foreign aid seemed excessively oriented towards the
short-term military and political considerations of the Gold War rather
than the long-term social and economic amelioration of the underdeveloped
nations. Galling for "A. New Approach In Foreign Policy," he pointed out;
"Our present foreign aid programs have neglected the great 
visionary partnership principles of the Marshall Plan 
and Point Four - they have been subordinated to narrow, 
expedient and temporary ends, fbney has been poured into 
military assistance programs, and in many cases has been 
wasted, at the expense of vitally necessary economic 
development. The next President will have to devise an 
entirely revamped foreign aid program." 59
In 1959, Kennedy was one of a small group of liberal Democratic senators
who petitioned President Ei:g ehhower to reassess the relative importance
of military as opposed, to technical assistance* He described the
International Cooperation Administration as being devoid of idealism
and suffering from "bureaucratosclerosisAs for the Foreign Service,
Kennedy deemed it too much preoccupied with "tennis and c o c k t a i l s . A s  a
congressman Kennedy was rarely impressed with United States "officialdom"
overseas. In a foreign country he was more often to be found talking to
local peoples...and administrators (or American newspaper reporters)
than State Department officers and ambassadors,
Kennedy had long been convinced that technical instruction and
educational programmes should be in the vanguard of American aid rather
than bureaucrats, dollars and guns. In June, 1959, he argued that American
foreign assistance needed to reorient itself towards basic human needs.
He emphasised that in the emerging countries, "There is an acute shortage
of technical, managerial, and skilled labor. Our aid now should be
concentrated not on large-scale monuments to American engineering but
on the village and the farm."^^ Kennedy actively encouraged all kinds of
student, cultural and technical exchanges in the hope that the poorer
peoples might learn how to help themselves. At the same time, he hoped
to break down the ethnocentrism so typical of the vast majority of
American aid programmes in the 1950's. With these ideas in mind,
Kennedy was gradually advancing towards the essence of the Peace Corps
concept - a direct people-to-people foreign assistance initiative. "For
we have not always recognised," he told Democrats in 1958, "that the
ideal contact is between peoples rather than governments, Governments
come and go while lasting personal friendships and impressions remain.
A third "stream" which converged with the others, was Kennedy's
historic sense of mission and sacrifice. He firmly believed that the
American forms of liberty and democracy were the best in the world and
that it was the United States' duty to share these virtues ‘with other/
peoples, especially the poverty-stricken masses of the underdeveloped
world. He outlined this belief before the Senate in 1954»
"I trust the United States has learned that it cannot ignore 
the moral and ideological principles at the root of today's 
struggles....The United States is the leader of the free 
world today; but this is not so because our citizens are 
anxious that we take the lead in military battles; nor
because our policies are faultless nor the most popular.
The mantle of leadership has been placed upon our shoulders
not by any nation nor by our own government or citizens
but by destiny and circumstance, by the sheer fact of our 
physical and economic strength,,..and what Washington 
term 3d 'bhe sacred fire of 1 iberty' 63
Kennedy appreciated that the burden of providing moral and physical
leadership for the world would, involve tremendous sacrifice on America's
part, but this made the prospect even more attractive to him. He felt
that /America’s richness in both ideals and material resources obliged
her to help the less fortunate nations, "The 1960's will require much
more from each of us than we have given in the past," he said during
the i960 campaign,^^ Indeed, the major theme of the Kennedy campaign was
the need for courage, dedication, hard work and sacrifice in meeting the
"challenge" of his proposed New Frontier, In particular, Kennedy told
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. that he believed there was a great "fund of
idealism" among the youth of America, waiting to be harnessed and
discharged for a worthy cause. Schlesinger wrote that the Peace Corps
was Kennedy's way of "demonstrating the reality of this idealism to the
world.
However, since as Schlesinger also noted, Kennedy was "a son of the 
Gold War," his sense of mission and idealism was inextricably interspersed 
with a fer/ent anti-communism, Kennedy’s interpretation of the struggle 
with the Soviets was much more refined than that of John Foster Dulles ; 
indeed, he was one of the Secretary of State's most persevering and 
incisive critics. Kennedy rejected Dulles's contention that the "neutralism" 
of newly-independent nations could not be tolerated and that every 
conflict was a "moral crusade requiring the unconditional surrender of the 
enemyNevertheless, Kennedy was a man of his times and, although not 
30 dogmatic as Dulles, still an avid Cold Warrior. "lh.e great danger is 
the Communist system itself and its relentless determination to destroy 
us," he proclaimed in September 196O. "We and the Communists are locked 
in a deadly embrace all around the world," he told an audience in 
Ohio, Anti-communist invective permeated Kennedy's campaign rhetoric, 
especially.the argument that the Soviets were making advances in the 
'Third World while American power and prestige declined. Such a 
philosophy proved conducive to a foreign policy initiative which might 
contribute, at least a little, to the battle for the "hearts and minds" 
of the uncommitted nations. Hence, when he proposed the Peace Corps,
Kennedy placed it in a Gold War context where America's "ambassadors of 
peace" would compete in the underdeveloped countries against "Castro-
'' 69type or Gommunist exploitation."
Kennedy's empathy with Third World people, his intention of 
reforming the foreign aid programme and his belief in missionary 
idealism, sacrifice and anti-communism all played a part in his espousal 
of the Peace Corps. Indeed, all three "streams" ran through the Cow 
Palace address. Besides, Kennedy's genuine affection for young people 
as well as his sense of adventure and idealism would have made the 
programme appear very attractive to him. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
described it, "The Peace Corps was something the Kennedy boys would have
done."70
In many ways, i960 was the perfect time for the annunciation of
the Peace Corps, Throughout the year, a number of people discussed the
feasibility of such à programme. Some even claimed responsibility for
having suggested the idea to Kennedy, On October 27, a week before the
Cow Palace address. General James Gavin, the celebrated army commander
and author, proposed a Peace Corps-type plan at the Regional Advisory
Council on Nuclear Energy in Miami; he urged Kennedy to accept the
idea. Schlesinger, Sorensdn and Galbraith felt Gavin was a very strong
71influence on Kennedy. Milton J. Shapp, a Philadelphia businessman,
submitted the idea to Robert Kennedy on October 25, Democratic
Congressman Barratt O' Hara of Illinois, also claimed that he gave some
material on a Peace Corps plan to Chester Bowles (Kennedy's foreign
policy adviser) during the campaign. Bowles, who collated information
on the Peace Corps for Kennedy during the transition period, gave a
speech on the subject at the University of Michigan in late October,
For a long time preceding and including election year, William 0.
Douglas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, tried to
persuade Kennedy to propose an overseas service project; perhaps with
this in mind, Kennedy appointed Douglas as first Honorary Chairman of
the National Advisory Council to the Peace Corps in I96I. Before the
campaign began, Victor Eeuther, director of tl;e United Automobile
Worker's (U.A.W.) international affairs programme, urged Kennedy to
make a "youth corps" one of his "issues." In the summer of I960, C.L.
Sulzberger, editor of the New York Times and a personal friend of
Kennedy, discussed with him a plan for sending young, qualified technicians
to the Third World. Likewise, on June 20, I960, the influential
journalist James Reston, asked in his column in the New York Times :
"If the main war is the battle in the underdeveloped 
areas, why not offer talented young man of draft age 
the option of using their brains in a civilian service 
in Indochina rather than sentencing them to Army KP in 
Hoboken? It is not fair or accurate to say that the 
voluntary system cannot compete with the directed system 
in recruiting men for service in the underdeveloped areas, 
for no really imaginative effort has been made to attract 
the volunteers." 72
Kennedy could conceivably have "picked up" on the idea from listening
to any of these people.
Many others showed a keen interest in the idea in I960, and they 
also may have influenced Kennedy, In August, Professor Walt W, Rostow 
of the Centre For International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (M.I.T.) and a member of Kennedy’s "brains trusty" suggested 
to hundreds of Cambridge students that they might begin to think about 
"service" overseas. When Professor Robert R, Bowie, Director of the 
Harvard International Affairs Centre, appeared before the Senate Sub­
committee on National Policy Machinery in early November, he proposed a 
Foreign Service "corps" to provide technical assistance to the Third 
World. Having changed his political colours by I96O, Heinz Rollman 
stood as a Republican candidate for North Carolina; not surprisingly, 
a "Peace Army" plan was central to his platform. In a book appropriately 
entitled The Overseas Americans. Harlan Cleveland (Dean of Syracuse 
University) called for a reinvigoration of the United States diplomatic 
Corps. Kennedy may also have noticed that the President’s Commission of 
National Goals, established in I960, recommended that greater numbers of 
qualified Americans should be encouraged by the Federal government to
"live and work abroad....Their number and their ability to represent
73the United States creditably must rise rapidly in the next decade."
At the same time. Senator Hirmphrey and C/ngressman Reuss ware 
diligently publicising the Peace Corps in 196O. Not only did they have 
the ear of Kennedy but they also gained support for their proposal from 
doctors, teachers, students and religious leaders. As the election 
approached, the idea became more and more widely known. instance.
Congressman John Brademas of Indiana, indicated that approbatory 
signals for a Peace Corps-type programme had come from church, civic 
and university leaders in his s t a t e . T w o  hundred and seventy students 
at Antioch College sent a petition to the Senate Foreign Relations
75Committee in favour of legislation for an overseas service agency. Thus, 
by the time Kennedy made his formal proposal in San Francisco, the Peace 
Corps idea had already developed a strong - albeit limited - popular 
base. Even some important Republicans supported it. Senator Jacob Javits 
recalled that he had "urged" Nixon to adopt an overseas service plan
before the 19o0 campaign. "I am sorry he did not accept it/’ said Javits 
during the debate on the Peace Corps bill in August, 196I . With no little 
magnanimiity, he conceded that Kennedy’s endorsement of the Peace Corps 
"does not mean it is a bad idea. It is a very good idea. This is one of 
the original initiatives coming out of the campaign which inspired 
American youth and people of other lands. We ought to do it
Certainly, the public pronouncements on the Peace Corps by Kennedy,
Humphrey, Reuss, Johnson, Bowles, Gavin and the others, helped build a
climate of opinion favourable to the idea. However, they were only
partly responsible for the wildly enthusiastic general response which
immediately greeted Kennedy’s address at the Cow Palace, That reaction
owed more to the feeling among American people in I96O that the country
needed something new, adventurous and idealistic. The dominant
characteristics of Kennedy’s campaign were youth, purpose and vigour -
best encapsulated in his perennial invocation "to get this country
moving again," Despite a much-vaunted affluence, Kennedy condemned the
Eisenhower era as a period of "slippage in our intellectual and moral 
77strength," Throughout 196O, Kennedy issued one jeremiad after another,
often making an analogy between the flatulent America of the 1950’s
and the appeasing Great Britain of the 1930’s. He told his audience in
Philadelphia that he had seen "another election just like this one in
1935; when England was engaged in a deadly competition with Germany.
Stanley Baldwin chose to tell the people that everything was being done
in good time, and that England’s security was assured. Mr. Baldwin won
78that election and the British almost lost World War Two." Comparing 
Richard Nixon to Baldwin., Kennedy saw himself as Churchill warning of 
the perilous times ahead. The American democracy was depicted as flabby 
and comfortable, being led to the slaughter by a lean and ruthless 
Soviet Union, "We seem to have lost both the sense of the promise of 
America and the will to fulfil it," complained Kennedy in a speech 
entitled "The Years The Locusts Have Eaten.
In the spring of 1959, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote Kennedy a 
memorandum entitled "The Shape Of National Politics To Come," His basic
theoiy was that "there is an inherent cyclical rythmn in our national
affairs," Drawing on historical examples, Schlesinger advised Kennedy
that periods of quietude in American politics were invariably followed
by periods of action and liveliness. Schlesinger concluded that the
current period of passivity and acquiescence under Eisenhower was about
to come to an end and that a politician of "intelligence and creativity"
would be required to lead America's "national renaissance."^^ In total
agreement with his academic adviser, Kennedy challenged Americans to
rededicate themselves to long-lost ideals and goals. He led the attack on
the affluent, purposeless society with his famous enunciation of a New
Frontier which represented "not what I intend to offer the American
81people but what I intend to ask of them,"
Kennedy was not alone in his dissatisfaction. In I96O, many Americans 
were il-l-at-ease with their country's performance. Throughout the year, 
there was an almost incessant state of the union debate on whether 
America had indeed lost her sense of national purpose. the first time,
a President's Commission On National Goals was established. Among its 
findings it stated the need for "extraordinary personal responsibility, 
sustained effort and sacrifice," A report by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee also str saged the necessity to exhibit "not only our materiil 
prosperity but also our dynamism, creativity and desire for peace." Walter 
Lippmanio-criticised the lethargy of America in his book The National
82Purpose. Time magazine devoted issues to the controversy, Kennedy and
83many other politicians attended a Convention in Miami on "National Purpose."
Intellectuals, journalists, theologians and politicians agreed with
President Nathan M. Pusey of Harvard that the United States was "wandering
along with no more thought....than the desire for diversion, personal
8Acomfort and safety."
It was particularly in foreign affairs that Kennedy criticised 
Eisenhower for allowing the country to vegetate. No significant new 
policies had been undertaken towards the emerging nations despite some 
forty countries having gained independence since 1945. In the minds of 
many Third World peoples, America had come to be associated with the C.I.À,
to the foreign policy objectives of the United States, The over­
threw "pro-Communist" governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 
and failed to do so in Indonesia in 1958. It also helped install 
supposedly "pro-Western" governments in Egypt in 1954 and in Laos in 1959.
By i960, the 0,1.A. had already begun to plan the overthrow and murder 
of Fidel Castro. "Covert action was over-used as an instrument of foreign 
policy," wrote Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research in 
the Kennedy administration, "and the reputation of America suffered more 
and raore."^^
In the late 1950's, one foreign policy panic followed another. There 
was national alarm in 1957 when the Soviets launched the Sputnik and 
in 1958 when Castro defeated Batista in Cuba. President Eisenhower was 
forced to cancel a tour of Japan for fear of protesters and Vice-President 
Nixon was stoned in Caracas, An alarming number of new nations voted 
against America in the United Nations and Kennedy claimed that Russia 
had a "missile gap" advantage over America, The Russian capture of an 
American U-2 spy-plane in I96O, was the capstone on a series of embarrassing 
debacles, Kennedy sprinkled his campaign speeches with statistics which 
charted the American decline: the low number of student exchanges with 
Africa and Latin America, the multifar'j-ous underdeveloped countries without 
American diplomats and the ridiculous imbalance in the distribution of 
American foreign aid. For instance, Yugoslavia received more money than
87the whole of the African continent. As the campaign neared conclusion, 
the Kennedy camp leaked some of the United States Information Agency's
confidential polls to the press, I'hey showed that American standing
88in Third World eyes was at an all-time low.
This sense of decline was not confined to Kennedy's campaign
rhetoric. Highly critical and prophetic books such as The Affluent
Society by John Kenneth Galbraith, The Lonely Crowd by David Ries man.
The End Of Ideology by Daniel ^B'ell and Foreign Aid: Our Trayic. Experiment
89by Thomas Loeber, became national bestsellers. In the entire postwar 
period, few books had more impact on the national consciousness than 
Eugene Burdick and William Lederer's The Ugly American. Although fictional.
it attempted to reveal the "blundering hypocrisy of some of our top-level
diplomats," and unmask the "opportunism, incompetence and cynical deceit
that have become imbedded in the fabric of our foreign r e l a t i o n s . T h e
villains of the piece were the professional American diplomats who, more
often than not, confined their work to moving from their air-conditioned
offices to government-bought limousines, American expatriate clubs and
cocktail parties. They rarely learned a native tongue, met local workers
or peasants, or felt a genuine concern for the real development needs
of the country in which they purported to "serve," The main character,
Homer Atkins, was called the "Ugly American" because of his grotesque
physical appearance. However, he was a skilled technician committed to
helping at a grassroots level by building water-pumps, digging roads,
and building bridges. He lived with the native peoples, worked with them,
and, at the end of the book, was beloved and admired by them, Tiie bitter
message was that the majority of American professional diplomats were
neither competent nor effective and that the more America relied on them,
the more her power and influence would decline, Atkins held the
professionals in utter disdain. When an official asked him how the United
States might improve the standard of its foreign assistance functionaries,
Atkins’s answer was painfully blunt: "tell 'em to get off theii asses
91and out into the boondocks,"
In a factual epilogue, Burdick and Lederer summarised their major
criticism of American foreign aid programmes and pointed the way towards
a new and fresher approach:
"Whatever the reasons, our overseas services attract far too 
few of our brightest and best qualified college graduates....
What we need is a small force of well-trained, well-chosen, 
hard-working and dedicated professionals. They must be willing 
to risk their comforts and-in some lands - their health. They 
must go equipped to apply a positive policy promulgated by 
a clear-thinking government. They',must speak the language of 
the land of their assignment and they must be more expert in 
its problems than are the natives." 92
The Ugly American had a prevailing and a shocking effect on domestic
public opinion. First issued in July, 1958, it was a Book-of-the-Month
Club selection in October and by November, it had gone through twenty
printings. It was so influential that, in later paperwork editions, its
advertising blurb claimed that "President Kennedy’s Peace Corps is the
answer to the problem raised by this book. "Although this claim was
somewhat exaggerated, Sargent Shriver admitted that the book "stimulated
a lot of people in this country to an awareness that the way you do
93something is sometimes just as important as what you do." Significantly,
Shriver hired Burdick and Lederer as consultants to the Peace Corps
and asked them to evaluate programmes in the field. Moreover, at the Cow
Palace, Kennedy referred to The U.glv American and conceded that he had
"shuddered" upon reading it.^ "^
The publication and astounding success of The Ugly American.
helped create a perfect environment for Kennedy’s Peace Corps proposal.
America had come out of a decade considered by many to have been stale
and placid. Perhaps the youth of the nation had felt most stultified.
The "baby boom" which followed World War Two, had led to the growth of
a population fifty per cent of which was under twenty-five years old in 
951960. Unlike their parents, who had suffered the deprivations caused by
Depression and war, these children had grown up surrounded by material
prosperity. For the first time, a university or college education came
within the grasp of the majority of young people, Kennedy was very
conscious of these "war babies of the 1 9 4 - 0 who overcrowded our schools
in the I950’s and are now descending in I96O on our colleges In the
1950’s, adults had been engrossed in the pursuit of a decent standard
of living; at the beginning of the 1960’s, their children, well-prcvided
for and increasingly well-educated, did not need to aspire to the same
ambition. Indeed, the Harvard Crimson proclaimed, "This is the first
generation of students which is not going to school for purely economic 
97reasons." Unprecedented material wealth freed the younger generation to 
heed their consciences and follow their ideals, Tom Hayden, the doyen of 
radical student politics in the 1960’s, argued that status and money were 
"not goals to be striven for." In their own way, these young people were 
contributing to the national purpose debate. The question they asked was: 
affluence for what? Ironically, Hayden was in the early morning
audience at the University of Michigan when Kennedy attempted to provide
98at least one answer®
Strictly speaking, John Kennedy was not of this younger generation*
He had fought in the Second World War with their fathers* Yet, the youth 
of America seemed especially attracted to his athletic and exciting image® 
His proposal for a Peace Corps epitomised the idealism and hope which 
they invested in him* Kennedy asked them if they were prepared to travel 
to distant lands, work under straitened conditions and help impoverished 
peoples,If was-this spirit of generosity and participation that had been 
sorely missed under Eisenhower, Their answer was resoundingly affirmative. 
As David Gelman, one of the first young administrators, put it:
"The Peace Corps is a part of the awakening that began 
with the i960 campaign exhilaration of John F. Kennedy®
The 1950*3 made ancient mariners of us all - becalmed, 
waiting and a little parched in the throat. Then we 
picked up momentum on the winds of change that Kennedy 
brought in - the New Frontier, the fresh faces in gg
government, the vigorous, hopeful speeches, the Peace Corps,"
John Kennedy once told John Kenneth Galbraith that "the finest 
strategies are usually the results of a c c i d e n t s H i t h  Kennedy s late- 
night, off-the-cuff remarks to the students of Michigan University in
mind, this maxim was certainly applicable to the Peace Corps, It owed its 
birth almost entirely to the extraordinarily propitious circumstances 
surrounding the I96O Presidential campaign, America’s renewed search for 
"national purpose", the impact of The UrIv ilmerican and the general craving 
for an adventurous^ idealistic initiative created an atmosphere conducive 
to the new proposal, Kennedy - with his sympathies geared tov/ards helping 
the developing nations and inspiring the youth of America to sacrifice - 
sensed this and took advantage of the moment. Young Americans were ready 
and willing to follow the example of Homer Atkins - the "Ugly American" -
who worked overseas at grassroots levels and helped people help themselves.
John Kennedy offered them the opportunity. In this way, the Peace- Corps
idea, and fate met and found, in the I960 campaign, their truly creative hour<,
CHAPTER THREE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE CORPS
"Section 1 : Establishment of the Peace Corps. The Secretary
of State shall establish an agency in the Department of State 
which shall be known as the Peace Corps."
-JOHN F. KENNEDY-
(Executive Order 10924= 
Establishment and Administration 
Of The Peace Corps in The 
Department of State, March I961)
4/
John P. Kennedy's espousal of a "Peace Corps" during the I96O
Presidential campaign had fired the imagination of the American people.
Yet, in the aftermath of Kennedy’s victory^ many doubted that the
proposal would actually come to fruition. After all, most political
candidates are popularly known for their faithlessness. Moreover,
Richard Nixon had suggested from the very beginning th.^ -t Kennedy had
adopted’.:, the Peace Corps solely for "campaign purp ses," In the so-
called "transition" period - the seven or eight weeks between election
and inauguration - Kennedy would be required to answer Nixon's charge by
taking vigorous action on the Peace Corps, Of course, the problem w--s
that no one had ever attempted such a venture before.
Less tham hne week after the 196O election. Professor Walt Rostow
of the Massachusetts Institute of.^  Technology (one of_.Kennedy' s academic
advisers during the campaign) wrote to the President-elect informing
him that "The notion of a Youth Corps has excited ’the imagination of
university people and students all over the land,”"* While urging Kennedy
to make efforts to ensure that the acquired momentum behind the Peace
Corps should not be lost, he posed a number of difficult but pertinent
questions concerning the size, nature and administration of the programme:
"What is a realistic maximum rate of build-up for the 
Youth Corps? To what extent is it likely to be able to 
use men and women without a S,A. degree?....What are the
major lessons for the Youth Corps to be derived from the
experience of the C.urikers, Oierttion Crossroads ifrica 
etc,...with projects if this kind? Should service in the 
Yoipth Corps be a potential substitute for national service 
under the military draft? If so, how should the legislative 
and the administrative arrangements be worked out?"
Rostov/ advised Kennedy it would be worthwhile consulting with the
religious and private organisations that had relevant experience in
this area. He felt they mi ■'ht he particularly helpful with the
"hard practical problems of selection, logistical support, administration
2
and relations with the local populations and governments,"
Kennedy immediately replied th.-. t Rostow should confer with 
Professor Max Millikan, -a friend and colleague of Rostov's at 
M.I.T, and a longstanding economic adviser to Kennedy on Third World 
problems, "Have Max take on the responsibility of working up a
3
Peace Corps idea into something I could implement," wrote Kennedy, 
Although he clearly intended to establish a Peace Corps, Kennedy 
emphasised that he did not wish to appear precipitate» Somewhat 
guardedly, Kennedy envisaged putting the Peace Corps into effect 
sometime in the winter of I96I, Obviously he still had certain 
reservations about the idea and he conceded that it might very well 
be "a mistake" to utilise young college graduates. He was worried 
that naive, young Americans might become embroiled in some délâcle 
abroad and the blame would be charged to their President's inexperience 
in foreign affairs. At this stage, Kennedy remained unsure of the 
logistics of rhe programme. However, he wanted an assurance that 
Volunteers would be responsible and useful to the countries in which 
they s e r v e d . Y e t ,  despite some lingering doubts,, Kennedy's probing 
of the possibilities of a Peace Corps puo-ramme so soon after his 
electoral victory inferred that it remained one of the campaign proposals 
which he would most like to put into effect.
Certainly, th-- enthusiasm of the .Vrnerican public had not waned.
On November 20, an editorial in the 'Washington Post impelled Kennedy 
to make the Peace Corps more than another campaign promise broken 
immediately after the•election, "We hope he will return to it when 
he assumes the Presidency as a serious scheme for using talent in a 
manner likely to benefit both the Foreign Service of the United States
W 7
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and the welfire of emerging nations abroad," said the Post » In a 
forceful letter to the New York Times, Eugene Burdick, co-author of 
The Ugly American, heartily approved of Kennedy's idea,^ Meanwhile, 
mail on the subject continued to flood Kennedy's offices in Boston .and 
Washington as well as the Democratic National Committee headquarters 
and the White House, A substantial portion was from young people 
volunteering their services, but other letters contained endorsements, 
ideas or blue—prints on the Peace Corps, Before the end of the ye^r 
Kennedy had received more than twenty-five thousand letters on the
7
subject —  more than on any other topic, Moreover, on November 23, 
i960, Richard Goodwin (the campaign aide who had researched the idea) 
reminded Kennedy in a memorandum that the Peace Corps had been one of 
his most popular campaign pledges. In terms of political benefits 
alone, Goodwin advised Kennedy that the proposal would be worth 
following up,^
Without official sanction from Washington, various meetings and
conferences on the Peace Corps were arranged all over the country,
especially by student organisations on college campuses. On November
11 and 12, i960, Princeton University sponsored "The Conference To
Discuss The Challenge To .haerican Youth Prom the World's Emerging
Nations" with representatives from the educational, business and
political spheres, Ms. Winifred Armstrong, a secretary from the office
of President-elect Kennedy, herrd the participants resolve that
"thousands of America's youth are ready to answer the New Frontier's
9
demands in the name of peace." Over the Th .nksyivinp- weekend, a 
students' meeting in New York endorsed the Peace Corps, ‘ t Har'/--''rd, 
three young faculty members proposed a "youth project" consisting 
of students going to work in Nigeria, Five hundred students at 
Amherst petitioned the Fresident-el-.ct to institute a Peace Corps,
Thu'S', between the election and the inauguration, there was overwhelming 
evidence of the favourable public response. Indeed, the New York Times
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reported "Peace Corps" conferences taking place in every major state
from New York to California,At a "Point Four Youth Corps Discussion
Meeting" in Washington D.C. on December 20, Congressman Henry Reuss
argued thit Kennedy's electoral victory was a sufficient enough
"mandate” for establishment of the Peace Corps; although, most delegates
from both government and private agencies opposed the substitution of
Peace Corps service for the military draft. Also in December, the
International Economic tnd Social Development Conference was attended
by over a hundred organisations interested in a "youth service,"
Furthermore - as if to remind Kennedy before his inauguration - the
Rockefeller Foundation sponsored two symposia on the "Youth Peace Corps"
11proposal on J.artuary 11 and 12, I96I,
Another sign of the voracious public appetite for information
on the Peace Corps was the avalanche of reports and position papers
which cascaded into Kennedy's offices. Whenever there was conference
jrhen a. report inevitably followed. It was as if everyone had an opinion
on how the new programme would be best run. Universities, foundations,
private voluntary services and religious organisations sent in hundreds
of suggestions. At the University of Michigan, the graduate students
who had been inspired by Kennedy's words to form an organisation called
Americans Committed to World Responsibility sent him their highly
favourable report in January, I96I, Harvard, Notre Dame, Yale,
Berkeley, rdie National Student Association, the United Auto Workers,
the Industrial Union Development, the .American Friends Service
Committee "^,nd the Institute of Intern tional Education were among the
countless number of bodies nh■t ch nnelled their viow-points towards 
12
Kennedy* Some were a little over-enthusiastic, Iraericsn labour unions, 
represented by the A.F.Ll - C,I,0's Executive Council on the Peace Corps, 
saw few problems in mobilising the "energies and skills of American
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workers in the gigantic task of assisting the new nations to spark their 
industrial development," Others were a good deal more cautious. I.V.S. 
warned against "too large an initi il program" and envisaged’ only five
13
hundred Volunteers in the field hy I963, As yet, Kennedy had given
little indication of which view he favoured.
His last ,'uhlic reference to the Peace Corps had been on election
eve, i960. Since then, he had been engrossed in the great "talent
hunt" for the new members of his administration. He appointed
Chester Bowles as a general "caretaker" of the material coming in on
the Peace Corps, but laid do^ vn no definite guidelines. The unprompted
popular response in the interim period put him under considerable
pressure to make a statement of renewed commitment* Kennedy's
difficulty was that, as yet, he had very little detailed, knowledge to
impart. He simply had not had the time or the opportunity to
investigate and evaluate the vario 's options.
By December pO, I96O, Professor Max Millikan of M.I.T, had acted
upon Kennedy's instructions to Rostow and had prepared a lengthy
"personal memorandum" for Kennedy entitled "An Internation Youth
S e r v i c e , S t r a i g h t  swap, Ilillikan conceded "we simply do nca'; know
a great deal about how to make a program of this kind of work,"
Accordingly, his recommendations were extremely tentative. All the
s^me, he was definitely in favour of a "youth service" e.nd did at le->.st
give Kennedy a framework on which to base a public statement.
On Januar;^ 9? 19^1, from the Stanhope Hotel, New York City,
President-elect Kennedy published verbatim, M i l l i k a n 's piper.
However, it was. heralded .as "a release from the office of John F.
1 5
Kennedy," The statement recognised the "mounting
52
flow of incontestable evidence that there are large and growing 
numbers of Americans in their twenties deeuly motivated to place 
their energies and talents at the service of constructive world 
causes and prepared to devote two or three years of their lives to 
such services irrespective of their long-term career objectives,"
While this dedication was particularly ascribed to students, it was 
said to be "growing in all sections of the American public." An 
Internation Youth Service Agency was proposed"on a limited pilot 
basis." It was suggested the new organisation would be part of 
the "broader effort b%r the International Cooperation Administration"
(i.e.A, was the U.S. government agency which administred all overseas 
assistance programmes). Therefore, it would not directly administer 
its own projects. International Youth Service workers would be paid 
"salaries" by their host governments and a minimum qualification for 
selection would be a Bachelor of Arts degree, Millikan felt it 
would be appropriate for the new agency's director to be chosen 
"from the academic world."
As it transpired, these particular speculations became obsolete 
when the Peace Corps was finally established in March, I96I,
However, a number of Millikan’s other proposals more accurately 
presaged the finished article. For instance, it was emphasised 
that "no selective service exemption should be granted to participants 
in this proyram. " Thus, Kennedy was able to p >.rry the major criticism 
that the Peace Corps would provide a haven for draft-dodgers. The 
statement Iso recommended rigorous tr'^ iniu;; -, nd selection standards 
and terms ci lasting two years. It stressed the
"experimentel»»nature of the programme and estimated there
would be no more than "several hundred young people in the first year 
or tv;o," Ending .as it had begun - on a cautious note - the release 
warned that "The danger and risks to which such a progam is exposed 
should nob be underestimated. The whole program could be brought into 
irreparable disrepute in the very early stages if it is started on too 
ambitious a scale.
The intention behind Kennedy's announcement was to quell the 
public clamour which hc.fi-groivn up during the transition period,
Millikan's IhternationAtYouth Service plan lacked confidence and 
precision when compared to the Peace Corps as it was finally established. 
However, from Kennedy's standpoint in early Januarj^, I96I the release 
was a success on several fronts. It silenced the critics by 
appearing cautious and by eliminating the draft evasion charge, and 
at the same time, it satisfied vociferous supporters by giving 
substance to their dearest hopes. Tactically, Kennedy's statement 
vis a triumph.
Of course, although Kennedy had temporarily deflected attention 
from his office, public discussion of the Peace Corps continued,
Mr, Charles Montani, a ship repairs executive, wrote to the New York 
Times suggesting that American naval ships laid up in "mothball" 
fleets could be used a floating bases for the Peace Corps; he 
argued this would save the government the expense of establishing a 
new agency -nd. would give the Peace Corps a flexible mode of operations. 
Foreign Policy Forum magazine devoted its January issue to the question 
of "Would a Peace Corps be Useful?" Franklin Wallick, public relations 
officer of the American Federation of labor, defended the motion and 
Professor Michael BeIshaw of Hunter College, New York, opposed it.
On Jannarjf, I3, I96I, Democratic congressman John Brademas of Indiana
told sixteen hundred students at Ohio Wesleyan University that
Kennedy's idea offered an "imaginative way to mahch the enthusiasm
of young Americans for international service with the serious
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shortages of skilled manpower in underdeveloped areas," Just one
week before Kennedy's inauguration, an editorial in the New York Times
claimed that the Peace Corps was "something that is in the spirit
of this democratic country, a forward-looking thing, and it is
heartening that so rneny of our young people are responding with vigor
and eagerness to i t , A  Gallup poll showed conclusively that
popular interest in the Peace Corps had not abated. A massive 71
per cent of Americans said they were in favour of the proposal with -
1 g
only a meagre 18 per cent against*
On January 20, I96I, President John P. Kennedy made his famous 
Inaugural Address during which he exhorted Americans to "ask not 
what your country can do for you - ask what you can do for your 
country." There was no mention of a Peace Corps as such, but^- 
significantly - Kennedy promised
"To those peoples in the huts and iliages 
of half the glofee struggling to break the 
bonds of mass misery....our best efforts to 
help them help themselves, for whatever 
period is required - not because the communists 
may be dbing it, not because we seek their 
votes, but because it is right. If i free 
socle by cannot help the many who ?,re poor, 
it cannot save the few who are r i c h , "20
During the hectic transition there had been little time for Kennedy
to take action on the Peace Corps proposal. Nevertheless, he
must have been aware that the tremendous public enthusiasm had not
diminished and th-it his campaign promise could not be abandoned or
even postponed. Hence, the day after the inauguration, Kennedy
telephoned his brother-in-1aw, Robert Sargent Shriver, and asked
him "to report to him how the Peace Corps could be organised and
21then to organise it,"
Shriver later recalled that, until President Kennedy asked
22
him to engineer it, he "did not know what the Peace Corps was,"
Related to Kennedy through marriage to his sister, Eunice, Shriver
had a professional background in business* Between 1948 and I960
he had been assistant general manager at Joseph P, Kennedy's (the
President's father) Merchandise Mart in Chicago* He was also an
executive director of the philanthropic Joseph P.Kennedy Jr.
Foundation, During the transition, Shriver hid been chief of the
nationwide quest for the most able people to staff the Kennedy
administration. This talent hunt was an unmitigated success with
Shriver personally finding and persuading some of the best and the
brightest men in the country — including Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara -
to come to Washington. Describing Shriver*s style of determined
23persuasiveness, David Halberstam called him a " :ig-game hunir, " 
Shriver,.exhausted after the hectic campaign and transition, 
claimed he had "no idea" why Kennedy chose him to coordinate the 
planning of the Peace Corps, His only reasoning was that he mey 
have impressed Kennedy with his work on Civil Rights, agricultural, 
educational and other "issues" during the campaign as well as with 
his personnel selections for the administration*^^ In addition,
Shriver's experience of voluntary public service in education 
would have made him an attractive choice. Between 1956 and I960 
he had been President of the Chicago Board of Education and a member
56
of various schools, universities and citizens' boards* He hsd also
given his services to numerous committees including those of the
Ford Foundation, Notre Dame University and the University of Illinois.
Nor would Kennedy have failed to notice that, as President of the
Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago, Shriver had won a
reputation as a strong proponent of Civil Rights, He had been
active in organisations involving hospitals, community service,
child care and other civic endeavou#% and, on a lighter note, he had
also served a terra as President of the jVmerican National Council of
Boy Scouts* ' Besides, Kennedy was aware that in the IR^o's, his
brother-in-law had been a leader of Experiment in International
Living groups and, in the IR^o's, had actually submitted a Peace Corps-
type plan to President Eisenhower, In terms of dedication to the
ideals of public service and interest in the general Peace Corps
25idea, Shriver*s credentials were excellent,
Shriver and Kennedy did not enjoy the closest of personal 
relationships. Certainly, they liked and admired each other well 
enough, but Kennedy*s acute sense of irony and his cool, almost 
detached, view of life was the opposite of Shri'ver's more earnest, 
wholehearted approach* At the same time, Kennedy was probably 
closer to Shriver's wife, Eunice, than any other of his brothers or 
sisters; significantly, she sometimes acted as an effective 
intermediary between the two men. On a purely professional level, 
Kennedy had been impressed by Shriver*s work for him during the 
campai,i-,ns for the Senate in 1952 and 1956 as well as in the re ce 
for the Presidency in I96O, Within the Kennedy entourage, Shriver 
had gained a reputation as an "ideas man" who was bright, lively 
and totally reliable. Ralph Dungan, an experienced political
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manipulator and a member of the Kennedy staff, claimed that Shriver
had "a thousand ideas every minute.
Shriver*s innovative mind, his versatility md his past
experience of dealing with young people, made him the perfect
figure to forge out the path for Kennedy's new programme* •
Nevertheless, he was taken aback by Kennedy's post-inaugural phone-
call. As he later described it;
"I needed help badly. Working out of a, room in 
Washington's Mayflower Hotel, I started rounding 
up friends who had some knowledge of international 
student exchange and education programs, plus 
practical experience in managing them*. . ^ President 
Kennedy wanted to know what was taking us so long.,..
I replied weakly that no one had. ever tri.ed to put 
together a Peace Corps before,"27
On January 21, 1961, Shriver took his first direct step towards 
organising the Peace Corps when he telephoned Harris Wofford Jr., a 
law professor from Notre Dame University who had acted as Kennedy's 
adviser on Civil Rights during the campaign* vUiile working together 
on the election and the talent hunt, Shriver end Wofford had become 
close friends, Wofford had long cherished the idea of a United 
States government service overseas. Indeed, he had been involved in 
establishing the International Development Placement Association 
(a small, government-subsidised overseas agency for students) in 
the 1950’3, Hence, he was only too glad - if a little startled - 
to help in ere ;ting what he called "this strange new animal, the 
Peace Corps," In later years, Wofford recalled how quickly it all 
began :
"The morning after the in ugijration Shriver called 
me -ud said 'You thought you were going to have a 
vacation didn't you? Well, the President just 
asked me to set up the task force to see whether 
this Peace Corps idea makes sense, hlien shell 
we have our first meeting?
50
In some ways, ohriver and Wolford were very much alike. Both
absolutely committed to Civil Rights, both interested in America's
relationship with the Third World and both devoted to the idea of
public service. Although Wofford shared Kennedy's sense of irony,
it was allied to an unshakeable personal integrity and an irrepressible
enthusiasm for ideals which was bound to be attractive to Shriver,
Indeed, Wofford described his understanding with Shriver as 
20
"telepathic". ' Their recent mutual experience of the campaign and
talent hunt had been the introduction — for both men - to the
workings of the Federal government. This was to prove highly
significant for the future. Many of the distinctive ingredients
of those exhilarating operations - initiative, spontaneity and the
pursuit of excellence soon came to characterise the government
organisation they were in the process of building.
For the first few days the Pea,ce Corps "task force" consisted
solely of Shriver and Wofford, sitting in their suite at the
Mayflower Hotel in Washington, Wofford remembered that most of
their time was spent making telephone calls to people whom they
thought might be helpful, :^ mong these were Gordon Boyce, President
of the Experiment in International Living; Albert Sims of the
Institute of International Education; Adam Yarmolinsky, a
foundation executive and a first-class lawyer; George Carter, a
campaign worker on Civil Rights issues and .■ former member of the
American Society for African Culture; Louis Martin, a journalist
who h'.'.d worked for the Democratic N-/tional Committee; and Franklin
Williams, I Kennedy c...mpaign helper '^ûth the black wore -md a
30
knowledgeable student of African affairs. All these men were
personal friends of Shriver and Wofford, By the end of January,
J'y
they had gathered together the nucleus of a Peace Corps task force 
which contained considerable experience of overseas programmes. 
Moreover, they soon found that one name led to another.
Thus, during the last week of January and the first week of 
February, scores of people from the academic, government, business 
and religious communities passed through the makeshift Peace Corps 
headquarters in the Mayflower Hotel. It was a very informal set-up - 
more like a group of friends gathering together to discuss a pet 
subject than an official committee establishing- a. government 
organisation, Shriver had no long-term, premeditated vision of 
what the Peace Corps might be, "My style," he confessed, "was to
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get bright, informative, creative people and then pick their brains,”
Besides people, Shriver was inundated by letters and reports
from various sources. From within government circles, the
International Cooperation Administration (l,C,A.) presented a study
of The National Peace Corps. Professor Hayes of the University of
Michigan submitted an extensive report on the potential of an
International Youth Service, The ten thousand dollars appropriated
by Congress to the University of Colorado for a study of the Peace
Corps produced a preliminary paper on A Youth Corps for Service Abroad,
From Britain, there came an advisory plan from Alec Dickson, chief
of Voluntary Service Overseas, Quite literally, hundreds of reports
were received - all in favour of the Peace Corrs but :-'ll offering
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confusing, and often conflicting advice on its execution.
Professor Hayes recommenced close cooperation with the United 
Nations and thc,t Volunteers should work it home as well as abroad. 
Professor Maurice Albertson of the University of Colorado, advised 
a Volunteer age limit somewhere between twenty and thirty and that
the new agency should not directly control country programmes. The
I.e.A. report stated th it Volunteers should be paid a substantial
salary of some three thousand dollars and that the Peace Corps
organisation should not be independent of the g-'-neral United
States foreign assistance effort, Alec Dickson prescribed that
the Peace Corps should ensure above '^.11 else, that its pro-ramraes
would respond to the felt needs of Third World peoples and be
desired by them. As Dickson pointed out, "One or two organisations
in the United States have made a strategic error in starting with
the recruitment of volunteers and the collection of money - only
to find that there are no projects overseas," In on interesting
footnote to his report, Dickson noted the difference between the
financial stringency of the British government and the abundant
resources available to the United ‘States, In a slightly envious
conclusion, he wrote, "the British government has recently given us
(V.3,0.) a small grant, warning us at the some time that we should
33not assume that this will be an annual offering!"
On attempting to distill bhis cornucopia of material, Shriver*s 
group discovered the only point of unanimity was that the Peace 
Corps should begin very cautiously and on a. small scale. Meanwhile, 
the Peace Corps continued to stimulate public debate. The correspondence 
columns of the"New York Times showed that some Americans felt the new 
organisation should not be part of the United ft-tes government as 
this would lead to it being accused of "imperialism" by Third World 
countries; others argued th-./t selection should not be limited to 
students. Con pressman Reuss took issue with bhe "c uibious
approach" and claimed there was no reason why Volunteer numbers 
should not eventually reach the , tens of thousands and undertake
b-L
"almost everything under the sun*" Conversely, one Mr, Charles 
Pemberton wrote to the editor of the New York Times ridiculing 
the idea of young /Americans going to ’'/ork abroad; he made an 
analogy with Henry Ford's "Peace Ship" and prophesied that the 
Peace Corps would meet a similar fate. However, Gertrude Samuels, 
a journalist for the New York Times argued that with half the world 
starving, two-thirds of the world illiterate and a life expectancy ' 
of thirty—six years in the Third World as. compared to seventy in 
the United States, the Peace Corps would provide a necessary outlet 
for "the individual .American to do something positive and affirmative 
for peace," Yet, despite the undeniably great need for help in 
the underdeveloped lands, the reaction of many professional 
academics to the Peace Corps was guarded*. Likewise, an editorial
in the New York Times on February 15, 19^1, warned that, of themselves,
34-"youthful volunteers are not the answer," On January pO, President 
Kennedy kept the public spotlight on the great debate by reminding 
the country of the ongoing "formation of a National Peace Corps" in
35
his first State of the Union address,
Shriver had scheduled the, first official meeting of the Peace 
Corps task force for Monday, February 6, I96I, As that date 
approached, Shriver and Wofford consulted with more and more 
experienced personnel. From International Cooperation Administration 
came Glenn McClelland, Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for 
Management; Charles Nelson, Chief of Latin .American and African 
Regional Divisions; Karl Bode, Assistant Deputy Director for 
Pl'uning; John Grady, Deputy Director for Management; and James 
Grant, Deputy birector for Programme sud Planning, Irving Lewis,
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Deputy Chief of the International bivision of the Bureau of the
Budget, was another government administrator who contributed.
From academia there was Samuel Hayes of the University of Michigan,
Carroll Wilson of M.I.T,, Eugene Rostow of Yale, Gilbert White of
the University of Chicago, Richard Neustadt of Columbia and Harlan
Cleveland of Syracuse, James Scott, Vice-President of the National
Student Assocation gave some advice as did James Russell, Secretary
of the National Education Association, From the world of business
and industry there was John Burnett, General Counsel of the
Development and Resources Corporation and Victor Reuther of the
United Automobile Workers,
Of course, Senator Humphrey and Congressman Reuss were regular
visitors to the Mayflower Hotel and Richard Goodwin, Assistant
Special Counsel to the President, acted as a channel of communications
between the task force and the White House, Although divers
recommendations, opinions and reports were circulating, Shriver had
made relatively little headway in defining the fundamentals of the
new progranime in terms of specific size, costs, organisation and
objectives. When, in the first week of February, Kennedy asked for
a comprehensive report by the end of the month, Shriver was forced
to concede that, as yet, the task force had not so much as settled
upon an official n'-me for th= new agency, Shriver described the
task force's predicament ;
"The President called every seven or eight days 
asking ifnat was the matter end why he couldn't 
announce the Peace Corps in Congress, .Ind we 
hadn't even deciied upon a name for it ye 
All we had was two or three sentences from a 
campaign speech....There were no rules, no 
regulations on who should join, where they 
should go or how long they should stay. We
spent the first thirty days over in the 
Mayflower Hotel in Washington, trying to 
assemble the most competent people eve-c 
involved in sending people overseas,"^?
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Unbeknown to Shriver, at a,proximately the same time as he
v/as busily recruiting a task force, two bureaucrats in the Far
Eastern division of the International Cooperation Administration
were assiduously working on a. Peace Corps plan of their oam,
Warren W. Wiggins was the experienced Deputy Director of Far
Eastern operations in I.C.A. Still only in his thirties in
i960, Wiggins had already helped administer the Marshall Plan in
Western Europe, sem/ed as United States economic adviser to the
Philippines and acted as Director of the A^merican aid programme
in Bolivia*^^ Although a highly respected foreign aid administrator,
Wiggins was totally dissatisfied with the manner in which American
overseas programmes were run. He often referred disgustedly to
the luxurious "golden ghettoes" where United States officials
lived in Third World countries — despite the poverty and disease
which surrounded them. "Reflecting on my own service abroad,"
said Wiggins, "I think we were too much encumbered by peripheral
service organisations, recreation associations, clubs, ilmerican-
oriented theatre groups, even exclusively American churches, I
have sometimes had the feeling that the management of the official '
59American community becomes an all-devouring juggernaut,"
Wiggins's foil was the quite brilliant twenty-six year old Far 
Eas b Regional Counsel for I.G,'.,, William Josephson^ '^ '^  Doth Wiggins 
and Josephson were attracted by the spirit and vision of John 
Kennedy's campaign and were desperate to "get connected" to the 
new administration.^^ During the transition period they worked 
on various "position papers" - on Vietnam, Laos, the reorganisation 
of Foreign Aid and the Peace Corps. Josephson later admitted that, 
at firsb, he had thought the Peace Corps "a silly idea." Indeed,
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both he and Wiggins began with the understanding that the programme
would be limited to sending young Americans overseas to teach 
42English, However, as they wrote and re-wrote drafts of their
report on the Peace Corps, their vision broadened, Wiggins
explained how the new programme came to fascinate him;
"I was intrigued by the idea of the Peace Corps - 
and worried about it. The concept was challenging 
to me as a result of my twelve years experience 
with United States pro/prams abroad. But I was 
concerned as to how the concept would be worked 
out, I wondered what the aims of the Peace Corps 
should be."'^
Wiggins did most of the actual writing on the finsJ. draft of
their Peace Corps paper and it was completed by the end of January,
They called their report The Towering Task, taking the title from
the phrase Kennedy had used in his otite of the Union address —
"The problems.,,, are towering and unprecedented — and the response
must be towering and unprecedented as weil,"^^ Wiggins and Josephson
were not under the auspices of the official I.G.i, working party on
the Peace Corps, although they did submit to it a copy of their
plan. They also gave one to Harris Wofford and another to Richard
Goodwin of the White Eouee staff. They sent it by these throe
different routes because, as Wiggins put it, they "wanted to make
45sure that Shriver would get it," No one is quite sure how, but 
a copy did eventually f^ll into Shriver's hands nd - according 
to Peace Corps mythology — he read it at 2 a.ra, on the morning of 
February 6, 1961, Quite simply, he thought it brilliant. He 
immediately sent Wiggins a telegram Inviting him to attend the 
task force meeting afc 9 a.m. Thus, the so-called "midnight ride 
of Warren Wiggins" bec-eme a legend in Peace Corps annals, Harris
b5
Wofford cited the "discovery" of Wiggins's piper as an outstanding
example of his almost "telepathic" understanding with Sargent Shriver;
"I got Wiggins's paper the night before the task- 
fore e meeting to begin at 9 a.m. in the morning, 
read it, around 2 a.m. finished it, and called 
Shriver at 7 in the morning to say I'd read this 
paper by a guy that sounds like he's right on 
target with the sort of thing you have in mind 
for this, Shriver said, "Great*" I said,
"Can. I invite him to come to the meeting?"
He said,' "Fine. Go ahead and invite him.
What's his name?" I said, "‘larren Wiggins,"
He said, "You're a little late, I finished 
reading it around 2,o'clock last night and 
sent him a telegram saying to be there at 9 
in the morning," This happened time and again 
with Shriver and me. He was oftep a few minutes 
ahead of me or on the same beam.
Shriver began the meeting the next day by introducing Wiggins 
and Josephson and then distributing copies of The Towering Task,
He advised the other members of the task force to read it carefully 
before making any comment whatsoever. It was a pregnant moment.
From this meeting onwards Wiggins, and his partner Josephson,
became the intellectual base of the new agency. Indeed, according 
to Shriver, Warren Wiggins was the figure most responsible for the 
"miracle of planning and organisation that brought the Peace Corps 
into being, The Towering Task began with the modest hope that 
it might "stimulate thought". In fact, it went much further and
provided a philosophy for the Peace Corps throughout the Kennedy
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era,
Wiggins disagreed fundamentally with most of the academic and 
other institutional approaches which had counselled "caution and a 
slow beginning," He advoc vted a "quantum jump" in Peace Corps 
thinking which would consider initiating the programme with 
"several thousand Americans participating in the first twelve to
eighteen months*" Whereas Hillika.n, Albertson o.nd Hayes had
estimated Volunteer numbers in terras of hundreds, '/iggins threw 
out figures of thirty, fifty and even one hundred thousand.
This was precisely why Shriver had been so struck by The Towering Task, 
It was original, adventurous and sought to create the Peace Corps 
as a truly significant force in the world arena. The argument for 
"bigness" did not appear rash because Wiggins provided a highly- 
persuasive rationale. He argued that "a small, cautious National 
Peace Corps may be worse than no Peace Corps at all. It may not 
receive the attention and talent it will require even for preventing 
trouble," Moreover, Wiggins claimed that "a slow, cautious start 
may maximise the chance of failure," To illustrate the benefits 
of a large Peace Corps, Wiggins offered the "test-case" of an 
Snglish-teaching programme in a country he knew well from past 
experience - the Philippines. He discussed the minutiae of bow 
the American government could provide salaries, transportation, 
teaching materials, training, housing and administration for 
Volunteers, Indeed, he even took into account unforeseen 
"contingencies," Wiggins reckoned that, by I965, there could be 
five thousand young American volunteer teachers in the Philippines 
at the cost of ^112, 002, 750.^^
Prom February 6, I96I, The Towering Task defined the direction 
of the task force's planning for the Peace Corns, Wiggins and 
Josephson had persuaded Shriver and many others that not only 
could a, sizeable I'e .ce Corps be effective, but that it might well 
be the best hope of success,. The Towering Task ceptured the 
quality which Shriver had desperately hoped to find - "professional,
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practical idealism."
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With three weeks until the deadline set hy President Kennedy,
the Peace Corps had at last acquired a skeletal framework; but
the substance - what Wiggins called "the arms and the legs" of
51the enterprise - had yet to be created. To a great extent the
task force was still working in a vacuum, simply because this type
of programme had never before been attempted by the government.
An organisation had to be legalised and constructed in Washington;
the procedure for recruitment, training, selection 'ind financing
of volunteers had to be systematised; the nature of the work and
general foreign policy objectives had to be defined. These were
only a few of an intimidating array of problems. However, as
Bill Josephson recalled, "\'/e loved the opportunity to create
52 ■something new *"
On February 9» 1961, in a memorandum to Shriver entitled 
"Countdown for Launching", A1 Sims argued that rather than attempt 
the impossible feat of tackling every problem simultaneously, the 
task force should concentrate on a few crucial priorities, Sims 
saw these as ; settling the programme's terms of reference and 
nomineting a Director, deciding on the size ar-d nature of the 
organisation and. recruiting key staff members, securing necessary 
funds and initiating a liaison with the Congress and, arranging for an
Executive Order" from the President which would quickly and effectively
55l‘-unch the Peace Corps as o. going concern. Throughout February, 
there was intense debate within the task force. Various cabals 
and individuals fought for the issues and opinions which they wished 
to see expressed in the final report to Kennedy, Harris Dofford 
continued to hold a brief for draft exemption for Volunteers - 
despite the weight of opinion against him,^ '^  Gordon Boyce differed 
with Wiggins over the degree of direct administration of projects
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which the Peace Corps should have; Boyce, along with many academics
and representatives from priva.te organisations, argued that the Peace
Corps should merely make grants to universities and private agencies
and then leave the total administration of country programmes to
them. But V/iggins felt this would lead to a "Peace Corps Foundation"
operating rather like the National Science Foundation - appropriating
funds but having no effective control. From the beginning, he was
insistent that the Peace Corps should play the central role in every
55aspect of the programme.
Besides these disagreements over specific details, a huge
divide opened up within the task force between "maximalists"
(foreign assistance professionals like Wiggins and Josephson) who
. wanted a large programme, and "minimalists (academics like Carroll
Wilson and Eugene Rostow) who believed that smallness would be the
best policy. At all times, Sargent Shriver maintained control
over the various factions and ensured that all discussion, was
creative by continually emphasising the simple but essential questions;
"Were there people who wanted to volunteer? Was there a demand for
: them overseas? Could they serve effectively overseas?
Relying on Bill Josephson*s reputation as "one of the shrewdest,
hardest-working young lawyers in I.C.A,," Shriver entrusted him to
handle the various legal and technical complexities involved in
57setting up a new government agency. One of Josephson's most 
vital concerns was whether Kennedy should issue an Executive Order 
which would immediately set the Peace Corps in motion. It was 
highly probable that such an act would be internreted by some 
members of the Congress as an infringement upon their legislative
by
prerogative. However at this stage, speed was the Peace Corps* 
primary consideration. There was not enough time for the detailed 
research and writing which the preparation of Congressional 
legislation would entail* Quite candidly, Josephson told Shriver 
that the Peace Corps was not yet ready to "talk convincingly to 
the Committees about specific numbers or specific members in specific 
places by specific dates through specific m e i n s , J o s e p h s o n  
argued that if the Peace Corps waited the six months it would take 
to get a bill through the Congress, then it would miss the potential 
recruits from the colleges and universities in the summer of 196I 
and would possibly not be in operation before the winter of 1962,
An Executive ^rder was the only viable alternative. Moreover, 
the diligent Josephson had discovered that "ample authority" and _ 
finance for the President to establish the Peace Corps existed in 
Section 4OO of the Mutual Security Act of 1954*^^ An Executive Order 
also made sense in regard to future Congressional strategy. If the 
Peace Corps could put volunteers in the field and prove itself a 
success before the Congress had actually to consider its legal 
permanence, then its chances of sumrival would be measurably increased. 
Of course, there would be the risk of alienating the Congress by 
presenting it with a virtual "fait accompli" but, as Harris Wofford 
recalled, the'-task force decided the Peace Corps would be "much less 
precarious if it were a living body instead of just an idea,"°^
The positive recommendation of an Executive Order was one of 
the m any judgements made in that critic! perio'l when the regort to 
Kennedy ’/-'S bain g drafted, another was t; e decision to niovt the 
name "Peace Corps" as the official title for the new organisation, 
Kennedy had used the phrase "Peace Corps" in the Cow Palace address.
YO
However, several State Department officials complained that the
word "peace" had come to be associated with Soviet propaganda and
that "corps" carried undesirable military connotations. Dozens
of alternative titles were suggested, including the previously
used International Youth Service, Point Four Youth Corps and
Youth for Peace; but, after much discussion, Shriver settled
upon the original. ”\'/hat we wanted," he wrote, "was a. name which
the public at large could grasp emotionally as well as intellectually,"^^
Shriver felt the term "Peace Corps" had this quality. He did not
believe that "peace" should become the exclusive property of the
Soviets and besides, the title "Peace Corps" maintained the spirit
of Kennedy's original statement.
As the end of February 3.ppro ached, the task force stepped up 
its pace. Discussions continued ’•/ell into the night and typists 
worked right do'.m to the deadline, Tvice in February Kennedy 
telephoned Shriver and questioned him about the progress of his 
investigations. Also, while addressing a Youth Fitness Conference
on February 21, the President publicly expressed his hope that the
62Peace Corps proposal would soolfl* -come to "realisation," This 
pressure brought to bear from the ifhite House was in turn exerted 
upon the task force. As Shriver pût it, "We often were forced to
63make some drastic demands on people," Bill Joseohson described 
the chaotic sc’-ne as the report was written in the early hours of 
Friday, Febriuary 24, 1961; "the final draft of the report was done 
with Charles Nelson sitting in one room writing basic cony, me 
sitting in another room rewriting it, Wofford sitting in yet another 
room doing the final rewrite, and V/iggins running back and forth
64between the three rooms delivering pieces of paper along the chain," 
Despite the last-minute rush, that morning Sargent Shriver was
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able to deliver to Kennedy The Report To The President on The
65Peace Corps.
In a memorandtun accompanying the Renort - "SniDiuairy of Next 
Steps" “ Shriver stressed that although he was making some 
recommendations, the final decisions on the design and purpose 
of the Peace Corps rested with Kennedy himself. "You must 
decide," wrote S h r i v e r , O n  the first page he described the 
Peace Corps as "a trained group of workers for world peaces 
young in years, mature in judgement, dedicated in spirit, 
volunteer in nature, ready to serve anywhere in the world at 
the discretion of the President and the Secretary of State,"
He then urged Kennedy to establish the Peace Corps by the 
following steps. First, the President should issue an Executive 
Order and make twelve million dollars available from his emergency 
fund for fiscal year I96I, Next, he should appoint a Peace 
Corps Director and a National Advisory Council consisting of well- 
respected and experienced members of the public* Shriver also 
advised Kennedy to inform the entire United States diplomatic 
mission of the nature of the Peace Corps and explain its purpose to 
all member governments of the United Nations, Lastly, he suggested 
that Kennedy could launch the Peace Corps "with maximum impact" by 
making it the"main item of a television-press conference, Shriver 
concluded this memorandum on a forceful note; "By these steps taken
 ^7
in the next few days or weeks, the Peace Corps can come into being," 
Shriver began the Report with e. very positive, confident first 
sentence, "Having studied at your request the problems of 
establishing a Peace Corps, I recommend, its immediate establishment*"^^ 
This sense of urgency became one of the most outstanding characteristics
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of the Peace Corps in the Kennedy era. However, although he was 
"satisfied that we have sufficient answers to justify your going 
aheady”' Shriver added a word of caution, "Since the Peace Corps 
is a new experiment in•international cooperation," he wrote, "many 
of the questions considered helow will only be finally answered in 
action by trial and error. Our tentative conclusions are therefore 
submitted as working hypotheses,"
The Report stated that the great shortage of time justified 
the recommendation for an Executive Order and the request for 
appropriations from the "contingency fund" of the Mutual Security 
Act, "If the world situation were moving at a snail*s pace" 
noted Shriver "the Peace Corps timidly conceived and administered 
could keep in step," It advised that the new organisation should 
be situated within the Department of State so that it could utilise 
the experience of professional diplomats. However, Shriver was 
adamant that the Peace Corps must not become a mere subdivision of 
I.e.A, He did not want it encumbered by I.C.A.'s political and
bureaucratic disabilities, Shriver insisted, "This new wine should 
not be prured into the old I.C.A, bottle." Rather, he suggested 
that the Peace Corps should be administered by a "small, new, alive 
agency operating as one component in our whole overseas operation." 
Shriver’s advocacy in the Report of a semi-autonomous new agency 
was the prelude to a bitter bureaucratic quarrel; but, from the 
outset, he sought to establish a distinctive "identity and spirit" 
for the Peace Corps,
For the internal workings of the Peace Corps, Shriver asked 
for "great flexibility to experiment with different methods of 
operation," While the Peace Corps would be closely related to 
other parts of the United States foreign aid effort, he was
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emphatic that' it should not become starchy and inflexible.
This was the first sign of Shriver's intense hatred of red
tape and traditional bureaucratic methods:
"No one.,..wants to see a large centralised 
new bureaucracy grow up. The American genius 
for voluntary action and private organisation 
must come into full play. The resources, 
energy and experience of our non-governmental 
institutions,including colleges and universities, 
foundations, trade unions, businesses, civic 
groups and religious bodies must be tapped.
This must be a cooperative venture of the whole 
American people - not the program of some 
alphabetical agency in Washington,"
This aim of making the Peace Corps a "different" type of government
agency was to become one of its consistently distinguishing
features. To promote universal participation and avoid self-
perpetuation, the Report said the Peace Corps would function
simultaneously by five different means. Firstly, through grants
to private voluntary agencies already engaged in grassroots
assistance programmes; 1.7.S., Operation Crossroads Africa, the
4-H Club and many others came under this category. Secondly, it
was envisaged the Peace Corps would work through arrangements and
contract agreements with college.), universities and other educational
institutions willing and able to participate in overseas projects-.
Another alternative was for the Peace Corps to develop its programmes
in conjunction with the other government aid agencies like I.C.A,
and the United States Information Agency, The Report claimed that
these established organisations could use Peace Corps Volunteers as
"personnel at the working level who can help translate high-level
advice into action on the line." Fourthly, the Peace Corps could
function through the United Nations and other international 
technical assistance and development schemes* Lastly, the 
Report suggested that the Peace Corps might even directly 
administer some of its own projects - all the way from 
recruiting Volunteers to planning programmes and establishing 
contact with host countfbes* This latter suggestion was to 
cause a major policy argument at a later date. The Report 
implied that the Peace Corps would directly administer programmes 
only under extenuating circumstances when "complexity or novelty 
or urgency" demanded they could not be efficiently managed by the 
other four channelso However, this did not prove to be an 
accurate projection®
Naturally, the Report went into some detail concerning the 
role of the Volunteer® After,all, the essential idea behind the 
Peace Corps was "the placement of Americans in actual operational 
work in newly developing areas of the world." It was strongly 
advised that there should be no automatic draft exemption. The 
Report predicted that in most cases service in the Corps would be 
considered a ground for temporary deferment and that few ex-Volunteers 
would be drafted. However, with a view to i.ie criticism which had 
been levelled at the Peace Corps by Nixon and Eisenhower, the Report 
argued, "the Corps must never be seen, in this country or abroad, 
as , a haven for draft-dodgers,"
Since no one could really be sure of who or what "Volunteers" 
would be, the Report decided against any narrow, disqualifying 
regulations. Although, it was imagined that most Volunteers 
would be young, college graduates, there was to be no rigid age 
limit for either young or old. Any able-bodied American citizen 
over eighteen could volunteer. An academic qualification in the 
form of a college degree or otherwise, would not be compulsory.
The Report also emphasised that the Peace Corps would he open to 
both men and women.
"From one to three years" was the length of service recommended 
and a recruitment and selection centre would be established in 
Washington D.C. to ensure that the Peace Corps would have "the 
broadest possible national base." Following the procedure of the 
Foreign Service, applicants were to take both a written test and an 
oral interview® The development of appropriate training programmes 
was deemed an "urgent priority" by the Report. The Peace Corps would 
utilise college and university facilities and instructors wherever 
feasible and the emphasis would be on language instruction and 
preparation for a specific job overseas; training time could vary 
from six weeks to six months® Volunteers in the field would be 
paid the minimum to provide a "decent standard of living", live in 
circumstances apposite to those of their host country counterparts 
and "avoid, all conspicuous consumption." However, by way of thanks 
for their service, a modest allowance would be made over to them on 
leaving the Peace Corps.
Drawing upon some of the evidence in the study undertaken by 
Professor Albertson and the Colorado State Universbbij Research Unit, 
the Report stated unequivocally that "the need for trained Peace 
Corpsmen is felt in every country in Latin ihnerica, Africa and Asia." 
It asserted that there was a lack of skilled personnel in teaching, 
public health, rural development, industrial projects and government 
administration. However, in its first year, the Peace Corps would 
probably concentrate on teaching projects; the need was obvious and 
besides — again, the need for speed was an important consideration 
- it would be more feasible to recruit and train qualified teachers 
than most other professions.
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Shriver predicted that, providing it was administered in a
proper fashion, the benefits of the Peace Corps would be manifold.
It would contribute to a "more intelligent American participation
in the world," to the social and economic development of "critical"
countries and regions, and to the promotion of international
cooperation and "good will towards this country," However, in a
vitally important statement of intent, the Report urged Kennedy
to take steps "to dispel ,the notion that the Peace Corps is merely
an attempt to export surplus American spiritual or political zeal,
and to show that the Peace Corps is not advanced as an arm of the
Cold V/ar but as a contribution to the world community*" Shriver
was determined that the Peace Corps should avoid being labelled
as an instrument of American cultural imperialism^ or as a tool
of United States foreign policy strategists. Accordingly, the
Report emphasised the reciprocal educational advantages of the
cross-cultural experience® "The Peace Corps can contribute to
the education of America," it stated. Indeed, the Peace Corps was
envisioned as a genuine experiment in international partnership,
not as a political or propaganda venture. As the Report put it:
"The Peace Corps offers as much of an 
opportunity to bring home to the United States 
the problems of the world as it does an 
opportunity to meet urgent host country needs 
for relatively trained manpower. If presented 
in this spirit, the response and the results 
will be immeasurably better,"
Moving towards conclusion, the Report claimed that the Peace Corps
carried the potential to add "a new dimension" to America’s view
of the world. That dimension did not consist of subterfuge and
intelligence estimates but rather of "a better understanding and
69more responsibility toward the world."
Shriver*3 Report To The President was very much in the
spirit of The Towering Task. It advised programmes of a
significant size, urged the government to provide bold and
forceful leadership and set out to be forthright and ambitious.
It promised Kennedy that, if he launched the Peace Corps "within
the next two weeks in a determined way," there could be as many
as two thousand Volunteers in the field by the end of the year.
However, it also realised that "No matter how well conceived and
efficiently run, there probably will be failures." Nevertheless,
a resilient optimism was the dominant theme® "The potential is
very great," Shriver told President Kennedy, "if you. decide to
70go ahead, we can be in business Monday morning®"
The White House’s initial reaction to the task force’s
findings was less than enthusiastic. Theodore Sorensen told
Shriver that the Report had turned out to be completely different
71to what the White House had envisaged. Obviously, Kennedy and 
his staff had been thinking of a small, low-cost addendum to the 
general United States assistance programme - along similar lines 
to the CL-utlous suggestions of Max Millikan. Instead, Shriver 
proffered a bold, prominent and independent new government agency 
which would be in the field within a few months. There was also 
the problem of'the Executive Order, Although Kennedy was in his 
so-called "honeymoon" period with the Congress, he was not over­
anxious to expend his Presidentialprerogative unless it was 
absolutely necessary.
The last week of February, 19^1, was taken up with frequent 
consultation between the task force members and their White House 
counterparts, Shriver’s group argued it was imperative that
momentum should not he lost; there was an organisation to be
built, rooms full of mail to be answered and Volunteers to be
recruited. All this had to be begun immediately if Volunteers
were to be in action before 1962. On the other hand, the
President’s staff were understandably nervous that a hastily-
assembled programme for young people to work abroad would prove
a political liability for Kennedy, Not the least of their
worries was the proposal for an Executive Order, Congressmen
would not take kindly to such an early invasion of their
legislative rights,
Warren Wiggins and Bill Josephson in particular, engaged in
industrious research and persuasive argument on behalf of the
Peace Corps, Josephson found relevant precedent for an Executive
Order of the desired type going back to Roosevelt’s establishment
of the Emergency Conservation Corps in 1953* He also argued that
it made good political sense to present the Peace Corps as a special
case. In this way, senators and congressmen would not regard it
as just another foreign aid "boondoggle" or a trespass against 
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their privilege, Wiggins presupposed that if Kennedy did not set 
up the reace Corps at the very beginning of nis administration by 
swift, executive action, then there was a strong possibility the 
programme might never see the light of day. Wiggins reckoned 
history had shown well enough that opportunities for a President to 
be both creative and idealistic did not come around often and
73certainly not in the second and third years of his term in office.
As March approached, Shriver and his task force felt it was a case 
of "now or never" for the Peace Corps*
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Lawrence O’Brien, Special Assistant to the President for
Congressional Relations, recalled being "extremely impressed"
by the Peace Corps’ articulate advocates and he finally agreed
that the Executive Order would be an effective tactic.
Kennedy himself was persuaded that the Peace Corps was a special
case and it was his "personal undertaking" that it be launched
as speedily as possible.Accordingly, the Peace Corps became
the only programme of the Kennedy era allowed the distinctive
75status of an "emergency agency,"
On March 1, I96I, a few days after he had received Shriver’s 
Report, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10924 which gave 
the Peace Corps the power to move into action as a new programme 
of assistance "for men and women of the United States.®..to 
nations and areas of the world." In an accompanying statement, 
Kennedy underlined his personal support for the project and gave 
some details of its logistics based on Shriver’s Renort.
Consistent with his previous cautious messages on the Peace Corps, 
he insisted that, it was established only on "a temporary pilot 
basis" with only five hundred or more going into the field by the
76end of the year.
As Shriver had suggested in the Report, Kennedy made a major 
announcement on the Peace Corps on radio and television during 
the Presidential News Conference on the afternoon of March 1, I96I,
In answer to a reporter’s question on the Peace Corps, Kennedy 
re lied that he was hopeful it would become "a source of satisfaction 
to Americans." When asked a further question about a future Peace 
Corps Director, Kennedy commented "We are going to make a judgement 
about who will be the head and what its staff will be in several 
days."^ ^
On the same "busy day, in a "Special Message to The Congress
On The Peace Corps," Kennedy requested permanent legislation.
He reaffirmed his faith in the "temporary Peace Corps" and
flattered the Congress hy mentioning the splendid work done on
the proposal "by Senator Humphrey and Congressman Reuss, He
spoke of the beneficial impact which the Peace Corps would have
on America’s relationship with the Third World, "Our own
freedom and the future of freedom around the world", said
Kennedy, "depends, in a very real sensey-on the underdeveloped
countries^ ability to build growing and independent nations where
men can live in dignity, liberated from the bonds of hunger,
ignorance and povetty," Kennedy also mentioned the "sacrifice"
and "dedication" of the young Americans who would serve overseas
in "the villages, the mountains, the towns and the factories of
dozens of struggling nations," Developing the line of argument
used in the Report, Kennedy stressed that "the benefits of the
Peace Corps will not be limited to the countries in which it serves.
Our own young men and women....will return better able to assume the
responsibilities of American citizenship and with greater understanding
of our global responsibilities." Finally, Kennedy reassured the
Congress that "service with the Peace Corps will not exempt Volunteers
from Selective Service," Moreover, he insisted that, as this stage,
the programme was purely "experimental in nature," However, he
ended his message to the Congress on an optimistic note, Kennedy
predicted that should the Peace Corps prove successful there could
be several thousand young Americans overseas within the next few.
years and that they would add a "new dimension" to the foreign
78policy of the United States,
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The President’s dramatic stroke of the pen within the first
hundred,da^s of his administration indicated both his personal and
public commitment to the Peace Corps and his implicit trust in
the judgement of Sargent Shriver, Kennedy was taking a considerable
political risk with his speedy establishment of the Peace Corps,
Had he not been convinced of its viability, it is unlikely he would
have taken such strong measures. With the Executive Order, Kennedy
made an uncompromising political pledge to the Peace Corps and
confirmed its general direction consonant with the recommendations
of Shriver’s He also focused popular attention on the
new agency. "Kennedy Sets Up U,S, Peace Corps To Work Abroad,"
proclaimed the front-page headline of the Hew York Times on
March 2, I96I, Journalist David Halberstam devoted a leader
article to the Peace Corps’ establishment — as did most of the
79other major dailies. Indeed, if the popular reaction to the
Executive Order was in any way an accurate indicator then Sargent
Shriver had been absolutely right in his Report to Kennedy that the
Peace Corps was the type of initiative for which "people here and
80abroad have long been waiting,"
However, while the Executive Order gave the Peace Corps a permit 
to operate in Washington, its effect should not be exaggerated. The 
gargantuan problems of function,organisation and - most crucial of 
all at this stage - leadership, had been left virtually untouched. 
They would soon have to be confronted. The period between November 
i960 and March I96I, had been vital for the Peace Corps; in that 
shorx time an idea had developed from embryo to political birth.
In the next few months it would be seen whether the fragile new 
organism could”-survive.
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The Peace Corps was that rarest of political phenomena ~ 
a campaign promise not broken. Such was the popular feeling in 
support of the programme, it would have been difficult for John 
Kennedy to ignore it. However, in the busy and exciting period 
of the transition and the first month of his Presidency, it would 
have been understandable if he had preferred to delay taking the 
risks involved in establishing a new government agency. That 
he did not, was an indication of his personal interest and 
attraction to the idea. The Executive Order served to confirm 
his political commitment® Almost as a by-product of Kennedy’s 
vigorous and speedy action, the major administrators in the 
Peace Corps’ history took the stage - Shriver, Wofford, Wiggins 
and Josephson, These men became the backbone of the new 
organisation and, in The Towering Task and the Report To The President, 
they supplied it with a basic philosophy and mode of operation.
Of course, as Shriver and the others surveyed the scene in March, I96I, 
they knew that many difficulties had still to be faced® Yet, they 
could take a great deal of satisfaction from the knowledge that the 
biggest problem had already been overcome »-■ the Peace Corps was 
established. As an editorial in the Hew York Times put it, on March 
2, 1961? "President Kennedy has started what is surely one of the
n . . 81'most remarkable projects ever undertaken by any nation."
CHAPTER FOUR
THE BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
"Your decision to preserve the special identity of the 
Peace Corps by making it a semi-autonomous agency in the 
State Department seems important and right....Our best 
advisors warned against the Peace Corps slipping into the 
established patterns of foreign aid. The Peace Corps' 
people-to-people approach and educational emphasis offers 
an opportunity to create a new pattern. For this it needs 
the freedom and energy of autonomy."
HARRIS WOFFORD
(Memorandum to President Kennedy, 
May 25, 1961)
The days immediately following Kennedy’s Executive Order
on the Peace Corps were fraught with tension for Sargent
Shriver and his colleagues. "We were worried that it would
fail and that it would be used against the President,"
admitted Shriver'} As yet, there was no organisational plan,
machinery, staff, programmes or authorisation from Congress.
Yet, to keep up interest and momentum, it was essential
for the Peace Corps to prove - as quickly as possible -
that it could work. "Everything was informal, creative, and
risky," recalled Shriver, "not only were we walking on
2
branches, but on the leaves." Indeed, as yet, the Peace Corps 
did not have so much as an official Director.
As early as January 31, 1961, the New York Times had 
tipped. Sargent Shriver to become the first Director of the
3
Peace Corps’. However, Shriver, in rhe Report To The Presidenc
had specifically suggested the names of several other well-
qualified men as potential leaders of the new agency. In
accordance with the Millikan report, they were from the
academic world. Prominent among these were Dean Eugene Rostow
of Yale Law School, Professor Carroll Willson of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Doctor Gilbert White
of the University of Chicago, and Chancellor Clark Kerr of
4the University of California," All men had experience in 
small overseas service programmes involving either the 
training or placement of American students in the Third World, 
Kennedy rejected Shriver's nominees on the grounds that 
the Peace Corps was going to be a daring, new foreign policy
initiative and he did not feel that a "bookish" type of person 
would be appropriate. On the day after the Executive Order, 
Kennedy pressed Shriver to accept the position. At forty-four, 
Shriver was young enough to give the Peace Corps the vital 
image which Kennedy hoped it might project. He was bright, 
handsome and - in the style of the New Frontier - "vigorous."
In his own right, Shriver was a highly-respected figure in 
the world of education, business and civil liberties and his 
family ties to Kennedy would give the Peace Corps a much 
needed visibility. At the same time, the appointment of his 
brother-in-law as Peace Corps Director would indicate Kennedy's 
close personal interest in the undertaking. These factors, as 
well as Shriver's sterling work as head of the task force, 
made him an attractive choice.
For a number of reasons, Shriver was reluctant to accept 
the offer. Firstly, Kennedy had already vetoed his appointment 
as Assistant-Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare for 
fear of the charge of nepotism. As Shriver himself recalled, 
referring to the controversial appointment of the President’s 
brother as head of the Department of Justice, "Bobby Kennedy 
as Attorney-General was bad enough?" Besides, Shriver had a 
very promising career in Chicago politics to return to - his 
name had already been mentioned as a future Governor of 
Illinois. Moreover, since the Peace Corps had been established 
as an executive agency, its Directorship was an office 
requiring Presidential appointment rather than confirmation 
by the Senate, These latter grounds gave Shriver most cause 
for concern. After discussing the legal technicalities with 
Bill Josephson, Shriver decided to refuse his brother-in-law.
In a tactful but forceful note, he outlined his acute awareness
not only of Kennedy's, political vulnerability but also of the 
mountainous task awaiting the chosen Peace Corps chief:
"Dear Jack,
I hope you realise by now that I'd do 
anything within reason to help your administration 
to the best of my ability. But the question of my 
proposed appointment and its confirmation by the 
Senate is causing me and the people working for me 
deep concern, I know that Kenny O' Donnell and Ted 
Sorenson and perhaps others, disagree with my 
position - but despite them, I don't want to 
embark on a difficult mission with one arm tied 
behind my back.
It would be a serious mistake, in my 
judgement, to appoint me as Director of the Peace 
Corps, which is now a full-fledged agency, and then 
make me the only agency head in the government not 
approved by the Senate. This is not good for the 
agency, the people in it, or for me. When I do have 
to face Congress in May, June or July, they'll be 
tougher then - and they will have no responsibility 
for having O.K.'d me how. .
Consequently, I respectfully suggest that 
you select another person to head the Corps which is 
now well-organised, well-manned, and aimed in the 
right direction. There are plenty of qualified 
people “ Rostow of Yale; White of Chicago; Clark 
Kerr of California etc. They or others like them 
would be glad to serve you. And they would relieve 
you of this difficult burden. You have enough problems.
Let's eliminate this one.
Best, -j 
Sarga.,
Kennedy refused to accept Shriver's answer. After consultatio] 
with Larry O' Brien (his aide for Congressional relations) Kennedy 
agreed that Senate confirmation should be sought. He then 
encouraged Shriver to "Go ahead, you can do it?" Thus, on March 
4, 19 61, Kennedy announced the appointment of Sargent Shriver 
as first Director of the Peace Corps - subject to Senate 
confirmation. Warren Wiggens was made Director "ad interim".
A few weeks leter - on March 21 - Shriver made a very successful 
appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his 
appointment was confirmed. The Committee hearing was a formality 
but, with a view to the imminent Peace Corps legislation, Shriver
sensed the importance of paying attention to political etiquette. 
This correct deference shown by Shriver impressed congressmen, 
helped allay fears that had been raised by the Executive 
Order and laid the foundation for an amicable relationship 
between the Peace Corps and Congress. His polite consideration 
at this early stage was to pay great dividends when the Peace 
Corps bill went to Capitol Hill in May 1961?
Having accepted his appointment, Shriver immediately set
to work. In a "Work Plan for March, 1961", he outlined the
main objectives for accomplishment during the Peace Corps'
first month in existence. Based on the Report to the President,
Shriver's "Fourteen Points” (as his plan was nicknamed by
staff members) formed a comprehensive summary of necessary
tasks to be performed, from the development of "pilot"
country programmes to the presentation of legislation to the
Congress}^ However, although he had identified the major policy
issues, Shriver as yet had no organistion with which to
execute them. As Al' Sims, a member of the first task force
group told him, "much of the skeleton has yet to be fleshed
11cut before our creature can walk like a man."
Kennedy's Executive Order had given the Peace Corps 
governmental authority, one and a half million dollars from 
the President’s discretionary fund, and some office space on 
the sixth floor of the International Cooperation Administration's 
Maiatico building in Connecticut Avenue - a few hundred yards 
from the White House- Aside from these bare necessities, the 
Peace Corps had no desks, stationery, organistional plans 
or volunteers. Since there, was not enough working space in the 
Maiatico building for secretaries, typists and the lower 
echelons of the staff, additional rooms had to be rented in the 
nearby Rochembeau hotel. Indeed, Sargent Shriver wrote his first
memoranda on paper borrowed from his last place of employment
12- the Merchandise Mart in Chicago. Ed Bayley, the newly- 
appointed Press Secretary for the Peace Corps, described the
13general chaos of those first few days as "all hell broke loose."
On March 2, 1961, Shriver and Wiggins began the search
for a staff for the Peace Corps. One of their first recruits
was John D. Young, Deputy-Director of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.), Young, by his own
description "a management type" had had experience of organising
several government agencies}^ N.A.S.A. granted him a month's
leave of absence to help put the Peace Corps together. As far
as the Washington bureaucracy was concerned. Young knew how
to get things done. Within a few days he had seen to the
provision of the logistics of the organisation - desks, stationery,
pencils, telephones and typewriters. Also within the first
week. Young prepared for Shriver one of the most crucial
memoranda in Peace Corps history - "Basic Concepts for Peace
15Corps Interim Organistion."
In this important document. Young cited the prerequisites 
for an effective Peace Corps organistion. Firstly y he advised 
the appointment of a Deputy-Director to whom Shriver could 
delegate the day to day problems of programming, management and 
general operation. Young foresaw that much of Shriver*s 
time would be taken up with high-level meetings and Congressional 
and press duties. Thus it was imperative that there should be 
someone to take his place in dealing with the more mundane, 
but equally important, organisational functions. Next, Young 
envisaged a single office for the planning and development of ' 
Peace Corps overseas programmes. He told Shriver that this 
office should be designed in such a way as to "bring together 
in a coherent manner both area and professional skills,"
That is., it should have the power to decide not only where
Peace Corps projects would be established, but what type of
projects these would be. Young then advised the setting up
of an Evaluation division which could analyse and formulate plans
on all aspects of Peace Corps operations. To deal with private
voluntary agency and university participation in the Peace
Corps, he felt two separate divisions would be necessary. The
all-important recruitment and general publicity functions
would be handled by an office of Public Affairs, Lastly,
Young outlined the sine qua non of any government organisation
- the Management division. Young pointed out that no new
bureaucracy could expect to survive without someone to take
care of budgetary, personnel and administrative matters.
However, he stressed that if these management services were
made "responsive" enough to the needs of the Peace Corps, they
could be kept at a "minimum.”'*"^' Jack Young's memorandum and
line-and-staff chart of March 8, 1961 became the touchstone
of the Peace Corps' organisational thinking - especially its
emphasis on. minimal levels of management and bureaucracy. It
was exactly what Shriver had wanted - a solid government
structure that left plenty of scope for individual initiative.
Although he was only with the Peace Corps for the month of
March, Young gained a reputation among contemporary Peace Corps
officials as "the governmental genius who put the first
17organisation chart together." (Appendix II)
Having designed a basic organisation and identified 
certain priorities, Shriver continued his "talent hunt" for 
people to man the Peace Corps. Several members of the task force 
stayed on to help with the administration of the new agency. 
Wiggins took over the essential function of the planning and 
development of overseas programmes; Josephson began drafting
Peace Corps legislation; Gordon Boyce, with his experience 
as head of the Experiment In International Living, started 
contacting private voluntary agencies; and Al Sims, a 
former director of the International Education Institute’s 
international exchange programmes, worked on the Peace 
Corps’ relationship with universities and educational 
institutions. Harris Wofford had taken up a very useful 
position between the Peace Corps and the White House. In 
early March, President Kennedy asked him to become his Special 
Assistant on Civil Rights, Wofford accepted the job - but 
only on the condition that he could continue to devote half 
his .time to the Peace Corps. Kennedy agreed. With one foot 
in Connecticut Avenue and the other in Pennsylvania Avenue^ 
Wofford served as an effective channel of communications 
between the Peace Corps and the President.
In his search for first-class administrators, Shriver 
telephoned people all over the United States and invited 
them to Washington. When Shriver was looking for a top- 
blass psychologist to develop standards for the crucial 
function of selecting volunteers, Nicholas Hobbs (who had 
served' on the-faculties at Columbia, Harvard, the University 
of Pennsylvania and Louisiana State University) was 
recommended to him. Hobbs, at that time working on a multi­
million dollar research project on mentally-retarded children, 
recalled receiving Shriver’s telephone call at the George 
Peabody College of Teachers in Tennessee, "How much time do I 
have to decide?" he asked, "Twenty minutes," said Shriver. 
Twenty minutes later, Hobbs booked a flight to Washington}^
Shriver’s interviewing style was discursive and 
provocative. Sometimes he presented interviewees with the
Millikan report and treated approval of its guarded recommendation
as grounds for immediate rejection. Shriver also informed
applicants that he had no idea when or how Peace Corps
staff would be paid. Thomas Quimby, a successful interviewee,
recalled that "Shriver did not want anyone around who was going
19to be too cautious." Shriver could be very persuasive.
Charles Peters, a journalist and former worker for the Kennedy 
campaign in West Virginia, recalled that when Shriver asked 
him to come to Washington he thought, "I would just come 
up for about three months to share in the exciting task of 
getting the New Frontier staeted." In fact, Peters stayed 
with the Peace Corps until 1964 and, as Chief of Evaluation,
20became one of the most important men in the agency’s development. 
More people applied, fox- staff positions with the Peace 
Corps than all the other federal bureaucracies put together. 
However, Shriver's extraordinary style brought to the new 
agency a talented, yet unusually adventurous group of government 
administrators. Among them were Morris Abram, a prominent 
attorney in Georgia who helped with legal problems; Thomas 
Quimby, chairman of the Democratic National Committee in 
Michigan who dealt with volunteer recruitment; Bradley Patterson, 
an assistant secretary to the Cabinet in the Eisenhower 
administration who established the Peace Corps Executive 
Secretariat; and William Haddad, a prize-winning journalist 
with the New York Post who took on a "special projects" 
portfolio, with power to research and evaluate all Peace 
Corps functions. Shriver found that one name soon led to 
another. For instance. Jack Young suggested that William 
Kelly, a colleague of his at N.A.S.A. would make an excellent 
head of Peace Corps contracts and logistics. On interview.
7^
Kelly enjoyed Shriver's lively questions covering all kinds of
topics and Shriver was impressed by Kelly’s intelligence ,
integrity and eminent common sense. Thus, Kelly took over the
problem of how best to transport Peace Corps Volunteers
from the United States to all corners of the earth. Shriver
recruited from both inside and outside government circles;
ability was the sole criterion. This deliberate policy of
using professional bureaucrats like Wiggins, Josephson,
Young and Kelly as. well as uninitiated "laymen" such as
Haddad, Peters, Boyce and Sims, gave the Peace Corps'
approach to problems a beneficial mixture of experience and 
21freshness.
At the White House, Harris Wofford heard a rumour that
Bill Moyers, the shining young star of Vice-President Johnson's
staff, was desperately keen to become involved with the Peace
Corps. Moyers had told Johnson during the I960 campaign that
if Kennedy instituted the Peace Corps then that was where he wanted
to work, Wofford contacted Moyers and set up an interview with
Shriver. This sparked off a minor brouhaha among the White
House staff. Moyers...’ was a key man in the relationship
between Kennedy and Johnson and the President's aides did not
want to lose.him to the Peace Corps. Wofford recalled receiving
an angry telephone call from Kenneth O* Donnell,Special
Assistant to the President. "What the hell are you doing
trying to screw up our thing?" he exploded. "Bill Moyers
is the only man around the Vice-President who we can deal with
2 2that we like and trust and we want to keep him right here."
Kennedy and Johnson went to great lengths to persuade Moyers 
to stay. They were unsuccessful. Moyers, only twenty-six in 
1961, felt a commitment to the Peace Corps and he was determined 
to participate, "That boy (Moyers) cajoled and begged and
pleaded and connived and threatened and politicked to leave
me to go to work for the Peace Corps," recalled Johnson 
23in later days. Named as a special consultant to the Peace 
Corps on March 14 1961, Bill Moyers went on to join 
Shriver, Wofford, Wiggins and Josephson as one of the
major architects of the new organisation. Indeed, when he 
was appointed Deputy-Director of the Peace Corps in 1963, he became 
the youngest official to hold such a position in the history 
of American governmental institutions. However, White House 
aides regarded Moyer's departure as an act of "piracy* by the 
Peace Corps. Indeed, throughout the Kennedy years the Peace 
Corps gained a reputation for enticing people away from other 
government organisations.
To Shriver, the early days of the Peace Corps were "like
the campaign of 1960 - but with no election in sight." Letters
and reports came in from all over the country and the elevators
disgorged constant sorties of "interested persons, newspaper
reporters, job seekers, academic figures and generous citizens
offering a d v i c e . O n e  dismayed job applicant went into the
Maiatico building for a scheduled interview and emerged two
hours later having helped move file cabinets, office furnicure
and office supplies into place. Some prospective staff members
left after a few days of working at the furious pace. Several
25secretaries had nervous breakdowns. Urgency forced the Peace 
Corps' new administrators to cut through established procedure 
and sometimes to violate regulations. After a mere fifteen days. 
Jack Young had counted at least twenty-two illegal actions?^
On March 13, 1961, Shriver established routine meetings 
for senior staff members on every.Monday, Wednesday and 
Friday; on Tuesdays and Thursdays meetings would be open to 
all staff members. During those conferences in the months of 
March and April, 19 61, Shriver recalled, "We hammered out
basic policies in long, detailed d i scussions."2? There were
countless problems to be solved and memoranda constantly 
flowed from one staff member to another. There was a wide 
range of issues to be decided regarding Volunteers’ medical 
protection abroad, taxes, insurance and material support.
Some staff members favoured the idea of a uniform for Volunteers; 
others suggested a Peace Corps oath should be taken before 
serving overseas. On the subject of Volunteers ' o,€€6>«>modation 
" Jack Young asked Shriver, "Are we serious about the 'mud 
hut' approach or are we going to provide minimum housing
2 8e.g. quonset huts, walled tents and similar types of shelter?"
As far as the Washington organisation was concerned there were
decisions to be taken on staff ratios, response to mail,
information output, coordination with other government agencies
and the form and timing of the Peace Corps' congressional
presentation. Salary scales provided one of the more sensitive
issues. Early on, John Kenneth Galbraith advised Shriver to
put an absolute ceiling of ten thousand dollars on staff 
29salaries. Shriver agreed in principle that there should not 
be a huge gap between payments to Volunteers and payments to 
officials. Yet, at the same time, he wanted to recruit the best 
staff members possible; it was likely that many would be 
married with financial obligations and unable to afford a 
drastic cut in wages. Therefore, Shriver decided against the 
low ceiling on salaries. However, he did insist that staff 
members overseas should forego extra remuneration for "hardship 
posts", luxurious housing, fancy automobiles and the various 
other trappings of diplomatic privilege. Bill Josephson 
agreed with Shriver that Peace Corps officials overseas should ' 
live, and be seen to live, in a more austere manner than their 
compatriots in the United States embassy compound and expatriate 
clubs. Nevertheless, he wondered whether a policy of not 
granting a hardship post allowance might not be a little too
harsh* He reminded Shriver that in some Third World countries 
the cost of living could be very high. "Toothpaste costs 
3 dollars a tube in Conarky," noted Josephson?^ However,
Shriver stood by his decision.
Along with Morris Abram, Josephson began to tackle 
the legal complexities involved in establishing the policies 
and conditions of service of a new government organisation- 
"There was an enormous amount of work to be done," Josephson 
recalled, "very dull, administrative legal work, writing 
delegations of authority, getting the fiscal process going, 
getting the administrative process going, getting the 
personnel process going, getting the procurement process 
g o i n g . T h e s e  pressures notwithstanding, in early March, 
josephson and Abram overcame one of the Peace Corps* .most 
controversial policy problems - whether Volunteers should be 
exempt from the draft. Despite Kennedy's statement on March 
1, 1961, that the Peace Corps would not be a substitute for 
military service, the precise legal position remained fuzzy. 
Moreover, Nixon's remarks about "draft-dodgers" continued 
to haunt the new agency. Josephson and Abram soughu to 
clarify this issue once and for all. Thus, Abram arranged 
a meeting with General Lewis B, Hershey, Director of the 
Selective Service. Under the circumstances, Hershey decided 
that draft deferment for Peace Corps Volunteers would be a 
perfectly appropriate Selective Service action. According to 
Josephson, Hershey wrote the legal procedure down on a brown 
paper bag - which was all he had to hand as he travelled
32with Abram in his car; the decision took all of two minutes.
This speedy solution to the draft problem allowed Shriver to mak^
an unequivocal public statement to the effect that Peace
Corps Volunteers would be deferred, but not exempted from
33military service.
On March 8, Abram confirmed that Hershey was very keen
to cooperate with the Peace Corps. He informed Shriver that
Hershey only asked "notice of at least a few hours before
any crisis arises in any individual case regarding the
deferment problem." Abram reassured Shriver that should
any embarrassing cases occur, "remember Hershey still has
a good deal of experience in manoeuvering to help get the
ox out of the ditch." Off the record, Hershey hinted that the
chances of any Volunteer being drafted were very slim. Moreover, tn
explained to Abram that if a Volunteer continued to work in
health, education or government after his.Peace Corps service,
a prolonged deferment would normally come into play; he
.asked only that conscientious objectors should not be selected
as they could conceivably cause complications?^ Thus, by the
end of the first week in March, Josephson, Abram and General
Hershey had finally quashed the "draft-dodging" accusation.
In later years, Josephson claimed that the "draft" problem
was really a false issue used by Nixon and other critics for
■political reasons. In the early 1960's very few Americans
were called up for national service; only when involvement
in Vietnam escalated under President Johnson did the pressures
on the manpower pool begin to have any bearing on the Peace
Corps, In the Kennedy era, there is no evidence to suggest
that the Selective Service deferment was a substantial factor
35in motivating young Americans to join the Peace Corps.
By no means all the difficulties were overcome in this first 
month. In particular, the enigma of the eventual status 
of the Peace Corps and its exact location within the Federal 
bureaucracy loomed large. Nevertheless, the new agency had 
been launched with considerable vigour by the President, Shriver 
had assembled an extraordinarily talented staff and a few of 
the more immediately important decisions regarding internal
structure had been taken. As he prepared to leave the Peace 
Corps and return to N.A.S.A. at the end of March, Jack Young 
advised Shriver that it was not too early to begin planning 
for the logistical support required for the various Peace 
Corps programmes. By March 27, a questionnaire form for Volunteers 
had been drafted and begun to be distributed among the ten 
thousand "would-be volunteers" who had already applied to 
the Peace Corps.
The atmosphere on the sixth floor of the Maiatico building
was electrifying. C. Payne Lucas, a bright young administrator
who joined the staff in 1961, described those early days of
the Peace Corps as "a massive orgasm - that was exactly what
it was like here." To many of these new government officials
everything was fresh and exhilarating. "We were dabbling in
foreign affairs, catching planes and learning foreign languages,"
said Lucas, "We had never written a cable before - we didn't even
3 7know what a cable was."
Everything was open to question; everyone was on first-
name terras. This spirit of adventure and informality was
best exemplified by Sargent Shriver. A newcomer to government
himself, he elicited everyone's opinion and kept the midnight
oil burning.^ He inspired his staff to excel "for Sarge,"
Secretaries refused to send out letters if they contained even the
slightest mistake - "that wasn't good enough for Sarge Shriver,"
recalled Genoa Godbey, a young typist who joined the Peace
Corps in March 1961. In this somewhat emotional environment,
C. Payne Lucas remembered, "There were those of us who c<Jme
in in the morning just to wait outside the door - so we could
3 8all ride up on the elevator with Sarge,"
On March 30, 1961, following the recommendation in Shriver's 
Report, President Kennedy announced the establishment of a 
Peace Corps National Advisory Council. This consisted of a
group of "outstanding American men and women who will give
to this program guidance and counsel in the development of
3 9its activities." William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court, was appointed as Honorary 
Chairman and Vice-President Johnson was named as Chairman 
proper. Having Johnson as a friend in court, was to prove 
providential for the Peace Corps in the very near future.
Council members were prominent Democratic and Republican 
men and women from all walks of life. Among them were 
Joseph Beirne, Vice-President of A.F.L.-C.I.0. ; Harry
Belafonte, singer and actor; William Sloan Coffin, Chaplain 
of Yale University; David E. Lilienthal, former Director 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority; Benjamin E.Mays, President 
of the United Negro College Fund; Eugene Rostow, Dean of Yale 
College; and Mrs Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Advisory Council 
was an attempt by Kennedy to align every shade of political 
opinion behind the Peace Corps. Indeed, he had striven to 
persuade the former Republican President, Herbert Hoover, to 
become the first Honorary Chairman; Hoover declined, on the grounds 
that he could not possibly devote the necessary time and energy 
to the post. Hoover told Kennedy he was already overburdened 
by commitments, "Some day you will find yourself in the 
same predicaments," he warned the young President - a remark 
which took on added poignancy in the light of later events?^
Yet, despite Hoover's non-acceptance of the Chair, Kennedy's 
second stroke of the pen for the Peace Corps at the end of 
March, allowed it to transcend political squabbles and become 
a truly "national" concern. . It also carried through Shriver's 
wish "to demonstrate the importance of this program and to generate 
public support.
On March 6, 19 61, Under-Secretary of State, Chester Bowles, 
sent a memorandum to President Kennedy in which he made clear 
that there was "wide agreement on the necessity and importance
of the Peace Corps maintaining its own sep^irate identity."
Bowles suggested that any organisational plans should be kept 
"sufficiently flexible so that the Peace Corps may move in 
the most productive directions which time and experience 
d i c t a t e . D e s p i t e  Bowles* elegant plea, there was no 
consensus within the Federal bureaucracy as to the status 
of the Peace Corps. Indeed, such was the ferocity of feeling 
"■ against the Peace Corps becoming independent of the general 
foreign assistance programme, a bitter bureaucratic battle 
ensued in which the President himself was forced to act as 
final arbiter.
Shriver*s Report To The President in February, had
recommended that, while the Peace Corps should draw upon the
experience and facilities of the International Cooperation
Administration (I.C.A.) it should be "a small, new alive
agency»" The Report warned that "Beginning the Peace Corps as
another I.C.A. operation runs the risk of losing its new appeal.
Of course, Shriver never intended the Peace Corps to be
completely separate.from the State Department but equally,
.as he told Secretary of State Dean Rusk, he did not want it •
identified by the public, by the Congress, or by foreign
countries as just "another foreign aid resource like
development loans or food for peace." Shriver reminded
Rusk that when Kennedy had first mentioned the Peace Corps
he had implied that it would be "an identifiable, visible
body of people, a corps in the fullest sense of the word
with an esprit de corps all its own." Shriver insisted that
the Peace Corps should not be seen as part of existing foreign
aid programmes but rather, should be "consistently referred
44to at home and abroad as President Kennedy's Peace Corps."
As early as February 19, 1961, Bill Josephson, himself 
an experienced former official with I.C.A., argued strongly 
that the Peace Corps should not be linked in any way to the
•traditional foreign aid establishment which was associated
with "boondoggles" by many congressmen and with "imperialism"
45by many Third World leaders. During March, President Kennedy 
reorganised the entire United States assistance programme. He 
incorporated all the government's economic and social development 
programmes - including I.C.A., the Development Loan Fund 
and the Food-For-Peace - into one gigantic new bureaucratic 
unit which he called the Agency for International Development 
(A.I.D.) Throughout March and April, Peace Corps officials 
resiliently resisted integration with A.I.D.
Within government circles there was a weighty body of 
opinion which felt threatened by the prospect of untrained 
young Americans going into the Third World. As Bill Moyers 
put it, "the old-line employees of State and A.I.D. coveted 
the Peace Corps greedily. It was a natural instinct; 
established bureaucracies do not like competition from new 
p e o p l e . H e n r y  Labouisse, who had been head of I.C.A. 
before it was replaced in 1961 by A.I.D., admitted that 
he had had mixed feelings on the Peace Corps. He feared 
that sending inexperienced youngsters into strange 
environments and cultures would be inviting disaster and 
embarrassment. Hence, he proposed the Peace Corps should be 
placed under the firm control of A.I.D. where its progress 
could be strictly monitored?^ "Those who had been presiding 
over foreign aid all those years simply thought they knew 
best how -CO do it," wrote Bill Moyers, "and they pooh-poohed 
the idea that volunteers could contribute to a field which 
had been dominated by professionals." One Assistant Secretary 
of State told Moyers that not only were many diplomats indifferent 
to the Peace Corps but, in some quarters, there was frank 
opposition?^ This bureaucratic conservatism did not apply 
to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Indeed, he told Shriver
that he thought the idea first-class. "The plan is practical,
experimental, does not promise the moon to anybody and we should
49get under way with it right away." he said. Under-Secretary
of State Chester Bowles (whose daughter Sally, was one of the
very first Peace Corps staff members), also promised Sargent
Shriver his assistance ”in every possible way."^^ Nevertheless,
despite the President's personal commitment to the Peace Corps
and the support of influential figures such as Rusk and Bowles,
the intransigence of an exceedingly powerful group of
experienced bureaucrats had yet to be overcome. Bill Moyers
later recalled that "they couldn't outright oppose the Peace
Corps because it had such high visibility with the President,
51So they did the next best thing; they sought, to absorb it."
The Peace Corps' first severe problem arose in late 
March over President Kennedy's proposed "Special Message
To The Congress On Foreign Aid," Kennedy's aides - Sorensen,
Goodwin, Dungan, O' Brien and O' Donnell - felt it would be
best, in terms of organisational tidiness, to tie the Peace
Corps to the foreign aid bill and then later with a separate
Peace Corps bill. Thus, when Shriver was shown rhe first draft of
Kennedy's proposed speech, he was horrified to note that the
President was fully intending to locate the- Peace Corps in the
new foreign assistance organisation, A.I.D., Shriver, Wiggins
and Josephson immediately composed a memorandum to the President
and argued the case for the independence of the Peace Corps
as forcibly as possible. Shriver also paid a visit to
Kennedy in the White House and made a personal plea. Again,
Goodwin, Dungan and Sorens&n claimed it was only logical to
place all the overseas aid programmes - including the Peace
Corps - under one umbrella. Kennedy, impressed by Shriver's
appeal, but used to accepting his aides' advice, remained 
52undecided. Consequently, his speech on foreign aid on March
22, 1951, was nebulous in regard to the Peace Corps'
organisational status. Citing the Peace Corps as one of the
"flexible tools" of the new American foreign assistance policy,
he said that far from being submerged, its "distinctive
53identity and appeal" would be preserved. Shriver’s personal 
petition to his brother-in-law had won the Peace Corps a 
reprieve-
On March 24, 1961, Shriver wrote to Richard Goodwin of
the White House staff and explained that "legislative
leaders..c.have expressed strong opinions that Peace Corps
legislation should be introduced separately and. before the
54general foreign aid bill." By arguing that the Peace Corps
would have a better chance in Congress if it was not tied to
foreign aid appropriations, Shriver strongly reiterated the
case for independence. However, it soon appeared that his
efforts had been in vain. For on March 30, 1961, Kennedy
sent Shriver a memorandum to the effect that Henry Labouisse
had been appointed as Chairman of a foreign aid task force
which would set about incorporating all foreign assistance
programmes - including the Peace Corps - into the new A.I.D,
agency. Almost reprovingly, Kennedy warned Shriver that he expect[e
55Labouisse to be accorded "complete cooperation." The task 
force on foreign aid met on a number of occasions but scheduled 
its final meeting for April 26. On that day the President 
himself would decide on the Peace Corps' status. The timing 
of the meeting could not have been worse for the Peace Corps. 
Shriver had already been advised by Kennedy that he should 
attempt to persuade Third World leaders of the Peace Corps' 
usefulness by making a three week visit to several developing 
countries; his trip was due to begin on April 22 - four days 
before the decision on the independence of the Peace Corps. 
Throughout April, Shriver lobbied Sorens&n, Dungan and
Labouisse and tried to persuade them of the absolute necessity of 
Peace Corps autonomy. At this stage, Shriver wanted to avoid 
bothering the President over this issue, but he let it be 
known that - if needs be - he was prepared to do so. Labouisse 
objected to even the possibility of Shriver making use of his ; 
personal relationship with Kennedy. He wanted this battle 
to be fought under the traditional rules of the bureaucratic 
game; invocations to the President on a personal basis were not 
regarded as fair play. Shriver replied to Labouisse in a 
strongly-worded memorandum - a copy of which he sent to the 
President:
"I agree that we should, if at all possible, avoid 
troubling the President at this time. I believe 
however, that although organisational, these issues 
about the future place and role of the Peace Corps 
are of such fundamental importance that he ought to 
participate in their resolution. His espousal of the 
Peace Corps notion in the course of his campaign was 
an important political commitment, and he has a genuine 
personal interest in the success of the Peace Corps 
as well."56
Shriver wrote that he had consulted with Vice-President
Johnson and other congressional leaders and they had advised
"it would be a grave political mistake for the Peace Corps
to be authorised at the same time and as but one of the categories
of assistance in the new foreign aid bill." With a final
blast against’ "conceptual and organisation#! neatness", Shriver
57embarked upon his journey to the Third World, He had done 
all he could to win independence for the Peace Corps. Ironically, 
the Peace Corps’ battle was now in the hands of two former I.C.A. 
bureaucrats - Warren Wiggins and Bill Josephson.
President Kennedy did not, if fact, chair the meeting on 
April 26 - at this point, virtually all his time was taken up 
in dealing with the repercussions of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. 
Instead, he designated his Special Assistant, Ralph Dungan to 
act for him. Labouisse and David Bell (Director of the Bureau
of the Budget) recommended the Peace Corps should be a 
sub-division of A.I.D.; of course, Wiggins and Josephson 
disagreed, arguing that the only advantage of this arrangement 
was bureaucratic tidiness. Dungan decided in favour of 
incorporation. A somewhat dismayed Bill Josephson made a 
record of the conversation at the meeting: "Mr Dungan 
said that the Peace Corps was not an extra-governmental thing.
He said that the Peace Corps could not be favoured or given extra­
ordinary treatment at the expense of over-all government 
considerations."^^ Warren Wiggins cabled a few brief dispirited 
words to Shriver, who at this time was in India. "Peace Corps 
not, repeat not, to have autonomy," he wrote* "Dungan 
describes himself as acting on behalf of the President,
Shriver recollected his feelings upon reading Wiggins's 
message - "I was sitting in a hotel room in New Delhi when I 
received a cable....I remember just sitting there for some 
time....holding the bad news in my hands and feeling helpless.
I was convinced a terrible mistake had been made, that the
6ÙPeace Corps was about to die a-borning."
Wiggins and Josephson suspected Dungan had not been an 
entirely dispassionate adjudicator; there was some evidence 
he had intercepted Shriver's memorandum to the President and 
prevented it"'from reaching him. Like Labouisse, Dungan believed 
the Peace Corps should be part of A.I.D. and that the President 
need not be troubled by the arguments of amateurs. Josephson 
blamed himself for being "innocent in the extreme" when 
confronted by wily, bureaucratic in-fighters like Labouisse 
and Dungan. Quite in despair at the defeat, he described 
the Peace Corps' mood in late April as "neurotic and leaderless 
He fired off a forceful memorandum to the President arguing 
that many Americans would not have volunteered for the Peace 
Corps if they had imagined it was going to be just another part
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of the United, States assistance programme. Abroad too, 
he said, leaders like Nehru, Nkrumah and Nyrere would be 
willing to accept the idea of a Peace Corps where they 
would not accept other United States international efforts?^
His words fell on deaf ears; Dungan's decision seemed final.
As a last-ditch effort, Shriver had advised Wiggins to 
ask Vice-President Johnson - in his capacity as Chairman of 
the National Advisory Council - if he would intercede on 
behalf of the Peace Corps to the President. With this new 
development, Bill Moyers took on the crucial role. No one 
knew Johnson better; moreover, the Vice-President was fond 
of remarking ' that in all his years in the ^^ngpess, he had never 
seen a more capable aide than Moyers. Well aware that Johnson 
had been a Director of the National Youth Administration 
during the New Deal, Moyers played on his sympathy for the 
Peace Corps idea and arranged a meeting with Wiggins and 
Josephson. In later years, Moyers recalled the gist of 
Johnson's advice against accepting Dungan*s decision:
"Boys, this town is full of folks who believe the 
only way to do something is their way. That's 
especially true in diplomacy and things like that, 
because they work with foreign governments^ protocoU 
is oh-so-mighty-important to them, with guidebooks and 
rulebooks and do's-and-dont's to keep .you from offending 
someone.. You put the Peace Corps, into the foreign 
service and they'll put striped pants on your people 
when all you'll want them to have is a knapsack and 
a tool kit and a lot of imagination. And they'll 
give you a hundred and one reasons why it won't work 
every time you want to do something different," 63
Johnson agreed that if the Peace Corps became part of A.I.D., 
it would lose its unique appeal to young people, become 
entangled in red tape and end up nothing more than "just 
another box in an organisational chart, reporting to a third 
assistant director of personnel for the State Department
After this informal cabal, Johnson called Kennedy and 
asked for a personal meeting. It was arranged for May 1, 19 61.
According to Bill Josephson, on his way to the Oval Office,
Johnson "picked up Henry Labouisse and Dave Bell by their
respective ears and began by telling them what the foreign
aid program really should do. It should be healing the sick
and the lame and the blind - very earthy, pithy stuff....
very close to what Peace Corps Volunteers could and would 
6 5do." Unfortunately, no record was kept of the conversation 
between Kennedy and Johnson, However, again according to 
Josephson, the legend grew up that "Johnson collared Kennedy.... 
and in the course of the conversation badgered him so much that 
Kennedy finally said all right.
Kennedy's reversal of Dungan's earlier verdict was 
confirmed by a somewhat terse memorandum from Dungan to Dean 
Rusk on May 2, 1961. "This is to ÜUform you," wrote Dungan,
"that yesterday evening the President, in consultation with the 
Vice-President,, decided that the Peace Corps should be organised 
as a s emir autonomous unit within the Department, of State and that 
the Director of the Corps would have an Assistant Secretary
6 7status and would report directly to the Secretary of State."
A front-page headline in the New York Times was much more
enthusia:s±±o and illuminating - "Peace Corps Wins Fight For
Autonomy" it proclaimed. Quite mysteriously, someone had "leaked"
the whole story of the Peace Corps' battle for independence
to the press - much to the embarrassment of Labouisse, Dungan
and several other of Kennedy's aides. "The President's
decision followed a two-month tug-of-war within the administration,
noted New York Times reporter, Peter Braestrup. "For Peace
6 8Corps officials, it was an important victory."
Harris Wofford rated the winning of independent status as 
"the biggest early decision" in Peace Corps history?^ It had some 
very important implications. Dungan, Bell, Labouisse and the 
other professional bureaucrats who had been in opposition to
the "independistes" were extremely upset by the Peace
Corps' unusual methods of achieving their objectives. In
particular, the Peace Corps' use of Vice-President Johnson
was considered vary sharp practice. Accordingly, a few days after
Kennedy's reversal decision, Dungan called Wiggins and-Josephson
into his office in the White House and informed them, in no
uncertain manner, of his displeasure. Josephson remembered
Dungan saying something to the effect that "if we wanted to go
it alone - we were really going to go it alone." The White
House staff and officials of A.I.D. were extremely irritated;
they did not take kindly to what they regarded as a surreptitLows
infringement of their authority. Furthermore, the breach
was never healed. From the time of the battle for independence,
there was always a certain coolness between the White House
staff and the Peace Corps. Dungan had meant what he said.
70"We really were on our own," recalled Josephson. However,
on the positive side, Lyndon Johnson became a staunch advocate of
the Peace Corps and took a prolonged and serious interest in
its well-being. Referring to his inestimable contribution
to the battle, for independence, Sarg&nt Shriver praised
71Johnson as "a founding father of the Peace Corps.”
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Peace
Corps' winning of independence was that it left the new agency
free to develop outside the constricting boundaries of a huge
bureaucracy. The Peace Corps was regarded as a "different"
type of government body - separate and apart with a life and
identity of its own. As Bill Moyers put it, "a remarkable
manifestation of a spirit too particular and personal to be
7 2contained by a bureaucratic organization," A delighted 
Harris Wofford praised Kennedy for his decision to preserve 
the special identity and fresh appeal of the Peace Corps by 
making it a semi-autonomous agency. "This decision seems
(important and right," he told the President, "Our
best advisors warned 'against the Peace Corps slipping into
the established patterns of foreign aid. The Peace Corps'
people-to-people approach and educational emphasis offers an
opportunity to create a new pattern. For this it needs the
73freedom and energy of autonomy,"
During the months of March and April 19 61, the American
public “ unaware of the internecine bureaucratic squabbles -
maintained a keen interest in the Peace Corps. Indeed,
popular enthusiasm seemed even more pronounced after the
Executive Order had made the idea a reality. Life magazine
reported that "the hottest topic on college campuses and among youn®
people generally....was neither studies nor panty raids, but
President Kennedy's Peace Corps." According to Life, "The
majority of collegians were strongly in favor....their earnest
debates proved that their generation was not silent, selfish
and conformist, as has often been charged, but world-mdnded,
idealistic and responsive." Kennedy's appeal for volunteers
instigated an unprecedented mail response to a concept which,
the New York Times lauded as "in harmony with the American
dream." A public opinion poll taken in early April, 1961,
revealed that 68 per cent of the public approved of the Peace
Corps; a survey undertaken by the American Council on Education
showed a massive 94 per cent of college students in favour?^
A few days after the President's announcement, Ralph Dungan
informed Harris Wofford that letters of support for the
Peace Corps were flowing into the White House from business,
industry, religious organisations, journalists and lawyers.
Nearly five thousand arrived on the single day after the
75Executive Order had been issued.
On university and college campuses in particular, the
response was ecstatic- The Guardsman of San Francisco City 
College observed, "Campaign platforms, it has been said, are to
get in on, not to stand on. Be this as it may, one prominent 
plank in the platform of President Kennedy is now in the process of 
becoming a reality." The students claimed that the establishment 
of the Peace Corps proved that Kennedy was not just another 
cynical politician - "It helped to get the President 'in’ 
and now he’s not only standing on it, but he is actively working 
on it attempting to give it life and meaning." Farleigh 
Dickinson University in New Jersey, proposed a plan to offer 
academic credit and grants for those interested in Peace 
Corps service. Six hundred students at New York University 
sent a twenty-eight foot long telegram to Sargent Shriver 
requesting that a project be prepared on their campus. By 
June, over one hundred and fifty educational establishments 
had made similar offers. A conference of twelve eastern colleges 
decided to send a resolution to the Organisation of American 
States endorsing the Peace Corps - as did the convention of the 
Student National Education Association.
In the Congress, Senator Bible was contacted by the
University of Nevada and told of the enthusiasm for the Peace
Corps in his home constituency. The American Instisute of
Foreign Trade in Phoenix, Arizona indicated their interest to
Senator Goldwater. Private foundations and industries in New
York began to urge Senator Keating to support the Peace Corps,
Senator Humphrey told his colleagues on March 7, that the twelve
thousand inquiries which had already reached the Peace Corps
offered proof that the public response to Kennedy's proposal was 
77"overwhelming". Moreover, by March 7, Sargent Shriver claimed 
that a dozen countries had shown interest in the Peace Corps.
The New York Times noted that the Washington embassies of 
Brazil, Nigeria, Colombia and Vietnam had given early endorsements 
to the Peace Corps. Prime Mininster Nehru of India spoke 
approvingly of the idea, as did General Azikiwe of Nigeria.
In West Germany, Mayor Brandt of Berlin lauded the idea. In
the House of Commons, it was praised by both Labour and
Conservative members of Parliament. Indeed, Newsweek magazine
reported that Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was "so
enthusiastic" about the Peace Corps he had asked President
Kennedy to include a British contingent among the first group 
7 Rto go overseas.
Almost every day in March and April the media focused 
on the latest developments in the Peace Corps. Meanwhile, 
Sargent Shriver gave press conferences, wrote articles for 
national magazines, and worked very hard at keeping up the Peace 
Corps' momemtum. However, while most reports were well— 
inclined, a perceptible element of scepticisVnsiaAvivèd, Kennedy 
received a confidential poll from Louis Harris which showed that 
although the balance of opinion was 2:1 in favour of the Peace 
Corps, it was a "far cry" from the overall 10:1 which the 
Kennedy administration generally enjoyed. Harris predicted 
that the Peace Corps would arouse deep cleavages within the 
country. While it would attract the support of young 
people and others sensitive to Third World problems, 
conservatives would attack it as "a dead ringer for the 
National Youth Administration, the Works Project Administration 
and several other New Deal experiments," Looking ahead to 
1964 and re-election prospects, Harris pointed out that although 
the Peace Corps would give heart and inspiration to important 
segments of the Kennedy support, it would also "solidify 
more than any other measure to date, the opposition of 
support that unquestionably will be lost in a re-election 
situation in 1964."*^^ The liberal New Rebublic suggested 
that rather than pack off "our evangelical youth" to the
underdeveloped world, America should send substantial amounts
of what really mattered - money. One businessman called 
the Peace Corps a "crack-pot" idea. The Daughters of the 
American Revolution passed a resolution at their seventieth 
Continental Congress which urged United States legislators 
to defeat the Peace Corps bill. The Young Republican National 
Federation issued a statement objecting to the Peace Corps 
and editorial comment in the New York Times warned that the 
new organisation should not degenerate into a public relations 
exercise aimed at combatting the image of the "Ugly American,
At a conference sponsored by the Rockefeller Brothers 
Fund and other major foundations. Peace Corps officials sensed 
there was great suspicion of Kennedy’s new agency. This 
stemmed from the behaviour of past government programmes which 
had not consulted with the private foundations. The Peace 
Corps was seen in this context. Morris Abram advised Shriver that 
he must break down this pessimistic attitude by personally 
talking to the foundation heads; in the meantime however,
Abram predicted little help would be forthcoming from the important 
foundations. Also, Carroll Willson of M.I.T. told Shriver 
that throughout the academic world there was both scepticism 
and indifference. He warned Shriver that this would have to
81be alleviated., if the Peace Corps was to function effectively.
More troublesome to Kennedy and Shriver than the 
dissenters at home were the unbelievers overseas. President 
Keita of Mali thought that while the Peace Corps might be of 
some value to young Americans, it would probably be 
ineffective in the amount of help it could give to underdeveloped 
countries. While attending a conference on Africa at New 
York University, Averell Harriman (United States Ambassador- 
at-large) , noted that the strong interest in the Peace 
Corps was tainted with scepticism. Also, Arthur Schlesinger
Jr. was informed that labour union delegates from India, 
Pakistan, Ceylon and Turkey were "Skeptical of its eventual 
success." The Johannesburg Star voiced a serious doubt that 
American youth could endure the sacrifice that Peace Corps 
work would entail, and a Burmese student, Khin Khin Kla, 
wrote an open letter to all prospective volunteers in the 
New York Herald Tribune. "Will you be able to take all 
this?" he questioned:
"You will live in a small wooden house, sleep on 
the floor on a bamboo mat, with a pillow stuffed 
with rice grain and a mosquito net to protect you 
from the swarms of bloodthirsty mosquitoes. The 
heavy, humid heat and the hard bed will not. be 
comfortable....you will suffer from the damp 
weather.... leeches will cling to you; worms, frogs 
and snakes will be numerous."82
The Washington correspondent of the respected Times
of India also wondered whether American youngsters accustomed
to air-conditioned houses, fast-food and cars would be able
to "suffer the Indian summer smilingly and, if they go into
an Indian village, will they be able to sleep on unsprung
beds under the canopy of the bejeweled sky or indoors in mud
huts, without writing home about it?" These doubting opinions
were reflected in the faint response to the Peace Corps from
Third World governments. Despite President"Kennedy's well-
publicised hope that "those countries which are interested
in understanding our country and traditions will welcome
these young men and women", as March ended, not a single
83formal invitation had come from abroad, Shriver quoted 
the sceptics as saying "Go ahead with your idealistic 
ventures; Americans have always oversimplified foreign affairs 
The Peace Corps is no exception. Waste your monies and your 
energies but don't expect us to attach much significance to
Q A
your effort."
Kennedy and Shriver knew that if the Peace Corps was
ever to be successful, then Third World leaders would have
to be persuaded that it was an important new American initiative.
More than dislike or distrust, Shriver felt the problem was
one of indifference; the governments of the underdeveloped
countries quite simply did not think the Peace Corps was
very important. To change this perspective, Kennedy
_ suggested Shriver should travel to some of the developing
countries and inform their heads of state of the value of
the Peace Corps. Kennedy also felt the trip would allow
Shriver the opportunity of seeing at first hand, the
circumstances of need and the conditions under which
8 Svolunteers would live and work. On April 22, 1961,
Shriver began his twenty-six day venture in personal diplomacy; 
it took him,to Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Burma, Malaya, 
Thailand and the Philippines. Accompanied by Harris Wofford,
Ed Bayley and Franklin Williams, Shriver conferred at length 
with leading foreign ministers and Cabinet members as well 
as with American technical assistance officers and embassy 
staffs. Not all government officials were instant converts 
to the idea. U Nu asked Shriver whether he really believed that 
young Americans could compete with the Chinese communists 
who had already offered assistance to Burma, President 
Nkrumah of Ghana wanted only the most highly-qualified 
Americans and was reluctant to accept "ordinary" university 
and college graduates. Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith 
in India anticipated "great trouble" in selling the Peace 
Corps to Nehru?^
However, although Shriver had had no previous diplomatic 
experience, his personal style overcame all initial reservations. 
When Harris Wofford made his report to the President on the 
trip, he told him that Shriver was a born diplomat. Wofford 
was effusive in his praise:
"I have never been witness to so successful an 
international operation. Shriver's meetings with 
government officials, newsmen and private citizens 
all produced good results for the Peace Corps and 
United States relations. Our ambassador and other 
overseas officers in every country expressed to me 
and others their admiration and appreciation of 
Shriver, their amazement at how much was accomplished 
in such a short time, and their increased hopes for 
the Peace Corps in their respective co u n t r i e s 87
Ed Bayley stressed that Shriver's kinship with Kennedy
made a great impression on foreign leaders. "He was 'royalty'
8 8to them," he explained, "a coAcept which they understood."
Indeed, the fact that Shriver was Kennedy’s brother-in-law 
won privileges and concessions for the Peace Corps at this 
early stage which might otherwise have taken months, or even 
years of diplomatic negotiations to achieve. Ambassador 
Galbraith described Shriver's style of diplomacy as "just 
right....natural, uncontrived and sincere." Nehru was so 
impressed that he asked Shriver to send even more Volunteers 
than either he or Galbraith had dared hope. Galbraith 
noted in his diary that he had left Nehru's office "a little
89dazed and with my reputation as a strategist in poor condition,” 
The aborted invasion at the Bay of Pigs took place only 
one week before Shriver's trip overseas. Harris Wofford informed 
Kennedy that the Cuban affair had undoubtedly shocked those 
Third World leaders who had believed that the new administration's 
foreign policy would be a real departure from the rabid anti­
communism of John Foster Dulles, However, Wofford claimed that 
the situation would have been much worse had Kennedy gone ahead 
and used American military force to overthrow Castro. His 
restraint had saved his image in the Third World. "There 
exists a reservoir of goodwill and hope for you in these 
countries," insisted Wofford, "the high expectations for a new 
American approach to the world which you have aroused in 
Nkrumah, Nehru and U Nu, to name three important cases, are
a great opportunity." Wofford believed the Peace Corps
represented Kennedy’s best hope of taking full advantage
90of this opportunity. The evidence suggested that he was
absolutely right. For, in May, 19 61, despite the Bay
of Pigs, Shriver returned triumphantly to Washington with
invitations from all eight countries he had visited to send
a total of three thousand Volunteers to begin Peace Corps
programmes. These first few invitations opened the floodgates.
Less than one week after Shriver’s return from the Third
World, Kennedy was able to announce at the first meeting
of the Peace Corps National Advisory Council that he had
received over two dozen formal requests for Volunteers from
91various Third World countries,
Shriver’s journey abroad to "invite invitations" was the
crucial last step in ensuring that the Peace Corps would be
successfully established. It not only destroyed the sceptical
view that foreign governments would not want young.Americans
meddling in their internal affairs, but also gave the Peace
Corps' organisers an insight into what Third World leaders
felt was needed and what they would accept. As Ed Bayley
noted, "We didn't really know what the Peace Corps was going
9 2to be until we made that trip." The period from Kennedy's 
issue of the Executive Order in March to Shriver’s trip 
to the Third World in May, 1961, was probably the most 
momentous in the history of the Peace Corps. On the basis 
of an election campaign speech, a new government agency was 
created and launched within one hundred days - an achievement 
of monumental proportions.
In July, six definite Peace Corps projects were announced 
for Tanganyika, Colombia, the Philippines, Chile, St. Lucia 
and Ghana. Seven thousand applicants were prepared to take 
the first Peace Corps tests and the first volunteers soon
b,;^ gan training at a field school founded especially for that
93purpose in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Also, a budget had been 
estimated and a Peace Corps bill drafted and sent to the 
Congress for consideration. The Peace Corps had come a 
long way from the Cow Palace. Even so, there was no time 
for smugness. Indeed, Warren Wiggins reminded all staff 
.members that complacency would not be tolerated:
"A period of extremely intensive activity for the 
whole Peace Corps is now at hand.... there will be a 
host of policy and administrative decisions.Much 
will be required of all the members of the Peace 
Corps staff in the next few weeks. Having been given 
autonomy within the State Department, we must now 
clearly demonstrate that we are capable of discharging 
the responsibilities that go with the status."94
"In little more than six months," Sargent Shriver told his
Q  C
Staff in the summer of 1961, "a vision has become a reality."
By May, the Peace Corps had been established, organised and 
staffed. Moreover, it had been invited to begin programmes 
in some of the most politically powerful countries of the 
developing world. Also, with the help of Vice-President 
Johnson, the new agency had fought for, and eventually won, 
the battle for independence within the Federal bureaucracy.
This was a turning point; the Peace Corps was now free to 
develop as a truly "different" type of government organisation. 
Yet, the months between March and May, 19 61, had been full 
of risks and danger. Many sceptics were quick to pronounce 
the Peace Corps a "second children's crusade." Indeed, only 
half-jokingly, Sargent Shriver later suggested that President 
Kennedy had chosen him to lead the. Peace Corps because "no
one thought it would succeed and it would be easier to
fire a relative than a political f r i e n d . H o w e v e r ,
the Peace Corps' winning of independence rendered its
future a good deal less precarious, "We now have our
first opportunity to step back and look at what we have
accomplished," wrote Shriver to his colleagues, "We
must analyse this experience, reflect seriously about what
kind of a’f prcgram.we-want and do something about it." Very
much aware that the Peace Corps had reached a watershed
in its history, Shriver concluded, "This is the last time
Kxilhave such an opportunity. Soon all the energies
of our staff will again be concentrated on program
development, operations and the legislative presentation 
.97to Congress.
CHAPTER FIVE
ASSAULT OR THE HILL
“An Act; To provide for a Peace Corps to help the peoples 
of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs 
for skilled manpower*’*
- THE PEACE CORPS ACT -
(Signed by President Kennedy, 
September 22, I96I)
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In the precarious summer of 1961, the Peace Corps* foremost aim, was 
sheer political survival. If the United States Congress did not make it law 
and grant funds then all would be lost before a, single Volunteer got into 
the field. Yet, to win approval on Capitol Hill, Sargent Shriver would have 
to overcome enormous inertia, scepticism and even some latent isolationism. 
He was extremely conscious of President Kennedy*s great political gamble* 
Many - including Eisenhower and Hixon - had openly derided the Peace Corps 
idea; if it failed to pass through the Congress, it would be taken as a 
sign of his inexperience and reinforce the charge that he was too young 
for the job* Thus, despite its loftier ends, the Peace Corps* immediate 
means were inescapably domestic and political. The jungle of Washington had 
to be conquered before any jungles in Ghana or Guatemal,ao
In the later years of the Kennedy administration, commentators 
liked to describe the Peace Corps * relationship with the eighty- 
seventh and eighty-eighth Congresses as a "love affair"*^ In April,
1962, the Peace Corps* legislation was supported in the House of 
Representatives by an overtfhelming vote of 3l7 to 70 and it passed the 
Senate by- voice vote. By Ncr/ember I96B, the voice vote formality was 
sufficient in both House and Senate. Also, in each of those years Congress 
increased its funding of the Peace Corps by some 30 million dollars. The 
Washington Daily Hews adjudged this latter action more notable in
view of determination to clamp down on foreign
aid spending in gênerai."
With no little'pleasure, Sargent Shriver charted the conversion
of confirmed sceptics to the Peace Corps cause. In March, 1962,
Shriver sent Kennedy what he jokingly entitled the "Statement-Of-the
Month" from Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. At a Harvard-
Princeton-Yals Club luncheon, the conservative Republican was
quoted as saying, "At first I thought that the Peace Corps would
be advance work for a group of beatniks, but this is not so,,,,
I have been impressed (and) I'll back it all'the way," Shriver
also relayed to the President a message, left at his office by
Richard Russell of Georgia, the second-ranking Democrat on the
Senate Committee on Appropriations and a prominent southern
conservative, "I just wanted to say that somebody down there
(»
has been doing a good job with a difficult chahl&nge, said Russell,
"the Peace Corps seems to be in mightygcod shape in Congress."
Howard Smith, Chairman of the House Committee on Rules and leader
of the southern Democratic bloc in Congress, was so persuaded
of the ' /i.' Peace Corps*, merit by 1962, that he permitted his
Committee to vote unanimoualy in favour of it in open session. "This is
something House parliamentarians tell me is unprecedented," a delighted
%
Shriver wrote to Khinedy.
Such warm Congressional endorsements had not always been forthcoming.
In 1961, the Peace Corps had been forced to fight very hard for its
legislative life on Capitol Hill; sucess did not come effortlessly.
The Democratic Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, recalled that even he had
had some doubts about the Peace Corps in the beginning, "I felt that it
might be a failure and have adverse repercussions for the Administration,"
he said. Likewise, the Majority WMp, Hubert H#mph rey, wrote In later
years that "while everybody praises the Peace Corps now,...anyone who'
has taken the trouble to look at the votes on the amendments to the
Peace Corps proposal at the time we were debating it in the Congress
5or read all the speeches, knows that it wasn’t easy,"
In his "Special Message To The Congress Qq The Peace Corps” on March
•.]_^ '19ol President Kennedy insisted that, at this stage, The Peace Corps
was only ''temporary"that it would be fundcfi from appropçriations "currently
available for our foreign aid programme" and that it would follow a
"similar approach" to the Humphrey - Reuas proposals of 1960,f 7et^ . despite 
this deferential attitude trouble was anticipated for any future Peace
Corps legislation in Congress. For one thing, the very concept of foreign
assistance was - by tradition-unpopular on Capitol Hill. Indeed, in the
same week as Kennedy announced the Peace Corps, the House Committee on
Appropriations refused to vote a single dollar of the I50 million dollars in
emergency funds which he had requested to carry out his foreign economic 
7
policy. Furthermore, many legislators felt their authority had been usurped
by the Executive Order, and the "back-door" funding of the Peace Corps
from the President's special contingency supply. Senator Bennett (R,, Utah)
was alarmed that the Congress had permitted the President to pre-empt its
legislative prerogative. "No matter how excellent the Peace Corps idea
may be,’* he argued, "there is no reason for setting it up in this manner,
which evidences such disdain for the constitutional division of powers,"
Similarly, Congressman Johansen (R,, Mich.) believed it was "an
unconstitutional act to initiate this programme without Congressional
authorisation."^ A subnbantiai number of disgn.ntled Congressmen wrote
letters of complaint to the President and Bill Josephson recalled a "little
9
bad taste in some committee staff mouths," The Peace Corps had not got off 
on the best of footing with the Congress and hence, could not afford to 
be over-optimistic about its chances of winning legislation in I96I, To 
cover the worst of eventualities, the Peace Corps' General Counsel 
prepared a paper entitled "Authority To Continue a Peace Corps Should The 
Congress Not Pass a Peace Corps Act At This Session,
The Executive Order had given the Peace Corps some breathing space 
from seeking appropriations for fiscal year 1961. Thus, between Î4arch 
and June, Shriver and his staff could concentrate on the form of the 
Peace Corps bill and the Congressional strategy to gain appropriations 
for fiscal year 1962, Bill Josephson remembered their determination to
"make the best impression on the Congress that anybody had ever made,"
In early Iferch, the Peace Corps began making some informal overtures to
important figures on the Hill. Hubert Humphrey and Henry ■ Reuss were the
natural choices as floor managers of the legislation in the Senate and
House respectively; the Peace Corps consulted regularly with both men.
Humphrey, in his seat of leverage as Majority Whip in the Senate and
also, as an experienced member of the powerful Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, played, an especially significant part in nursing the
Peace Corps through the Congress at delicate moments. His ;commitment to the
Peace Corps ideal was longstanding and, in his memoirs, he described the bill
12as being "of particular emotional importance to me,"
The influential chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
William J, Fulbright, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman,
Thomas Morgan, were also kept well-informed at the early planning stages. 
Moreover, on March !, 5^ 196!!, Shriver paid an essential visit to the office of. the 
Speaker, Sam Rayburn - the most senior ranking Democrat in the Congress*
With impeccable tact, Shriver wrote to thank Rayburn for spending time with 
him discussing the viability of the Peace Corps:
"The problem, of course, as you pointed out, is to carry it
out in such a way that will be constructive and beneficial 
to everyone concerned. We want it to be a down-to-earth, 
people-to-pcople approach that will avoid waste ar.d unnece­
ssary expense.%and I was glad to get your thinking along 
these lines,"
At this point, Shriver realised that the Congress held the power 
of life and death over the Peace Corps, To give this relationship the 
attention it deserved, he set up an office of Congressional Liaison within 
the Peace Corps. Its functions were to work on the form and presentation 
of legislation, to reply to Congressional mail, to keep the Peace Corps 
organisation informed of Congressional visits in Washington and the field, 
and to report to the White House on Legislative developments. In charge 
of this office was Bill Moyers, the twenty-six year old former executive 
assistant to Vice-President Johnson, For all his youth, Moyers had worked 
for Johnson (then Majority Leader) on Capitol Hill since 1954 and his 
political acuity was highly valued by the comparatively inexperienced 
Shriver, Moyers was ably supported by Wilson McCarthy, Warren Wiggins,
Bill Josephson and Ed Bayley. In the Director's staff meeting on March 
22, 1961, these men planned the Peace Corps' assault on the Hill, The 
predominant questions likely to prove troublesome in Congress were outlined:
Will enough people volunteer?’ Will the Peace Corps move cautiously enough?
Will Volunteers be "salesmen" for the American way of Life'? Will Peace 
Corps service be more* attractive to the wealthy th^ fi the poor? Will the 
United States government be liable for injuries to, and mistakes by, the 
Volunteers? Slowly, &roun^the answers to these questions, the Peace Corps'
Congressional presentation evolved.
Meanwhile, in Congress, discussion of the Peace Corps had already
i)
begun, "The bloom is off the rose so far as the Peace Corps is concerned^ 
said Senator Goldwater in a speech critical of the new agency, Frances 
Bolton (R., Ohio) a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called 
the idea "terrifying" while Alexander Wiley, the ranking Republican on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, felt it was being pushed much too fast,
John Rhodes (R,, Az«) of the House Appropriations Committee assailed the 
proposed Beace Corps as an easy target for communist infiltrators. On the othe: 
hand, a number of Democrats made favourable statements* Senators Young, Hart, 
Muskie and Mo Gee spoke enthusiastically of the Peace Corps as an 
embodiment of the spirit of the New Frontier while Congressman Libonati
15saw it as an idea portraying "the pioneer spirit of the American youth,"
While congressmen shaped up for the debate on the Peace Corps bill,
Shriver's staff'were busily writing it. Based on the Report To The 
President, the final product was the cumulative effort of Josephson,
Moyers, Wiggins, Abram and Nelson; Ted Sorensen of the White House staff 
gave a little advice and Roger Kuhn, a young lawyer who had some 
experience of drafting legislation with the International Cooperation 
Administration, made a major contribution. Two specific issues proved the 
most controversial: authority and funding, Kuhn and Abram argued for the
vesting of authority in the Director or in the Peace Corps as a 
sovereign institution, whereas Josephson wanted to place the Peace Corps 
under the President and thus be able to invoke his name whenever possible.
With a view to future bureaucratic battles, Jbsephson sensed that the 
Peace Corps would be better placed, strategically, under the wing of the
rresiüent - whose power was virtually absolute - than on its own. This
meant sacrificing total autonomy but the long-term advantages of being the
President's agency would prove worthwhile. As Josephson explained, felt
that we would be in a stronger position if we were able to say the&0 functions
are conferred upon the President who will be able to supervise and regulate
them and reorganise them if need be, rather than lock us in institutionally,"
Josephson's reasoning won the day,^^
Josephson also proposed that the Peace Corps should ask the Congress
for only one year’s appropriation at a time* More experienced foreign, aid
administrators forecast that such an innovation would cause untold chaos
within the Peace Corps bureaucracy and forestall necessary long-term
planning. But again, Josephson's ineluctable logic prevailed. By requesting
only annual grants, he argued that fretful congressmen would be reassured
that the Peace Corps would not become a renegade, uncontrollable
organisation* There was an element of risk involved. In any year it chose,
Congress could cut the Peace Corps' money supply. Nevertheless,
Josephson believed there was "an absolute utility each year in going up
to the Hill, Congress knows that each year it will get at the program,
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and it also keeps it up-to-date about your program," .’He was right and 
his argument proved particularly persuasive to reluctant congressmen who 
were worried that the Peace Corps might become a costly, self-perpetuating 
government bureaucracy. In writing the legislation, Josephson and Kuhn 
worked especially hard on making it as acceptable to the Congress as 
possible. For example, in describing the Peace Corps, they were careful 
to avoid use of the word, "presumptive".^^
At the same time, they deliberately attempted to leave the Peace Corps 
as free a hand as possible. The draft bill gave the Director substantial 
powers to "promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary 
or appropriate to carry out such functions, and may delegate to any of his 
subordinates authority to perform any of such functions, including, if he 
shall so specify, the authority successively to redelegate any of such 
functions," The training and selection of Volunteers was left for the 
Peace Corps itself to control, as were their living, travel and leave 
allowances and their housing, transportation and subsistence supplies.
However, the bill did require the Peace Corps to report to tne vongress
every year and to request its funds annually. For fiscal year 1962, it
asked for 40 million dollars. Also, as Josephson had suggested, the Peace
Corps' ultimate authority rested with the President - he could dismiss any
19Volunteer at his discretion.
By May 11, 1961, the finalised draft of the Peace Corps bill was
ready for inter-agency review by the Bureau of the Budget, the State
Department and the White House. Warren Wiggins urged that this procedure
be carried through speedily, indeed, "on arf urgent basis,." He told Dean
Rusk that the time was ripe for the passage of '.legislationt since there whs
20
"high public and Congressional interest in the Peace Corps.”
Moreover, by the beginning of May, the Peace Corps had won its battle
for independence. This not only guaranteed its autonomy within the Federal
bureaucracy,.but also its freedom from being sent to the Congress as a
part of the Administration's general foreign aid package. This was crucial,
for it was axiomatic that foreign aid fared disastrously in
21appropriations committees„ Since the Peace Corps' inception, Shriver had
been consistently advised by legislative leaders to take the Peace Corps
to the Congress as a separate commodity. As Shriver told Kennedy, Senate
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen "expressed the opinion that the Peace
Corps should be the subject of separate legislktion if we hope to get any
22prompt and substantial action at this session. This distinctiveness was 
pivotal to the Peace Corps' success in the Congress. However, it caused 
some discomfort in another direction. Certain Presidential aides - most 
notably Congressional Liaison officer Larry O'Brien ~ had been very 
displeased at the Peace Corps’ fight for independence. In the bitter 
aftermath of the Peace Corps' victory, Wiggins and Josephson had been 
warned by Ralph Dungan that they could expect no help from the White House 
staff. Bill Josephson-explained that Dungan and O'Brien looked upon the 
Peace Corps' administrators as obstinate "loners" and ambitious "empire- 
builders." Thus, as far as the President's aides were concerned, the Peace 
Coips- was on its own - in every respect including Congressional support.
So, despite Shriver's obvious lack of experience, the IVhite House staff
oiierea iix'cie assistance. '
At first, Shriver's greenness seemed an insurmountable barrier to his
and the Peace Corps'auccess with Congress. He had never held political
office; he had never lobbied on Capitol Hill; and he had never testified
before a Congressional committee. His chief political experience had been
as adviser to ^ennedy in the I96O campaign and his administrative
background was in business, not government. Thus the Congressional
committees had to be convinced not only of the feasibility of the Peace
Corps idea but also of the competence of its administrators. For his part^
Shriver believed his Congressional innocence was an asset rather than a
liability. In retrospect, he claimed that "If you don't know how it's
supposed to work, then sometimes you do better,Certainly, his technique
was unconventional and, in some ways, unprecedented.
Shriver's forte^ was the personal touch. Between March and September
1961, he personally met with some three hundred and sixty three members 
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of the Congress. The usual tactic of a government administrator with a
bill before Congress was to concentrate on the "big men" on Capitol Hill
- the Majority and Minority leaders, the Whips, the Spealcer and the
committee chairmen. While Shriver made sure that he saw these men, he also
talked to everyone else - or at least, three out of every four congressmen.
He termed this strategy "saturation bombing." In an entertaining
memorandum of September 6, 1961, - "from one brother-in-law to another" -
Shriver outlined for President Kennedy a typical day on the Hill:
"If you want to know what it takes to get your 
Peace Corps through the House and the Senate, 
you may find out by looking at the following 
schedule for tomorrow's activities:
9:00-- Congressman Avery
9:45—  Senator Saltonstall 
10:45—  Congressman Bow 
11:30—  Congressman Brown 
12:15—  Congressman Gallagher
1:00—  Lunch with Senator Ellender and the
Senate Appropriations Committee (this 
is a private luncheon arranged on his
own initiative by Senator Ellender)
3:00—  T.V. Tape with Senator Smith of 
Massachusetts
3:40—  Congressman Kitchin
4:00-- Still to be filled
5:00—  Interviews at Peace Corps offices with:
1) William Rolston, Director of Heifer 
Project
2) Kitty Hay, possible overseas Peace 
Corps Representative
In a postcript, the ebullient Shriver claimed that although this had been
his daily routine for two month§^ "We all love it - and the Volunteers
26think you are the greatest,"
Shriver held hundreds of breakfast meetings with groups of congressmen.
These were extraordinary in that they were based on the geographical
region which a congressman represented rather than his party affiliation.
By meeting Democrats and Republicans at the same time, Shriver cultivated
the notion that the Peace Corps was above partisan politics. In later years,
he recollected, "I zealously went out to win over Republicans as well as 
27Democrats." Naturally, legislators felt flattered when they saw the
Director of a government agency - and the President's brother-in-law to
boot - personally carrying out his own lobbying programme. It was a
significant factor in'persuading''many of them to vote for the Peace Corps.
As one member of the House Rules Committee explained to Bill Haddad:
"You know why I really voted for the Peace Corps?
One night I was leaving at 7:30 and there was Shriver, 
walking up and down the halls of the House Office
Building, by himself, looking into all the doors. He
came in and talked to me, I still didn't likggthe program,
but I was sold on Shriver, I voted for him,"
Shriver was a brilliant performer in committee hearings, always
effervescent and thoroughly prepared. Prior to his appearance before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1961, Shriver asked
his staff for a complete rundown on some of the Peace Corps’ more vital
statistics, "I should have the cost of administration to date," he wrote,
"and the contemplated cost of administration. Also, I should have the
number of people involved, their salaries, and the relationship of their
29expenses to the cost, per capita, of maintaining a Volunteer abroad."
Thus Shriver could reply- to expected questions on expenditure with the 
precise information that a Peace Corps Volunteer would cost the United 
States taxpayer 13»336 dollars for two years service. (Appendix lll^Before 
the vote in the Senate Appropriations Committee, Shriver analysed opinion 
and corresponded with Hubert Humphrey regarding the precarious tension 
within the Committee, At this stage, it seemed the Peace Corps would be 
defeated by one vote:
"Right now I count 13 votes in favor or xne 4u mixaron 
dollars (the amount requested for fiscal year 1962) - 
Hayden, Chavez, Ellender, Me Clelland, Magnusson, Pastore, 
Kefauver, Monroney, Bible, Byrd, (W.Va, ), Me Gee and 
Humphrey - and I4 against us - Russell, Robertson, Holland, 
Stennis, Bridges, Saltonstall, Young (h+gak.), Smith (Maine), 
Bworshak, Hruska, Allott and Schoppel,"
Shriver felt that the Peace Corps' best hope of success was to lobby 
senators Stennis and Holland; he §eft little to chance.
In his own cogent and articulate fashion, Shriver reassured 
congressmen on every facet of Peace Corps operations - that training and 
selection standards would be rigorous, costs would be minimal, and caution 
their watchword. He also paid great attention to detail. When Senator 
Capehart (D,, Ind.) asked him a question about equipment and cost during 
a Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Shriver's meticulous answer ran to 
exact figures on jeeps (135)» horses (20) and outboard motors (l); his
31figure on cost was to the cent - 10,712,894 dollars and 58 cents,
Shriver's innate political sense soon became apparent. When needs be, 
he used the President's name; for instance, he insisted that Kennedy 
himself - rather than the Secretary of State - should always present the 
Peace Corps' legislation to the Congress. Shriver illustrated the Peace 
Corps' bipartisan nature by pointing our the number of prominent 
Republicans as well as Democrats chosen to serve on the National Advisory 
Council; Also, during committee hearings, he always managed to produce 
a string of star witnesses - everyone from Heinz Rollman to Dean Rusk. Most 
of all, Shriver was consistently deferential in his attitude towards the 
Congress, "During the exploratory stages of this program," he told 
committee men, "we have tried to keep clearly in focus the will of Congress, 
Indeed, he was fond of reminding Congress that, to an sxtent, it was 
responsible for the birth of the Peace Corps, After all, the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee sanctioned Henry Reuss's original proposal for a 
study of the idea. Shriver's painstaking efforts paid handsome dividends. 
Congresswoman Church (r ,, 111.) of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
told him that she knew of no government adminstrator who "has-made such
32an effort to bring his story personally to members of Congress," Dean, 
Rusk echoed this sentiment: "I doubt that any individual or agency has ever
had so favorable a situation in the Congress as Sargent Shriver built for 
the Peace Corps,"
Shriver's polished performances owed a great deal to the research 
and planning undertaken by his aupeirh congressional liaison back-up team.
Bill Moyers in particular guided him through Congress by au.ticipat^g 
potentially difficult questions and cantankerous members. Knowing cost 
would be a critical issue, Moyers prepared the Peace Corps' economic brief 
long before its legislation went to Congress. In May, I96I, he told Bill 
Josephson that "There is a certain amount of distrust on the Hill now 
towards the Peace Corps' expenses - growing out of the use of the
Executive Order and Mutual Security fund." Moyers maintained that "Congress 
is not going to want to walk in the dark as far as our administrative 
budget is concerned. Again and again I have been asked questions like 
^How large is your administrative staff going to be?^ Moyers advised that 
the Peace Corps should "take the initiative here and show Congress that we 
are prudent and compassionate on a sensitive issue*,.« we ought not to move 
in any direction that heightens the possibility of d i s t r u s t , H e  also 
correctly predicted that Otto Passman (P., La.), the notoriously frugal 
Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, 
would prove the Peace Corps' .strongest single opponent in the Congress,
To create a convivial atmosphere for the Peace Corps on the Hill, Moyers 
and his staff met formally and informally with countless congressmen; 
they established a three-day deadline on replies to congressional mail; 
phone-calls from legislative offices were never delayed or refused; and 
congressmen were invited to visit training "sites in their home states. For
example, in early August Senator Ralph Yarborough saw trainees at the 
University of Texas in El Paso, "I have never seen a more intelligent, 
dedicated group of students," he told his colleagues during the debate on 
the Peace Corps bill,^^
Another of the Peace Corps' subtle techniques was to ensure that a 
Volunteer from each state had been selected by the time the bill was set 
up for passage. As the first Volunteers were chosen, they became news - 
at the local and state levels - and congressmen in Washington were often 
required to make at least token statements of acknowledgement on the floor 
of the House and Senate. This kept members aware that people back home 
were joining the Peace Corps and that it was a generally popular grassroots 
issue. No time or effort was spared to maintain this congressional 
involvement and interest, Don Romine, one of Bill Moyers's assistants, 
recalled rushing up to the congressional Post Office at four o'clock one 
morning in June, 1961, just to make sure that congressmen would receive a 
briefing-paper which Moyers had prepared for them for that day’s hearing.^^ 
With this extensive lobbying network in the background, Hubert 
Humphrey introduced the Peace Corps' legislation in the Senate on June 1,
1961. Senate bil^ ,, S. 2000 sought to "establish a ^eace Corps of American 
Volunteers to carry America's skills and talents and idealism abroad to
help other peoples help t h e m s e l v e s . F o u r  days later, Henry Reuss brought
a similar bill (H.R.7500) into the House, After hearings in late June,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously reported out the bill
and on September 14» 1961, it passed the body of the House by a roll-call
vote of 288 to 97» One week later, the conferees from both houses reached
agreement and the amended bill passed the House by a vote of 253 to 79»
Again,•a voice vote was sufficient for passage in the Senate* On September
22, 1961, President Kennedy signed the Peace Corps Act which stated:
"The purpose of this Act is to promote world peace 
and friendship through a "Aeace Corps, which shall 
make available to interested countries and areas, 
men and women of the United States qualified for 
service abroad and willing to serve, under conditions 
of hardship if necessary, to help the peoples of such 
countries and areas in meeting their needs for trained 
manpower, and to help promote a better understanding 
of the American people on the part of the peoples 
served and a better understanding of other peoples on 
the part of the American people."
In peace Corps terminology, these requirements specified by the Congress
became known as the "Three Aims". These re-emphasised that the Peace Corps
was not just a technical assistance agency but a means for allowing Third
World peoples to learn about Americans and vice-versa. These "Three Aims"
were consonant with Kennedy's original purpose for the Peace Corps and
its success was judged in these terms.
However, the Peace Corps' passage through the Congress was by no
means all plain sailing. Although congressmen opposed to the actual Peace
Corps concept were few, many Republicans stressed that, in its first year,
they would regard the new agency as "experimental". Resistance to uhe idea
was strongest in the HHouse. Led most vociferously by H.R, Gross (R., Iowa)
a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, these congressmen
viewed the Peace Corps as a "a shining example of ....a legislative pig-in
39-a-poke" and another "foreign aid boondoggle". Most notable among their 
number was John Taber of New York, the ranking Republican on the House 
Sub-Committee on Appropriations and Otto Passman, who held the Chair of 
that Committee. Throughout the Kennedy years, Passman's unrelenting
opposition remained the Peace Corps' most serious obstacle to lull iunding.
The attack on the Peace Corps in the upper chamber was led by Bourke 
Hickenlooper of Iowa who, as third-ranking Republican on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, was in a position of some influence, Barry 
Goldwater, Homer Capehart (R., Ind.) and Richard Russell (D., Ga.) were of 
similar persuasion. George Aiken, the second-ranking Republican on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, also recalled thinking that the Peace Corps 
seemed to offer "an exceptional opportunity to get into difficulty.
However, of more immediate importance than the outright hostility of these 
few was the apparent indifference of the Democratic senator from Arkansas, 
William Fulbright. The Chairman of the prestigious Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee admitted that, from the start, the Peace Corps was not one of 
his "pet projects." He was dubious about the quality of applicant it 
would attract, he did not adnrîËre its "one-way" approach of sending young 
Americans to the Third World without reciprocation, and he was concerned 
as to the effect the Peace Corps might have on his own highiy-successful 
Fulbright programme for educational exchange.
On August 2, 1961, an alarming rumour swept Peace Corps/Washington: 
Fulbright was about to recommend to his committee that the Peace Corps’ 
authorisation request be cut from 40 million dollars to 10 million 
dollars. Under a headline of "Peace Corps Bill Is Facing Curbs", the New 
York Times quoted Fulbright as saying the Peace Corps should adopt a slower 
approach. The Times stated that "such a deep cut in funds....would cripple 
the Peace Corps, embarrass the President abroad, and encourage the more 
conservative House to make even deeper cuts." Minority leader Sverstt 
Dirksen predicted that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might 
"completely transform" the Peace Corps' legislation.^^ As it transpired, 
the Committee voted I4 to 0 in reporting out the bill - Republicans 
Hickenlooper,, Capehart and Williams abstained. However, it soon became 
known that, before this favourable vote, the Committee had rejected 6 to 11 
a motion by Hickenlooper to downgrade the Peace Corps' first year's 
authorisation to 25 million dollars. Furthermore, two Democrats - 
Fulbright and Frank Lausche of Ohio - had voted with Hickenlooper. Had it
not been for a sterling defence by Hubert Humphrey in Committee, the vote
could vieil have been catastrophic for the Peace Corps, Indeed, even as the
bill was reported out, Fulbright repeated that he would like to see the
Peace Corps begun "on a more modest level,” His unenthusiastic attitude
43augured ominously for the Peace Corps' safe passage through the Senate.
Sargent Shriver, worried and angry about the lack of pressure being 
exerted on the Peace Corps' behalf by the White House Congressional 
Liaison and the Democratic leadership on the Hill, fired off a strongly- 
worded memorandum to President Kennedy. "Unless we can build a climate 
of opinion in which the Peace Corps is considered 'must Legislation^," he 
warned, "we are in trouble - regardless of the general goodwill that 
surrounds this proposal." Shriver claimed that congressional leaders 
like Mansfield, Fulbright and Rayburn were "openly lukewarm toward the 
Peace Corps - at least in terms of the legislative priority accorded it."
He pleaded with Kennedy to provide the necessary leadership on the Hill:
"The \ih±te House must provide sufficient leadership and pressure so that 
there will be no doubt in the minds of Congress that the President feels 
the bill must be passed this session. Unless the White Bouse supplies 
this leadership, the lateness of the session alone may doom the chances 
for Peace Corps legislation and appropriations this session.♦,.The bill 
is at least a week from the Senate floor," Shriver added that, at this 
moment, he felt thoroughly frustrated. "Bill Moyers and I have been living 
on the Hill," he wrote, "We may even have laid the foundation for at 
leas t the beginnings of a good working relationship with Congressman 
Passman," However, in a forceful conclusion, Shriver told Kennedy that it 
wa.s time for the White Bouse to lend the Peace Corps some assistance: "Not
that we intend to relax in our efforts, but I think that at this point the 
Peace Corps itself has done all it can on the Hill." In this crucial 
memorandum, Shriver made it clear to Kennedy that if he did not give some 
assistance at this stage, the Peace Corps legislation might be aborted.
Shriver's powerful message had the desired effect. At a news 
conference on August 10, 1961, Kennedy without being asked a question 
about it - made a strongly supportive statement on the Peace Corps, He
outlined the tremendous response which it had been receiving and he spoke 
of it as one of the most encouraging features of his administration: "It has
had a most promising beginning, and we have an opportunity if the amount 
requested by the Peace Corps is approved by the Congress, of having 2,700 
Volunteers serving the cause of peace in fiscal year 1962." With Shriver’s 
memorandum in mind, Kennedy added his weight to the Peace Corps’ assault 
on the Hill. "I am hopeful," he said, "that the Congress will support this 
-effort." The President’s remarks were short but to the point and - less than 
two weeks before the debate on the Peace Corps would begin in the Senate - 
strategically important. In appealing directly to the public, Kennedy was 
letting the Congress know that he was committed to the Peace Corps.
Even so, the battle was not yet won. On August 24» during the debate 
in the Senate, the major issue once again was Hickenlooper's proposed 
amendment "to cut 15 million dollars out of the unnecessary fat in this 
authorisation."^^ He was supported by Senators Lausche and Bennet (R. Utah), 
Senator Symington (D., Miss.) advocated full funding, noting that it 
amounted to a mere tenth of one per cent of the latest defense appropriations. 
Majority leader Mike Mansfield also backed the Peace Corps' request. He 
predicted that - like all foreign aid efforts - the ^eace Corps would run 
up against difficulties in Otto Passman's House Sub-Committee on 
appropriations. However, he hoped that "at least in getting the program 
afloat, we will on this occasion allow the full amount requested by the 
Committee on Foreign R e l a t i o n s . T h e  arguments of Symington, Mansfield and 
Humphrey fended off the proposed 57,5 per cent cut. In a roll-call vote the 
Hickenlooper amendment was defeated 52 to 59. Nevertheless, Fulbright again 
went on record as being "not without misgivings" and he, along with seven 
other Democratic senators, voted with Hickenlooper.^^
As it happened, the Peace Corps' victory on the floor of the Senate 
proved transitory. As Mansfield had feared, Congressman Passman's Sub- 
Committee on Appropriations made a deep inroad into the Peace Corps' 
authorised funds. Before it was finally signed into law on October 1, 1961, 
the Peace Corps’ budget had been cut from 40 million dollars to 50 million 
dollars - a massive 25 per cent - by Passman's Committee, In that respect.
Hickeniooper and Fulbright had the last woro.
Overall, Hickenlooper offered over thirty amendments to the Peace 
Corps bill. Most were of a minor, technical nature and Humphrey accepted 
three-quarters of them virtually without question. For example, the 
possibility of draft evasion persisted as a problem for many congressmen 
despite Shriver's announcement in March, 1961, that Peace Corps service 
would defer not exempt, Volunteers from their military duty. Humphrey 
readily allowed a Hickenlooper amendment to this effect since it merely 
formalised what was already established Peace Corps practice. The greatest 
fear of Hickenlooper and other critics was that the Peace Corps might 
become another entrenched and expanding Washington bureaucracy.
Congressman Gross predicted that the Peace Corps would go the way of all
previous foreign aid programmes - "with too many chiefs and not enough
Indians." To guard against this, Hickenlooper proposed that Peace Corps
administrative personnel be limited to two hundred and seventy five in its
first year; that ten "supergrade" (that is, not subject to Civil Service
pay scales) staff positions be cut from the forty requested by the Peace Corps;
and that the number of Volunteers assigned to the United Nations and other
international organisations not exceed one hundred and twenty-five. Also, the
House cut the proposed Career Planning Board - to assist returned Volunteers - 
49from the bill. Legislators felt these measures would prevent the Peace 
Corps from becoming over-bureaucratised. Some Peace Corps staff members were 
not so reassured by these strictures. Bill Josephson felt that the staff limit­
ation (275) might prove disabling. "The vice of personnel ceilings" he told 
Shriver, "is that for want of a secretary a whole program was lost."^^
The Congress's other major worries were firstly, that young, unworldly 
Americans working in foreign countries would fall prey to communist 
infiltrators; and secondly, that the Peace Corps would attract sundry 
socialists, radicals and beatniks. The first fear was effectively allayed 
by yet another Hickenlooper amendment which demanded that Volunteers 
receive training and instruction from the Peace Corps on the "philosophy, 
strategy, tactics, and menace of C o m m u n i s m . T o  an extent, the second concern 
was satisfied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (P.B.I.). J. Edgar
- Hoover's agency carried out investigations oi a n  vuxujli,u«oj-o w  
September, 1961 and agreed to keep a benevolently watchful eye on the Peace 
Corps thereafter. Shriver also attempted to mollify worried congressmen by 
explaining to them the Peace Corps' position on this sensitive subject:
"As you know, we in the Peace Corps share your firm conviction that it is 
essential for Volunteers to be loyal Americans and to possess a full under-
52
standing of, and deep commitment- to, the free system," Despite these 
placatory measures, the fear that the Peace Corps would become infested by 
radicals was exacerbated in August, I96I by a twenty-two year old Peace 
Corps trainee named Charles Kamen,
Kamen, by all accounts an upstanding young student, had been involved 
in a incident in Florida at a Rotary Club function in December, I96O.
He had ; > dared to laugh during a showing of the rabid anti - 
communist film Operation Abolition, Rotarians claimed that this proved he 
had communist sympathies and hence they forcibly ejected him from their 
club. When it was discovered that Kamen had been accepted by the Peace Corps 
for training at Pennsylvania State University, a few congressmen - notably 
Hickenlooper and Gross - made an issue of it, "The impression we get 
is that the Peace Corps is going to be staffed by beatniks and Kamen is a 
classic example" said one indignant congressman. In fact, Kamen had a history 
of involvement in nuclear disarmament and anti-segregationist movements; so 
much so, Bill Josephson described him as "a highly-motivated and idealistic
54.young man who holds his political beliefs strongly." Nevertheless, right-
wing Republicans and southern Democrats called for Kamen's immediate
dismissal. Hickenlooper raised the "Kamen Incident" during the Senate's
debate on the Peace Corps bill, and Passman grilled Shriver on the subject
when he appeared before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations. Indeed,
such was the furore over Kamen that on August 50, the President himself was
asked by a reporter for his opinion on Kamen. Kennedy tactfully replied that
55he had "every confidence in the judgement of those who make the selections."
This answer did not satisfy the popula^press. Newsweek informed its 
readers that Kamen ("Until recently he was bearded - a fact which his 
critics have not overlooked") was a perfect example of "going overboard on
i d e a l i s m . T h e  Peace Corps came under tremendous pressure to "drop" him
forthwith, Ed Bayley remembered members of Passma»n's Appropriations
Committee phoning Shriver to say "If you want ten million dollars cut - 
57keep Kamen in." Despite these threats, the Peace Corps permitted Kamen to
complete his training course.
However, at the end of his training stint in September, Kamen was deemed
--"unsuitable" for Peace Corps service. Inevitably, there were suggestions
that Shriver had made a deal with Passman to drop Kamen after training.
If indeed Shriver struck up such a bargain with the chairman of the House
Aparopriàtions' Sub-Committee then he certainly got a raw deal - for 10
million dollars was cut from the Peace Corps budget anyhow, ^t seems more
likely that Shriver withstood this early challenge to the integrity of the
Peace Corps' selection process and insisted that Kamen be allowed to finish his
training. Although, the "deselection" of such an apparently able applicant
certainly created the suspicion that Shriver had bowed to the will of
reactionary legislators. The whole sordid affair ill became the Congress.
In the aftermath, the New York Times criticised conservative congressmen
for attacking "irrelevant" issues such as Kamen and it praised Shriver for
not. bending to their whimsP^
The "Kamen Incident" had its own repercussions on the Peace Corps bill.
Firstly, on September 19, 1961, the House - Senate conference added an
amemdment requiring Volunteers to take an oath of office in which they would
swear that they neither advocated, nor knowingly belonged to an organisation
59which advocated the overthrow of the United States government. Secondly, 
Passman's argument for a large cut in Peace Corps appropriations was 
strengthened by the great hullabaloo over Kamen. On September 2p, 1961, the 
House Sub-Committee on Appropriations reduced the Peace Corps' first year ' 
budget from fO million dollars to pO million dollars; thus, the unhappy 
ghost of Charles Kamen was exorcised from the Peace Corps.
Despite Passman's appropriations cuts, Hickenlooper*s amendments and 
Kamen's"deselection", the Peace Corps assault on Capitol IHill was a great 
triumph. It received the second biggest margin of favourable votes for any
new non-defence measure sent by Kennedy to the Congress and, notwithstanding
a few minor changes, the bill was left intact. Senator Hubert Humphrey
gave enormous credit to Shriver:
"(l wish) to commend you again on the outstanding manner in which 
you presented your c.ose for your recommendations. Also, you deserve 
unstinting praise for the splendid manner in which you have administered 
your agency. It is your record of administration, your careful and 
meticulous personal supervision and direction of the Peace Corps'. 
activities, and your frankness and candour with the members of the 
Congress that have earned for you respect and support which was so 
evident....I know that it is not necessary for me to advise you, but 
as a friend and one of your admirers, may I remind you to always 
follow the pattern that you have set this far. ...You can get what 
you want from this Congress. "
Unstinting praise also came from the White House. Congressional Liaison
officer Larry O ’Brien told Shriver, "You unquestionably get the whole
credit for getting this one throughj
On signing thë Peace Corps bill, President Kennedy expressed particular
pleasure at "the bipartisan effort and support in the shaping of this new 
"^1
Agency." A brief analysis of the voting in I96I would seem to confirm that 
the Peace Corps was an issue which went beyond the narrow confines of party; 
rather, it divided the Congress by conservative - liberal lines. As it 
passed by "voice" in the Senate, it is difficult to discern divisions from 
the vote on the bill. However, the vote on Senator Hickenlooper’3 proposed 
amendment bo cut 15 million dollai's from the Peace Corps’ authorisation might 
serve as a useful indicator. The amendment was defeated by 32 to 59; a vote 
in its favour is counted, in effect, as a vote agaipst the Peace Corps.
Eight Democrats voted for the amendment with fifty-one against, while twenty- 
four Republicans voted for, with eight against. This gives the appearance 
of a straight party division. However, the eight Democrats who voted in 
favour were all recognised conservatives - like Russell of Georgia, Stennis of 
Mississippi and Thurmond of South Carolina. Senator Fulbright, with :iis
6.
reputation as a liberal - at least in foreign affairs - was a possible exception 
These conservative Democrats joined with mostly southern or mid-western Repub­
licans - traditionally conservative and isolationist - to vote for the amendmen 
On the other hand, many of the Republicans who voted against the amendment 
were noted liberals - like davits and Keating of New York. These liberal
Republicans tended to join with the remaining majority of Democrats to vote 
against the a m e n d T h i s  voting pattern suggests^bhat the Peace Corps 
cut across partisan party lines in the Senate. It was significant that, in 
his remarks to the Senate at the end of the debate on the Peace Corps,
Humphrey chose to single out two Republican senators - Dirksen and Wiley - 
for their cooperation. "And I am pleased indeed" concluded Humphrey, "that 
it has won the support of senators on both - sides of the aisle,Appendix ) 
Opinion in the House can be gauged from the roll-call vote on the 
Peace Corps bill on September I4 , l?6l. It passed by 288 to 97» Two 
hundred and six Democrats voted for the bill and twenty-nine against; 
eighty-two Republicans voted for, with sixty-eight against. While the 
Democratic support for the bill was overwhelming, the majority of Republicans 
also voted in favour of the measure. As in the upper chamber, conservative 
Democrats (like Passman of Louisiana and J.O* Davis of Georgia) joined with 
mostly southern or mid-western Republican conservatives in opposition to the 
bill. The less conservative Republicans voted with the remaining majority of 
Democrats to support the Peace Corps, (Appendix V)
Thus, as Kennedy suggested, the Peace Corps transcended party feuds in 
both chambers of Congress, Indeed, Congressman Hemphill of South Carolina 
equated the political inoffensiveness of the Peace Corps with that of Grace
65Kelly, Billy Graham and the Pope, On the other hand, in a memorandum'to Shriver
in October I96I, Bill Moyers forecast that the Peace Corps would not always
escape the murky waters of party politics. He mentioned former President
Eisenhower's latest statement which described the Peace Corps as a juvenile
experiment. "If you want to send ■^ eace Corps Volunteers to an underdeveloped
area", "he said,"send them to the moon!" Moyers told Shriver that the Congress
would have to be won over again in 1962 and he predicted that the Republicans
would make criticism of the Peace Corps fa major issue" in the mid-term election 
66campaign.
For once, Moyers was not absolutely accurate. In general, the Peace 
Corps had very few congressional problems of any consequence after I96I, Once 
the glowing reports on the Volunteer.S'' oditievements in the field began to 
filter back to Washington, there was little danger to be feared on Capitol
Hill. There were some, not insignificant irritations. The House Sub - 
Committee on Foreign Operations Appropriations persistently attempted to 
limit the Peace Corps' funds. Nevertheless, although Otto Passman remained 
a mortal enemy of the Peace Corps, in 1962 and I965 he could only manage 
to inflict cuts of 7.5 per cent'*and' 9.7 per cent on its appropriations - nowhere 
near the swingeing 25 per cent of -1961. (APPENDIX Vl)
In the Senate, criticism of the Peace Corps virtually ceased. One 
indication of this was the defeat by voice vote of Senator Lausche's 
proposed amendment to cut 28 per cent from the Peace Corps' authorisation 
for fiscal year I965. In the House, Congressman Gross vainly attempted to 
muster his forces against the Peace Corps but even he found it difficult 
to make complaints. His proposed amendment in November 1963, to cut 
the Peace Corps' authorisation from 102 million dollars to 64 million 
dollars was easily defeated by a voice vote. Another indication of the 
Peace Corps' overwhelming support in the lower chamber came in 1962 when 
one hundred and seven Republicans voted for the Peace Corps bill with 
only fifty-four against while, in 1965» a voice vote proved sufficient
4T* 68for passage.
Of course, other minor annoyances cropped up periodically. John Moss
(d ,, Calif,) Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Government Operations
questioned whether the Peace Corps' use of classified documents did not
indicate its involvement in some kind of intelligence operations. Shriver
was forced to explain that in dealing with sensitive personnel information,
he sometimes needed the "Confidential" or "Secret" stamps - but he assured
Moss that these classifications were few and had nothing whatsoever to do
69with intelligence work, Shriver also had to give written assurance to
Senator Fulbright that no more than I5 per cent of all Volunteers would be
stationed in any one country. Fulbright's complaint originated from his
discovery that there were more Volunteers in the Philippines; than in all
70other countries put together in March, 1962, A resolution by 
Congressman Selden (l ,, Ala.) limited to 580,000 dollars, the Peace 
Corps' financial assistance to other nations for the development of their
own Peace Corps - type projects. This greatly hindered the ^eace Corps* 
proposed participation in the International Peace Corps Secretariat, which 
hadübeen created by the forty-three nation conference on Middle-Level 
Manpower held in Puerto Rico in October, 1962. It aimed to foster 
indigenous voluntary service programmes. Thus, the Congress effectively
71wrecked Shriver's dream of instigating a world-wide "Peace Corps movement,"
From time to time then, the Peace Corps suffered minor rebuffs on the
Hill. On occasion, Shriver had to admit to a rotten programme - for example
in Jamaica - or to mistakes in the field. But after 1961, the Peace Corps
was widely regarded by congressmen as a respectable and permanent government
institution. Even southern Democrats came to look upon it favourably -
if only for the negative reasoning that "it's good we have all those liberals
72
in one.place where^we can watch them,"
Shriver maintained good congressional relations by constantly urging
his staff to encourage the participation of Congress and to keep it
informed on Peace Corps activities, Once every week - throughout the
Kennedy years - Shriver had breakfast on Capitol Hill with twenty or thirty
congressmen: he invited them to staff meetings and to inspect country
programmes; and Shriver, as well as the Volunteers themselves, kept up a
constant stream of letters to congressmen from the field. The Peace Corps
never took for granted its excellent rapport with Congress, For instance,
while mild cuts in appropriations authorisation had to be expected,
Josephson told.Moyers, "It does not follow that we go up to the Hill like
patsies leading with our chins," Hence, the Peace Corps used every tactic
at its disposal to win full funding; It was ^osephson's idea to begin the
Peace Corps' congressional presentation fo.r fiscal year I965 with an
informal and effusive letter from Volunteer Tom Scanlon in Santiago, Chile,
It proved an effective - if impish - tactic. Josephson recalled that it
was the first time Congressmen had heard a iQ-gislative request from a
73government agency begin with the words "Hello Everybody!"
One of Shriver's most persuasive arguments was that the Peace Corps 
was as parsimonious as any government organisation could possibly be. He 
supplied detailed figures on the break-down cost of all Peace Corps
operations; he outlined economies made by cutting down on overtime payments, 
long-distance telephone calls and shipment of equipment overseas; and, in 
a vitually unprecedented action, he actually returned unspent monies to 
the Treasury - 1,9 million dollars at the end of fiscal year 1962 and
5*9 million dollars at the end of fiscal year 1965* The latter act 
intensely irritated congressional critics like Passman who had always 
claimed the Peace Corps was just another spendthrift agency. Sensing where 
the average congressman's priorities lay, Shriver went to great lengths to 
minimise Peace Corps expenditure, "Ours is a bone and muscle budget" 
he told Senator Fulbright
Another of Shriver’s most potent arguments for winning congressional 
favour was that the Peace Corps would aid America's fight against the 
communist threat. The majority of congressmen - including Humphrey and 
Reuss - liked to think of the Peace Corps as a new, if more humane, weapon
I
in the Cold War. Humphrey pointed out that although it would cost the
taxpayer less than the price of one Atlas missile, the Peace Corps would
help the United States compete for "the leadership of world revolution";
Senator Pell (D., R.I.) saw the Peace Corps as a "dire threat to the
Communists in the developing,world"; and Congressman Judd (R.,Minn.)
claimed that the new programme would engage American youth in "open
75cultural competition against the youth of the Communist system," Shriver 
did not contradict these views. Notwithstanding his claim that the Peace 
Corps was above,politicking, his speeches on Capitol Hill were often 
flavoured with anti-communist rhetoric, "One thing we are doing," he told 
The House Sub-Committee on Appropriations, "we are annoying the Communists 
extraordinarily. We are aggravating and exciting them by the mere fact 
that we send Peace Corps Volunteers." When asked by Congressman Gross why 
the United States government should pay for sending ^eace Corps teachers 
to Ethiopia, Shriver played the anti-communist card:
"But think of it, Congressman Gross, suppose we knew there were 
five hundred secondary school teachers in Ethiopia and they all 
came from Communist Russia and they were teaching all of the 
schoolkids in Ethiopia, I think a lot of people in the United 
States would be worried about that."76
Just:how seriously the Peace Corps accepted its Cold War role — as. 
thrust, upon.it by the Congress - is questionable, Sargent Shriver was. 
always careful to emphasise the Peace Corps* freedom from any entanglement 
in American foreign policies. However,, in the early 1960's congressmen 
were reluctant to vote for any proposal which did not toe the anti­
communist line, Shriver realised this and accordingly added some anti­
communist spice to his lobbying tactics on the Hill, From his point of 
view, it was a functional congressional strategy which redounded to the 
greater good of the Peace Corps.,
In 1962, President Kennedy heard from Shriver that the Peace Corps* 
hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had been a "love-, 
feast;" in 1963, only two members of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations turned up to question Shriver - an indication of Congress's
77uncritical attitude towards the Peace Corps by that time. Indeed,
Senator McGee (D,,Wy) of the Senate Committee on Appropriations effused 
that "if we had ten Sargent Shrivers-we could conquer the world". In 
November 1963, CongressmanFascell][D,, ’Fla,) of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee was more succinct^ "The Peace Corps'is doing a good
-73
job,.,.nothing can be said in criticism about the program,"' Clearly, 
the Peace Corps had vfon the Congress,
In 1963, the Peace Corps was Very favourably regarded by most Democratic 
and Republican members of the Congress. Indeed, it was one of Kennedy's 
few legislative proposals that managed to transcend party politics. The 
unrelenting diligence and shrewd tactics of the Peace Corps' congressional 
liaison team dissipated the substantial scepticism which had been evident 
on Capitol Hill in early 1961. They were fortunate in that, with the Peace 
Corps, they were not negotiating with any really hard political currency.
Few congressmen were eager to covet jobs teaching in Malaya or road building 
in Tanganyika; therefore, the Peace Corps lobby was not forced into the 
sordid political compromises and pork-barrel deals which often accompany 
the passage of any legislation. In that respect, it was a "clean" issue. 
Nevertheless, Sargent Shriver's political achievement should not be under­
estimated. Many congressmen were so impressed by his charismatic personality, 
they admitted that they voted for him as much as for the Peace Corps 
legislation. At the beginning of 1961, he went to the Congress with the 
reputation of being a political novice, -Yet, upon signing the Peace Corps
bill in September, President Kennedy expressed his esteem for "the most
79effective lobbyist on the Washington scene - Sargent Shriver."
CHAPTER SIX
THE ANTI-BUREAUCRATIC BUREAUCRACY
"It has even "been described as an anti-bureaucratic 
bureaucracy, an organisation for those who do not 
want to be organisation men, an agency of programmed 
diversity, programmed uncertainty, sufficient 
unpredictability - just going to the threshold of 
chaos but not quite reaching it."
- HARRIS WOFFORD -
("The Future Of The Peace 
Corps"in The Annals, May 1^66)
“The Peace Corps is a hold, new idea requiring a hold, new effort,"
Sargent Shriver told Dean Rusk on May 26, I96I . “The Peace Corps should
he, and do, something different," he wrote, "different from all other
kinds of organisations which the United States has heretofore undertaken 
1
abroad," In this early declaration of intent, Shriver emphasised his 
aim of making the Peace Corps a unique kind of government agency» Its 
winning of independence gave it the opportunity to develop in the 
direction chosen by Shriver and his staff. They were determined not to 
fall into the tried and routine ways of most bureaucracies. Certainly, 
the Peace Corps organisation, 196l-6d, was very much in the style of 
post-Rooseveltian, liberal ideas. It was rational, intelligent, literate 
and informal. Yet, in many ways, it went beyond this. Pot it was also 
athletic, daring and self-deprecatory. Indeed, in its refusal to be 
bamboozled by esoteric, bureaucratic rules, it was unprecedented.
"In many ways," wrote Sargent Shriver in a memorandum to the Peace
Corps staff, "our* entire effort has been directed at simplifying and
2
streamlining the structure of this organisation." Sharing Kennedy^s 
abhorrence of what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called "bureaucratosclerosis", 
Shriver was determined to build an agency which would functio" in the 
fastest, most efficient manner possible. Bill Kelly, an experienced 
government administrator who became Director of the Peace Corps* Division 
of Contracts "and Logistics, recalled that the most detested word in his 
new boss’s lexicon was "bureaucracy". In the veiy/ early days of the Peace 
Corps, riimoiur had it that Jack Young - 'who was attempting to erect an 
organisational suoerstructure - was forced to hide his line-and-staff
3
charts from Shriver for fear of incurring his wrath. Young claimed that
it was Shriver*s proclivity to "get everybody into the act and then worry
about the niceties of how one would manage the enterprise later". Although
Shriver had asked him to help set up a governmental framework for the
Peace Corps, Young always felt this was more for appearances* sake ("store
4
front") than from any overwhelming desire to organise and manage. Shriver
was determined to keep control of the Peace Corps in his hands and, as 
an outsider to governmental, procedure, was not about to become entangled 
in its convoluted web of red tape. He stated emphatically that his 
approach was "incompatible with the existenceof ...any .1 strategy* or 'plan' 
to have things come out one month, five months or ten months later in 
accordance with some preconceived .notion as to ho?f they should come out." 
Shriver held no truck with grand designs and had no hesitation in 
admitting that in beginning this new venture he "did not know all the
5
answers and few, if any people did."
Despite Shriver's thoughts on this subject, the able bureaucrats
who surrounded him - Wiggins, Josephson, Young and Kelly - argued that,
from a purely pragmatic point of view, a minimum level of organisational
planning was essential for uhe effective function of any government
agency. Bill Josephson joked with Shriver that he too had seen, during
the Eisenhower administration, "the days when not much progress was made
but, boy, were we organized'." Nevertheless, he warned that "while good
decisions don't automatically follow from good organization, it is hard to
6
make them without it." Shriver took the point but demanded that the
7
watchword of all plans be "flexibility."
Given Shriver's predid.ection'it \as '.inevitable .that the: ''Peace Corpa-^ '’
detailed design would be prone to almost constant ohangs. and adaptation
as new situations and ideas occurred. In March, I96I, Jack Young
remembered drafting "lots of organizational charts" and, he added, "some
8
I believe Sarge Shriver actually signedl" Only in 1963 did a permanently 
stabilised organisational design emerge. (_APPS]>fDIK VII) However, 
notwithstanding continual minor emendations. Jack Young's memorandum on 
"Basic Concepts For Peace Corps Interim Organisation" of March 3, I96I, 
remained at the root of all subsequent structural thinking. In this 
plan. Young had outlined certain "rudimentary management processes" such 
as programme development and operations, recruitment and financing. That 
is, those functions deemed critical for getting the Peace Corps job done.
To Young and Shriver, the effective performance of these essential tasks 
was always of much greater imoortance than "organizational boxes or
9^
division of work."
The Peace Corps was headed, in every sense, by its first Director,
Sargent Shriver» Prom the beginning he grabbed hold of the reins of
power and never relinquished his firm grip. He was aided by an Executive
Secretariat which attempted to formalise the organisation's procedures
and by the National Advisory Council which made itself available for
consultation. The latter body was not very forceful since its role was
nebulous and its powers undefined. Its first honorary Chairman, William
0. Douglas, remembered spending "hours and days sitting around with a
10
dozen people trying to decide what to do." In effect, every debate or
policy question was ultimately decided by Shriver himself. Hence, the
Peace Corps centred unequivocally around his charismatic personality.
Before the end of March 19Ô1, Shriver had insisted that all written
'materials be sent to his office for review, Bradley Patterson, the first
Executive Secretary of* the Peace Corps, recalled that "everybody sent
everything up to him for approval ahead of time before it got sent out."
This procedure became just about the only unthinking bureaucratic response
11
within the Peace Corps.
In the very early days of the Peace Corps, because it was such a 
small agency and also because Shriver had such boundless energy and 
enthusiasm, it was possible for him to take a hand in everything from 
sending out cables to reading volunteers' application forms. Patterson 
was amazed at how Shriver coped - "his kids and his wife didn't see much 
of him, but he kept on top of it." Of course, as the organis^ation grew, 
Shriver was obliged to delegate some of his powers. Even so, he was 
always liable to inquire into any Peace Corps matter, from the timing of 
a public statement on a policy issue, to what books should be shelved in 
the library of the Corps' training camp in Puerto Rico. On one occasion, 
Shriver took umbrage at a seemingly routine cable sent by a Peace Corps
official to the embassy in Ghana. The cable outlined v;hat the Peace Corps
overseas staff might need ~ office space, ancillary staff, a car, a
chauffeur and so forth. Bradley Patterson recalled that Shriver "took
one look at that message and that word 'chauffeur' caught his eye, and
you could pick him off the ceiling he was so outraged." Shriver immediately
summoned the staff member responsible and told him "the Peace Corps wasn't
going to have any chauffeurs, by God," Shriver cancelled and rewrote the
cable himself and the staff leamt a lesson about his vigilance — on
13
matters great and small,
Patterson described Shriver as "not a systematic person" but rather
"a guy who leaps into the breach and gets things done, crossing channels
or speeding things up or taking short cuts or cutting corners and so forth
in any moment that he feels necessary." This highly unbureaucratic
procedure made it extremely difficult for more traditional administrators
like Patterson, to maintain any semblance of organisational routine;
however, as Patterson later conceded, it was Shriver's way of "projecting
himself onto his staff and everybody who worked or had relations with the 
14
Peace Corps." indeed, Shriver so personally dominated all Peace Corps 
decisions that he found it nearly impossible to find someone willing to 
take the post of Deputy-Direotoru Prcfe.^sor Carroll Willscn :f M.I.T. 
turned it down in the spring of 196I because, under Shriver, he considered
15
he would be no more than an office-manager. In fact, Paul Gersn the
Peace Corps* first Deputy-Director did not arrive until the autumn of 196I.
No organisational diagram could possibly convey the all-pervading influence
of Director Shriver. Since everything important went through him, the
image of the Peace Corps and Sargent Shriver became virtually a single
entity. As Patterson put it, "the Shriver idea Wcis the Peace Corns because
16
he ran it out of the palm of his hand.-"
Below the Director, the agency was further organisied into five major 
offices, each headed by an Associate Director responsible to Shriver and 
five staff support Divisions, the chiefs of which also reported to the
Director. Responsibility for the selection, training and general support 
of prospective Volunteers from the moment of application was vested in 
the Office of Peace Corps Volunteers, This office maintained communication 
between the Peace Corps administration in Washington and the actual 
Volunteers in the field, Larry Dennis, educationalist and journalist, 
was its first Associate Director and significantly, Shriver had it placed 
at the focal point of the organisation chart and linked directly to him.
The Office of Programme Development and Operations (p.D.O.) was 
responsible for the selection, negotiation and establishment of Peace 
Corps projects overseas and for their operation after the Volunteers had 
arrived. Besides the Volunteers themselves, P.D.O. was at the very heart 
of Peace Corps functions. Warren Wiggins was its first Associate Director 
and it was organised into a Division Of general Programme Development and 
Coordination and four regional offices - Latin America, Africa, the Far 
East and North Africa/Near East/South East Asia, These ambitious Regional 
Directors wer^ among the most powerful staff members.
Bill Moyers was the first Associate Director of the important Office 
of Public Affairs which directed the Peace Corps* recruiting activities 
and coordinated the agencî^ s^ essential relations with members of the 
Congress, It distributed information about the Peace Corps uo thousands 
of organisations - educational, business, labour, ciiTic and agricultural - 
by providing public notices of where and how to volunteer for the Peace 
Corps and by responding to the tremendous volume of mailed applications 
and enquiries.
The Office of Management handled all Peace Corps finances including 
the allocation and control of funds appropriated by Congress. It also 
administered personnel procedures - employment, promotion, termination, 
rating, security - and supplied office space and equipment. The Associate 
Director of this office had one of the most difficult jobs in the Peace 
Corps. For, in an agency committed to unbureaucratic procedure, the 
Office of Management was obliged to be at least moderately bureaucratic.
Hence, foui* unhappy men came and went in as many years.
General inspection and examination of all Peace Corps activities 
was carried out by the Office of Planning and Evaluation. Under its 
controversial first Associate Director, Bill Haddad, it served as a 
device for self-criticism within the Peace Corps. It sent candid and 
often scathing "evaluation" reports to Shriver on all aspects of 
operations and generally advised liim on long-term Peace Corps goals.
From the beginning, the cooperation and assistance of private 
voluntary agencies, universities, colleges and international 
organis.ations (such as the United Nations) was recognised as crucial 
to the success of the Peace Corps. The Division of University, Private 
and International Cooperation attempted to maintain a healthy partnership 
between the Peace Corps and autonomous voluntary bodies. By 1963,
Franklin Yfilliams had taken control of this Division. Responsibility 
for the actual negotiation and administration of contracts between the 
Peace Corps and other organisations for services rendered either during 
training or overseas, was assumed by the Division of Contracts and 
Logistics, led by the experienced, hard-bargaining Bill Kelly. This 
Division also arranged material support for the Volunteers. The Division 
of Research was designed to validate ind improve the Peace Corps' traininif 
and selection methods. Physical and psychiatric examinations of Volunteers 
as well as care and instruction during the training period and overseas 
was carried out by the Medical Programme Division. Lastly, the Peace Corps' 
General Counsel provided legal representation in all matters with other 
United States government agencies, private organisations and foreign 
powers. Bill Delano wa.s the first General Counsel but the real driving 
force in this office was Bill Josephson. Such vrere the main components 
of the Peace Corps organisation situated in the Maiatico building at 
806 Connecticut Avenue, diagonally across from the White House.
Overseas, operations in each country were supervised by a Peace Corps 
Representative (commonly referred to as the Rep) and his supporting staff. 
These Reps were very young men usually in their early thirties who had
iiiada an outstanding mark in their particular occupations - goverrjr.ent,
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education, the law or business. Shriver told Kennedy that he gave Peace
Corps Reps "an unusual degree of responsibility," allowed them to "make
many decisions in the field" and urged them to adapt Peace Corps/
18
Washington's general policies and guidelines to local situations» The 
Rep had to report to the U.S. ambassador* and keep up contact with other 
American agencies overseas. However, as Shriver's proxy in the field, he 
had sole responsibility for the general performance, behaviour and welfare 
of all the Volunteers stationed in his country. There were usually up to 
twelve people on his staff, among whom there would certainly be a doctor, 
a secretary and one or more assistant Reps. The Rep was also commonly 
assisted by a Volunteer Leader in the field - a notable character chosen 
in training. To facilitate operations, experienced foreign nationals 
were recruited whenever possible to assist the Peace Corps. The remainder, 
and by far the majority of the Peace Corps organisation was made up by the 
, Volunteers themselves. By the end of 1963, nine out of every ten Peace 
Corps employees were Volunteers and Shriver instructed Reps to give them 
a substantial amount of responsibility. At the end of the day, the Peace 
Corps was dependent upon the quality of, and the work done by the 
Volunteers overseas.
In theory at least, the Peace Corps organisation chart of 1963-*64_, 
indicated an equanimous, finely-balanced agency with powers and functions 
evenly distributed between the various boxes and units. However, the neat 
diagram did not show the reality of constant turmoil and intense power 
struggles which raged within the Peace Corps between different offices, 
divisions and personalities. Underlying the conventional line-anl-staff 
exterior there were many furiously competitive elements and several 
explosive characters. The Peace Corps was no place for faint hearts.
Bill Josephson, one of the toughest in-fighters, recalled.that "You had 
to be resilient, capable of taking a knock on the head and come bouncing 
back." Franklin Williams, who came into the Peace Corps with no experience 
of internecine governmental competitiveness remembered it as "one hell
19
of a classroomI"
Sargent Shriver was also a complete stranger to government procedure
but he was well-versed in efficient business technique. "One of the
things Mr. Joe Kennedy taught me," he said, "was that in laying out a
new project, you shouldn't try to cope with every/ little problem; the
thing to do was to get a kind of bird's eye view of the project and then
single out its four or five major problems. Once these were solved, all
20
the little ones would fall into place." Shriver always maintained
this sense of administrative priorities. Moreover, he had the ability
to articulate - whether orally or in writing. Bill Josephson was
astonished at how quickly and skilfully Shriver handled the legal
complexities involved in establishing a new government organisation,
"It never ceased to amaze me how well he handled the paper/zork," said
Josephson, "particularly the difficult paperwork coming out of my shop..,,
21
he had this amazing ability to simplify a complicated problem,"
At a personal level, Shriver conmiunicated very well. He ?ras
charming and tactfiiD.; but at the same time, he was ruthlessly critical
of incompetence. He believed in competition as a practical method of
achieving the best results on any given issue. In writing a political
science essay on the Peace Corps, Mr. George La Noue - a Gueit Scholar
at the Brookings Institute in 196^ - ascribed to Shriver "the competitive
theory of administration" as outlined by Professor Richard S, Neustadt
of Harvard in his influential book Presidential Power, b'hile Shriver
admitted having consulted with Keustadt during the formation of the
Peace Goips, he denied having read his book. Shriver pointed out that
his administrative style was always more empirical than ideological:
"I am unaware that I have any fixed nations about public 
administration or public administration techniques,.,..! 
have al7/ays believed in competition and in the value of 
bringing together many persons of differing views to 
analyse and solve any new problems.the sharp and 
vigorous inter-play of personality, opinion and action..,, 
will guarantee that the right issues will be clearly 22
raised, correctly framed and decided when ripe for action."
By setting up competing factions, Shriver.Meliferately culti’/ated an 
atmosphere of diversity and, sometimes, contradiction. H a m s  .foi^ ora 
wryly described this as "creative chaos." Every battle was Darwinian, 
the toughest fighters, hardest workers and most persuasive debaters 
emerging on the winning side - with Sargent Shriver as the final arbiter.
The Peace Corps experience was so intensely personal for every 
individual that rifts and disagreements were inevitable. Indeed, it ws= 
often said that there was not one, but as many Peace Corps as there were 
Volunteers. One of the major tensions was between what Professor Robert 
Textor, an early Peace Corps consultant, called the three "subcultures" 
of the Peace Corps: the Peace Corps/aTashington staff subculture, the 
Volunteer subculture and - in an intermediate position - the overseas 
Representative subculture. Professor Textor claimed than "Almost any 
sensitive observer, if given two weeks in Washington headquarters ana 
two weeks at an overseas post, would agree that the separateness of 
these three is something that is real and demonstrable. The different 
systems of values' and standards between these subcultures will be 
analysed in a. further>chapter. At this point, suffice to say that the 
wide disparities between the three was one of the greatest sources of 
"creative chaos" or "creative tension." Peace Corps/Vashington soietiies 
tended to regard itself as the "real" Peace Corps with the Volunteers 
viewed as some kind of abstract addendum. On the other hand, the 
Volunteers in the field considered themselves the true cutting edge of 
the Peace Corps and were often resentful and sometimes downright nosoiie 
towards the paid, professional "bureaucrats" in Washington, in many 
ways, the Representative subculture was in the worst position. rrOi,e=su- 
Lawrsnce Fuchs, himself a Peace Corps Hep in the Philippines, explainer 
how they were caught between the major conflicting parties, suoject to a 
"credibility gap" on both sides. This situation held the advantage of 
ensuring constant argument and revision over Peace Corps policy and 
thus helped maintain the vitality of the organisation both in Washington
and in the field. However, as Rep Charles Houston pointed out to Bill
Moyers, the Washington - field dichotomy, was also potentially disastrous:
"A schism is looming. The fatal identification of the 
forgotten staff overseas versus the uncaring and impersonal 
'they* in Washington seems to be closing in. This can wall 
evolve (or degenerate) into such a serious split that, as 
the initial blush of enthusiasm wears off from the overseas 
staff, both many of Sarge's original appointees as well as 
some of your better, 'career* people may either toss in the 
sponge or become alienated from Washington, If we are to 
follow or allow ourselves to be dragged into this time-worn 
path, then I submit that the Peace Corps is on the way down.
This kind of occupational disease can become an inoperable 
cancer if let go on long enough."
In conclusion, Houston noted that he had seen the International
Cooperation Administration ruined by internal cliques and factions.
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"Please don't let it happen with the Peace Corps!" he pleaded.
Within Peace Corps/Washington itself, there were numerous differences 
of style, character and opinion. From the start there was an antagonism 
between the experienced government bureaucrats who had joined the Peace' 
Corps from other agencies - the "insiders" - and the people who were 
coming into the government for the first time - the "outsiders."
Patterson recalled that "there was a friendly, and sometimes not always
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friendly dialogue betvreen the two." Most of the insiders had come from
the International Cooperation Administration - Wiggins, Josephson,
Alexander, Nelson, Singer, Ottinger. The outsiders were from diverse
backgrounds - Wofford (law), Moyers (staff of Lyndon Johnson), Haddad
(journalism), Sims (education), Boyce (the Experiment in International
Living) and Peters (local state politics) . 7/hile Shriver was in theorjr
an outsider he always straddled both fences very well. As Bradley
Patterson recalled, "Shriver kept all these tigers in check because he
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7/-13 a bigger tiger than all of them."
This conflict stemmed from the Peace Corps* unusual origins. After 
all, it had begun on an intensely personal basis with Shri.ver, vYafford 
and a few friends sitting around a table in an hotel room - an unnatural 
birth for an official bureaucracy. The outsiders were determined that the
agency should not lose this personal, creative flavour. On the other 
hand, people like Wiggins and Patterson knew that a modicum of formality 
and procedural rules were necessary for sui'vival. They tended to regard 
the committed anti-hureaucratic men as incurable romantics. The one group 
acted a goad on the other to produce the blend Shriver- wanted,
Patterson described it as a mixture of "charismatic action" with 
"bureaucratic organization." Harris Wofford said the synthesis was "an
29
organisation for those who don't want to become organisation men."
Certainly, a job on the Peace Corps staff was not for the stuffy 
or the staid*. One officer claimed "you must be prepared to run a
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hundred-yard sprint for ten miles every day." Offices consistently 
fought over various plans and policies. For instance, P.D.O, constantly 
battled with Planning and Evaluation over their "unscientific" methods of 
assessment* In May 1963? Richard Ottinger, Chief of the Latin American 
regional office, fired off an angry memorandum to Charles Peters, Chief 
of Evaluation, concerning a report on Peru, Ottinger complained of the 
short time spent in evaluating programmes, the journalistic style of 
reporting and the scathing criticism of personalities. "As an overall 
comment," he concluded, "I object to the evaluators getting into the 
pr'ogramming business." When- the Evaluation Division submitted a highly 
critical report on the Peace Corps’ community action project in Guatemala, 
Sargent Shriver invited Jack Vaughn (then Chief of the Latin American 
Divisionj to respond - "Jack Vaughn, may I have one of your hot rebuttals?"
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he wrote in the margin of the report. A common complaint from all
Divisions was that P.D.O'S programme projections habitually outstripped
the Peace Corps' a.bili-by to select and train the required number of
Volunteers. In September 1962, Elizabeth Harris (of the Office of Peace
Corps Volunteers) criticised Warren Wiggins and his Office thus:
"Too often.,. .P.D.C. officers have treated both Training 
and Selection as a supermarket where charge accounts are 
honored....P.D.O. has too often demanded the merchandise 
only to bring it back time and again for exchange before 
deciding on the final purchase. This has resulted in 
confusion-,duplication of work and considerable ill-feeling 
....Thus P.D.O. and Peace Corps Volunteers must work together
on matters concerning the individual Volunteers, and must 
start doing so immediately, not on a 'my office is more 
important than your office* basis, but on the fact that 
Peace Corps/jashington exists only to provide for and support 
the Volunteers regardless of the necessary bureaucratic 
distinction beirween P.D.C, and Peace Corps Volunteers in 
its major responsibilities."32
Bill Josephson recalled that almost everyone enjoyed undercutting the 
Office of Management which was regarded as the-biggest single stifler
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of creativity in the Peace Corps.
Peace Corps staff meetings had the reputation of being among the 
most brutally frank in 'Washington. Certainly, some acrimonious 
exchanges took place. If a Division chief was adjudged ill-briefed or 
negligent in some way, he found himself severely criticised by his peers. 
Bob Gale, Chief of Recruitment, remembered one particularly ferocious 
debate when an ill-infomed official fled the staff meeting in tears and 
consequently offered his resignation - which was accepted, Sargent Shriver 
snubbed Bill Kelly for irwo weeks after they had argued furiously over the 
validity of a proposed contractual agreement with the University of îîotre
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Dame. ■ Yet, even the Director himself was not above censure. In
September 1961, Josephson rebulced Shriver and John Corcoran, Associate 
Director for Management, for drawing up an organisation chart without 
prior consultation with the rest of the senior staff, '"As I have said 
to you before," Josephson scolded Shriver, "a substantial amoiqnt of the 
anxiety that reigns around here from time to time stems from bilateral 
dealings with you on matters of multilateral concern," Josenhson advised
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the Director to think again.
The fierce competitive element vras extended to the Regional Chiefs
and country Heps in their quest for the best available Volunteers ?^nd
resources. Thomas Quimby, Peace Corps Rep in Liberia, admitted "stealing"
twelve of the best Volunteers from Harris Wofford's Ethiopia consignment,
while Don Romine, an assistant to Wofford, recalled taking a leading
Selection officer to dinner in order to "persuade" him to add more
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Volunteers to his project. Indeed, one of the most disliked men in the
entire Peace Corps organisation was the somewhat eccentric, hut ruthlessly 
scrupulous John Alexander, a Regional Chief of the Africa Division, who 
also headed P.D.OJs Coordination section; that is, he had the crucial 
power to either approve a proposed programme or quash it as unfeasible.
The meetings over which he presided were known, in Peace Corps parlance, 
as "the murder boards" - an indication of the seriousness with which 
these decisions were regarded.
By the end of I963, Charles Houston had become so embittered at the 
continual internecine fighting, he complained to Bill Moyers that 
"Allegiance, dedication and relation to the Peace Corps as a warm, living 
entity now seems rare*" As Houston saw it, there was too much in-fighting 
and petty possessiveness with its concomitant "back-biting, rumor-mongering, 
petty jealousies and unpi'oductive competitiveness to out-do, give a black 
eye to, or put in its place another office, division or employee,"
Houston came to the conclusion that "team work and team spirit have
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become prettyvraæ commodities." However, if the ferocious in-fighting 
caused casualties - personal and organisational - it also produced victors, 
Warren Wigginsb Office of P.D.O, won one bureaucratic battle after another 
and in so doing, gained for itself a prized place at the very centre of 
the Peaie Corps organisation.. It had most ::taff (fcrty-six out of the 
first one hundred members), was highly-disciplined, manned by "insiders"
- mostly foriegn aid experts - and led by the extraordinarily able 'Jiggins, 
From the very outset, the bureaucrats - Wiggins and Josephson outstanding - 
had made a.n indelible mark on the Peace Go:rps * They had drafted the 
Towering Task and they had been mainly responsible for the winning of 
independence in Shriver* s absence,, Shriver was impressed not only by 
their intelligence and idealism but also by their eminent ability to 
weave their way through the labyrinthine passage of the Federal 
bureaucracy* They were tough and wily in-fighters who relished a 
challenge and whose force of opinion had to be reckoned with on any 
major issue. Though Shriver often'fulminated against "bureaucratic
nonsense", he appreciated that he himself had little knowledge of how 
to get things done in Washington and would need to rely on experienced 
administrators; that they were of the calibre of Wiggins, Josephson 
and Kelly was a bonus.
In charge of programmes and development Wiggins held, next to
Shriver, the most important single position in the Peace Corps. P.D.O.
negotiated and established projects with host governments, determined
numbers and skills of the Volunteers that could be used effectively,
supervised co-ordination with the State Department, A.I.D., and other
U.S. government agencies, and maintained internal balance and control of
projects - particularly with reference to Volunteers and funds available.
When other Peace Corps offices and divisions wanted something, soonei’ or
later they had to go through P.D.O. - and Warren Wiggins was a very
difficult man to defeat. He was insistent that the Peace Corps should
have total control over its own'destiny and. in one of the"earliest major
battles within the new agency he made certain that this would be so.
Well aware that most universities were slow-moving, distant and more
interested in research and publication than social and political action,
Wiggins sensed it would be disastrous to allow them control of the Peace
Corps' overseas.programmes. He was equally sceptical of the capabilities
of private agencies whose experience was limited to small projects, Cf
course, Wiggins realised that educational institutions and private
organisations would be helpful on the domestic side of the operation -
especially in training Volunteers. Jfowevezy overseas, Wiggins wanted
the Peace Corps to be the master of its own fate - "even to the extent
of oersonal approval by Director Shriver of University and Private Agency
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personnel abroad with Peace Coins responsibilities
The Towering Task had not attempted to deal with the issue of 
whether programmes should be direct or contract administered, let alone 
how bureaucratic responsibility for them should be assigned. However, 
the Report To The President of February 1961, had been quite clear: the
Peace Corps would directly administer projects only in highly unusual 
circumstances when reasons of ’‘complexity or novelty or urgency" 
forestalled administration by private agencies, educational institutions, 
international organisations or other U.S. government agencies, "As a 
high educational venture," Sargent Shriver advised Kennedy, "its.
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proper carriers are our traditional institutions of higher education."
The first very rough, hand-drawn organisation chart reflected this 
intention by allocating equal power divisions to private voluntary 
agencies, universities and P.D.O. Yet, by the end of 1961, a much 
revised chart clearly indicated that the lion’s share of programming 
would be done directly by P.D.O., which had been made into a major 
Office, whilst Private Agencies, Universities and International 
Organisations remained as mere Divisions, (APPENDIX 3nZQ)o By I963, 
the further amended chart showed that the three Divisions of Private 
Agencies, Universities and International Organisations had been merged 
into a single unit, indicating their significant loss of both power and 
status. (APPENDIX Thus, in the foundational struggle for control
over Peace Corps projects, the private sector had been defeated by the 
Office of P.D.O. In February 1964, during an executive session of the 
House C imrrlttee on Foreigi. Affairs, Bill Joiephson confirmed what had 
been common knowledge within the Peace Corps since the summer of I96I -
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"Most Peace Corps projects are directly administered by the Peace Corps." 
Behind Josephson*s terse statement lay the history of the most bitter 
bureaucratic battle fouglit vfithin the Peace Corps: the struggle for control 
over programmes between P.D.O, and the division of Private, University and 
International Relations.
The Kayes, Nillikan and Albertson reports had all recommended that the 
Peace Corps would best operate as a decentralised organisation - like the 
National Science Foundation - operating its programmes through selected 
private agencies and educational institutions. It was thought that the 
Peace Corps would greatly benefit from the skill and experience of the
private sector in voluntary service overseas and from the public support 
which these bodies vfould bring with them. It v;as also hoped that by 
extensive use of the machinery already available through private means, 
the Peace Corps would manage to avoid the administrative elephantiasis 
which beset most other government bureaus. On March 8, I96I, Gordon Boyce, 
Chief of the Division of Private Organisations, told Sargent Shriver that 
there was little doubt that "with appropriate support, private agencies 
can bring to the Peace Corps a vigor and vitality whose equal will be 
hard to find. Their resources are deep, their contracts broad, their 
programs far-flung," Richard Ottinger also argued that universities and 
private agencies should be given the power necessary to administer projects 
and thus "identify institutional programs primarily with the institution 
rather than with the Peace Corps." Professor Carroll Wilson of M.I.T,, 
working in the Division of University Relations, called for a "sister
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relationship" betv/een academic institutions and the Peace Corps,"
Publicly 3,t least, the Peace Corps always paid homage to this notion 
of full cooperation with the private sector. Indeed, President Kennedy 
spoke of the "trained men and women to be sent overseas....by private
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institutions and organisations" when he established the Peace Corps,
On March 21, I96I', during the hearing on the proposed nomination of the 
Director of the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver was asked by Senator 
Fulbright how the Peace Corps intended to administer its programmes; 
significantly, Shriver put "direct administration" at the bottom of a list 
which laid emphasis on private organisations, educational institutions, 
government agencies and the U.N.O. In April 196I, Shriver stated that 
the Peace Corp;s wanted to "help, not replace private agencies which are 
doing an excellent Job in this fie11." A few months later he toll the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he hoped to utilise American 
universities and private voluntary agencies "to the maximum." Thus, 
the American public and the Congress were constantly reassured by 
official Peace Corps pronouncements that "the Peace Corps will give
preference to the administration of projects by qualified private 
organisations which are interested, available and acceptable to the
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host country," In I96I, this proved a persuasive political tactic,
particularly on Capitol Hill. During congressional hearings Sargent
Shriver brouglit forward witnesses from private organisations who testified
in favour of the Peace Corps. He also argued that the Peace Corps'
partnership with business, industry and agriculture would open doors to
millions of Americans. Thus, tremendous public pressure was brought to
bear on conservative congressmen, \7alter Judd, a ranlcing Republican on
the House Foreign Affairs Committee admitted that he voted for the
Peace Corps because "all my life I have been an admirer of the A-H
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movement with whom you are contracting."
However, despite the Peace Corps' continual public statements about 
a "broad and valuable" relationship with the private sector, the minutes 
of one of the very first Director's Staff Meetings on March 30, I96I, 
revealed that Shriver had told administrators to concentrate their initial 
efforts on programmes where "the direct Peace Corns label and image is
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engaged," This order set a pattern for the administration of Peace 
Corps projects which was never reversed. There were many reasons why 
an equa.L programming partnership between thi Peace Corps and the private 
sector was never fully realised. A crippling factor was that, since most 
of the major private voluntary agencies were religious-based, the Peace 
Corps could not afford to become involved with them. Any infringement 
of the First Amendment would have had disastrous political consequences 
for the Peace Corps at this early stage. Besides, in March, 'I96I, speed 
was the dominant consideration. To make an impact on the Congress and 
the public, Shriver simply had to get programmes into the field quiclcly; 
and speed was not a characteristic normally associated with either private 
organisations or academic institutions. Wiggins, Josephson, Kelly and 
others who had experience of government dealings with the private sector 
advised Shriver that if he handed control over to academic "perfectionists’
it could well taloe a very long time before a Peace Corps Volunteer ever
got into the field. As Harris Wofford explained it:
"The great semi-autonomous bodies....the Red Cross and things like 
that....don’t have a lot of sex appeal in terms of a vary fast 
moving operation. He (Shriver) put enormous væight on speed and the 
more he saw of the complaints about the State Department and A.I.D, 
particularly - how long it takes in their pipeline to get anything 
done; how, in many projects, the time for them has passed by the 
time the experts and the money arrive - he was determined that in aJ-etO 
months we’d be able to produce Volunteers to fill jobs that took 
fourteen months in the old agencies,"46
Another problem, as Bill Josephson noted, v/as that administrators
found it exceedingly difficult to find private organisations willing to
make a wholehearted commitment to a Peace Corps project. They wanted to
help with some part of the overseas administration but rarely with it all.
Naturally, the Peace Corps was reluctant to split up programmes in this
way. Furtheimiore, as Sargent Shriver told his staff, the Peace Corps
intended to go to Third Uorld countries where the United States had
"not yet succeeded in making a significant social, economic or political
impression." In many cases, outside organisations had little expertise
in these areas; hence it seemed more practical to let the Peace Corps
discover for itself the problems of establishing orogrammes in these 
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countries.
Nop the least contributing factor to the frail relationship between 
the Peace Corps and the private sector was Warren Wiggins-'s sceptical 
attitude. During his years with the International Cooperation 
Administra tion he had seen the Federal government taken advantage of 
("screwed" was hoiw he put it) by both private organisations and academic 
institutions, Wiggins claimed that in too many cases the private sector 
had been awarded huge grants by the government only to produce sloppy 
and inefficient programmes overseas. He was absolutely determined that 
this should not happen to the Peace Corps, Indeed, such v/as his feeling 
on this matter, that it was rumoured Wiggins had told Shriver he would 
resign unless the Peace Corps was equipped with its own central core 
programming unit which could fight against the poor administration of
Peace Corps projects by outside bodies. Bill Kelly strongly supported-
V'iggins on this issue. Accordingly, as Director of Contracts and
Logistics, he proposed that the Peace Corps should not give"grants"
to private organisations but rather should make "contracts," To Kelly -
who during his time at N.A.S.A, had also seen the government "screwed"
by private and academic institutions - this difference in bargaining
method was all-important. In later years he recalled that his thinlcing
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had been: "Grants do not demand performance, contracts do,"
Shriver agreed to both the Wiggins and the Kelly proposals; all his 
administrative instincts inclined.towards executive control. Thus, he gave 
Wiggins and his experienced "insiders" in P.D.O. the potential to become 
the boiler-room of the Peace Corps, They seized their opportunity.
Shriver did not intend to emasculate the valuable contribution of the 
private sector - indeed he was well aware that he depended upon it for 
the selection and training functions - but equally, he did not want to 
relinquish the supreme power over the administration of overseas projects. 
Harris Woffold summed up Shriver*s thinking on this matter: "If it had
been parcelled out, granted the habits of higher education, the likeli­
hood is that you would have had little pieces of it run by different
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departments and they’d cut up the pie. It :ould have been awful,"
To a great extent then, the programming relationship between the 
Peace Corps and outside organisations was settled very early. To be 
precise. Interim Policy Directive 2,1 made the Associate Director of 
P.D.O. (Riggins) responsible "for the overseas administration of all 
projects and the coordination and balance of the Peace Corps .program. " Shrive: 
signed this in June I96I - before all but the first five or so Peace 
Corps projects had been approved for implementation. After this 
directive, Gordon Boyce and A1 Sims, the respective Chiefs of Private 
Agency and University Relations, who had been with Shriver since the 
very first task force meeting on the Peace Corps, resigned. They 
complained bitterly that the life-line to the private sector had been
cut. Their resignations were the visible outcome of a ferocious
bureaucratic battle between the "insiders" led by Riggins and the
"outsiders" led by Boyce and Sims over the issue of who should control
Peace Corps programmes. The "outsiders" lost. In a bitter memorandum -
written before he left - Boyce warned Shriver that more power wSuld have
to be given to the private agencies and universities if he wanted to
avoid P.D.O,*s victory leading to the Peace Corps becoming "impaled upon
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the thorns of bureaucratic necessity."
However, although P.D.O. gained the upper hand at the outset, Shriver 
consistently encouraged the private sector to participate more fully in 
Peace Corps projects. Certainly this was a sound political stratagem,
A congressman would be much more likely to give his vote to the Peace 
Corps if it had a contract with one of his constituency’s colleges, 
universities or private agencies. The press also liked to see the Peace 
Corps acting responsibly by working hand-in-hand with experienced, non­
profit making overseas organisations. An editorial in the Mew York Times 
in June 196I, argued that the Peace Corps’ proposed collaboration with 
the Cooperative For American Relief Everywhere (C.A.R.E.) in Columbia
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was a wise way of avoiding mistalces. Yet, political considerations 
notwithstanding, Shriver’s personal administrative style also led him to 
constantly encourage competition from the private sector over Peace Corps 
projects. Hence, he made countless speeches to academic institutions
urging them to help in working out "this new marriage between government 
and education." In a memorandum to Peace Corps staff on January 9, 1963, 
Sliriver pointed out that private organisations should be invited - whenever 
possible - to share their experience and acumen, and to strengthen the
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Peace Corps’ recruitment drive and its links to the Amexican public.
Jack Young confirmed Shriver's early commitment to a cooperative relation­
ship with the private agencies:
"I agreed with Sarge Shriver's view of the roles of Universities 
and private agencies. Whatever we were tiying to do, these groups 
knew more about it and had much more experience than anybody in the 
public service at that time. They had performed all the functions 
at one time or another,.,.You always have to build new organizations 
from the current knowledge of what others have done or are doing 
that is similar."53
Indeed, it was with the express intention of giving more bureaucratic 
muscle to the private sector that Shriver merged together the three 
divisions - Private, University and International - in 1963- There was 
no question of his ignoring them, Betvfeen I96I and 1963 he had seen that 
they were not strong enough to compete with P.D.O. on their own, so he 
pooled their resources in the hope of buttressing their collective position.
Even so, P.D.O, remained in the ascendant. Rith its tough "insiders" 
it was in a better position to win projects than the "outsiders" from 
private agencies or academia, Wiggins and his men jealously guarded what 
they considered to be "their" Peace Corps and to an extent, they resented 
the intruders from the private sector. Wiggins was the master of getting 
the right memorandum to the right man at the right time and - in the 
bureaucratic battling over projects - the private bodies had no one to 
match him. Yet, if P.D.O. had the edge when it came to bureaucratic 
intrigue and caballing, it also had the edge in consisterâly''producing the 
best projects and ultimately, that was what mattered to Sargent Shriver. 
Certainly, in the first year of the Peace Corps, Wiggins used the private 
agencies and the universities to plug gaps in his.own programming 
machinery or 'to enable the Peace Corps to begin a project right away —
J^ or example, the C.A.R.E. rural development project in Colombia, or the 
University of Notre Dame rural community action in Chile, But simul­
taneously, he skilfully constructed the Office of P.D.C. as the hub of 
Peace Corps projects around which all else would revolve.
One of the first programmes contracted to the private sector was the 
University of Notre Dame's rural action project in Chile in June, 196I. 
However, Bill Kelly recalled that it was very expensive, badly trained 
and poorly planned; as such, it set a very important precedent. It
proved to be an exceedingly complicated process to coordinate plans
and actions between Peace Coips/Uashington and the University of Notre Dame.
MisLihdeo/standings led to delay and incompetence. This experience scared the
professionals in the Peace Corps and .made them reluctant to contract out
the administration of future programmes to "outsiders," As Thomas Scott,
a former Director of the Division of Private and International Organisations
admitted, "all too often, failures on the part of the contractors justified
55and strengthened the voice of the opposition on the staff. " On the other 
hand, P.D.O. could be guilty of bloody-mindedness and on occasion the good 
work done by the private sector was overlooked - for example, the C.A.R.E./ 
Peace Corps project in Colombia or the Y.M.C.A./Peaca Corps project in 
Venezuela - and its mistakes emphasised. In the early years, blunders 
were plentiful both in those programmes which the Peace Corps administered 
itself and in those it contracted out. But because of P.D.O,'a defensiveness 
and possessiveness they tended to forgive the failings of their own men in ths^  ^
field as "normal problems of cross-cultural adjustment." However, when ■
the same problem affected the Contract Representative Overseas (C .O .R.), then 
the fault lay indubitably with the inefficiency of "those damn private 
organizations," As Scott put it, "The private agencies would make the 
same mistakes as the Peace Corps, learn the same lessons, bub not get the 
same chances to try again.
A fundamental difficulty was "identity," Shriver and Riggins feared 
that in a programme administered by a private organisation Volunteers 
would be confused as to whether they were working for the Peace Corps or 
for an outside body-especially in programmes in which both participated.
In July, 1961, Bill Haddad reported to 3hriver that some Volunteers in 
training felt uneasy that they were being "tied up with C.A.R.E. rather 
than the Peace Corps," Bill Kelly also;complained that educational 
institutions and private agencies were getting in the way of Volunteers ’ 
loyalty to the Peace Corps. Furthermore, he argued that the partnership 
was adding nothing to Peace Corps programmes except duplication, red tape and
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bureaucracy. On another occasion, Kelly became furious when he discovered
that, instead of the standard Peace Corps jeeps, a couple of Harvard
professors on contract as advisers in Nigeria, had bought brand new
Mercedes-Benz cars as their in-country transportation and charged them to
the Peace Corps. This typa of action hardly endeared the academic
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community to the "insiders".
The private sector continued to battle gamely with P.D.O. throughout 
the Kennedy era; but even a-t the peak period of their involvement in 1965, 
only sixteen private organisations - including C.A.R.E., Heifer Project 
Inc., the 4-H Club Foundation, the National Farm Union and the American 
Association For Health, Physical Education and Recreation - had programming 
contracts with the Peace Corps. Although these helped administer some 
thirty projects in twenty-one countries, their participation was usually 
peripheral - in the form of C.O.R,'s or specialist advisers - and only 
covered 20 per cent of Volunteers in the field. The University Division, 
with its vast potential of hundreds of eager educational institutions, 
provided a mere thirteen colleges and universities as contractors in 
sixteen programmes. They administered barely 10 per cent of all Volunteers, 
Also, contracts with international organisations were negligible; although 
there were exceptions'like the programme in Pakistan jointly administered
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by the Food and Agricultural Organisation.
Some Peace Corps staffers vainly attempted to restore the initially 
intended balance. Harris Rofford recalled having a "running argument"
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on that for five years. I favored' giving more power to the Universities." 
Rogers Finch was one in a long line of Chiefs of University Relations who 
resigned after a. sharp disagreement with Shriver about the role of 
educational institutions in the Peace Corps, Franklin V/illiams, first 
Chief of the Division of Private Agency Relations and later head of the 
merged Division, of Prcurabe, ..University and International Organisations, 
was probably the most vociferous champion of the private sector’s cause.
In a memorandum of May 1962, he argued that the Peace Corps should become
more international through a deeper involvement with the United Nations
and foreign private organisations. In a terse, hand-written note in the
margin, Shriver vetoed this proposal: "Let’s get our own private
organizations fully developed before we put in much time on these
’triple cross bucks’. We need to play straight football - block, tackle,
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and run. Leave the fancy stuff to others," In a volatile staff 
meeting in December Williams again challenged Shriver to implement
the Peace Corps' publicly-stated "policy of preference" for the university 
and private agencies programmes. Again Shriver retorted, "We have a 
policy of preference for agencies with professional qualifications. Vfe 
do not just bring in agencies or universities to add something to projects 
if that something is merely sharing the administrative load, I have often 
said that it is insulting to have University professors overseas simply
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to perform administration chores," Shriver was unwilling to be tied 
to the theory of a Peace Corps relationship with the private sector if, 
in practice, it did not prove efficient, practical and economic, "Just 
show me dollars and results," he told Bill Kelly, As early as January 
8, 1962, Sargent Shriver admitted to the New York Times that the role 
of private organisations in the Peace Corps had been "less than expected," 
Prom the beginning, Wiggins,’ Josephscn, Kelly and indeeo. Shri.ver himself, 
had been convinced that the Peace Corps would operate faster, cheaper 
and more efficiently if it directed its own programmes. This did not 
preclude the participation of private organisations, but it assigned 
to them a much lesser role than they had at first anticipated. Their 
disappointment was deep. As far as Thomas Scott was concerned, the 
programming relationshio between the Peace Corps and the urivate sector
6k
could only be characterised as the downright "failure of a partnership."
P.D.O.’s victory left it as the powerful nucleus of the Peace Corps, 
Thus, somewhat ironically, it was around Vfiggins’s P.D.O. - in many ways 
the most tightly-disciplined and most bureaucratic single unit within the 
Peace Corps - that the agency which prided itself in being "unbureaucratic"
revolved* However, although P.D.O. won the battle over programming, the 
Peace Corps contracted out, between and 1964?an. average of 30 per
cent of its appropriations to the private sector for selection, training
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and professional support services. The Peace Coirps’ cooperation with
the private sector, though nowhere near as broad as had been envisioned
in the Report To The President, was still much wider than any other
Federal agency. Virtually all selection and training of Volunteers was
carried out by educational institutions, particularly colleges. This
v/as an extremely important role which they managed very successfully.
Thus, in an extraordinary gesture of openness, the Peace Corps allowed
its final product - the Volunteer - to be chosen by "outsiders."
The great need for speed had forced the Peace Corps and private
institutions together; yet, despite a relationship which was sometimes
stormy, the marriage was fertile and mixed parentage added richness and
flavour to its progeny. In the first four years, over four hundred and
fifty Peace Corps projects were prepared at'eighty-six educational institution
representing thirty-two states; nearly five thousand regular and special
faculty members participated in various ways and over thirty private
organisations helped with training and overseas support. Since 80 per cent
of Volunteers came from universities or colleges, the Peace Corps claimed
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it had made over eight thousand "associations" with outside bodies. 
Psychologists, educationalists, linguists, overseas representatives and 
other experts were hired on a consultative basis. The agricultural, 
business, philanthropic and industrial sectors all participated in the 
Peace Corps by providing advice, equipment or manpower. For example, on 
July 24-, 1962, Sargent Shriver reported to President Kennedy on the 
"significant help" and "high degree of cooperation" which the Peace Corps 
was receiving from the private sector - including I.B.M., the National 
Advertising Council, Caterpillar Tractors and American Telegraph and
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Telephone.
This relationship with outside bodies was of profound significance
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in the character development of the Peace Corps organisation. By 
extending and sharing its responsibilities, the Peace Corps became more 
like a federation of different entities rather than one monolithic 
government institution. Indeed, the only functions which remained the 
sole domain of Peace Gorps/Jashington were overseas programming, 
budgeting, general policy-making, invitations to training and contracts 
with foreign governments. All others were contracted out, giving the 
maximum number of people - from all walks of life - the opportunity to 
participate in the Peace Corps at some level* This established for the 
Peace Corps, a strong domestic constituency which had its roots in the 
pluralism of American life. Also, it obviated the need for the Peace 
Corps to hire and train a huge technical staff of its own. In theory, 
if not often in practice, it was possible for a Volunteer to go through 
his service without meeting a directly-employed Peace Corps official.
This great potential for diversity within the agency reinforced the 
truisim of not one Peace Corps, but many. Different agencies and 
different personalities had their own distinctive methods for any given 
project or situation. This continuous leasing of power meant that few 
procedures ever became routine; there was al?fays a different way of doing 
things, always room for debate. In other words, the "extended organisation" - 
as it came to be called in Peace Corps circles - ensured the provision of 
the essential ingredients which Shriver had desired for his "different" 
government organisation: flexibility, vitality and, most of all, non­
bureaucracy.
In leading the Peace Corps, Shriver placed little value on
theoretical principles or traditional modes of bureaucratic behaviour;
each issue was approached on its merits with only one pre-eminent
question - will it work? Since, as Shriver said, the Peace Corps was
setting out "to do what no government agency had ever done before,"
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there were few rules or precedents to be applied. Gerald Bush, a 
training Coordinator, recalled that in any staff controversy, "the worst
possible argument that could be made vras that the Department of State 
did it that way. The second weakest argument that could be made was 
that it had been done that way before. The strongest argument was
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that it had never been done before and let's try it." The complete 
lack of an institutional history often meant that decisions had to be 
made in totally unforeseen circumstances, and sometimes with little 
time for great discussion. For this reason, Shriver usually made Peace 
Corps policy as he went along, on an ad hoc basis. The staff nicknamed 
his polioy-deGisions "ShriverismsAn in-house joke was that whatever 
Shriver said to the New York Times or on Meet The Press had to be 
carefully monitored - lest he should make a policy while answering a
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reporter's question, without telling his associateso
Shriver's only rule was that all policies should be flexible enough 
to allow for any possible contingency^ Hence, every Peace Corps policy 
directive. / v/as entitled "interim" ~ denoting that it could be changed if 
necessary. Bill Josephson, who devised this nomenclature, explained that 
the quality they were trying to capture in their procedure was that Peace 
Corps policy was not immutable. "It was not a substitute for thought,"
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said Josephson. Since the Peace Corps was dealing with thousands of 
Volunteers- all working in diverse circumstances and subject to the 
vagaries of their particular locale, this elasticity in policy-making 
was essential, "A routine application of policy to issues raised by 
Volunteers,"'argued Josephson, "Would have killed the Peace C o r p s L i k a  
Shriver, Josephson v/as committed to flexibility whenever possible. When 
the Management Division argued that the Peace Corps should have an 
Instruction Manual in line with other government agencies, Josephson 
prevailed upon Sliriver that the Peace Corps must avoid writing a rule- 
book. "1 knew from my experience in I.C.A.," he said, "the stultifying 
impact on the program that would have," Josephson's argument was 
successful and, under Shriver, the Peace Corps never printed a policy 
manual. The closest approximation was a Peace Corps Representative's 
Handbook. Collated by Josephson and printed for internal consumption
only, it was a miscellany of documents containing what he termed "bits
oj* written policy" - an important letter, a telling memorandum or
sometimes just a telegram. Its purpose was to provide a little guidance
for Representatives abroad. As Josephson described it, "it didn't tell
you the way the government manuals usually do, to take Form 23, and fill
in this block, and so on. It told you things that were there really
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to make you thinlc
Out of necessity then, as much as desire, official Peace Corps 
policy guidelines were flexible and, according to Shriver, " carefully
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evaluated in each country," Since circumstances could vary greatly
from one programme to another or from one Volunteer to another, there
had to be sufficient scope for individual initiative and adaptability.
This was never better illustrated than when a coup d'etat in the
Dominican Republic left the Peace Corps in the position of dealing with
a government not officially recognised by the United States, After
sending a cable to Washington, the Rep maintained normal Peace Corps
relations; he adjudged that the Volunteers could continue their work
without danger to their lives and without becoming politically involved.
Later when the United States recognised the new government, Shriver
commended the Rep for ,’iis performance: "You were there, v/e weren't and
we were relying on you." In an illuminating conclusion Shriver emphasised,
"We don't want global policies that may not apply in a particular 
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situation," Peace Corps Interim Policy Directive 4.6 stated that it 
v/as the job of the Rep to "provide imagination and ingenuity necessary 
to retain the freshness and uniqueness of the Peace Corps and keep its 
objectives clear and its organ!:%ition appropriately modest,"
V/hen Charles Houston, Peace Corps Rep in Hew Delhi wrote to 
headquarters in Washington with an organisational problem. Bill Josephson's 
reply was indicative of the unique philosophy at the base of the Peace 
Corps: "in response to your question as to whether you are being 
'sufficiently bureaucratic', as you laaow, the general approach is to
yv
discourage this whenever, wherever, however possible." This attitude 
went a long way to explain Harris Wofford's description of the Peace
Corps as "an antibureaucratio bureaucracy an agency of programmed
diversity, programmed uncertainty, sufficient unpredictability- just 
going to the threshold of chaos but not q.uite reaching it'." Even 
the office of P.D.O. which - outwith Management was probably the most 
bureaucratic arm of the Peace Corps - was subject to the strictures of its 
Chief, Wazren Wiggins, that "policy and programming directives particularly 
should allow for flexibility." Wiggins made it clear that he wished 
transmitted "only those directives which are absolutely necessary."
Although an experienced administrator, Wiggins ooul.d in no way be 
described as a traditional organisation man. "I would like to pass
on to you the Director's advice," he told his staff in 1961-, tnat
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1Îpaper never won e. war*
Ironically, on paper, the Peace Corps had the appearance of any
• other lino-and-staff government bureaucracy with the normal functions
of recruitment, budget,' personnel and so forth. Even the bureaucratese
used to describe its product - "middle-level manpower" - had the ring of
a traditional government agency. In early 1961, some feared that this
'would, in fact, become the case, down Kenneth Galbraith no bed in his
diary:
iiiiliiil:'
with their attitudes."77 
Galbraith and other sceptics did not take into account the extraordinary
determination of Shriver, Wofford, liggins, loyers, Josephson and others
to make the Peace Corps a trtuLy "different" type of organisation. "'.Te
can't have any negative, efficient bureaucrats here," Bill^Hadded told
Shriver in a memorandum of May 1961, "no' cynics allowed!" Shnver's
administrators were very conscious of how Point Pour - at one a
17X
hold new programme - had 'become ossified; they were intent that such 
"bureaucratie dinosaurism would not overtake the Peace Corps, "’forking 
with the Peace Corps," Shriver told his new staff, "should not be 
exactly like working with another government agency. We have a special 
mission which can only be accomplished if everyone believes in it and 
works for it in a manner consistent with the ideals of service and
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volunteer-ism."
The first priority was to keep administrative staff to a minimum,
Warren Wiggins informed Dean Rusk on May 3, 196I, that "the Peace Corps
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does not wish to have a.large administrative staff of its own." All 
Peace Corps officials were very conscious of Shriver*s desire to keep down the 
administrative apparatus. Bill Moyers wrote Shriver a memorandum on 
"How To Keep The Punch In The Peace Corps" in which he compared the
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agency to a "trim ship" with no frills or extravagances. On March 5,
1961, there were 101 people working at Peace Corps headquarters and no
Volunteers in the field. After three years - and the development of a
government agency - there were 647 staffers in Vfashington' with a further .
365 in training camps or in overseas posts. There were also over 7000
Volunteers in training or in the field. Yet, despite this neccessary
expansion, Warren Wiggins maintained that "the of smallness was
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retained." Between I96I and 1964, there was an average of 10 Volunteers 
in the field for every administrative person in support - clerks, typists 
and overseas staff included, Shriver was always quite proud to compare 
the figure of his trim ship to the Federal government's average of one 
person in Washington to every four abroad.
The Peace Corps* disdain of bureaucratic procedure led to some 
friction with the more traditional agencies. For instance, the Bureau of 
the Budget and the Executive Office frequently requested the Peace Corps' 
projections for the next few years - quite a legitimate inquiry from their
i
standpoint since, acting as bureaucratic mechanisms of control, they 
wanted to make long-term estimates based on size. However, for the Peace 
Corps, the question was absurd. Under Shriver, the agency lurched
spasmodically from day to day. Increasing or decreasing staff as the 
situation demanded. Bradley Patterson recalled Shriver’s reaction when 
a Budget officer asked him to make a long-term estimation: "I remember 
Shriver almost started laughing at him., He said, 'Look, it's a very 
legitimate question, but how the hell do I know where we're going to be 
in five years?'" Indeed, Pgtterson concluded, "we hardly knew where the
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next day v/as coming from." While this sometimes caused disorder and 
untidiness, the Peace Corps' philosophy of cutting its cloth to suit its 
needs ensured that bureaucratic growth per se never became a goal.
The informal, personal atmosphere within the Peace Corps organisation 
was another safeguard against the norm of bureaucratic atrophy. Since 
it dealt directly with people, it was important that the Peace Corps 
should not become an impersonal machine. "Our interest is the individual"
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said Wiggins. Thus there was a particular effort to maintain relations 
between Peace Corps/Washington and the Volunteers in the field on a plane 
more personal than institutional. The Division of Volunteer Field 
Support established this direct link by setting up Volunteer conferences, 
visiting and listening to the Volunteers, helping them settle back home 
and by publishing a monthly newspaper The Volunteer. "In general," recalled 
Padraic Kennedy, Chief of this Division, "we actempted uo ureat the
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Volunteer as a human being rather than a number." A book was published 
~ Who's Who In Peace Corps/Washington - to make the "faceless bureaucrats" 
at headquarters more familiar to the Volunteers overseas» Volunteers were 
encouraged to send letters to Washington - which they did in abundance - 
and Peace Corps Heps to send tapes or letters. Shrivers always made sure 
these were answered. Indeed, the Peace Corps' ubiquitous Director was the 
consummate exponent of the personal touch. He personally said yea or nay 
on every major decision, he personally interviewed every candidate for 
an upper-echelon post. Newell Flather, a Harvard graduate, decided in the 
spring of I96I to volunteer for the Peace Corps. When he telephoned 
Washington to ask for an application form he was absolutely astounded
to find himself talking not to a clerk or a secretary hut to Sargent 
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Shriver himself.
Although Wiggins was in charge of P.D.O., Moyers of Public Affairs,
Josephson of Qenersl. Counsel and so forth, Shriver deliberately left
it unclear where one office's jurisdiction ended and another's began.
This vague delegation of authority provided the essence of the Peace
Corps® anti-bureaucratic character. For, especially as there were so
many enthusiastic generalists in the new agency, it became inevitable
that almost every important idea or issue transcended bureaucratic
compartmentalisation. As Bill Kelly recalled, "It was open house on all
issues and everyone was fair game." During a staff meeting in 1965, Bob
Gale of P.D.O, criticised the methods of the Recruitment Division.
However, instead of .'rebuking him for commenting on something which he
knew little about, Shriver gave him the job of Chief of Recrui.tment and
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ordered him to do better. Even in the first organisation chart, 
nomenclature had not been downgraded; everyone was a Director or a 
Chief - thus avoiding a rigid sense of hierarchy. As Gerald Bush 
explained it, "In this type of organization, vertical and lateral 
communication was relatively free and unencumbered by divisional lines. 
The structure nf the organisation v/as loose, fragmented and duplicative."
Shriver did., not vrorry about the duplication which this vagueness 
sometimes caused - so long as the job was done efficiently - and the 
constant debate and argument which it fuelled vras consonant with 
his style of leadership. He never had fewer than thirty-five members 
of his senior staff at their meetings on Mondays, Wednesdays and 
Eli days, and everyone in the Peace Corps from Volunteers to secretaries 
was invited to the general meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays. He 
assigned problem issues to committees, made up from representatives 
of various Divisions. This kept debate open and gave each sector of 
the Peace Corps an equal opportunity to state its opinion. The Peace 
Corps was in fact administered more by these ad- hoc, "task force"
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committees than by the Offices and Divisions shown on the
organisation charts. Those who like to think of themselves as
purists or theorists soon foundered; the only means of survival
were originality, adaptability, and knowledgeable argument. In
this respect, as Bush argued, "The Peace Corps consistently
asserted the opposite of the orthodox view of administration.***
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a conflict and consensus type of bureaucracy,*'
In characterising the Peace Corps organisation, V/arren Wiggins 
used the words "flexibility", '^imaginâtion" and "constructive conflict". 
He noted that, "some on the outside characterise the Peace Corps as 
just a bit of madness"; and, he concluded, "from time to time, we 
who work on the inside find that a correct characterisation,"
Sargent Shriver described the position in the early days : "We
knew the Peace Corps would have only one chance to work. As
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with the parachute jumper, the chute had to open first time,"
This explained the unconventional manner in which the Peace Corps
approached its many problems of organisation. Shriver savoured
the opportunity to create something new and he 'and the majority of
his staff shared an iconoclastic attitute towards established
procedure. Risk-taking was openly encouraged, "We do not rely
upon the rule-book," Wiggins told his staff, "but the exceptional
privileges granted by the rule-book," Gerald Bush recalled being
ordered to "operife fast and stay legelf but if something goes wrong -
just operate fast." George Carter, first Rep in Ghana described the
Peace Corps as "an environment of institutionalised uncertainty,"
Shriver was determined that the Peace Corps would be an open
organisation; indeed, as Warren Wiggins put it, "an open society of
91open personalities." He had no time for the timid proposal or 
the bureaucratically-inhibited response. Re demanded boldness and 
intellectual daring, "There will be little tolerance of a 'tomorrow'
philosophy," Shriver wrote, or "an 'it can't be done because it 
hasn't been done before' attitude," The Peace Corps welcomed the 
"different,
Shriver was fond of claiming that the Volunteer had a "24-hour 
a day job" and he judged his staff by similar criterion. Late 
hours, weekend work and early-morning phone-calls became the standard 
fare of Peace Corps staffers. The difference between home and office 
became indistinguishable for anyone "on board" - the Peace Corps always 
came first. To encourage officials to identify with Volunteers, it 
became an unwritten law that everyone — senior staff included - should 
actually serve in the field at some point. 'The aim was to prevent 
8. huge gap developing between the officials in Washington and the 
Volunteers overseas. Thus, Harris Wofford served as a Rep in Ethiopia, 
Tom Quimby in Liberia, Prank Mankiewfcz in Peru and so forth. Of 
course, Shriver paid as many visits abroad as possible; by the autumn 
of 1963 he had already visited thirty-six of the forty-four countries 
where the Peace Corps was present. Attempts were constancy made to 
avoid the situation where desk-bound bureaucrats planned programmes, 
■unaware of the actual conditions under whioh the Volunteer had to work.
To keep the organisation on its toes and avoid self-perpetuation,
Shriver set up within the Peace Corps, an Evaluation Division. In
the words of its first Chief, Charles Peters, its function was "to
take an independent, no axe-jro-grind look at all aspects of the Peace
Corps." As early as April, I96I, Bill Haddad argued for an "Inspector
General-type" who could make continuous assessments on the value of 
9 5 -Peace Corps work. ' in other words, evaluation was to be the eyes and 
ears of the Director.
Charles Peters recalled that his first evaluations were no more
94than brief, patchy reports on Peace Corps training methods. But 
soon, a process was devised whereby an individual evaluator or a team
of evaluators - often journalists - went overseas for a two or 
three week period, observed the Peace Corps at work, gathered 
information through intensive interviewing and sent back their 
analyses to Sargent Shriver, Their reports were readable, 
journalistic impressions which concentrated on the "living and working" 
problems faced by Volunteers, Thus, the evaluations dealt with the 
appropriateness of the Volunteer life-style and living standards, 
the use of Peace Corps vehicles, contact- with Americans from other 
agencies, the placing of too many Americans in one city, the 
congregation of Volunteers to the exclusion of host country nationals, 
Vacation, peraxal' adjustment problems, staff inadequacies, host country 
reactions and the effectiveness of selection and training methods.
They were deliberately impressionistic rather than technically detailed 
and were designed to impart the "mood" of a programme. Nevertheless, 
they were extremely candid and classified as "Eyes Only" for the 
Director,
Although the main concern of the evaluators was the Volunteer, 
every aspect of the organisation was open to criticism; there were 
no sacred cows. Part of the reasoning behind, evaluation was to avoid 
mistakes or, at least, to discover them before the press SÔ,
55described this as "getting the Time magazine story oefore Time magazine." 
However, jusb'as important was his desire to have an insider who 
performed in a capacity that was not part of the regular functioning 
structure of the Peaœ Corps and who could be relatively objective,
Shriver dispatched these evaluators all over the globe and urged them 
to cast j. cold eye on •-.11 the Peace Corps' acsiviPias, He wanted to 
know what was good, but more importantly, what was weak or inefficient.
The good news tended to come to light rather quickly in the press; 
the bad often remained hidden, "As an evaluator," Peters wrote in a 
1963 evaluation report on Brazil, "you feel you have a duty to raise
{96hell*" To guard against the self-congratulatory tendencies
certain to arise in even the most enlightened bureaucracies,
Shriver often contracted with people who had no government ties -
journalists, academics, scientists - to perform evaluations.
The hypercritical and sweeping extent of this process was, wrote
97evaluator Meridan Bennet, "unique: in government operations,"
In the early days, Haddad and Peters were sometimes denigrated 
hy their peers as "Shriver's spies." Evaluators paid brief visits 
to projects, had no scientific methodology and their findings were 
seen only by Shriver* Some of the more professional bureaucrats 
claimed that this procedure was highly irregular. Every so often 
Peace Corps/Washington would rock with the news of the latest 
scandalous expose from the field. Country Reps were often dismissed 
and, after one particularly devastating report on Pakistan, Peters 
recalled that the- entire overseas staff was sacked, Tom Quimby was 
once moved to write a twenty-page rebuttal to a critical evaluation
report on Liberia where he was Rep, "Frankly," he admitted "they
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made me madder than hell," "Misleading" and "false" were a few of 
the adjectives hurled at Evaluation by Joseph Kauffman, .Director of 
Training, In a memorandum to Bill Wtoyers in September 19^2, he was 
almost categoric in his denunciation of its role "in visiting training 
centers, of their reports (which are not always seen), of the low level 
of analysis, colored language and superficiality," Indeed, the 
enraged Kauffman said there was "a strong feeling that if the .agency 
has to economise, Planning and Evaluation ougnt to go firsts .As
presently run, the operation is ineffective at best and an affront to
99our dignity at the least."
Certainly, evaluators were irreverent* They cared little for 
bureaucratic procedure or established reputati.;ns* They judged 
performance by the highest standards and were scathing of even the
slightest incompetence. Returned Volunteers especially relished 
the opportunity - as evaluators - to criticise their former bosses.
In later years, Charles Peters admitted that evaluation reports 
sometimes showed too much emotion and relied on "gut feelings".
Indeed, at one point in 1^62, Peters was positive he was about to 
be fired by Shriver because his reports were proving too disruptive.
He recalled the Director being very upset at Evaluation's 
"colorful" assessments. However, in the autumn of that year 
Shriver made a visit to Africa and sent back a cable to Washington 
headquarters which said, in effect, "Tell Peters he was right," 
Complaints continued throughout I96I-64» but Shriver never heeded 
the calls for Evaluation's destruction; indeed, he said he found 
its reports "95 per cent reliable*
In time, the Evaluation Division refined its methods and
brought in more sociologists, psychologists and scholars. Yet,
as Bill Haddad i^ ointed out to Shriver in I963, "It is interesting
to note that the scholars....with all their academic training, still
produce reports not significantly different from those produced by
101the newspaper types we nave here," Constant self-criticism meant 
the loss of many reputations in Peace Corps/Washington. One 
evaluation report of a Peace Corps official read: - "'While he is a 
very lovable old gentleman, it h ;.s never been clear why this individual 
was hired,,..it would be well not to continue his employment,"
Another described a Peace Corps Rep as "too pompous, far too church- 
oriented and too formal." His retainment was not recommended.
No one in Peace Gorps/v/ashington was more respected than Charles 
Peters. He was bright, superbly irreverent and extraordinarily far- 
seeing. Time without number, Peters gave Shriver warning of 
potential disasters in the field; on every subject, from use of 
vehicles to sexual behaviour and political scandal, Peters provided
the Peace Corps hierarchy with the soundest advice. His critical
reports and biting memoranda were sometimes hard for administrators
to accept; but if it was difficult not to hate Evaluation, it was
equally difficult not to like Peters personally. He was convinced
that "if the Peace Corps is to get better - and unless we keep
trying to make it better it will surely get worse - we must raise
our s t a n d a r d s . H e  was a perennial seeker after excellence who,
despite friction with his peers, was dubbed by them "the conscience
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of the. Peace Corps.
As well as Evaluation there was also a Research Division.
Volunteers were chosen at all stages of training and field work and
asked to fill out forms, talk with interviewers and take special
tests in a continual effort to improve the selection training
procedures. The Peace Corps often contracted out this type of work
to distinguished social scientists and worked in cooperation with
researchers and universities in the host country. Completion of
Service Conference for Volunteers were another source of valuable
feedback to V/ashington. At the end of their stint overseas,
Volunteers would meet with Peace Corps officials for two or three
days to talk and write about their experience. In addition to
providing information which helped improve operations, the end-of-
term meetings-allowed administrators a unique insight into the Peace
Corps as it functioned on the ground. As Dr. Joseph Colmen, Chiei
of Research pointed out, "The Peace Corps would be derelict if iu did
not take advantage of the kinds of knowledge which is available to it
,104
from the Volunteer by getting his first-hand opinion.
These various reflective mechanisms lent credence to Shriver s 
boast that no one was more critical of the Peace Corps that it was of 
itself. This self-examining attitude allowed it to escape from the 
ossification endemic in most government bureaucracies and kept it 
athletic and vigorous. Even in 1966, iVndrew Kopkind of the Hew
j-ou
Republic could praise the Peace Corps as "the last, remaining, 
isolated and beleaguered outpost of the New Frontier, All the 
other fortresses have fallen to the captains of consensus.
Based on Shriver and Wofford's talent hunt for capable people 
to man the Kennedy administration during the transition period, the 
Peace Corps established its o’vn permanent Talent Search Operation,
Bill Haddad was described as Shriver’s "vacuum-cleaner for talent 
in staff positions". In June I96I, he contacted over one hundred 
individuals and asked for names of "qualify" people. By July 27, 
he had received four hundred n a m e s , T h e  Talent Hunt was Shriver*s 
device for ensuring a constant flow of new ideas and first-class 
personnel to the Peace Corps, Top staff posts were filled on a 
short-term basis by men on leave of absence from private business, 
the law, labour unions, universities and industry. The competition 
for places was intense and only the very highest standard of 
performance ensured any degTse of permanence, Shriver kept the 
Talent Hunt as part of his own office and if a candidate for a senior 
staff position made it through the barrage of interviews (which ranged 
between ten and thirty) then he was always finally confronted by 
Shriver himself. In this manner Shriver made sure that he knew and 
approved of his top men.
In 1965, the first of the returning Volunteers were given 
administrative positions in Washington, Indeed, in 1962, Bill Haddad 
argued that the Peace Corps staff should eventually consist entirely 
of "returnees" and thus m^ke the organisation thoroughly "volunteer"
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in nature. While Haddad's dream was never fully realised, by the 
spring of I965, returned Volunteers numbered 183 out of a total of 
approximately 1000 Peace Corps staff employees. Of about 700 
employees in Washington, 101 were returnees . and of the 300 employees 
overseas, 82 were returnees. Thus ex-Volunteers comprised about I4
per cent of the Washington staff and 27 per cent of the overseas 
staff. Indeed, by I965, 33 per cent of all Peace Corps Reps were 
returned Volunteers,This development added to the process of 
regeneration within the ifligace Corps and formed the seeds of self­
revision, The "new wave" of administrators created an amorphous 
underground in Peace Corps/Washington, got their feet on the rungs 
of power and became an important force for change and innovation 
in the bureaucracy.
The Peace Corps' "different" air, its freshness, was best 
characterised by Shriver's "no-career" philosophy which he had 
propounded since its inception. In informal, but unmistakeable 
fashion, Shriver made it clear to all prospective staff that the 
Peace Corps was a "service" mot a "job" and tnat the standard 
emoluments of a career in government - tenure, promotion, retirement 
schemes - did not apply. Shriver wanted to maintain experimentation, 
creativity and risk; he did not wish to attract "careerist" types. 
Thus, as Bill Josephson explained, "we almost never* made a tenured
appointment in the Peace Corps and we resisted all efforts at
109establishing registers*"
On March 6, I963» in a memorandum entitled "In-tTp-And-Out -
A Plan To Keep The Peace Corps Permanently Young, Creative And
Dynamic", Prahklin Willi^ ams argued that the Peace Corps should formally
legislate against careerism:
"Unless we permanently build in some protections, it is 
inevitable that the Peace Corps, as a number of other 
unl'imented federal agencies, will eventually become so 
bureaucratic, hide-bound, 'know-that-is-the-way-we-did-* 
it-yesterday-is-the-v/ay-it-should-be-done-today' in our 
attitudes that all the wonderful vigor, originality, 
flexibility, etc, that we talk about will slowly disappear 
,...This kind of bureaucratic hardening of the arteries 
can be avoided. The secret is staffing, I py^gose an 
'in-up-and-out' procedure for the Peace Corps."
Based on an idea first put forward in December, I96I by Professor
Robert Textor (then a consultant to the Peace Corps), Williams
proposed that all Peace Corps personnel should be subject to a
■limited tenars period of five years* Other staff members agreed 
with the Williams thesis that the Peace Corps - in its third year
at- this point - was in danger of becoming a burgeoning bureaucracy,
Charles Houston put it this strongly to Bill Moyers:
^Names of our own "alphabet divisions* are tumbling from 
the lips of too many people too often. What 'my division* 
or 'our people' may say, think or do on any given question 
or issue has become paramount* I had the strong feeling 
that far fewer people are still asking what they can do for 
their country or for the Peace Corps, A growing number 
seem to be asking what Sarge and the Peace Corps can do 
for them,...I get the impression that new ideas are 
frequently now screened by a careful analysis of the 
relative benefits which may accrue to the office or 
employees considering them,,,.The old spectre which 
haunts so many government offices, 'it is unpre^^^ented, 
therefore impossible* is breathing down close."
To investigats these criticisms and Williams's proposed remedy for them,
Shriver placed Bill Moyers in charge of a special task force committee
"To Keep The Peace «Corps Flexible", The committee agreed that the
Peace Corps was in need of a guard against careerism, but envisaged
a major problem in gaining legislation to restrict the number of
years a person might work with the agency. Bill Haddad told Shriver
that the forced cut-off date and its concomitant, "administration by
112rookies", was causing him some concern. Also Shriver had to take
into account the inevitable hostility of the Civil Service Commission,
the loss of experienced and able people simply through this rotation
and the possiblity that this controversial piece of legislation might
obscure the Pe-ace Corps' more urgent needs in Congress, Despite
probable repercussions, Shriver was willing to pay zhe price necessary
to ensure that "new gj^ ergy, spirit and ideas -«re constantly injected
115in the Peace Corps' administration," Thus the long, hard drive for 
legislation began.
Notwithstanding certain reservations about the wisdom of going 
all-out for legislation, Shriver's staff threw all their weight behind 
what they nicknamed the "Five Year Flush", In a memorandum to Myer 
Feldman, Special Assistant to President Kennedy, Moyers argued that 
the Peace Corps was "unique" among government agencies:
"Why is it unique? A number of reasons could be 
offered, but the central reason is that most of its 
people - now totalling about 7,000 - are Volunteers,
Volunteers are a very/ special breed. Their idealism, 
the nature of the commitment they have made, their 
goals all deserve special respect and require special 
handling,,I think Sarge is also concerned to try to 
create a device which will assure that the Peace Corps 
will retain its fresh, critical and spirited approach 
to its business, A five year limitation on employment 
will guarantee constant turnover and, therefore, constant 
injection into the Peace Corps of new ideas and energies,"
When Under-Secretary of State George Ball warned Shriver of possible
Congressional intransigence, Shriver answered,"Frankly, I think that
anything legislated .^bout this organisation is sui-generis almost,
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even in the minds of Congressmen," As predicted, John W, Macy, 
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission .proved an obstacle to 
legislation, "This approach is so fundamentally in conflict with 
the concept of the career service", he told Shriver "that I believe, 
even under the special circumstances of the Peace Corps, that this
116
limitation would constitute inappropriate public policy,"
Thus, 1963 ended with the "Five Year Limitation" legislation, 
mired in the Congress, It remained so until October 10, 1965* 
Effective on that day, an amendment to the Peace Corps Act required 
that no staff member above the grade of GS-9 would be permitted to 
remain in the organisation's egjploy longer than five years.
Professor Textor claimed that this wan "the first time in the history 
of the American republic that a federal agency has deliberately moved 
to limit drastically the tenure of its own personnel for the specific
117
purpose of avoiding bureaucratic arteriosclerosis." Certainly, 
it was a turning point in Peace Corps history; the five year law 
applied to all senior staff. Accordingly, .and with characteristic 
propriety, Sargent Shriver resigned the Peace Corps Directorship on 
March 1, I966 - five years to the day since his appointment by 
President Kennedy,
The enactment of the five year limitation was perhaps the
most emphatic symbol of the Peace Corps* anti-bureaucratic tendencies,
Indeed, it took enormous satisfaction from being unlike normal
government institutions. As Charles Peters put it in June I963,
"In the Peace Corps we pride ourselves on being as unbureaucratic 
1 1 8 .as possible," It disdained civil service regulations; outsiders
were invited to participate in its most important functions; staff
meetings and controversial issues were open to everyone; there was
fluent and regular communication between officials and Volunteers;
policy was always flexible; and tnere were numerous devices for
self-criticism. It was true that at the very heart of the
organisation there was the disciplined, highly-efficient P.D.O.
with its hard-nosed in-fighters* Yet, even Wiggins*e bureaucrats
were atypical of the kind usually found in government. Besides,
within P.D.O, there were constant arguments and differences of
opinion, Andrew Kopkind claimed that it was these unique qualities
which made the atmosphere in the Peace Corps* offices, "different
from any other large bureau in Washington,...(it) retains those
paradoxes of style and substance which informed the best inventions
of the Kennedy years; it is expectant, contradictory, optimistic,
119innovative and thoroughly frantic,"
CHAPTER SEVEN
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND THE PRESIDENT
"In Washington, we have given much thought to the policies 
and practices; necessary to carry out our unusual program 
successfully..-The basic philosophy of the Peace Corps is 
one of service."
- SARGENT SHRIVER -
(Memorandum To The Peace Corps 
Staff, December 1961)
15^
Although semi-autonomous, the Peace Corps organisation 
did not exist in a vacuum. It was obliged to work with other 
countries, peoples and agencies. To perform successfully, it 
needed to establish basic principles, policies and relation­
ships. "It chilled the blood of Shriver and the people who 
didn't want directives and red tape.... and bureaucracy," 
recalled Bradley Patterson, "but we had to have them." 
Patterson, an experienced administrator, realised that no 
government body could function without laying down necessary 
rules, regulations and policies. "You had to have some guid­
ance as to who the hell would be a Volunteer," he said, "what 
their procedures of selection would be, what their standards 
would be, what the projects would be, whether we would work 
with religious projects or not."  ^As a fragile, new agency, 
the Peace Corps also had to work very hard at building fruit­
ful relationships with the more traditional Federal organis­
ations. In early 1961, there was a good deal of scepticism 
about sending young Americans overseas as "middle-level man­
power." The Peace Corps had to overcome the cynics. In this 
respect. President Kennedy was of inestimable help. More 
than any other government agency - at home or abroad - his 
name was associated with the Peace Corps. This relationship 
with the President was most important. As Harris Wofford 
shrewdly put it, "In those first years, nobody outside the 
White House was going to lay a hand on the Peace Corps or
2
Shriver because of his own power and Kennedy's behind him."
On December 15, 19 61, in a memorandum to President 
Kennedy, Sargent Shriver outlined "the policies and practices
necessary to carry out our unusual program successfully."
This unique treatise on Peace Corps "philosophy"was intended 
not only for Volunteers in the field, but for the overseas 
and the Washington organisation too. "The basic philosophy 
of the Peace Corps," wrote Shriver, "is one of service." 
Volunteers would be expected to live simply and unostentat 
iously. "They have a 24-hour a day job," said Shriver, "They 
receive no pay and accept substantial hazards to their health 
and even to their safety." Since the overseas staff were 
the Volunteers' leaders, they also had to "live simply and 
inconspicuously like the Volunteers, maintaining close and 
continuous contact and identification with the Volunteers." 
Despite difficult living conditions, Shriver warned his 
colleagues that there would be no special rewards or priv­
ileges attached to employment with the Peace Corps. He 
instructed them that "The Peace Corps is not just a_job. There 
are no 9.00 to 5.00 days in our operation." While Peace 
Corps rules were flexible and "may not be uniform for all 
stations," Shriver concluded, "it is urgent that everyone 
not only understand, but fully accept the basic philosophy of 
the Peace Corps. There is no place for anyone who disagrees 
with the goals of service." Although this memorandum was
brief and to the point, there was never a clearer, more
3
concise exposition of basic Peace Corps principles.
Some rules and regulations concerning Peace Corps 
service were relatively easily defined. For example, every 
Volunteer received 75 dollars per month "termination allow­
ance." This accumulated and was paid to the Volunteer in a 
lump sum - 1800 dollars at the end of his term overseas.
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Volunteers were given "leave" at the rate of two and a half 
days for each month of service. Again, this leave could be 
accumulated and travel was permitted outside the Volunteer's 
host country. Volunteers could resign from the Peace Corps 
at any time; however, to discourage them from just packing 
up and leaving when they felt like it, Shriver ruled that the 
Peace Corps would only pay return fares home at the end of 
two years of service.
Of course, some policy questions were not open to specific 
or rigid solutions. For instance, in May 1962, General 
Counsel Bill Delano noted that the controversial issue of 
Volunteer marriage had "sharply divided the agency."
Bill Josephson said "no question has been longer discussed 
within the Peace Corps. Some hard-line staff members felt 
that marriage either before or during service should lead to 
immediate exclusion from the Peace Corps. They feared that 
the responsibilities of married life would impair the 
Volunteer's performance in the field. However, in a 
persuasive memorandum, which became in effect Peace Corps 
policy. Bill Delano countered this opinion and argued that 
marriage either to a private American citizen, a host country 
national or a fellow Volunteer, should not be an irrevocable 
barrier to Peace Corps service, Delano argued that if 
deterrence of marriage became firm policy, "then we may be 
getting the Peace Corps into many more difficult and controv­
ersial situations than would otherwise occur." On legal, 
ethical and practical grounds, he feared the Peace Corps 
would be charting treacherous waters if an arbitrary judge­
ment was made on this fundamental issue:
-1-00
"I invite you to put yourself the situation 
of a Peace Corps Rep abroad, trying to do 3 /
probably with too few Volunteers, whose Volunteers 
are, by and large, very good, mature, dedicated 
people, telling one of them who comes to him and 
says he wants to get married to a non-Volunteer 
that there is a presumption that his marriage 
is not consistent with continued effective service.
A n d  I am not sure that many Congressmen (or^women) 
will understand that point of view either.
Delano's arguments prevailed. Interim Policy Directive
3.8 (Policy With Regard To The Selection For Training Or
Service Overseas Of Married Volunteers) stated that married
couples would be accepted into the Peace Corps and marriages
during service would not imply automatic disqualification.
As in the vast majority of Peace Corps policiesr the main
criterion was the practical one - will the Volunteer continue
to be as effective after marriage as before? The flexible
policy decided each case "should be handled on its own merits.
The same question was applied to pregnancy during service:
can the mother and father continue effectively as Volunteers
after the birth of a child? "Our policy," wrote Shriver in
July 1962, "is to decide each situation on a case-by-case
basis." A caveat to this was that unmarried female
Volunteers who became pregnant would be immediately sent
home since the Peace Corps could not be expected to take on
the maintenance of the child.
Thus, despite Shriver's hatred of rules and regulations, 
he soon realised that the Peace Corps could not survive 
without them. After an initial reluctance to keep files 
and make policy statements, Bradley Paterson recalled 'a 
feverish time of writing directives and guidelines and 
doing the things that bureaucracies do."^ On almost every
j-'oy
issue concerning the Volunteer it was necessary for the Peace 
Corps to have an opinion - even if that opinion was not to 
be seen as the last word. One policy guideline followed 
another. There should be a full-field security investig­
ation of all Volunteers conducted either by the Civil Service 
Commission or, if necessary, the F.B.I. Volunteers were not 
U.S. diplomatic personnel and therefore should not seek the 
privileges and immunities customarily enjoyed by such 
personnel. Only essential equipment should be supplied to 
Volunteers for their work lest they be regarded as "Santa 
Clauses with handouts." After one Volunteer in the 
Philippines was discovered carrying a gun, Shriver demanded 
that all fire-arms in the Peace Corps' possession be returned 
to Washington immediately by classified pouch. "The Peace 
Corps must never even resemble soldiers," he ordered, "the 
carrying of fire-arms by Volunteers may remind some of
Q
colonial repressions." In a letter to Peace Corps Reps 
on "The Social Behaviour of Volunteers" Shriver laid down 
guidelines on the eating of food, dress, language, alcohol- 
intake and use of leisure time. For example, on the matter 
of dress, Shriver pointed out that all Volunteers should be 
aware that their "personal appearance can reflect credit or 
discredit upon them and the Corps." The question of beards 
(and their association with"beatniks") was a contemporary 
problem. However, Shriver took a liberal view. "There seems 
little reason to tell a man who normally wears a neat, 
regular beard that he should shave it off," he wrote. On the 
other hand, he warned that "a group of Volunteers who suddenly 
decide to grow shaggy, semi-ludicrous beards as a lark or 
evidence of 'roughing it', will bring discredit on the Peace
Corps and make it more difficult for all of us to do the 
j ob."^
Shriver made it clear that he expected every Volunteer 
to be exemplary in his social behaviour - including his 
sexual behaviour. There was-'even a Peace Corps policy on 
the use of contraception. To avoid an excess of "Peace 
Corps babies" in Third World countries, some officials 
argued that Volunteers should be issued with contraceptive 
devices - in much the same manner as soldiers were supplied 
by the U.S. army. Shriver ruled this out, arguing that con­
traception was a private matter:
'"In every aspect of creature comfort needs, we 
have tried to keep the Volunteers as far from 
the military approach as possible on the theory 
that we are dealing with intelligent adults who 
will live closer to their host country nationals 
if they cope with food, clothing, shelter and 
travel on an individual basis. I do not think, 
therefore, that the G.I. 'pro' kit precedent is 
persuasive in the Peace Corps context."10
By the end of 196 3, policy guidelines for the Volunteer had
been set down on. everything from health precautions to where
they could - and could not - travel during their leave period
After a few Volunteers were discovered to have taken a
"holiday" in Paris, the Peace Corps prohibited all journeys
to Western Europe. "Volunteers are supposed to learn about
the Third World," said Shriver, "not the developed, indust-
11
ialised Western world," Policies also emerged for organis­
ational procedure. The Peace Corps had its own cable series 
(TOPEC-PECTO) for the frequent and fast flow of information 
to and from the field. Access to security classification 
of certain documents was also deemed necessary since the
xgj.
Peace Corps dealt with some highly sensitive personnel inform­
ation. If a staff member appeared at a function, made a
speech or wrote an article then he or she could not accept any
12payment whatsoever.
In fact by 1963, some staffers and Volunteers were com­
plaining that the Peace Corps was becoming policy-laden and 
that there were too many attempts at "control." Yet, despite 
the seeming proliferation of policies, Shriver always emphas­
ised that these should be thought of as flexible guidelines 
rather than binding laws, Shriver was a firm believer in 
individual initiative. As he told President Kennedy, "Trust
and respect will solve more difficult situations than any 
13directive." Only one Peace Corps policy was written in stone: 
there should be no religious, racial or sexual discrimination 
of any kind.
In the summer of 1961, Bill Moyers warned Shriver that
the religious question was "an emotional controversy with
strong political overtones" which could well affect the Peace
C o r p s . J o h n  F. Kennedy's Catholicism was adjudged by
Ted Sorens&n to have been "the strongest factor against him"
15in attaining the Presidency. The problem was exacerbated
for the Peace Corps by Kennedy's choice of his Catholic brother-
in-law as its first Director. Moyers explained that if the
Peace Corps contracted with religious voluntary organisations -
especially Catholic ones - then the charge of government
involvement in religious proselytising would inevitably follow
with its concomitant infringement upon the First Amendment.
Jack Young recalled that during the first days of the Peace
Corps " in the background lurked the problem of separation of
Church and S t a t e . I n  an early editorial entitled "A
Secular Peace Corps," the New York Times advised the Peace Corps
to learn from religious agencies working in the development field
but not to finance them:
"No sectarian religious organization should receive 
financial support, either direct or indirect, from the 
Corps. For a Federal government agency to give such 
asistance would be to violate the constitutional separ­
ation of church and state, which should be kept sacred - 
especially in these days when it is being taken far too 
lightly in the educational field here at home."17
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By June 1961, the American Jewish Congress and the United 
Presbyterian Church had forcefully stated their objection to any 
Peace Corps - church relationship.^^ This raised an acute problem 
for the Peace Corps' proposed partnership with the private sector 
in overseas projects. If religious welfare and Mission programmes 
were excluded from the Peace Corps then relatively few private 
organisations would be left with which to contract. It was 
noted that of nearly twenty thousand secular American foundations, 
only twenty-nine vere listed as having overseas projects greater 
than KÿDOO d o l l a r s . I n  terms of voluntary work overseas, the 
ecclesiastical bodies - Catholic Relief Services, Church World 
Service^ Lutheran World Relief, American Friends Service etc, - 
sponsored the bulk of the programmes. With its projects about 
to be launched and a bill before the Congress, it was imperative 
that Shriver should not alienate the support of organised religion. 
Yet, as Bill Josephson put it, he would have to be very conscious
20of President Kennedy’s "understandable sensitivity in this area." 
Shriver decided that unless directly challenged on its stance,
the Peace Corps should adopt a public policy of silence.
Internally however, it was one of the most thoroughly considered
issues of 1961 . Ted Sorensen constantly reminded the Peace Corps
of the President's particular vulnerability in the area of church-
state relations. Therefore, during a weekend trip to Hyannisport,
Shriver personally explained to Kennedy the Peace Corps' reasons
21for the delaying tactics. In June^ Josephson gave the legal
opinion that no Volunteers should be chosen on a religious basis, 
but the nettle of the direct contractual relationship with religious
? 9
agencies had still to be plucked.
Like many subsequent Peace Corps decisions, the religious 
policy was made by Shriver himself in response to a specific crisis. 
The problem came to a head in July 1961. while the first Volunteers 
were in training at Harvard for a proposed teaching programme in 
Nigeria. When Nigeria had gained independence in 1960, its new 
Ministry of Education had incorporated the many colonial Mission 
schools, although these continued to retain their religious base. 
The question arose as to whether Volunteers could teach in these 
schools without violating the principle of separation of church and 
state. Some American private organisations working in Nigeria 
suggested that Volunteers should be selected according to their 
religion and then sent to the respective Catholic or Protestant 
school^. on July 14, Shriver vetoed this suggestion in a 
telegram to the U.S. embassy in Lagos;
HHSlpr
diversity of religious affiliation and non 
affiliation."23
in effect, this message established a firm peace Corps policy. 
After consultation with Sorensen, Moyers and Josephson, Shriver 
decided that since Volunteers would be employed by the Nig 
government and not by a religious body, the programme could go 
ahead. They could teach secular subjects in Mission schools 
under the strict condition that no religious instruction would 
be asked of them. This decision was formalised in a document 
entitled "The Religious Policies of the Peace Corps. The
Peace Corps would consider projects from foreign governments
which Used religious organisations provided Volunteers would not
become in any way involved in proselytising. However, direct
contracts with religious agencies themselves were strictly
prohibited. Bill Josephson tempered this somewhat by explaining
that although the Peace Corps would not contract with a private
agency in connection with a proselytising project there remained
a broad spectrum of religiously affiliated private groups whose
24proposals would be considered "on a case-by-case basis."
As ever, flexibility was the watchword.
On December 15, 1961, Shriver publicly announced this policy 
at a Private Voluntary Agencies conference. He used the Nigerian 
example to illustrate the Peace Corps' religious objectivity*.
"In Nigeria we will have 100 people by January - 
many of them teaching in church schools. It is 
inevitable that some Volunteers will be teaching 
in a Mission school different from their faith.
Some people will write us and say 'This is awful,'
I think it is great. Our basic policy is ~ 
no religious proselytising or propagandising."
Shriver insisted that because of the legal and constitutional question 
there could be no direct contracting with a "100?^ church program.."
Of course, he explained -that Volunteers in the field would work 
on a practical basis with experienced professionals. He gave 
the example of the Peace Corps working with Catholic priests 
in Colombia;
"Some people advised us that the priests in the 
local villages would be opposed to the Peace Corps.
Some advised us that the Church in Colombia was so 
strong that the Peace Corps should not go there.
Our experience, however, has shown that the local 
priests have been cordial. Our Volunteers are 
putting up a basketball court, are building a 
sewage system; is this aiding religion?
Despite Shriver’s reasoned arguments, many religious organisations 
were livid at what they considered a snub by a new agency composed 
of inexperienced amateurs, "We greatly regret to see this 
precedent set," said Miss Owens of American Voluntary Agencies,
"the church-related agencies have a tremendous wealth of experience." 
Bishop Swanstrora of the National Catholic Welfare Conference was 
even more vehement. "I deplore this policy," he protested,
"we regret, and in a sense, are disturbed that the Peace Corps 
has set up this policy.
The church-state conundrum continued to bother the peace
Corps from time to time. For instance, the legality of Volunteers
teaching in a Catholic school in St. Lucia was questioned in 1951,
27
and was still causing problems in 1963. The Peace Corps did work 
with some religious-affiliated bodies - International Voluntary 
Services, Heifer Project and the Y.W.C.A.; but, in general, it 
was forced to rely heavily on the secular organisations - 
M.E.D.I.C.O., C.A.R.E., the National 4-H Club and the Experiment 
in International Living.
The Peace Corps' religious policy was an important factor 
in crippling the participation of the private sector in direct 
administration of overseas programmes. Ironically, the Catholic 
church was hurt most since it had the majority of denominational 
projects, especially in Latin America. It had hoped for the 
support of the Peace Corps, in both money and manpower.
Moreover, for a few years, Shriver was consistently criticised by 
Bishop Swanstrom and the National Catholic Council. Bradley Pattersoj 
saw the paradox in Sargent Shriver, a prominent Catholic layman.
"getting this kind of heat from his own church." Shriver himself
took ironic pleasure in reminding his brother-in-law that he was 
defending him and his new agency from this charge of religious 
bias - towards Catholics or any other denomination. In one 
delightful memorandum, Shriver told Kennedy about "A Protestant 
volunteer from Kansas, teaching in a Catholic Mission school in 
Ghana (under a Catholic headmaster) who is conducting the weekly
meetings of the Student Christian Movement made up of sixty
29
Protestant students attending the Catholic school."
Regarding the racial problem, the Peace Corps went beyond 
mere neutrality to a policy of positive discrimination in favour 
of disadvantaged minorities. Shriver explained this policy to 
the National Conference On Religion And Race in Chicago on January
1953:
other minority groups as possible for jobs
to seek then\ out * " 3Q
in his original address on the Peace Corps at the Cow Palace,
John Kennedy had stressed that service would be open to "every 
race and walk of life." However, the policy of deliberately 
"seeking out" blacks and non-whites emanated from the convictions 
of the Peace Corps’ founding fathers, Shriver and Wofford.
Shriver, a liberal Catholic, liberal educationalist and long­
standing member of the Catholic Interracial Council had witn 
brutal discrimination in Chicago; indeed, he served on,the Board ■ 
of Education there at the time of the historic Brown decision 
and had seen the violence and riots caused by racial disharmony.
His personal commitment to Civil Rights was deep and unwavering.
Wofford had many ties to the black community and, in 1960, was 
one of the few white men close to Martin Luther King Jr. In 
March 1961, Kennedy appointed Wofford as his Special Assistant 
on Civil Rights, Together Shriver and Wofford had led the 
highly successful Civil Rights section of the Kennedy presidential 
campaign; seven out of ten blacks voted Democratic, Even in 
a Kennedy administration generally committed to Civil Rights, 
the Peace Corps - inspired by Shriver and Wofford - was far 
ahead of its time in its strenuous effort to provide equal 
opportunity for blacks.
As ever, Shriver*s purpose was practical as well as 
ideological. He knew that a multiracial Peace Corps group 
would have a better chance of effective people-to-people contact 
with black Africans and Indians than a group made up solely of 
white Americans, On February 24, 1961 Derek Singer sent a 
memorandum to Warren Wiggins advising the use of Howard University 
in Washington D.C, - the top black American educational institution-to 
"provide Corpsmen with a basic feel and understanding of 'the best’ 
in American Negro culture and thought.” In August, Shriver made 
black recruitment a Peace Corps "priority" and ordered "a 
specialised public information attack" on the black community,
Harris Wofford circulated a memorandum to Peace Corps staff in 
October 1961, advocating positive efforts "to promote equal 
opportunity within our agency," Deputy-Director Paul Geren and
Franklin Williams responded that more minorities had, in fact, 
been taken into "the higher-grade categories" and that a special 
recruiting drive for blacks was being organised. Puerto Ricans
were another minority group who found the peace Corps "discriminating 
in their favour," Derek Singer argued that this was a valid 
policy since they would add an important texture to the Peace
Corps initiative, especially in Latin America, In February 1952,
Bill Moyers also noticed that "special steps" were being taken 
to recruit on Indian Reservations. In the summer of that year,
Shriver informed President Kennedy that the Peace Corps was doing
32everything in its power "to encourage American Indians to volunteer,"
During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in
June 1951, Shriver made it clear that the Peace Corps would not send
Volunteers to any country which would not accept Jews,
Bill Josephson recalled this issue being raised in 1961, by a
request from Ambassador William Rountree for a Peace Corps project
to be launched in the Sudan - on condition that no Jewish Volunteers
would be'included. The Peace Corps flatly refused this limitation
and the possibility of a programme there died.^^ Universities
in the southern states of America were also refused training and
selection contracts because they refused to accept blacks. In
particular, Shriver.publicised his anger at the University of Texas’s
avowed segregationist system. Also, in July 1962, he publicly
protested the refusal of an inn near Olney, Maryland to serve
3 5black Peace Corps trainees."
Yet, despite the peace Corps' great efforts, blacks never 
made up more than 5 per cent of Volunteers in the field between 
1961-3 - a period when the American population in general was 
11 per cent b l a c k . T h i s  low figure was attributable to two 
major factors. Firstly, many of the most able black American 
youths were beginning to make a commitment to poverty and ignorance 
at home rather than abroad by enlisting in the ensuing Civil Rights 
crusade. Secondly, and perhaps more '-importantly, most blacks 
simply could not afford the time and the implied economic sacrifice
involved in two years service in the Peace Corps. By 1963,
recruiters were ’’selling" the Peace Corps to blacks on positive 
economic grounds, arguing that after two years of service they 
would be guaranteed a superior type of job. However, the 
argument never proved very persuasive. C. Payne Lucas, the 
most outspoken black in the peace Corps administration, explained 
the dearth in these terms;
"Most of the black kids in the sixties were kids 
whose parents struggled to get them through college. 
Suddenly, we were talking about going into the peace 
Corps, But black kids finished school and their 
parents expected them to help them. We offered 
them 75 dollars a month readjustment pay....It 
comes down to dollars and cents.
Nevertheless, in peace Corps/Washington at least, giant
strides i'n the field of Civil Rights were taken. In January 1963,
7.4 per cent of higher echelon posts in the Peace Corps were
filled by blacks. The comparative figure in other Federal
agencies was 0.8 per cent; 24 per cent of lower administrative
positions were also occupied by blacks as against 5.3 per cent
in other government bodies. Also, by 1964, 10 per cent of all
Reps were black. In the early 1960's, this was a marvellous
3 8effort and an impressive record. Its effects on the.countries
where the peace Corps went should not be underestimated. Young,
white American Volunteers openly mixing with blacks made a strong
impact on Third World peoples, "So far as the American image
goes," wrote Kevin Delany and David Gelman in an evaluation report
on Liberia in 1963, "we are probably doing more good on the race
issue than any other aspect....The race question is still the
hottest one going, where the Americans are concerned, and the mere
fact that we are willing to discuss it with students and others 
in a reasonable, candid way, makes a solid impression.
CUV
Also outstanding was the peace Corps’ emphasis on giving 
women the same opportunity for service as men - at a period in 
history when champions of women's liberation and sexual equality 
were not conspicuous. Again, Kennedy had given the lead at the 
Cow Palace by stating that peace Corps service would be open to 
women. In March 1961, at one of the first Director's meetings, 
Shriver ordered that attention should be given to "opportunities 
to include outstanding professional women on the headquarters 
staff." Again, at the first session of the National Advisory 
Council in May 1961, shriver pledged his--commitment to "women 
as Volunteers." In New York, Shriver gave a major address on 
"Women in The Peace Corps" in which he called for women to do 
necessary work overseas as nurses, teachers and doctors. An 
even more obvious sign of the Peace Corps' determination to give 
equal opportunities to women was its recruitment literature 
which stressed that "American women doing Peace Corps work abroad 
will give a personal nudge to history in terms of improving the 
status of women in many of the newly emerging countries of the 
world.
in the early days, there were some reports which advised 
the omission of the "weaker sex" because of the dangers of rape 
and single-girl pregnancies in the Peace Corps, especially in the 
"machismo" cultures of Latin America. Nevertheless, despite some 
initial worries, Shriver believed women should be given the chance 
to prove themselves as able as their male counterparts.
This, they did. By 1963, one third of the seven thousand Volunteersf 
serving around the world were female. During a hearing before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1964, Shriver admittec
he had not recruited as many women administrators as he would have
l i k e d . E v e n  so, Dorothy Jacobsen (Chief of Division of Personnel),
Ruth Olson (Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of
Volunteer Support) and Alice Gilbert (Chief of the Division of
U,N. and International Agency Programmes) made it to upper echelon
posts in Peace Corps/Washington. Besides, at the Volunteer level -
as Shriver proclaimed in a speech "On Women" in June 1952 -
"The role of the woman in the peace Corps is exactly the same as
4?that of the male."
The Peace Corps’ excellent non-sexist record was slightly 
flawed by one issue. If a single female Volunteer became pregnant 
she was sent home immediately, while the father - often a Volunteer 
too - was allowed to remain in the programme. Many women 
Volunteers deemed this a blind spot in the Peace Corps' otherwise 
fair and undiscriminating attitude towards the sexes. However, 
even given this sexist flaw and the lack of success in recruiting 
minorities as Volunteers, the Peace Corps could be described, 
with some justice, as visionary in both areas when compared 
to the deficiencies of contemporary Federal agencies. Indeed,
Warren Wiggins went so far as to claim that, for its time, the 
Peace Corps was "unique in the history of government institutions."^^
Of course, although the Peace Corps' policies and principles 
were liberal, flexible and - to a great extent - far-seeing, 
it could not live by these alone. No government organisation, 
no matter how "different" it thought itself, could afford to 
ignore its fellow agencies. Hence, the peace Corps' relationships 
with its peers were central to its effective functioning. Yet, 
in the first days of the Kennedy administration, Bradley Patterson 
recalled experienced bureaucrats throwing up their hands in horror
at the prospect of the Peace Corps, "We haven't the faintest idea 
what this one's going to be about," he quoted them as saying,
"This is an unmeasurable to us!
From the very beginning then, there was a mixture of concern 
and fear within the Federal bureauracy over the peace Corps. This 
apprehension was accentuated in May 1951, when the Peace Corps - 
after some bitter in-fighting - won its independence. As 
Bill Josephson told Shriver, this victory was not exactly "greeted 
with cheers by the rest of the concerned bureaucracy." Ralph Dungan 
in"the White House and Henry Labouisse, head of I.C.A., "clearly 
felt unhappy and embarrass^" In particular, they felt the Peace 
Corps’ use of Vice-President Johnson to exert pressure on the 
President had been "an end run" and, indeed, that "the Peace Corps 
had behaved irresponsibly throughout." Some were depicting the 
Peace Corps as "a ruthless and unruly place." To dispel this image 
Josephson advised Shriver to consolidate upon his personal relation­
ships with senior officials. For, although the Peace Corps was 
semi-autonomous, it was required under law to co-ordinate its 
activities with the State Department, A.I.D. and the U.S. Information 
Agency, It would also need the help of other agencies, Josephson 
gave the specific example of the Peace Corps utilising the Depart­
ment of Health, Education and Welfare for the develepment of medical 
45programmes.
Since the peace Corps Director had the rank of Assistant 
Secretary of State, he reported directly to the Secretary of State. 
Happily, Dean Rusk sympathised with Sargent Shriver's desire for 
Peace Corps Ind/Bpendence. According to Rusk, they came to an early 
understanding :
"We agreed that the Peace Corps should,operate outside of 
the framework of American foreign policy. That it should 
not be looked upon as an instrument of the U.S. Embassy in 
any particular country...1 told Sargent Shriver that he 
should not look over his shoulder at me or at the Depart­
ment of State but that he should organise and administer 
the Peace Corps with as much indpendence as possible..,! 
told him that I would always be available to him in the 
event he needed my support or if any particular problems 
arose, but that he should not feel that I expected him to 
make regular or written reports to me on how things were 
going. He accepted that role and performed it brilliantly.
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Rusk's warm rapport with the Peace Corps was natural. Firstly,
he personally liked the idea very much - "it was one of my
favourite undertakings." Secondly, in 1960, he had been
Chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation which had
given a ten thousand dollar grant to the University of Colorado
to ..make a study of the Peace Corps proposal. Thirdly, he had
"a tremendous respect for Shriver's abilities and talents and
thought that he was the ideal man to launch this interesting
undertaking."^^ Coincidentally, Rusk had been recruited for
the Kennedy admivU6tration by the Shriver-Wofford talent hunt
team. At the swearing-in ceremony of Shriver as Peace Corps
48Director, he gave him a glowing endorsement. He also paid
Shriver the compliment of inviting him to attend all State
Department staff meetings. Moreover, Under-Secretaries
Chester Bowles and George Ball assured shriver of their early
support and Assistant Secretary William Crockett pledged that
"We in the state Department wish to do everything in our power
49to assure the success of the Peace Corps."
Despite the friendship of high officials, the overall 
Peace Corps - State relationship was not uniformly cordial.
In the summer of-1961, Bill Josephson told Shriver that "carping
comments" on the Peace Corps were still being heard in the middle
50and lower ranks of State, Assistant Secretary for Educational
and Cultural Affairs, Philip Coombs put it this way;
"Some of the 'old hands' in the State Department 
had strong misgivings about the Peace Corps idea 
at first - fearing that these young people running 
loose would create all sorts of problems for U.S. 
relations. Most of the new Kennedy appointees, 
however, such as Chester Bowles, Ed Murrow,
Averell Harriman (and myself) who tended to be 
better tuned in with the younger generation, 
viewed the Peace Corps idea with confidence and 
enthusiasm from the outset."51
Shriver made supreme efforts to allay the fears of conservative
State officials. In the first week in March, 1961, he gave a
brilliantly reassuring speech before the Foreign Service Association -
the "blue blood" of the American diplomatic corps - which turned
many potential enemies into friends. Shriver reported to
Chester Bowles that he felt his speech had left them "a little
less worried, scared or even terrified at the prospects of
5 9Volunteers rushing wildly and aimlessly around the world. "
Peace Corps operations were submitted to review by the State
Department, "I have arranged with Ken Mansfield, State's
Inspector-General, "Shriver told president Kennedy, "that we
53shall normally rely on him for needed inspections." Also,
Shriver made no objection to all Peace Corps cable traffic, 
being subject to State's clearance.
Shriver's cooperative measures notwithstanding, there 
remained an element of mistrust between the peace Corps and 
State and occasionally, this led to a blow-up. One such row 
took place in July, 1962, during a State Department - Peace Corps 
meeting on educational aid to Africa. Bill Haddad described it:
"Immediately, a few of the people at this meeting 
questioned our competence to select people to teach 
in African universities. Without the use of four- 
letter words, I carefully explained to them our 
selection and training processes... This didn't satisfy 
them.,.they talked about our sudden intrusion into 
the education field...In checking with the staff, I 
found that everyone got the same bitter taste in 
his mouth that I did, and their first reaction was 
to tell them to go to hell."
Haddad concluded that he would like Shriver "to show up to answer
the questions of these pontifical, pompous idiots...What I would
54really love to see is your technique in levelling these people."
On another occasion. Bill Josephson became upset with State's 
failure to reciprocate the Peace Corps' free flow of information:
"Can anyone explain to me why we never appear to 
see State or A.I.D. messages involving major decisions 
on issues involving countries in which we have 
programmes, but seem to receive thousands of copies 
of every blankety-blank and end-of-tour report of 
every broken-down A.I.D, technician, not to mention 
the scholarly bi-weekly dispatches aspiring young 
F.S.O. 7's and 8 's write for promotional purposes?"
To an extent, the Peace Corps had only itself to blame
for its occas'ionaliy fraught relations with State. Its insistence
on being "different" - abnegating privileges and disdaining the
hospitality of the American diplomatic community - led to a certain
self-righteousness. For instance, Warren Wiggins's remarks about
the traditional Foreign Service living in "golden ghettoes" overseas,
caused much resentment. The Peace Corps' ardour in guarding its
independent status sometimes lapsed into an arrogance which proved
just as destructive as the conservatism of some officials at Foggy
Bottom. In general however, the friction was not obtrusive. The
superb understanding between Shriver and Rusk ensured an efficient
if not a perfect Peace Corps - State partnership. As Assistant-
Secretary Coombs put it:
"Once the young people got out there and predominantly 
favourable reports began to flow back, it became clear 
that they were an unique and a significant new asset, 
and the misgivings sharply subsided. I was not aware 
of any serious intransigence, in the sense of trying 
to undermine the program.
A useful case in point was George Springsteen, Spectal Assistant
to Under-Secretary George Ball, and responsible for State-Peace
Corps relations. As Bill Josephson told Shriver in 1962,
Springsteen had at first been "quite cool" towards the Peace Corps;
57however, once he saw it working in the field he "warmed up."
Overseas, the U.S» ambassador's sanction was required for
all Peace Corps programme reqfuests but, apart from that very formal
duty, the Peace Corps had little contact with embassy staff.
While Shriver recommended "Courteous and respectful regard for
the Ambassador," he advised that Peace Corps offices should not
be located in the U.S. embassy and he insisted that Peace Corps
members should not be used for "propaganda p u r p o s e s . S h r i v e r
was willing to forego charges of Peace Corps "aloofness" since
he felt it was essential to avoid congregation in the areas where
all other Westerners lived. "Separateness from other overseas
operations of the U.S. is important to achieving the desired
image these policies may come as a blow, but they must be
59applied," he wrote.
There was an initial reticence on the part of the American 
diplomatic community to accept the Peace Corps. As Chester Bowles 
described it: "The old-timers didn't want the Peace Corps in their
hair. Their thinking was 'Some Volunteer goes out and gets caught 
in some raid, and I, the ambassador, get the blame for it.
Keep it away from m e ! I n  August 1952, Bill Haddad complained
to Ralph Dungan in the White House about the reluctance of the
American community - diplomatic, business and private - to work
61with the peace Corps. However, as the Peace Corps began to
prove itself in the field, relations improved beyond measure.
At first. Ambassador Charles Baldwin in Malaya told Shriver that 
heu wanted no more than thirty Volunteers; but later, as the 
Peace Corps expanded, he admitted that it was "very successful." 
Ambassador Douglas Henderson in Bolivia recalled his dealings 
with the Peace Corps as "informal but pragmatic," In the 
Philippines, Ambassador William Stevenson resented the 
"foolishness" of the Peace Corps - their refusal to use the 
embassy or the P.X. club; yet, he admitted that the Volunteers 
did a good job. "It got to be such a thing," he said, "that 
when I would visit a governor say in Palavan - which is a far- 
off -area - his first words to me would be that he wanted more 
Peace Corps people. And it got to be sort of a status symbol.
He wanted six because the other governor had five and so forth." 
Likewise, Ambassador Charles Cole thought the Peace Corps a "great 
success" in Chile while Ambassador William Mahoney in Ghana assessed 
it as "the only effective thing w e ’re doing out here."^^ Of 
course, relations between the Peace Corps and the diplomatic 
community varied from country to country. In general, however, 
although close contact remained only between high officials, 
country teams worked well together with the Peace Corps usually 
going its own way and handling its own affairs. Ambassador Baldwin 
described this arrangement:
"I tried insofar as possible to keep hands off the 
Peace Corps people - to refrain from interfering.
I had a compact with my Peace Corps supervisor that 
while I recognised my responsibility as Ambassador 
for the peace Corps activities, I felt it was 
desirable to play down as much as possible the 
official aspect of the Peace Corps, to emphasise 
the people-to-people aspect. We carried out that 
policy. While I provided office space in the 
Embassy chancery for the Peace Corps for a while, 
it later moved out of the chancery completely.
This was part- of the" agreement between me and the 
^ Peace Corps supervisor, that they should function
physically outside the Embassy. It was a desirable 
arrangement.
The effective, if distant, cordiality which characterised 
the Peace Corps' relationship with the U.S. official Mission, 
was not evident in its dealings with the Agency for International 
Development (Ad.D.). Josephson told Shriver that many A.I.D. 
officials had felt "betrayed" by the Peace Corps at the time 
of the battle for independence and this antipathy prevailed 
thoughout the Kennedy era.^^ In July, 1951 Bill Moyers reported
that some A.I.D. trainees in Washington had made caustic criticisms
65 . .of the Peace Cc^ps. This antagonism was extended to the field
where, as Peace Corps evaluator Herb Wegner noted, "even the
average petty cash reimbursement turnaround takes three months,"
Ty Wood, A.I.D.- chief in India noted "a vast suspicion of
-Peace Corps generally at that time." In Bolivia there was an
"under-current of- ill-will towards the peace Corps" and A.I.D.
officials felt that the Volunteers should drop their pretentions
to being "different" and "get on the team." Larry Fuchs, the
Peace Corps Rep. in the Philippines wrote of the constant
66"bickering and politicking between the agencies."
The problem was a fundamental one of approach. The Peace. 
Corps proclaimed itself people-oriented whereas A.I.D. concentrated 
on the supply of needed equipment and was bascially technically- 
oriented. The Peace Corps sought to do the special "personal"
job that A.I.D, or any other programme of technical assistance 
would not attempt. This caused bitter resentment. Though 
sometimes Peace Corps and A.I.D. undertook successful cooperative 
ventures - like the educational television project bv Colombia - 
in general. Peace Corps staffer Robert Carey wrote that "The 
early relationships between the Peace Corps and A.I.D. were 
dismal.
Other agencies were much more forthcoming with, helpful 
offers. On March 2, 1951, George McGovern, Director of the 
Food-For-peace programme, wrote to Shriver:
"The announcement by the President yesterday, on 
the establishment of the Peace Corps, was a high 
tribute to the work you have done in making this 
idea a reality*..I should like very much to 
discuss with you the most constructive ways in 
which we can be of service to you".gg
Likewise, Ed Murrow. Director of the U.S. Information Agency, told 
Shriver that "The success of the Peace Corps will be closely linked 
to our objectives. We are eager for it to succeed. We think
we can help to see that it does." In April, 1961, Secretary of
Agriculture, Orville Freeman pledged the services of his department 
to the Peace Corps - for instance, in the supply of farm-trained 
people. During that summer Luther Hodges, Secretary of Commerce, 
offered to help the Peace Corps recruit people from middle manage­
ment so that "industry would be emotionally involved in the 
Peace Corps and what it stands for. Indeed, the vast majority
of the well-established Federal bureaucracies proved most cooperative
The Civil Service Commission agreed to take on the responsibility 
of administering the Peace Corps Entrance Exam; the General 
Accounting Office allowed the Peace Corps a flexible financial 
remit; even the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
allowed the Peace Corps to "borrow" from its staff - one such loan 
being the invaluable Jack Young. Also, during the first year, 
the Peace Corps received the full cooperation of J, Edgar Hoover 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I,).
The F.B.I. conducted full-field investigations of the first
prospective Volunteers, Shriver felt this action would reassure
worried Congressmen that "undesirables" would be excluded and thus
help with what Bill Delano called "the legislative midwifery" on
Capitol Hill. It also aided the Peace Corps in its selection
process. Shriver wrote to Hoover in September 1961, thanking him
and telling.him that Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy - with
whom Hoover did not enjoy the warmest relations - would get to
70know of this great favour. However, after 1961, the Civil Service
Commission took over the investigative procedures and thereafter 
only 3 per cent of all applicants, trainees and Volunteers were 
ever referred to the F.B.I. This minority consisted of extra­
ordinary cases. For example. Bill Josephson recalled a problem 
over the identity of one Volunteer arising from a report that the 
Soviet Union was attempting to influence his behaviour by exerting 
pressure on his parents who lived in Russia. The F.B.I. was 
called in and, in fact, ascertained that he had been confused 
with another man of the same name; the Volunteer had no relatives 
in Russia. As Josephson explained, the Peace Corps' use of the 
F.B.I. was exceptional and only concerned with "protecting the 
integrity of our operation from subversion rather than using the
intelligence resources of the U.S. as a tool in the conduct of our 
71operations."
The subject of the peace Corps' relationship with the 
intelligence community - particularly the Central Intelligence 
Agency (C.I.A.) - was extremely sensitive throughout the Kennedy 
era. Leftist governments continually accused the peace Corps 
of being a "cover" for American espionage. As early as March 16, 
1961, Radio Moscow attacked the Peace Corps as a plan for "the
72collection of espionage information for Allen Dulles's agency."
A year later it was broadcast that "U.S. agents are sent to
Afro-Asian countries under the U.S. Peace Corps label. The plan
to organise the Corps was., jointly prepared by the U.S. State
Department, Pentagon and C.I.A. Director of the Corps, Shriver,
is an old employee of the C.I.A." Radio Peking joined in, as did
Castro and the Eastern bloc press. One of the more ridiculous
propaganda pieces appeared in an article in a Polish newspaper
in March 1963. Alongside photographs of girl Volunteers in
training, the caption read: "The Americans consider all means
acceptable. Where other means do not succeed, sex may be very
useful. Girl members of the Corps on the exercise field,"
Tass also had a flair for misconstrued sexual innuendo.
It charged that a promiscuous woman Volunteer teacher in Somalia
corrupted her pupils by demonstrating the "indecent movements"
73of the Twist.
A more sober analysis might note that not a single case
of C.I.A. infiltration of the Peace Corps, or use of C.I.A.
resources by the Peace Corps has ever been substantiated.
As George W. Owens, C.I.A. Information and Privacy Coordinator 
wrote in October 1978, "it has been Agency policy to scrupulously
avoid Peace Corps relationships which could ever be construed
74as cooperation with the C.I.A. for intelligence purposes."
No investigation - including the thorough searchings of Senator
Frank Church’s Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities in 1975 - has turned up
the slightest evidence of the Peace Corps' use as an arm of
U.S. intelligence. Sargent Shriver knew that any such association
would utterly destroy the Peace Corps' credibility. Hence,
he took the strictest precautions. Most importantly, he was
given an assurance by President Kennedy that the CGI.A. would
not attempt to infiltrate the Peace Corps and would not enlist
a former Volunteer until at least five years after his peace Corps
service. Kennedy personally relayed this message to Allen Dulles
and John McCone, the two C.I.A. Directors of this period. This
understanding on the inviolability of the Peace Corps was referred
75to (in Peace Corps circles) as "The Treaty."
On February 28, 1962, the C.I.A.'s Assistant Director, 
Stanley J. Grogan, reassured the White House that the "C.I.A. has
nothing whatever to do and wants nothing whatever to do with the
Peace Corps. Nothing could be more fatal to the Peace Corps 
than to have a C.I.A. c o n n e c t i o n . ^  National Security 
airgram to all Û'.'S. embassies in the Third World, Dean Rusk -
reiterated the principles of the treaty:
"From the beginning of the Peace Corps, I have 
considered it understood that Peace Corps Volunteers 
would not be used as intelligence sources on the 
countries in which they are serving. Because of 
the geographic dispersion of Volunteers and the 
access which they have to the people of the -country, 
some members of your staff, through either un­
familiarity with policy or over-zealousness, may 
be tempted to regard the Volunteers as instruments 
of foreign policy designed to serve the particular
ends of the staff members' job. In order that there 
should be no misunderstanding as to the role of Peace 
Corps Volunteers, I wish to state the relevant policy:
Peace Corps Volunteers are not to be regarded or 
utilised as official members of the Mission and in 
particular they are not requested to undertake any 
formal or informal intelligence functions. They 
are to be treated in the same manner as are other 
responsible and loyal private American citizens
resident in your area and are not to be singled
out for intelligence interviews.
To a great extent, the true role of the Cd.A. in the early 1960's
remains to be defined. Such was the nature of its operations,
almost every American working abroad could have been accused of
being an "agent" 5 it. is always very difficult to disprove being
a spy. There may have been an instance or indeed, instances,
of "over-zealousness" by Chl&At agents in the field and a few
Volunteers could conceivably have been recruited. But the evidence
is negligible, Charles Peters recalled only one incident, when
a C.I.A. agent tried to influence a Volunteer in Thailand; once
discovered, a message was sent directly from the White House putting
an immediate stop to it. The U.S. ambassador in Liberia ordered
Peace Corps Rep. Tom Quimby to make intelligence reports to him
on field situations. Quimby refused, and when he protested to
Washington, the erring ambassador was severely reprimanded,
Bradley Patterson knew of only one occasion when the Peace Corps
asked the C.I.A. for help and that was to seek advice on how to
deal with the problem of loneliness and frustration facing the
Volunteer in the field - and hence possible entrapment by
communists. However, even this mild example of collaboration
was of little consequence since the Peace Corps never used the
7 8C.I.A. '8 proffered instructions.
214
within the Peace Corps, policy regarding the C.I.A. was 
established on September 5, 1961, Specifically, it said that no 
former employee of the C.I.A. and generally, no one who had worked 
in "intelligence" - up to ten years previously - would be employed. 
Even someone married to an intelligence officer was excluded.
This directive entitled Employment Of personnel Who Have Been 
Employed In Intelligence Work was unequivocal ; "We do not want 
the Peace Corps publicly identified in any way with intelligence 
work and we do not want the Peace Corps used as a vehicle for 
intelligence work."^^ Excellent people were refused entry into 
the Peace Corps - both at staff and Volunteer levels - if they had 
the slightest "intelligence" connection. Bill Delano had the 
special portfolio on this problem. He remembered two first-class 
secretaries were turned down because they had done some part-time 
typing for the C.I.A* years e a r l i e r . V o l u n t e e r s  too, were 
warned during training about possible.C.I.A. infiltration.
They were told that the slightest hint of solicitation should be 
immediately reported to their Rep.
All available evidence indicates that, in the Kennedy years, 
the Peace Corps and the C.I.A. had a perfect relationship - they 
stayed as far away from each other as possible. This understanding 
worked to the advantage of both agencies. Notwithstanding communist 
assertions that Shriver was a "bloodthirsty Chicago butcher and 
sausage-maker" and the Peace Corps "a nest of spies,” Bill Josephson 
recalled "a lot of generalised charges, but no specific charges 
naming specific people." Administrators of the calibre of Shriver . 
Moyers, Wiggins and Josephson would not have been easily gulled.
Thus, as Bill Josephson concluded, "We may have been Kidding
ourselves, but so far as i Know, the C.I.A. conscientiously
honored its undertakings."^^
In many ways, the Peace Corps' most crucial organisational
relationship was with the White House staff and the President
himself - for there rested the ultimate source of power.
Sargent Shriver recalled that Kennedy "never ever turned down
82anything we asked him to do." Whenever he was requested to
greet Volunteers in the Rose Garden, annouce a new programme or
sign a letter of congratulations to those serving abroad, Kennedy
willingly complied. In this respect, he certainly did his duty
by the Peace Corps. Shriver, for his part, kept up a constant
stream of personal letters and memoranda to the President on various
issues pertaining to the Peace Corps: the warm reception given
to the first Peace Corps contingent in India, or the dangers
Volunteers faced from rebels in the outback of North Borneo,
or the news that Kennedy's "alma mater" - Harvard - was participating
83in a training project. One newsy letter from Shriver in Colombia, 
informed Kennedy that "Your Peace Corps is proving to be an asset 
in Colombia....The Volunteers are in towns where no North Americans 
are living or have lived." On the ever-sensitive religious 
question, Shriver wrote;
"Our Volunteers are not living in the homes of 
priests (as reported in the Washington Star.)
They have their own private accommodations 
which are shared in every case with a Colombian 
counterpart. But cooperation from Church and 
local priests is essential to success.
W e ’re getting it."
cu-o
Shriver told Kennedy that the Volunteers "have your photo affixed
to a map of the U.S.A. in many of their rooms" and asked him to
"Please tell Jackie she's the new pin-up queen of the Latinos,
They have dubbed her 'La Reina' and her picture appears on many 
84a wall."
These personal messages did not usually contain very
serious material. They were merely a reflection of Shriver's
desire to keep the president informed and interested in the
progress of the Peace Corps. However, Shriver also made an
official weekly report to the President on Peace Corps activities.
These reports.'%'t a slightly more serious note - difficulties with
a Senate committee (usually Appropriations), a critical article in
the press, an analysis of early terminations from peace Corps
service. Occasionally, a piece of bad news was related - for
instance, that Governor Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil,
85had ordered the Volunteers out of his area. But, more often
that not, the reports glowed with Peace Corps achievements - 
a record number of Peace Corps applications, a word of praise 
from a Third World leader, or an extraordinary job done by a 
Volunteer. After reading one such report, Kennedy remarked,
"Sarge is really on the ball."^^
There is little doubt that Kennedy looked at the Peace Corps 
with an endearing eye. In a memorandum to the President,
Harris Wofford dubbed it Kennedy's "special baby, and in a 
sense the first offspring of the New Frontier," Extending the 
metaphor, Fred Dutton (Special Assistant To The President) said 
that the rest of the Federal bureaucracy was well aware that the 
Peace Corps was "a favorite child." Dave Powers recalled that the 
President loved to meet and talk with the Volunteers,
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When Ambassador Baldwin met with Kennedy, the president asked him 
to tell the Tunku in Malaya that he was "very pleased indeed 
that he is interested in what I think will be a very important 
program (the Peace Corps)." Likewise, Ambassador Galbraith 
noted that whenever he returned from India and met with the 
President, he would ask "How are Sarge*s kids doing?"
Kennedy himself told a group of Volunteers that "The White House
belongs to all the people, but I think it particularly belongs
.87 to you."
Yet, although Kennedy always displayed his interest in the
Peace Corps - and it was a crucial factor in its success - he
actually paid very little specific attention to it and, with
few exceptions, Shriver only used the presidential relationship
for cosmetic or publicity purposes. As Harris Wofford put it,
"Shriver only went to Kennedy to add juice to the Peace Corps,
to send off the first group. Kennedy did anything Shriver asked
88him to do like that." Certainly, Kennedy signed the Executive
Order which gave the Peace Corps an auspicious beginning and he 
also helped define the Peace Corps' relationship with the C.I.A. 
However, for the most part, he took no direct hand in Peace Corps 
affairs. Significantly, during the all-important fight for 
independence, vice-president Johnson was much more active on the 
Peace Corps' behalf than the President,
Evaluator David Gelman attributed this inattentive attitude 
to an "apparent lack of serious regard for the Peace Corps at the 
White House." Harris Wofford agreed that there was not much 
evidence of White House interest in Peace Corps issues but he put 
this down to the President's preoccupation with crises - Berlin,
Cuba, Civil Rights - than to downright indifference. Similarly,
Presidential assistant Ralph Dungan did not consider the Peace
Corps central to Kennedy's immediate thinking. "It was not
often discussed or debated in the White House," said Dungan,
"it was nice but it just wasn't that important," Likewise
Fred Dutton described Kennedy's perspective on the Peace Corps
as "a bright speck on a general picture of problems and politics."
While Kennedy liked to remind his staff that he was very fond
of the Peace Corps, he was quite happy to leave its management
with Sargent Shriver and his associates. "They paddled their
89own canoe," said McGeorge Bundy.
Some Peace Corps officials, especially in the early days, 
were disturbed at the seeming lack of enthusiasm at the White House 
Bradley Patterson was disappointed that there was such little 
response to the Peace Corps' weekly reports - "nobody ever called 
.up.and said this was good, or we want more of this....you sent 
it into a blank wall, so to speak." More disillusioned.
Bill Kelly believed that the White House staff ignored the 
Peace Corps because they were certain it would prove an impracticable 
flop and they did not want its failure directly associated with the 
President. This analysis certainly sheds new light on Shriver's 
lighthearted statement that Kennedy only chose him as the Peace 
Corps Director because "no-one thought it could succeed and it 
would be easier to fire a relative than a friend." However,
Shriver's more serious view was that he should make the Peace 
Corps a success without troubling the President; he told Patterson
that he didn't want to "bother Jack with problems I don't
want to wash my dirty linen in front of him.
shriver's stoical philosophy camouflaged a coolness between
the Peace Corps and certain White House officials. This can be
traced back to the 1960 campaign when there had been a cleavage
between the Shriver wing of Kennedy's staff and the experienced,
professional wing - O'Brien, O'Donnell, and Dungan - known
collectively as the "Irish Mafia." The latter group felt that
Shriver’s team was not hard-headed or realistic enough. They
adjudged Shriver a political lightweight and, rather patronisingly,
dubbed him the "Boy Scout" - implying that he was too naive for
the tough political arena. This friction increased during the
transition period when some of Shriver's talent hunt choices -
Bundy, Rusk, McNamara - were more favoured by Kennedy than those
of the Irish Mafia. According to Harris Wofford, Larry O'Brien
was especially "sore at Shriver for shovelling all these people
in that hadn't done anything in the campaign and he was particularly
sore when some egghead who hadn'-.t done anything in the campaign
was being treated more respectfully than somebody that he was
recommending."^^ Of course, the Irish Mafia were further upset
by ahe Peace Corps' determined stand over the independence issue
in April and May, 1951. On a more general level, the Presidential
aides were completely different in character from the people who
joined the Peace Corps staff. Shriver attracted confirmed
idealists; indeed. Peace Corps officials sometimes joked about
"working for Halleluiah," However, the more cynical members of
the White House staff deemed them insufferable romantics. At
least one Special Assistant to the President found the Peace Corps'
92"we-can-walk-on-water" attitude intolerable.
This uneasiness between the Peace Corps and White House 
aides was not helped by the fact that Shriver and Kennedy were 
never very close at a personal level, Shriver had always been
much more radical than Kennedy - especially in the area of civil 
liberties. Indeed, as David Halberstam put it, Shriver was 
regarded as the "family communist" by the Kennedys. His 
effusive brand of idealism went against the grain of John Kennedy 
who was, wrote Halberstam, "at least as sceptical as he was 
idealistic, curiously ill-at-ease with other people’s overt 
id'ealism, preferring in private the tart and darker view of 
the world and of mankind." Harris Wofford also noted that 
Kennedy was "put off by too far-reaching ideas..... Certainly,
idealism or liberalism in any conventional sense was uncongenial
93to him." In effect, Kennedy's somewhat existential sense of
irony was the polar opposite of Shriver's unbounded idealism 
and optimism.
Yet, although Shriver was not particularly intimate with 
the President or the Kennedy family, he was desperately keen to 
■prove his worth to them. He was extremely sensitive to insinuations 
that he was merely riding on Kennedy's coat-tails. When a 
reporter asked him about his personal relationship with the 
President, Shriver replied curtly, "It's a fact of life, why 
think about it at all? I'm perfectly capable of looking after 
myself . A  rebuff suffered by Shriver at the hands of his 
brother-in-law in May 1951, did nothing to assuage this feeling, 
Shriver, completely inexperienced in Congressional affairs, 
was due to take the Peace Corps legislation to Capitol Hill.
Nervous, and worried about the lack of help coming from the 
White House congressional liaisons office - led by Larry O ’Brien - 
Shriver took advantage of a weekend trip to Hyannisport to ask the 
President for some advice and cooperation; his wife Eunice, 
acted as intermediary. However, referring to the fight for 
independence, Kennedy told his sister that Shriver and the
Peace Corps had wanted to be on their own and now they were -
completely on their own. It was as if Kennedy was telling
Shriver that it was time he woke up to the harsh realities of
political life. In later years, Shriver recalled that from
that moment on, he vowed never again to ask the President for
95so much as "a light for a cigarette."
Despite this slight dryness between the Peace Corps and 
the White House, they managed a very successful working relationship. 
Since the White House staff tended not to take it very seriously 
the Peace Corps was free to develop in any direction that Shriver 
and his aides chose; hence, it could often presume authority 
on issues even when that authority had not been specifically 
designated. Besides, the Peace Corps could rely on at least 
one staunch supporter in the White House - Lyndon Johnson.
"I am proud of you, your conduct and your record and you have 
my complete admiration and confidence," he told Shriver.
As for President Kennedy, he obviously felt a very special 
affection for the peace Corps. It appealed to his idealistic 
side. It was a bright idea which he had thrown out in the 
heat of the presidential campaign; but, once ensconced in 
the White House, it was not one of his principal concerns.
Shriver ran it so efficiently that it did not have to be.
No matter the attitude of some of the White House staff, there 
was no question of the President's personal commitment to the 
Peace Corps. For him, there was only ever the question of 
political priorities; the Peace Corps was not one of them.
Besides, the very slight tension between the Peace Corps 
and some Presidential aides was imperceptible to the vast majority 
of observers. Indeed, most thought Kennedy was "closer" to the
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Peace Corps than any other government agency. In principle at
least - if not in actual practice - this was true.
97Theodore Sorensen dubbed Kennedy "the Volunteer.”
Moreover, in Washington, Jack Young noted that "The ever present
'shroud of the P r e s i d e n c y . s e t  an environment where 'things
got easier to do’ once the bureaucracy understood Kennedy was
truly behind the Peace C o r p s . O v e r s e a s ,  Kennedy was even
more closely identified with the Peace Corps. In Africa, the
local peoples referred to Volunteers as "Wakina Kennedy" -
followers of Kennedy; in the town of Bassari in Togo, the lone
Volunteer there was nicknamed "Kennedy in Bassari" by the natives.
In the Dominican Republic, the Volunteers were called "los hijos
99de Kennedy" - Kennedy's children. In later years, Juan Bos&h,
President of the Dominican Republic, explained how - in the minds 
of Third World peoples - Kennedy and the Peace Corps were as one;
"For the first time we found in the U.S. a man 
who felt as we did, who suffered with us. That 
is what Kennedy signified. To us he was not just 
an American president. He was a Latin American 
leader. That was the great transformation he 
produced in Latin America. Unfortunately he is 
dead. But I believe that Kennedy's message must 
continue in American young people. I believe that 
the Peace Corps has done much more for good relations 
between Latin America and the United States than all 
the United States Ambassadors since 1820. And the 
Peace Corps, what is it? Kennedy in action.
The first principle of the Peace Corps was service; all other 
policies flowed from that source. They were pragmatic and flexible 
In some respects they were also visionary. The Peace Corps’ 
unparalleled, positive attitude towards religious, racial and 
sexual equality, characterised it as an institution far ahead 
of its time. In its relations with other government agencies
it generally succeeded in maintaining its independence - particularly
from the intelligence community - while cooperating wholeheartedly.
Despite some friction with White House aides, there was a special
bond between the president and the Peace Corps. "It was an
enterprise which was as close as any I knew to President Kennedy's
heart," Lyndon Johnson told the Peace Corps staff a few days after 
101 ,Dallas. This affinity was perhaps best described by a young
Volunteer in Africa who sent a letter to Peace Corps/Washington
shortly after the President's death. "Being in the Peace Corps
we all here felt we had a special attachment to him," he wrote,
"Hell, most of us felt we were working for him and would refer
102to him as Jack - as if he were a Peace Corps Volunteer."
CHAPTER EIGHT
AH EXAMPLE FOE GOVEEHMEHT SERVI O'
"The^ concept of the Peace Corps was entirely new. It was 
subjected to a great deal of criticism at the beginning.
If it had not been done with such great care and really 
in a sense o f •loving-and prideful care, it could have 
defeated a great purpose and could have set back the whole 
cause of public service internationally for a good many 
years. That it has turned out to be the success that it 
has been has been due to the tireless work of Sargent Shriver, 
and to all of you. You have brought to government service 
a sense of morale and a sense of enthusiasm and really, 
commitment, which has been absent from too many governmental 
agencies for too many years. So that while the Peace Corps 
men overseas have rendered unusual service, those of you 
who have worked to make it a success here in Washington I 
think have set an example for government service which I 
hop-1 will be infectious. "
- JOHIT P. KENNEDY -
(Remarks To The Peace Corps 
Staff, June 14, 1962)
The Peace Corps, a daring new government agency, was 
greatly inspired hy its staff members. Sargent Shriver 
described them as "an unusual group of dedicated Americans".^ 
Led by Shriver, they initiated a massive overseas programme 
almost overnight and on a shoestring budget; many had no 
previous government experience. As a group of adminis­
trators, they made a fascinating study. The anthropologist 
Margaret Mead wrote that they were characterised by "high 
intelligence, goodwill, an almost infinite capacity to 
improvise, an enthusiastic willingness to learn by doing
and a readiness to correct errors that perhaps need not have 
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occurred". These Peace Corpsmen also had one other out 
standing quality in common - idealism.
As a newcomer to Washington, Shriver went about staffing 
the Peace Corps in much the same way as he had seen 
President Kennedy staff his administration - through a 
"talent hunt". Of course, Shriver's job was much more 
difficult than Kennedy's. People invited to come and work 
for the President did not normally refuse; without too much 
difficulty, Kennedy was able to persuade the creme de la 
creme from the legal, business and academic professions to 
come to the White House, Thus, Bundy, McNamara, Rusk,
Dillon, Schlesinger and the others whom David Halberstam 
immortalised as "the best and the brightest", cams to 
Washington-^ However, in beginning his precarious, new
venture, Shriver knew that he could not hope to attract the 
doyens of the American establishment. With its great risk 
of failure, a job with the Peace Corps was not the kind of 
offer likely to entice those with reputations to lose.
Nevertheless, Shriver was determined to find admin­
istrators of the very highest quality. He succeeded by 
recruiting from outside established circles and by refusing 
to make reputation a sine qua non of qualification. In this 
way, he drew into the Peace Corps many men and women who had 
not previously set their sights on public life but who had 
outstanding records in their own chosen professions. Among 
the first 275 staff members 43 had a degree in Arts, 23 in 
Law and 31 had Ph. P . 's.^ There were illustrious university 
professors, top-class businessmen, medical doctors, authors 
and former journalists. Since they had no experience of 
the Federal bureaucracy, they were largely ignorant of what 
was considered "impossible" in government onerations.
However, this only made them even more attractive to Shriver.
Of course, not everyone came from outside the government, 
A substantial number were tested foreign aid bureaucrats - 
like Wiggins and Josephson. Nevertheless, everyone who 
accepted Shriver's offer was well aware that the entire 
project might flop, pay was non-luxury and jobs non-career. 
These men and women sought something new and adventurous.
They enjoyed the element of risk. Moreover, like Shriver, 
they had an uncompromising sense of idealism. Warren Wiggins 
described the qualities Shriver was looking for: "practical
common sense, idealism, a concern with America's role 
vis a vis other cultures, administrative flexibility and
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intellectual daring". Peace Corps staffers did not view 
their service as just another stepping stone in a carefully- 
plotted career. Indeed, in joining the Peace Corps many 
gave up years of seniority in other government agencies or 
sacrificed high incomes in private industry. Inspired by 
the ethos of Kennedy and his New Frontier, they saw the 
Peace Corps as an opportunity to enrich their lives and the 
lives of others, be creative and put their ideals into 
action.
Certainly, idealism was not the sole motivation. Men 
like Wiggins, Josephson and Kelly were not without ambition - 
for themselves, their organisation and their country. They 
were hungry for success and the recognition accompanying it. 
With the stakes so high and reputations there for the making, 
several power-brokers- emerged. In the Peace Corps these 
characters were known as "empire-buildars". Size, that 
inevitable guage of success in America of the early 1960's, 
rapidly made the Peace Corps a force to be reckoned with in 
Washington. Within the agency, Associate-Directors and 
Chiefs fought to make their power greater, their Division 
stronger. This fierce competitiveness ensured that the Peace 
Corps never became a mere haven for romanbics. Yet, without 
idealism and a belief in the principles of public service, 
even the wiliest bureaucratic battler could not have survived, 
As Robert Textor, an early academic consultant to the Peace 
Corps observed, "they were, by and large, a worldly-wise
group, highly intelligent and administratively experienced 
and politically - in the manner of the Kew Frontier 
'tough'. At the same time, most of them were dedicated,
liberal and altruistic".
The Peace Corps also had its share of the intellectual 
hubris associated with the Kennedy administration. The 
institutional pride was overwhelming and there was some 
conceit, arrogance and insensitivity. These bright young 
men were supremely confident in their own ability and the 
success of their undertaking. On discussing traditional 
foreign aid during one of the very first Peace Corps staff 
meetings, the twenty-six year old Bill Moyers proclaimed,
"We can do it better".^ This was the Peace Corps' credo.
Yet, this cockiness was tempered by a vein of humour Which 
coursed through the agency. Prom the beginning, the Peace 
Corps’ sense of irony was self-evident. Staff members 
parodied The Towering Task as "the Tottering Tisk , one of 
the first memoranda on organisational structure became known 
as "Shriver'3 Fourteen Points". The office of Donovan McClure 
a Chief of.Public Affairs, featured a dartboard with a 
photograph of Sargent Shriver's face on the front. Sariver 
himself used to joke that Kennedy had only chosen him to lead 
the Peace Corps because it would be easier to fire a relati/e 
than a friend. Humour was an essential Ingrodiens o: any 
staff meeting.® Ho Peace Corps official was more self- 
confident or able than Warren Wiggins; yet, even he could 
compare the organisation of which he was so desperately proud 
to "an adolescent, gangling, growing, unpredictable and
often awkward...... bat gaining strength, learning fast,
with lots of sex appeal'*.^ Informality, vitality and irony 
accompanied the air of self-righteoiisness within the Peace 
Corps to produce an impressive and, in many ways, a unique 
esprit de corps.
C, Payne Lucas, one of the first administrators claimed
that, "The Peace Corps was not a job; it was a way of life".
Indeed, for many, it was an emotional as well as a work
experience. Lon Romine, one of Bill Moyers's assistants,
recalled that Peace Corps staffers believed in what they were
doing "to the point of being fanatical about it...cit was
11close to a religious experience". Some officials worked 
the first three months without pay; all staff worked public 
holidays without pay. The lights burned bright in the 
Maiatico Building on Saturdays, Sundays and weekday evenings “ 
staff positions in the Peace Corps demanded a total commit­
ment of time and energy. This kind of dedication was 
exemplified by the chief official in Peace Corps/Washington - 
Sargent Shriver. As Lucas put it, "Anyone who would under­
stand the Peace Corps must first understand the meaning of 
of leadership within that unique Federal agency; and anyone 
who would understand that must first study the executive
12genius of the Peace Corps’ first Director, Sargent Shriver".
Shriver was a "workaholic" and he expected the same 
relentless drive from his staff. When a Division Chief 
suggested an early morning meeting "about ten o'clock",
Shriver shook his head. "By ten, the day is half over," he
said.^^ In true Kennedy fashion, he disliked weakness or
failure; he liked to think of himself as tough-minded.
Signs on his office door read "Nice G-uys Finish Last" and
"Good Guys D o n ’t Win Dali Games", Certainly, he gained a
reputation as a demanding task-master. As one staff member
put it, "When he assigns you to’a job, he expects you to do
it 100 per cent and at once!" Yet, although colleagues
sometimes complained of his tongue-lashings, 2 a.m. phone-
calls and undying effervescence, Shriver commanded a rare
loyalty. Bill Haddad, one of the most irreverent of Peace
Corps officials, conceded that "No one ever dreamed that he
could do the job as well as S h r i v e r " . L i k e w i s e ,  .
Bill Josephson claimed that Shriver's boundless energy and '
quickness of mind left him feeling that "I was always
15running to catch up with him". Perhaps the highest 
compliment came - through Jacqueline Kennedy - from the 
President himself. On a photograph of Shriver talking with 
Kennedy she wrote, " chck always said that no one could have
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made the Peace Corps work but Sarge".
What inspired Shriver to such great efforts is open to 
conjectureo Perhaps he felt he had something to prove to the 
professional politicians surrounding Kennedy who dismissed 
him as a "lightweight". On a more philosophical level, his 
liberal Catholicism and compassionate social beliefs - as 
evinced by his voluntary public service in the 195C’s - would 
have made his commitment to Peace Corps ideals total. His 
wife, Eunice, may have been another influence. She load a 
long association with service in the Settlement Houses of
Chicago and work with the mentally-retarded. Indeed, it
was Mrs. Shriver, who in 1963 persuaded President Kennedy
17of the need for a "Domestic Peace Corps". Whatever the 
combination of factors, it made Sargent Shriver the hub of 
the Peace Corps. On praising Shriver for his sterling 
performance, Kennedy pointed out that it had been by no means 
a straightforward task, "I don't think it is altogether 
fair to say that I handed Sarge a lemon from which he made 
lemonade," he quipped, "but I do think that he was handed one 
of the most sensitive and difficult assignments which any 
administrator in Washington has been given almost in this 
century".
Much of Shriver's talent and.hence his success, lay in 
his choice of administrators. In later years,, he wrote that 
he was "immensely proud" of his staff and believed them to 
be "among the finest at work in government". Despite the 
continual process of loss and replenishment, the Peace Corps 
consistently managed to attract top-flight personnel. "When 
a brand new, untried, untested organisation is able to attract 
able and d.evoted workers," wrote Shriver "it's proof that 
you've got something fresh and challenging and worthwhile 
Of course, every staffer had an important part to play, but 
four major personalities outshone all others: Wofford,
Moyers, Josephson and Wi:gins,
Harris Wofford was the philosopher-king of the Peace 
Corps who, throughout the Kennedy era, acted as Shriver's foil. 
No one was more loyal or more valuable in terms of providing
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ne« ideas and setting the tone of the Peace Corps organis­
ation. Wofford combined a deep humanitarianism with a 
sensitivity for the practical requirements of a successful 
overseas programme - a synthesis seldom found in the executive 
branch of government. Bill Moyers was Shriver'a brilliant 
and highly articulate aide-de-camp. Although only in ais 
twenties, Moyers had already gained a wealth of experience 
in government and he used his acumen in guiding ohriver 
through the Congress and acting as troubleshooter on 
virtually every policy issue. The legal sword ci uhe ?„a„.. 
Corps was Bill Josephson - another man in his twenties. An 
adept and - when needs be - ruthless lawyer, Josephson was 
an indispensable source of ideas and sound counsel. As 
Shriver recalled, "Josephson's careful legal w r k  bound­
less intellectual energy combined not only to keep us on tne 
right track but to move us rapidly ahead, within, t’nrough, 
and sometimes around the bureaucracy of Washington".
Warren Wiggins was a cool and superbly efficient professional 
bureaucrat who sensed that the Peace Corps was an opportunity 
to create something new and who broke many of the traditional 
rules of government in the process. Seated at the cenore ot 
the organisation, he designed the Peace Corp.T p-Oa^-^ o.
One colleague felt that Wiggins best typified teat unic_us 
blend of "enthusiasm and charisma with organization mar 
characteristic of the Peace Corps
--------- 33
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Neither Shriver nor any of -his administrators haa m e  
reputation of their White House contemporaries - Bundy, 
McNamara, Rusk and the others. Yet, in some ways, Shriver
and his senior staff were as able as the men who surrounded 
Kennedy. Indeed, in the sense that the Peace Corps' 
officials worked off an idealistic base, it might be sug­
gested that they had even more to offer. The famous "best 
and brightest" in the White House led America into Vietnam 
and a disastrous war; the less well-known, but equally 
talented members of the Peace Corps sent young Americans into 
the Third World to teach, minister to the sick and build 
bridges with other cultures. Indeed, President Kennedy's 
preference for the Peace Corps' chosen priorities was under­
lined when he told its staff members, "You have brought to 
government service a sense of morale and a sense of enthus­
iasm and really, commitment, which has been absent from too' 
many governmental agencies for too many years". Moreover, 
Kennedy felt that the Peace Corps' idealism and general
pursuit of excellence had set "an example for government
22service which I hope will be infectious".
In March I963, James Heston of the Hew York Times wrote 
that "Of all the agencies of the Federal government, only the 
Peace Corps has surpassed the hopes and claims of the Kennedy 
administration". Although it was the youngest, most fragile 
organisation in Washington, he reported that it had developed 
"the spirit of innovation that was supposed to inspire the 
whole government when President Kennedy took over". Sadly, 
Heston observed, the Peace Corps "stands above the rest as the
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only thing new and vigorous that has managed to avoid the
pessimism of intractable problems". That the Peace Corps was
able to maintain its fresh approach owed a great deal to its
administrators. Many of them newcomers to government, they
brought to Washington a unique blend of intelligence,
irreverence and originality. Indeed, in the light of their
tremendous enthusiasm and dedication to public service, it
might be argued that they were truly the best and the
brightest New Frontiersmen - certainly they were the most
idealistic. As Bradley Patterson, the Peace Corps' first
Executive Secretary put it: "More than any other agency of
government, the Peace Corps personified the whole Kennedy
philosophy of 'Ask not what your country can do for you, ask
what you can do for your country*. And all of us believed it
and lived it and felt we were part of an enterprise which was
the personification of that philosophy.......it was a
24.pleasure".
PAST II
TH3 PEACE COBPS / V0LUNT33BS
CHAPTSH WINE
THE RSCRUIT'MEMT, TRAINING AND SSL3GTI0ÏÏ OR VOLUNTEERS
"The Peace Corps will make every effort to ensure that 
the Volunteers who go abroad will be the cream-of-the- 
orop, talented, fit, well-adjusted and devoted 
American men and women,"
- SARG2NT SHRIVEH
(statement of Peace Corps Policies 
With Respect To The Qualifications 
Of Peace Corps Volunteers,
Augustj1961)
A few days after the Peace Corps had been established by 
Executive Order, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson took 
Sargent Shriver aside and gave him some advice on the 
selection of Volunteers. "Do it like I did the Texas Youth 
Conservation Corps," said Johnson, "keep out the three ’G ’s ‘." 
"The three.*Cs7?" asked a puzzled Shriver. The three 
•C’s ’," repeated Johnson, "The Communists, the Consumptives 
and the Cocksuckers, " In his own inimitable fashion, the 
Vice-President was telling Shriver that if the wrong type of 
person was selected to go overseas, the Peace Corps would 
face embarrassment at home and disaster abroad. Yet, in so 
many ways, Shriver was charting nev/ territory. He had to 
recruit, train and select thousands of young people to go to 
strange new countries and perform tasks which Americans had 
never even attempted before. The only means of learning 
would be trial and error. After all, as Warren Wiggins 
recalled, at this stage, "no one even knew what a Peace Corps 
Volunteer looked like."^
Shriver’s Report To The President of Pebruary, 1961, had
deliberately left the opportunity for service open to as many
American citizens as possible. Any single male or female over
the age of eighteen could volunteer; marrieds also - sc long
as they had no dependents. Within early Peace Corps councils
it had been argued that service should be restricted to
skilled technicians and those with sophisticated academic
qualifications, Shriver strongly disagreed; he felt there
was so much work to be done in the underdeveloped world that 
any intelligent, caring, well-motivated American - whether
technically skilled or academically brilliant - should be 
given the opportunity to contribute. In the area of people- 
to-people contact, Shriver argued that an unskilled but 
enthusiastic "generalist" could do at least as well as a 
skilled but diffident technocrat. "There was no point in 
having just Ph.D's and mlni-Nobel prizewinners in the
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boondocks," he recalled.
Shriver's sentiments reinforced Kennedy's original aim 
of giving as many American youths as possible the chance to 
serve at a grassroots level in Third World countries. His 
Cow Palace proposal had been aimed primarily at the college 
Senior completing his liberal arts degree (B.A.) - bright, 
healthy, interested in the outside world and well-educated 
in a general sense. Kennedy and Shriver knew that the 
"B.A. generalist" would be much more likely to give up tvvo or 
three years of his life to service in an underdeveloped land 
than the qualified technician or tradesman already embarked 
upon a career. Nevertheless, many were sceptical of the 
abilities of the untrained, inexperienced B.A. generalists 
and of the wisdom of Shriver's -decision to build the Peace 
Corps around them. Undaunted, Shriver told Kennedy in August 
1961, that he was absolutely certain the Peace Corps could 
attract Volunteers who would personify the "motivation, 
vitality and democracy which distinguishes the new Kennedy 
admi ni st rat io n ."^
Despite his confidence, Shriver experienced some initial
difficulty in finding sufficient numbers ox suitable
applicants - mostly because the Peace Corps paid only
perfunctory attention to the recruitment function. In those
early, frenetic days when an organisation had to be built, 
orogrammes developed and Congress faced, recruitment was left
to take care of itself. The level of popular interest in the 
Peace Corps had been such, that Shriver and his colleagues - 
somewhat naively - expected Volunteers to appear in droves 
without an intensive recruitment campaign. Indeed, the Peace 
Corps' official policy position was that it did not "recruit" 
but merely supplied "information." Shriver emphasised that 
while applicants need not be of the "Rhodes Scholar elite", 
service was an exceptional privilege open to only the very best 
of Americans. He was determined that Peace Corps advertising 
would not become a desperate "we need recruits" campaign; 
accordingly he issued a stern warning that the Peace Corps 
should never attempt to "enlist" people in the manner of the 
U.S. Marine Corps. A few advertisements were placed in the 
media, an information booth set up in Times Square and 
pamphlets dispersed sporadically on college campuses; but, 
basically, the Peace Corps waited and hoped that enough 
people would answer Kennedy’s call of their ovm volition.
Answering that call was not as simple as it first 
appeared. In order to become a Volunteer, any interested 
person had to fulfil the rigorous requirements established 
by Dr. Nicholas Hobbs, the highly-experienced psychologist 
who became the Peace Corps' first Chief of Selection. On 
March ?8, 1961, a conference on Peace Corps selection decided 
that applicants should take written tests rather than 
interviews since - as Hobbs argued - the latter had little or 
no "predictive efficiency"'” Any applicant !iad therefore to go 
through a substantial amount of paperwork before acceptance. 
There was first a comprehensive questionnaire which dealt 
with every aspect of his life, from medical history to legal 
status - including criminal convictions. Next, he had to 
nominate six referees whom the Peace Corps asked to supply
information on the applicant's emotional maturity, honesty, 
relationships with other people and so forth. Then a six-hour 
long Peace Corps Placement Exam consisting of general aptitude 
and language tests was conducted at some eight hundred regular 
Civil Service Commission centresarounâ the country. The 
applicant also had to undergo a thorough medical examination. 
Physical and medical problems were not disqualifying factors 
per se ; for instance, there were opportunities for the blind, 
crippled, diabetics and the like. Each case was judged on its 
merits depending upon the availability of assignments 
compatible with the applicant's condition. The information 
from the questionnaire, the letters of reference and the tests 
were collated and evaluated by a Peace Corps Assessment Team.
Applicants deemed suitable were then invited to 
training. The success rate was not high; between 1961 and
1963 only one out of every five applicants was selected for
a. . ■ 7training.
Training sites were chosen to match, the skills and 
preferences of the applicant with a programme and a country 
where these would be best utilised. During training, 
applicants were observed and tested under conditions of stress, 
Meanwhile, their background was investigated by the Civil 
Service Commission, although, in some dubious cases - and 
before the Peace Corps bill had passed the Congress in 1961 - 
the F.3.I. undertook full- field investigations. A Peace Corps 
Selection Board made the final; decision on which apolicants' 
would be invited to serve.
This careful and sometimes protracted procedure meant 
there was a world of difference between the expression of
good-natured interest in the Peace Corps and the time- 
consuming process of finding referees, answering difficult, 
personal questions and actually applying. At first Peace Corps 
administrators did not appreciate this difference; they took 
"interest" to be synonymous with "application". The error of 
their ways was very soon driven home.
In March, 1961, the Peace Corps received ten thousand 
letters of interest from would-be Volunteers. By the end of
the month, application forms had been printed and distributed 
to all U.S. Post Offices. It looked like the Peace Corps 
v/as about to be overwhelmed by ah avalanche of eager applicants 
However, by the end of April, although letters of interest 
continued to pour in, it was clear that instead of the fifteen
thousand applicants which Shriver had expected, only eight
' 8 thousand people had actually returned questionnaires. This
was little short of a disaster - made worse by Shriver's
absence on a trip to Third World countries where he v/as busy
informing foreign governments of the supposed vast numbers of
young Americans anxious to serve. Warren Wiggins immediately
cabled Shriver in New Delhi and told him that obtaining even
an "adequate" supply of Volunteers was going to be a major
problem. ' The rate of returned questionnaires did not exceed
two hundred per week and was going down. "With each day it is
becoming clearer," wrote Wiggins, "that recruitment is as
0
important a Peace Corps task as program development.""' He 
proposed that all the Peace Corps' immediate energies should be 
concentrated on recruitment and that Bill Moyers should be 
placed in charge with Tom Quimby and Bill Haddad as his 
assistants. Accordingly, the Recruitment Division 7/as 
transferred from the Office of Peace Corps Volunteers to the
Office of Public Affairs under Bill Moyers. Nevertheless, even 
this "dynamic team" (as Wiggins described them) could not
produce thousands of applicants overnight. On May 7, 1961,
The Hew York Times criticised the Peace Corps for its 
failure to provide enough specific data to the public. It 
also reported that Peace Corps applications were lagging far 
behind expectation^? Despite the Peace Corps' prediction that 
seven thousand people would sit the first Placement Tests on 
May 27, officials were forced to admit that only half that 
number had attended.
In public, Shriver told The Hew York Times that, while
numbers had undoubtedly fallen below expectations, he.was
pleased with the high calibre of those who had applied. In
11private, he admitted his extreme disappointment. He was 
worried th.at he would be unable to honour his commitments 
abroad and he feared the adverse impact of the mild response on 
the Congress. He plunged into the recruitment drive himself, 
asking businesses to grant leave of absence to those willing 
to volunteer and urging labour unions to guarantee re­
employment rights to workers who wanted to join the Peace Corps 
Subway and bus cards carrying information on Peace Corps 
service were printed and it was advertised on radio and 
television. By mid-June these efforts yielded ten thousand
applications - enough to satisfy the first year's requests for
12Volunteers - but thereafter the daily rate dwindled steadily.
If the Peace Corps was to reach its proposed target of seven
and a half thousand Volunteers in the field by fiscal year
1962, more productive recruitment techniques would have to be
found.
The popular response to the Peace Corps, as well as the 
polls undertaken by the Hew York Times, indicated there was a 
great reservoir of talent available for service but that the
free flow of information to potential applicants was impeded?^ 
The problem was made worse by the administrative chaos rife in 
Peace Gorps/Y/ashington in those early days. Applications were 
lost, files were misplaced and enquiries sometimes had to wait 
three or four months for a reply. "Sooner or later," Bill 
Moyers told Shriver in July 1961, "this,,.is going to react 
against us and cause us serious trouble in recruiting and
"i Æ
public relations."
When a survey of the Peace Corps' accessibility to
university and college students reported that the most serious
weakness was lack of information on campus, Quimby immediately
1 bstepped up the recruitment drive. The Peace Corps publicity 
machine churned out stories for newspapers and magazines, 
radio and television stations carried Peace Corps advertisement 
and the National Advertising Council donated its services for 
the preparation and distribution of publicity. Journalist 
Dave Garroway produced a highly-acclaimed film on the Peace 
Corps which was televised nationwide. Numerous brochures 
described specific activities and opportunities for service 
Booklets were aimed at students, teachers, farmers, doctors, 
architects and engineers while a pamphlet called Two's Company 
invited married couples to join. Another with the tongue- in­
cheek title of You Can't Send A Girl There! stressed equal 
opportunities for women while Over Mv Dead Body.sought to 
reassure anxious parents. At the s me time, Sargent Shriver 
wrote hundreds of personal letters to college presiljats, 
education boards and captains of industry, coajcing them to 
endorse the Peace Corps. His efforts did not go unrewarded.
For instance, in 1962, the New York City Education Board was 
only the most prominent of many which allowed teachers leave of 
absence for Peace Corps service without loss of job or
16
increment. And, in 1963 - at the personal request of Shriver
President Nathan Pusey of Harvard publicly encouraged his
17students to take the Peace Corps' Placement Tests.
To establish the crucial relationship with universities 
and colleges, Moyeis brought in Samuel Babbit, former Dean of
Men at Vanderbilt University.
Adopting a low-key approach, Babbit set up a single 
Peace Corps faculty contact on campuses all across the 
country with instructions to conduct a continuous non- 
aggressive information programme at each college. In this 
way, Babbit hoped to win the Peace Corps a reputation for 
honesty and integrity which - in the long-term - would bring 
a consistent flow of high-quality applicants. He refused to 
indulge in a mass, "hard-sell" campaign which might bring 
immediate results but would eventually damage the Peace Corps' 
image and attract the wrong type.
These various measures had the required effect. In 
1962, the Peace Corps received 26,155 applications compared 
to 11,578 in 1961, The monthly rate of Volunteer Questionnaire 
went up by a massive 60 per cent from 1,286 in 1961 to 2,ISO in 
1962. (APPHTDIZ IX) Even so, recruitment could hardly keep 
pace with expansion. During 1962, the Peace Corps went through, 
its most staggering period of growth. Established in eleven 
countries in December 1961, it moved into a further thirty 
in the following year, putting tremendous pressure on the - 
Recruitment Division. This could not have come at a worse 
time, as the early months of 1963 saw a drastic,decline in 
applications and the agency suffered one of its worst short­
falls. With more and more countries clamouring for Volunteers,
the Peace Corps was faced with an emergency.
During a staff meeting in March 1963, Bob Gale (then
Chief of Special Projects) criticised recruitment methods as
"amateurish." He argued that the Peace Corps' efforts should
be focused much more on college campuses than on
agricultural and technical professions. "After all, that's
where the young liberals were," recalled Gale. He advocated
an in-depth, professional "sales" campaign. Attacking Babbit's
methods as too timid, Gale said there was little point in
having a solitary Peace Corps man on campus who put up a
notice from time to time and then sat waiting for the students
to come to him. Gale proposed that teams of well-briefed,
enthusiastic Peace Corps officials should engage in "mass" or
"blitz" recruitment drives on campuses all over America. To
his complete surprise, Sargent Shriver agreed and gave him the
18job of organising this effort.
In the spring of 1963, Gale took several of the most
attractive and persuasive Peace Corps/Washingtcn staff
members to the University of Wisconsin and began his
"blitzkrieg" experiment. "The aim," the effervescent Gale
told his colleagues, "is to raise all kinds of hell without 
19
being idiotic." Literature was handed out in bulk, classes 
were interrupted for Peace Corps "seminars", a colourful 
information booth was set up in the middle of campus and every 
senior student was openly solicited as a potential Peace Corps 
applicant. Gale's recruitment methods were forceful and 
aggressive - the opposite of Babbit's. They were also 
immediately effective. After one week, a total of four 
hundred and twenty six Wisconsin students had applied for 
Peace Corps service - approximately 10 oer cent of the senior
PC
classT
With Gale's success in mind, the Peace Corps geared 
up for "saturation-bombing" of campuses. All available hands 
in Peace Corps/Washington - including Sargent Shriver - were 
pressed into service for a huge national recruitment drive.
In 1963 and 1964, "Wisconsin Plan" teams visited over two 
thousand campuses from New York to California. Simultaneously, 
a continuous stream of information flowed from the Office of 
Public Affairs. Over fifty Peace Corps Service Councils. - 
composed mainly of friends and relatives of Volunteers - were 
established to assist the Peace Corps by giving talks at 
junior colleges, high schools and local community meetings. 
Hundreds of returned Volunteers also participated in the 
massive recruitment campaign. Bob Gale estimated that over 
seven hundred speeches on the Peace Corps were given monthly. 
This stupendous effort produced an unprecedented number of 
applicants. By the end of 1963, 40,000 Americans had 
actually volunteered, while letters of interest came in at the 
rate of 7,000 per week - compared to 3,000 in 1962. Shriver
? 2estimated a further 55,000 applications would arrive in 1964:
Yet, despite this astonishing success - in terms of numbers -
not everyone was gratified at the Peace Corps' sometimes over-
zealous pursuit of recruitment goals, -Ever-vigilant
evaluators warned of the evils of excess and the grave danger
of becoming over-anxious to "sign up " people for their two
years service, "Under cover of an information campaign," wrote
23evaluator David Gelman, "the Marines had long since l^uided,"^
Gelman and other critics felt the Peace Gorpgi mass
recruitment methods too often lacked taste, restrains and
honesty. "The final failure of team recruiting is that its
effects on our great uncaptured mass of potential Volunteers 
are about as enduring as those of a travelling circus," wrote
Gelman, "once the sawdust is swept up, there's nothing left 
but the odour of performing e l e p h a n t s , I n  terms of cost 
alone, by 1964 the Peace Corps was spending tv/o million dollars 
on recruitment. The Recruitment Division developed such a 
neurosis about big numbers and rapid growth that Gelman 
accused it of trying every trick and advertising device in the 
book short of "dropping questionnaires from aeroplanes." On 
more than one occasion. Peace Corps recruiters were seen 
"grabbing a student and forcing him to listen to a spiel on
OR
the Peace Corps," A member of the original advance team
at Wisconsin outlined the recruiter's general line of persuasion
to the senior students: "Go ahead and take the test - it
doesn't obligate you - you can always change your mind - two
years out of school might do you good - etc," However, he
admitted that since almost every final-year student was
encouraged to apply, there was the distinct possibility of
26"picking up some-real kooks." The "mass" technique
certainly pushed up the quantity of applicants but the quality
became increasingly mixed. One recruit- expressed his
disillusion; "I thought we were something special. Then I
saw that they were just pulling people off the streets and
27
testing them later."
In the Washington headquarters, David Gelman felt,
"v/e have allowed ourselves to get hooked on the aphrodisiac of
pS
Instant Results." He called for the complete abolition of 
recruitment in name and in fact and for a return so Sam 
Babbit's subtle approach - building small, year-round Peace 
Corps support constituencies on campuses. Gelman warned that 
unless the imperative of "growth" was supplanted by an 
imperative of "improvement" then the Peace Corps would not 
only continue to acquire too many "high risk" applicants but -
by its avaricious methods - would also drink dry the well of 
potential recruits. Before very long his prophecy rang 
true. From 1964 onwards the level of Peace Corps applications 
steadily declined. In May, 1965, Bob Gale admitted, "With 
few exceptions, v/e are coming back from schools with fewer 
and fewer numbers. Results from team recruiting are down
90
22 per cent from last year."
A more general criticism of the style of Peace Corps
recruitment throughout this period was that all too often it
succumbed to "Madison Avenue hoopla" and took to "selling
30
the Peace Corps the way ad-men sell Volkswagens,"
Volunteers consistently criticised the travelogue style and
holiday brochure-type content of some of the Peace Corps'
recruitment literature. For instance, in Peace Corps
advertisements Nepal was depicted as "The Land of The Yeti
and Everest"; in Venezuela, another Volunteer had been told
by a recruiter to "Bring your bathing suit, the swimming is 
3 1great," It was not uncommon for committed recruiters to
over-emphasise the "opportunities" which the Peace Corps
could offer the Volunteer at the expense of the "service"
which the Volunteer could offer the peoples of the
developing world. Evaluator Tim Adams described Peace Corps/
Washington's recruitment blurb as a "you-too-can-be-a-world-
□aver" approach which often misled the public and the
V o l u n t e e r . D a v i d  Gelman also condemned the Recruitment
Division's glib, eye-catching publicity and the "enormous
quantity of dishonest or simply inaccurate twaddle uttered
in the name of informing the public." Indeed, he
classified some Peace Corps recruitment drives as "mass
3 3misinformation campaigns." Most irritating was the 
concentration on the theme of "Volunteer service in the 
boondocks" or "living in a mud-hut under arduous
conditions." In reality, the majority of Volunteers lived 
comfortably in cities or towns.
Gelman and other evaluators persistently called for a 
more serious and thoughtful information programme that would 
attract the most sincere motivations for service rather than 
the most superficial:
"To.do-this we have to generate some serious public 
dialogue on the lessons and values of public service 
as we have experienced it. V/e have to do this in the 
popular press as well as in the college press, the 
education journals, the political science journals, 
the psychology journals, the trade publications and 
the house organs...Instead of concentrating on press 
handouts, Sunday Supplement puffery, poster art and 
slick brochures, we ought to bend our P.R. efforts to 
promoting such dialogues on a perceptive level...we 
could be making our own contribution to the 
professional journals. By neglecting such journals 
in the past, we have overlooked an important avenue 
of communication with faculty members whose influence 
on the college generation is obviously considerable.
This sort of criticism had some effect. Towards the end of 
1963, the Peace Corps began to remedy some of its weaknesses 
A new posver campaign stressed '‘16 hour days'', "monotony", 
"bloodthirsty mosquitoes" .and "one fraction of the results 
you'd hoped for." A more ironical spirit entered Peace Gorp 
pamphlet literature. "This is how the Peace Corps measures 
success" proclaimed a picture of one inch on a ruler; the 
caption beneath a .picture of a solitary shovel was "The Peace 
Corps brings idealists down to e '.rthf Young Americans were 
told why they should not join the Peace Corps; "You were 
expecting romance? glamor? Then forget about the Peace Oorp 
One huge poster showed tv/o identical pictures; one was titlb 
"Before Peace Corps", the other "After Peace Corps" The bl^r 
went on to explain why Volunteers should not expect their 
Peace Corps service to change the world overnight. David 
Gelman claimed that this deflationary approach was more
commensurate with "the modest spirit of the Volunteers and 
the unspectacular realities of their overseas experience,
Peace Corps recruitment in the Kennedy era was sometimes 
carried out in a shoddy fashion. Its advertising often 
glamourised overseas service and the "blitz" approach to 
recruitment was a short-sighted and indeed, a potentially 
disastrous development. On his return to Washington after 
two years in Nigeria, Roger Landrum, one of the first and most 
perceptive Volunteers, advised the Peace Corps hierarchy to 
make radical changes in recruitment procedures and in the tone 
of Peace Corps publicity in general:
"By using its current methods of approach the Peace 
Corps is losing the very people it needs to make the 
Corps strong. Recruiters, should address themselves 
to particular audiences within the colleges and 
universities, rather than gearing to everyone in 
générale By being more sophisticated, recruiters can 
reach the segment of the campus population that the 
Peace Corps is really interested in sending overseas.
The literature that is being distributed does not 
convey the proper message, nor does it create the prope 
image of the Peace Corps to the people that we should 
want - as Volunteers. Some of my friends have said that 
after reading various Peace Corps brochures, they felt 
thattthe Peace Corps was too superficial an organisâtioh. 
A solution to the problem would be to add more insight 
and a fuller picture to the Peace Corps informational^^ 
material and to cut-out the Kadiscn Avenue aonroach."^
Bill Moyers, a dogged fighter against both the "numbers" 
approach and publicity gimmicks, reminded Shriver that "for 
the Peace Corps...recruiting is never a matter of induction; 
me can't draft anyone, and if v/e set urn appecIs ( ' oppcrtunitJ 
to learn about other people*,- 'travel' etc..,.) beyond the' 
basic desire of an individual to involve himself in this 
program simply because he feels it is worth doing, we will 
fail."37
Yet, despite these justifiable criticisms, Peace Corns
24#
recruitment ' did achieve its most important goal. In March 
1961, there was not a single Peace Corps recruit; by 
December 1963, some 78,000 completed application forms had 
been received. The "quality" of these applicants was a 
controversial subject meriting further discussion. Although, 
one major argument against the charge that the Recruitment 
Division sought big numbers' at any price.,, v/as that between 
1961 and 1963, a mere 20 per cent of all applicants were 
deemed of high enough calibre to be invited to training. 
Furthermore, at its height, the Peace Corps received 
applications from less than 5 per cent of the graduating
D P
classes of American colleges and universities.^ Considering 
these figures, the chronic shortage of time, the importance 
of making an immediate impact on public consciousness and the 
difficulty.:' of actually persuading people to give up two 
years of their lives in service, the Peace Corps' recruitment 
function could be said to have served its purpose 
marvellously well.
Although recruitment was one of Sargent Shriver's .ziost 
serious problems, devising an appropriate training procedure 
seemed even more intractable. A number of options were 
available. The Peace Corps, could set up its own troining 
centres around the country or establish a single Peace Corps 
Academy in Washington, or use the facilities of private 
organisations like International Voluntary Services nd the 
Experiment in International Living. Airernarively - and 
more obviously - the Peace Corps could use the services of 
higher education. This expedient won the day - but not 
without heated discussion. Although colleges and universities 
seemed the best qualified bodies to prepare educational 
programmes overseas, some Peace Corps staff members -
notably Warren Wiggins and Bill Kelly - were worried that 
academics might push training in a theoretical rather than 
a practical direction. After all, the whole point of the 
Peace Corps Volunteer was to be a "doer" more than a 
'"thinker." Against this, it was indisputable that colleges 
and universities had the experience, the educational 
resources and staff, and the space to accommodate Peace Corps 
trainees, Moreover, they could begin training programmes 
without delay and, in those early days, time was always a 
crucial factor. By taking up an immediate partnership with 
higher educational institutions, the Peace Corps could save 
■valuable months during that hectic summer of 1961, Besides, 
Shriver was eager to involve as many Americans as possible in 
the new experiment. Contracting out the training function to 
colleges and universities across the country seemed a 
convenient and significant way of accomplishing this.
In its first two years, the Peace Corps cooperated with 
over seventy academic institutions. This extension into the 
world of higher education had a salutary domestic impact.
Not only were students and their families made aware of the 
Peace Corps' presence but, as Dr. Virgil Hancher, President 
of Iowa State University noted, training programmes also ha; 
a beneficial effect on faculties:
"The members of our faculty are having to come mcgethe 
across disciplines. They are having to think through 
old problems of education freshly and to tackle new on 
Along with the Peace Corps trainees, they are learning 
learning how to teach languages in the new method, how 
to teach area studies better...The project is increasijn 
the international dimension of the State University of 
Iowa. This international dimension is being.glared, ijn 
various ways, with the people of the state."
Colleges and universities usually took on training programm 
during the summer months when lecturers had time to devote
sufficient attention to the Peace Gores and Volunteers 
could take up rooms in the dormitories vacated by regular 
students* Academic institutions received a welcome 
addition to their revenues at 211 dollars per trainee per 
weekt^ In return, the Peace Corps gained the knowledge 
and advice of academia's area experts, linguists and 
psychologists. This marriage between the Peace Corps and 
higher education was subject to frequent breakdowns of 
communication and administration. Yet, as Donald Shea, 
heed of the Peace Corps Training Center at the University of 
Wisconsin noted, "it developed into one of the most 
challenging and potentially one of the most mutually 
profitable educational partnerships between the Federal 
government and higher education.""
In Peace Corps/V/ashington, there was debate as to 
whether training should be brief and relaxed or lengthy and 
competitive. Since ..‘Shriver wanted Volunteers in the field 
as soon as possible, the shortest method had obvious 
attractions. Some private voluntary agencies, such as 
I.V.8. and V.S.O., had worked quite successfully without 
rigorous training procedures; but these had been basically 
small-scale programmes. Shriver concluded that it would 
court disaster to thrust large numbers of young Americans 
into developing countries without thorough preparation* 
During a staff discussion on training methods for the first 
group of Volunteers - bound for Tanganyika and Ghana - 
Shriver decided upon an eight to ten week intensive 
training period. He described the enormity of the task 
facing the Peace Corps in setting up a brand new training 
system:
"We found that v/e had to choose men and women of 
differing backgrounds, occupations, and education 
and in 90 days, equip them to contribute their skills 
effectively within societies and cultures far different 
from any they had ever known. Men ranging from 
University presidents and professors to labor leaders, 
mountain climbers and veterans of African safaris 
stre.amed into Washington to help us develop radically 
new and intensive curricula. We had to teach languages 
as rapidly and intensively as had ever been attempted. 
Some of the languages were so exotic that v/e found 
ourselves writing our own textbooks and dictionaries, 
to teach* for example, Somali, Tshi, and Pasar 
Malay.
Prom the beginning, Shriver was Insistent that training 
should be job-oriented and the project, not academic theory, 
would define its nature. To guard against the danger of 
training becoming too "academic", Shriver assigned a Peace 
Corps Training Officer to every educational institution.
This officer, often a professional educator, supervised all 
aspects of the training schedule - from choosing the 
university or college where the programme would be most 
suitably established to collaboration with lecturers on its 
implementation. The Training Officer was the official Peace 
Gbrps representative to both the educational institutions 
and the trainees. Thus the Peace Corps retained a 
considerable amount of control even though training programmes 
were administered by a wide variety of educational 
inst itutions.
The Office of Programmes Development and Operations 
produced a. document entitled "Form 104" which described the 
skills, knowledge and other materials needed for each 
country project. These I04's were among the most important 
documents in the Peace.Corps because they shaped both over­
seas and domestic training programmes. For every 1Ü4, a 
distinct training programme had to be devised. This 
guaranteed that the training element would always be vital
and flexible. As ever, Shriver would have no truck with 
a didactic approach.
Adaptability was also the watchword of the Peace 
Corps' first Chief of Training, Dr. Joseph Kauffman, a 
former President of the University of Rhode Island. While 
he realised that each educational institution had its own 
distinctive character, Kauffman established eight basic 
components for "the preparation of a Volunteer for 
effective service o v e r s e a s . F i r s t l y ,  Technical Studies 
gave the Volunteer a grounding in the knowledge and skills 
required to perform the specified job overseas. To deal 
with the historical, economic, political and cultural 
aspects of the host country, there was an Area Studies 
course- Language Studies concentrated on conversation 
practice and technical terms appropriate to the work 
assignment. The history of the American democratic process 
as well as contemporary social and economic problems were 
included under American Studies. International politics 
and the role of the United States was analysed in a course 
on World Affairs; this also attempted to instruct trainees 
on how to deal with communist subversion in the Third 
World. Physical training and Recreational Studies included 
learning about and practising host country sports and 
pastimes. Health training and Medical Studies advised the 
Volunteer on necessary precautions for personal hygiene in 
underdeveloped countries and gave him a basic introduction 
to First Aid. Lastly, a general orientation course 
encompassed the aims and organisation of the Peace Corps and 
the Volunteers' role within itt^
These eight basic components were taught by a variety
of methods of instruction; lectures, discussions, seminars, 
field work and films. The time allocated to each differed 
according to the training institution, the type of technical 
skill required and the desired degree of language 
proficiency. For instance, Volunteers going to teach in 
English-speaking Africa, did not need to spend as much time 
on language studies as those going to community development 
projects in Latin America. If engineers bound for 
Tanganyika were already professionals then the technical 
studies section of their course could be modified.
Flexibility was the key. In general, Peace Corps groups 
received training according to a three-phase pattern. Eight 
to ten weeks at a college or university in the United States; 
two or four weeks field training at one of the Peace Corps’ 
outdoor camps; finally, a brief one or two week period of 
"in-country" training overseas.
A typical campus schedule would have the trainees in 
class from 7.00 a.m. to 10,00 p.m., six days a week. Outdoors 
training programmes were even more demanding. They sought 
to give Volunteers a "feel" for the situation they would 
face overseas. For example trainees bound for social work 
in Colombian city slums were given on-the-job training in 
New York City's Spanish Harlem. A group for Nepal was 
trained outdoors in mountainous Colorado. New Mexican 
Indian Reservations and Spanish-speaking villages provided 
appropriate environments for community development 
trainees. The island of Hawaii, with its multi-racial 
population, remote valleys and a varied rural economy, 
performed a similar function for Volunteers headed for 
Southeast Asia- The Peace Corps’ own training camps in 
Puerto Rico were modelled on the British Outward Bound
school camps. Dawn rises, two-mile runs, half-day hikes
through the wilderness, obstacle courses and mountain
climbing became standard fare. Many Volunteers, particularly
older ones, complained that this extreme physical exertion
was all rather unnecessary. However, Bill Delano, the senior
staff member who devised the programme, explained that the
idea was to prepare Volunteers for "stress-type" situations
in the field - psychological and physical. Delano argued
that strenuous exercise sections were beneficial to people
who had never lived a rough, outdoors life. It was also
designed to induce a psychological control of fear. For
example, Volunteers were sometimes required to survive for
three hours in the water by learning "drown-proofing"
techniques. "The idea was to test the Volunteers to the
45 ■limit before they went abroad," recalled Delano.
Training was the most visible domestic aspect of the 
Peace Corps and as such, very important in terms of impact 
on the American public. The early training programmes were 
consrancly featured in magazines and newspapers. Everyone 
wanted to read about this new breed of American - the 
Volunteer. Reporters filed into the Peace Corps' two field 
camps in Puerto Rico - named Crozier and Radley after 
Volunteers killed in a plane crash - to see trainees swinging 
through trees, scaling sheer cliffs and being thrown into 
rivers bound hand and foot. As Gerald Bush, a staff member 
in the Training Division put it, "The ten-hour day, six-day 
week with calisthenics at 5*CÛ a.m. became a part of the 
Peace Corps i m a g e . T h e  media gave unstinting praise to the 
Peace Corps' adventurous training techniques. They seemed a 
step in the right direction - away from the boring Foreign 
Service instruction manuals and the stultifying procedures
of the State Department and A.I.D. The Nation forecast 
that the Peace Corps' methods would imbue Volunteers with 
"visions of what they could do for the underdog, the torch 
of learning they would carry to remote and Illiterate 
settlements, the prosperity they would spread with their 
American knowledge and skill, the sanitary latrines and 
clean water supplies they would create, the misery they 
would e r a s e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  training for the Peace Corps 
was never that simple. Indeed, in thêir revisionist 
analysis of the Peace Corps - Keeping Kennedy's promise - 
Kevin Dowther and C, Payne Lucas reckoned, "The great 
majority of Volunteers have been sent abroad without 
sufficient skill, without sufficient language ability, 
without sufficient cultural awareness.
Since the Peace Corps was virtually flying blind, the 
early training.programmes were fraught with error. "It was 
like declaring war without having trained the army at hand" 
recalled Doug Kiker, Chief of the Peace Corps' Division of 
Public Information^^ There 7/as such a dearth of relevant 
experience, many of the difficulties involved simply could 
not have been anticipated. Training chief Joseph 
Kauffman admitted, "Our first programmes often suffered from 
a lack of contemporary area studies information, precise job 
information or ambiguity of the structure within which 
Volunteers would o p e r a t e . O n l y  when Volunteers actually 
got into the field could the Peace Corps begin to learn how 
it might improve its training methods. Given these 
precarious beginnings, it was not surprising that early 
programmes were patchy. As Peace Corps consultant Robert 
Textor wrote, "The quality of training has ranged from
51Very good to very poor."
Some of the Training Division's most serious problems 
stemmed from the I04's sent out by the Office of Programme 
Development and Operations (P.D.O.). These were often 
hastily written, nebulous programme descriptions. Yet, the 
training courses had to be built around them. ■ Hence the 
Training Division laboured under the handicap of having to 
prepare Volunteers for vague and sometimes even non­
existent jobs. A badly written 104 could render the most 
competent training course irrelevant. However, even 
when programmes were well researched and described,’ there 
often remained a basic misunderstanding between trainers 
and programmers. The Training Division sought to prepare 
the Volunteer for a specific job overseas; but P.D.O, 
was more concerned with creating a general setting for the 
Volunteer in which he could create his own "role" - the 
specific job was only one aspect of this. In an evaluation 
report on Senegal, David Hapgood pointed out this profound 
contradiction in aims between Peace Corps training and 
programming: "The jobs the Volunteers will do in Senegal
are highly unstructured, but the training is highly 
structured. This is like training for cabinet-making in 
order to run cross-country. It just is not relevant."
Irrelevance was one of the mayor charges levelled 
against the Training Division in the Kennedy era. Charles 
Peters and his colleagues in the Evaluation Division 
consistently complained to Sargent Shriver that Peace 
Corps instructors were not giving trainees the realistic 
preparation necessary for going overseas. For instance,
70 per cent of Volunteers were actually located in other 
than isolated and rural communitit es, yet the approach in
training was strongly oriented towards the standard image
of the Volunteer working alone in the boondocks. "7/e
misled the trainees badly," wrote Tim Adams in a 1963
evaluation report on East Pakistan. "No one levelled with
them about the karsh realities. They were hoodwinked into
believing everything was all set. As a result, their
disillusion upon arrival was magnified by their sense of
betrayal." In the early training programmes, Volunteers
were led to expect well-planned jobs and immediate results.
This rarely proved to be the case. In 1963, evaluator
Paul Jacobs stressed that "much more emphasis should be
given in training to convince the Volunteers that they
are workers in the vineyard and that they may not be
54-around to see the crop harvested..." The failure to prepare
Volunteers for the probable frustration awaiting them overseas
became a consistent criticism of training programmes. "Given
the hopeful American nature, its naivete, lack of experience
and susceptibility, we are just not training our Volunteers
well enough," reported David Gelman in 1962. "I am not
talking about American Studies or First Aid, I am talking
about their whole disposition to the experience - mainly
55the frustration that awaits them." Training courses
tended to emphasise constant activity and job satisfaction. 
However, many Volunteers found that boredom and frustration 
could be just as common. As one discontented Volunteer 
teacher in Sierra Leone cut it :
"They just don't tell it to you the right way in 
training. It's not romantic. It's hot, sweaty and 
tedious. It's not the challenge of the mud-hut and 
all that - that would be too easy. It's the challenge 
of the principal changing schedules on you every day 
and sending two teachers to the same class. It's the 
unruliness of the students, the indifference of the 
other teachers...That's what they ought to tell you in 
training."56
The Peace Corps was obliged to rely upon 
academia to provide trainingpersonnel. At Georgetown 
University in February, 1963, Sargent Shriver described the 
work of the Peace Corps' academic trainers as "wonderful... 
The fundamental, big, dramatic fact is that, from the very 
beginning, training given to the Volunteers by the American 
academic community has been superb." However, despite 
Shriver’s polite tribute, the training programmes 
supervised by academics were far from flawless. The 
essential difficulty stemmed from the early debate on 
whether Volunteers should be trained as "thinkers" or 
"doers". Some of the academic lectures were sublimely 
irrelevant to the conditions which Volunteers actually 
found overseas. Academics tended to concentrate on 
scholarly texts and abstract theories whereas Shriver and 
the Peace Corps' Training Officers on campus wanted the 
emphasis placed firmly on "action". In 1963, Charles 
Peters tried to define a happy medium:
"I would like to- discuss the difficulty of getting 
the conventional academic disciplines'to focus their 
attention on the problems our Volunteers will actually 
encounter overseas. He are not preparing these people 
to write learned treatises; we are preparing them 
to live and work in a foreign country. For example, 
a good American is likely to arrive in an under­
developed COuntry with a respecm for work, a concern 
for the individual and a spirit of democratic 
informality that are lacking in his counterparts.
Unless the Volunteer undertands these differences and 
has done some thinking about the difficult decisions 
that he will have to make as to what to say and do in 
light of these differences, he may have some unhappy 
experiences and make some seri-us mistakes. Training 
must help him understand the attitudes of the people 
with whom he will be working. Training must 
illuminate the differences between their attitudes 
and typical American attitudes. It must not waste time 
telling a trainee that King 3 umboo overthrew King 
Schook ini622 unless that fact helps the Volunteer 
understand the oeople he is working ?;ith. " p8
In 1961 and 1962 this conflict between the theory and practice of 
training a Volunteer caused some friction between tne Peace .orps and 
higher education; it also led to difficulties for the trainees.  ^One 
of the more egregious examples was an agricultural extension project 
for the Sao Francise. Valley in Braxil,trained by the faculties at the 
University of Oklahoma and Kansas State University. Once oversea., 
volunteers complained that their instruction had borne little relation 
to the field situation. Only one of their instructors had had 
any practical, first-hand experience of Brazil and "half the 
professors did not even Imow the name of the Brazilian President." 
one Volunteer claimed bitterly, "The professors knew they did not 
the proper material to feed us. Their attitude was one of hoping for 
a Sourdes miracle to rescue the program - but it never came off.'
The training programme at the California Polytechnic Insuitu. 
for a teaching project in Morocco left its participants almost totally 
dissatisfied. The area studies course was biased (with Moroccan 
politics.and history given a strongly pro-monarchist interpretation), 
the physical education was regarded as a "joke" and the health training 
"repetitious". One Volunteer concluded, "Our lectures were all by 
. incompetents." Tho trainer :ln health care admitted to the Volunteers, 
that he knew nothing about Morocco - so he showed them his slides of a 
hi, game safari in East AfricaA° The lack of coordination between the 
various courses was another regular complaint, ifainees bound for 
Oeylon in 1962 criticised the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania 
for totally ignoring the rather sensitive local political situation. On 
investigation, it was discovered the American studies lecturer had left 
that particular aspect of training to the area studies lecturer a:.d
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vice-versa *>
one of the most persistent criticisms of academic trainers was that 
a U  too often they had never been to the countries on which they 
were giving instruction. Indeed at a P^ace Corps conference on training 
and selection in June. 1963, Charles Peters said be bad occasionally
been "appalled at the gap be-Ujeen what is known about a program overseas 
and what is icnown about it at the training center. Not infrequently^ 
lecturers were chosen more because they happened to be regular 
faculty members of the training institution than because they were
experts on a specific subject* Peters attacked this playing of academic
politics: " When we find a Project Director (the academic in charge of a 
training programme) engaging a lecturer because that lecturer can do a 
favor for him_p we do not like it# " He also rebuked academics for not 
being absolutely frank about their training capabilities. Just because 
a university had, for example, a department of Latin American Studies, 
did not necessarily mean it was capable of preparing Volunteers to do 
community development work in Uruguayc Tet, for reasons of prestige and
finance, colleges or universities rarely refused to administer training 
püîograiruTies when asked « Peters hinted tliat academia .had. not always
given the Peace Corps value for money;
"An example of -what I mean is that occasionally we have found • 
ourselves stuck with programs in which there are 20 or more 
different lecturers in each course# Upon investigation we 
learn the reason is that the school has a rule against extra 
compensation for its faculty working in outside activities 
such as Peace Corps training programs; and therefore the work 
has to DB spread around fcr no extra pay* One- time, the no- 
extra-pay rule resulted in the following situation: The Peace 
Corps training program started September I, the regular school 
term started September 20« Almost all of the contribution of 
the school faculty was compressed into the period September 
1-20p 'The program was wildly distorted, but the faculty got 
their extra pay."63
Thus, the relationship with academic training institutions was not always 
as "wonderful" as Shriver had described it. The Peace Corps 
had been obliged to use them because shortage of time left it with little 
other choice» For its part, higher education never seemed quite sure of 
what the Peace Corps was trying to do. Hence, it attempted to 
produce its usual academic product. In most cases, that was exactly 
what the Peace Corps did not want.
However, by no means all the evils which bedevilled Peace 
Corps training could be laid at the door of academia. The training 
Division itself made some fundamental errors. Probably the most blatant 
was the failure to concentrate on language training. At Syracuse 
University, language was treated as an "afterthought"; it was si:{ weeks 
before the trainees bound for îialawi had an instructor who knew the native 
tongueo Likewise, to trainees going to a teaching project in Morocco 
it seemed that instruction in French at the California Polytechnic 
Institute was "sqaee^ into odd spots in the program.,.» for teachers,
they scrounged around among the student body and found some Lebanese 
students whom they used."^^ ^  ^^63 Eugene Burdick and William Lederer - 
authors of The Uflv American - wrote an evaluation report on the Peace 
Corps in the Philippines, " We are convinced," they said," that a 
successful Peace Corps operation is dependent upon language facility more than 
any other single factor. The Volunteers we: found:to be operating 
at a high degree of capacity, accepted in the barrios and integrated into
their communities, were those who had mastered the language. Volunteer
65morale" and frustration was also linked directly to language facility.
Between 1961 and 1963, evaluators consistently complained that too 
many Volunteers were sent overseas without sufficient proficiency 
in the languages of their host countries. In Brazil, evaluators 
Herb Wegner and Paul Vandenvood estimated that 55 per cent of Volunteers 
had language deficiencies to the point where "their entire effort is 
seriously hindered," In a report on Ethiopia in 1964* Richard Richter 
made a scathing attack on the Training Division's continued inadequancy 
in language training. The Peace Corps* publicity picture of Volinteers 
dedicatedly pursuing their costs * languages he described as " one of the 
greater triumphs of modern press-agentry. Except for Latin America and Frenc 
Africa, the picture is a lieo"^°
In later years, Sargent Shriver made sure that much more 
training time was devoted to language instruction. When,in 1963, an 
evaluation report on Afghanistan informed him that Volunteers were not at all 
fluent in Farsi, he immediately ordered the Peace Corps Rep there - 
Bob Steiner - to "get into action on this language situation." Indeed, acting 
on the advice of Charles Peters, Shriver sent out a letter to all Peace 
Corps missions in 1963 which explicitly ordered Reps to make " continued 
efforts to upgrade language competence." Furthermore by the end of that year, 
Shriver had allocated more than half of.every training programme's time to 
language instruction.^^
A lack of detail and sometimes relevance, was a criticism of the 
Peace Corps' technical studies programmes*- For example, the majority 
of Volunteers were sent to the underdeveloped countries as teachers; 
for most of them it was their first classroom experience. Yet although 
they were given lectures on education, training provided very little teaching 
practice*
Again Volunteers in Uruguay complained that although they had 
received general instruction on agricultural extension at Iowa State 
University, there had been far too much emphasis on "how we grow this in 
Iowa" instead of a concentration on the adaptation of these techniques 
to the very different conditions they would find on Latin American farms*
At Indiana State University, Volunteers in training for a construction 
programme in Tunisia were annoyed that they were not given even the most 
elementary facts about conditions on building-sites in northern Africa; 
instead, everything was based on American methods# Similarly 
agricultural workers in Panama received no instruction on how to combat 
.urrchirig ants or use compost in tropical soils; trainee builders were told 
nothing of how to construct a bridge, drill a well or mend a fence with 
local tools* In an indictment of the Training Division's technical 
studies programmes in 1964, evaluator Dee Jacobs argued it was high
time the Peace Corps realised that the Volunteer who was not properly 
trained in a relevant skill would find difficulty being effective 
overseas - " The B.A* generalist who has a degree and nothing else, is a poor 
risk."^^
The U»So Congress had insisted that Volunteers be trained to
counteract possible communist attempts to subvert them* However, in its
early years the Training Division was wont to devote tchnmuch time to the
euphemistically entitled "World Affairs" courses* In 1961,
trainees preparing for the first teaching programme in Ghana spent less time
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learning Twi than they did on the theory and practice of Marxism,
Every Volunteer was furnished with a pamphlet called What You Must Ibnow
About Communism* Yet no section of the Peace Corps * training programme
was more disliked by the Volunteers - mostly because they found it boring
and irrelevant. The Tracing Division's approach to communism was
usually based on a theoretical Marxist dialectic rather than on local
situations overseas and how they might affect Volunteers, In an
evaluation report on the Dominican Republic in 1962, Charles Peters noted
that Volunteers there adjudged their instruction on communism "a
70waste of time*•••in agreement with the majority of Volunteers everywhere*" 
Most Volunteers advocated that less training time should be devoted
to the Gold War and more spent on "the real jobs and questions asked -
Birmingham, Jazz, the Twist , Mahalia Jackson, Ray Charles and Johnny
Halliday." Indeed, one Volunteer's major criticism of his instructors
71was, "they taught us nothing about American Jazz." " In December, 19o2, 
Charles Peters recommended to Shriver that the "anti-coimriunist" section of 
training shoiold be completely abolished.Although this was never 
quite achieved - the Congress would have been loath to allow it -
by the end of 1963, the amount of time allocated to it in training 
had been sealed down to a few hours * :
Between 1961 and 1963, a plethora of other minor deficiencies plagued 
Peace Corps training* At first, instructors preferred to avoid giving 
explicit advice on sexual behaviour. However, after reports of sexual 
indiscretion in various countries, the Training Division concurred
with Da^ /id Gelman that ignorance of the sexual mores of a foreign
culture could prove "disastrous ~ for the Volunteers themselves and for 
73their project." First instruction was another weakness.
Training for emergencies at Iowa State University consisted
of two firemen reading the First Aid manual out loud. Too much
emphasis on physical exercise was another minor annoyance. Volunteers
frequently complained that the real challenges they had to face were not
physical exertion and hardship but tedium and frustration. One
Volunteer in Tanganyika only half-jokingly suggested that rather than
sliding down ropes and climbing mountains, training programmes might
better consist of "days being waited on hand-and-foot by a 
7/
servant,"
Some trainees disliked the dormitory environment of campus programmes,
They resented the reinforcement of college-type discipline which they
thought they had just escaped. Two former Volunteers, David Hapgood
and Meridan Bennett, claimed that the trainee had less autonomy than a
college freshman; " He was bedded in a dormitory, tumbled out at an
arbitrary hour, fed in a prescribed place at a prescribed time* He
75hardly had time to sleep far less to think - it was like boot camp."
A few training programmes were too unwieldy, lilce the first Phillippines 
programme made up of one hundred and eighty Volunteers, and a subsequent 
programme for Ethiopia of three hundred* Others tried to cram far too 
many subject into too little time. Some of those subjects were 
extremely esoteric. Trainees for Liberia at the University of 
Pittsburgh, complained that a disproportionate amount of time had been spen
76learning about the life cycle of the mosquito*
Without a doubt, the Training Division's greatest failure was its ofted 
futile attemps to prepare Volunteers for the various cross-cultural differsnc 
which would confront them overseas. Kevin Lowther and G, Payne Lucas wrotp 
that Peace Corps training " failed to reveal the cultural structure and
subtleties that make the host country function....faileh to prepare
Volunteers for the minor annoyances that drive many to cynical denigration
77of the entire culture*" Inevitably,some crass errors were perpetrated*
An area studies course at the University of î-îinnesota crudely lumped
together East and West Pakistan as a single cultural entity* Instructors
for a programme in Sierra Leone did not bother to find out that the national
sport was soccer; thus, Volun.teers were overseas readily prepared to establisa
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friendly relations by encouraging basketball practice* However,
most of training’s cross-cultural weaknesses originated from the dire
lack of relevant past experience. Few Americans had a deep understanding
of the sophiscated cultures of the developing countries* It was only
after years of directing progi'ammes that Peace Corps trainers came to realise
that every country had not just one cultural pattern but many complex ones -
each with its own subtle nuances* Joseph Kauffman admitted that
awareness of " a third or foui’th culture within the host country could be a
79significant factor in the success or failure of Volunteers."
Although unavoidable, the. lack of detailed cross-cultural 
understanding in training programmes was, in many ways, the Volunteers’ 
most disabling weakness in the field. They often criticised training 
lectures for "beautifying" native peoples. Volunteers in Senegal 
complained that their instructors had given them great expectations of 
being welcomed with open arms by a nation of poor but eager workers.
Reality cameras a brutal shock. They found an elite that was indolsnc 
and corrupt - more interested in prestige than production - and a mss ‘nan 
was apathetic and difficul.t to arouse to new forms of endeavour* Cne 
Volunteer in Afghanistan told Charles Peters that the widespread apathy and 
lack of incentive had been his deepest disappointmentj he was bicter 
that training had not warned him about "people spitting or blowing their 
nose in public - sometimes on you - the tendency not to plan but to live 
from day to day, and the widespread homosexuality." In Iran,,Volunteers
experienced severe difficulty in adjusting to the constant "one •* 
upmanship" practised by the natives and the widespread suspicion of all Araericar 
“ because they were associated with the Shah and repression. The training 
programme for the Dominican Republic had left Volunteers ignorant of the 
fact that men raised four or five families simultaneously and that 70 per cent 
of births were illegitimate* A Volunteer in Nigeria was completely 
disillusioned to find that not all the students who came to visit 
him were just being friendly - but were sometimes looking for hand-outs or 
acting as pimps for native women*
In some Third World countries, cheating,stealing and graft were 
accepted as normal, everyday occurrences - but the Volunteers learned 
little of this beforehand* Training programmes for Africa often overlooked 
cities and the special kinds of problems raised in. them by the clash of 
tribal tradition with industrial modernisation. Volunteers working 
in the Near East were obliged to adapt to a strange phenomenon which they 
later dubbed "The Asian State Of Mind", depending on interprétabion, this 
could be used to describe the relaxation, solitude loneliness or underemploy­
ment which affected ths,m in the developing countries of Asia. Early 
training courses missed out on these important cross-cultural dimensions - 
much to the discomfort of Volunteers. "Ten minutes after a guy is in 
this country," said on highly critical Volunteer in Tanganyika, "he knows 
more than he was given in a hundred and fifty houJPS of training.
Overall however. Peace Corps training had at least as many virtues 
as vices* The quality and value of a training programme depended on the 
individual Volunteers, instructors and institution involved. Trainees 
for a coimnunity development project in Peru assessed Cornell University 
very highly«, They had been given a practical, technical training and, 
since almost all the lecturers had been to Peru, the area-studies course was 
first-class. Volunteer nurses going to Tanganyika felt their training at 
Syracuse University .had been excellent. The language instruction in 
Swahili had been effective and analyses of local conditions were full and
accurate# One girl exclaimed, "In some ways we know more than the people
born and raised here," Evaluator Bi.chard Richter reported that trainee
teachers bound for Ghana gave the faculty at Berkeley "rave notices,,*it can
be said that nearly all Volunteers feel they were well prepared for the
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Ghanaian situation by the training program." Joe Walsh,a trainee at the 
University of New Mexico in 1962 for an agricultural extension project in 
Guatemala felt that nis instructors had given him the best possible 
preparation. He was taught how to vaccinate pigs, raise chickens and 
dig wells; moreover, he described the outdoors field training on an 
Indian Reservation as "aa..eye-opener, Indeed, most Volunteers 
appreciated the Peace Corps' outdoor training courses, whether 
carried out in Puerto Rico or some other appropriate location.
Notwithstanding the minor complaints about extreme physical exertion, 
many Volunteers considered the outdoors camps to have been the very best part 
of their training schedule* For instance, Volunteers in Malawi deemed 
the Puerto Rico field camp' to have been the single most important factor 
in, preparing them for their overseas en'vironment.^ '^
There were so many variables to be taken into account that it is 
difficult to generalise about the "quality" of training. language 
training for a community development project in Panama in 1963 
was done at four different institutions. Volunteers reckoned it had 
been ,^ good" at the University of Missouri, "average" at the University 
of 'Wisconsin and "dowuright bad" at Berkeley and Arizona State University * 
Trainees at the University of Oklahoma bound for Bolivia found their 
area studies lectures particularly good in a generally excellent training 
programmes However, the eccentric lecturer who had concentrated on 
military strategy during the "World jlffairs" course was deemed a "nut*"
At Georgetown University, trainees going to Afghanistan thought that the 
Peace Corps /Washington personnel who participated in their programme 
were "rah-rah and laughable®" Yet, they praised the area studies course 
and some Volunteers felt that, once overseas, nothing they saw or experienced 
came as a complete surprise - "And this is a country where stones serve as
toilet paper," noted evaluator Thorburn Bold. However, a seoona group 
going to Afghanistan in 1964 did not agree with the first group's 
favourable judgement. Likewise, English teachers in training for 
Ethiopia at Georgetown in 1963, considered their area studies course 
inaccurate and uninformative. let, the health instruction was
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excellent as was the training in teaching science#
Engineers trained at Washington State University for Ecuador in 
1962, found their medical and technical instruction "excellent", whereas 
Volunteers trained at the University of Maryland had "no kind memories of 
their training," On the other hand. Volunteers in an English-teaching 
programme for Turkey trained at Maryland, described the faculty as 
"excellent" although they had noticed a few mistakes; for instance, 
their instructors had used pork for a demonstration of hygiene in 
cooking - not the most helpful example for Volunteers bound for a Moslem 
country. At Utah State University in 1963, trainees going to Iran 
were given little idea of what to expect; instead of being prepared for 
the complex social structure and the shock of the Iranian-style toiletj 
Volunteers were shown slides of gazelle hunts and exotic swimming pools j bux. 
then again, most felt they had benefited from the outdoors section of their 
training which had taken place on a Navajo Indian Reservation in Utah. 
Although, as ever, there were some dissentera- who deemed it a "waste of
time."^ ^
Peace Corps training was a very personal experience - different for 
every Volunteer. One adjudged the training programma for Liberia at the 
University of Pittsburgh completely useless - "we haven't even lookeo at our 
notes since we came here," he told David Gelman. Yet, another Volunteer 
in the same programme claimed, " rne training o.-glnn  ^
more and mors into the the picture here." In the sAmmer of 1962,
the first group of English teachers bound for Ethiopia were trained at 
Georgetown University in a haphazard and rushed manner; one y.ar la cor, 
a second group was trained at the University of California and the course 
was smooth and carefully planned. However, once in the field.
evaluator Richard Richter deemed both groups very successful and could
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not discern whether one had been better prepared tirian the other*
Most of the failings of the early training programmes were 
inevitable* As Joseph Kauffman put it: "There was not enough time 
to reach a professional level in the technical training, not enough time 
to reach a useful level in the language training, too much was being 
attempted* At the time, most of the Peace Corps/Washing ton staff had
no experience of overseas work* Given such a situation, it followed 
that the methods and the quality of Peace Corps training would vary*
Since it was not professionally experienced, the Training Division was 
always open to criticism and - to an extent - it became the "whipping 
boy" for all the misfortunes that befell Volunteers overseas* Evaluators 
were particularly quick to pounce. Yet, as Sargent Shriver argued in an 
angry riposte to a critical evaluation report on training in the summer 
of 1963; "After all, we've only been doing this for thirty months I 
In 1961 j the task facing the Training Division had been 
unenviable* For instance, in Nigeria alone there were two hundred and 
fifty different languages* To prepare a completely comprehensive 
language training programme would have been well-nigh impossible.
As it was, between 1961 and. 1963, the Feace Corps gave instruction on 
some forty-seven languages, over half of whi.ch had never been taught before 
in the United States, It also trained Volunteers'in over two hundred 
different skills# Nevertheless, as the Training Division candidly 
conceded: "It is difficult to see how the Peace Corps could assure itself
(in eight, to twelve weeks of training) that an applicant has, in fact the 
skills necessary to perform the specific task he has been requested to 
perform and the additional knowledge and attitudes necessary for success, 
Training Officers soon came to describe* their job as "no-win"® No matter
how competent they were or how well their programmes were administered,
training could always be criticised for not being "realistic" enough or
"thorough" enough; training could always be "better®" Yet, inadequate
as much of the early training was, its immediate objectives were
accomplished® By and." large, it moved trainees from a sheltered
environment to a more exposed one and gave them a language, a skill
and an all-important sense of independence#
Besides, the Training Division made a good deal of progress in the
Kennedy years* %  1963, training for the Peace Corps had come to be
regarded as a continuing experience. Whilè the eight basic components
remained, they were subject to many refinements® The training period
was lengthened to a minimum of twelve weeks and langue.ge instruction was
made the central focus® On average, over three hundred hours of every
training programme were given over to language® Indeed, Allan Kulakow,
chief of language Training, suggested that the most outstanding
characteristic of the "Ugly American" was being erased by the Peace Corps
Volunteer: "ha is no longer tongue-tiedo Volunteers are trained to speak.
as equals with people through the world who remember .toa well the disdain
and deprecation expressed in the linguistic ethnocentrism of the
92old colonial powers*" Significantly, the Peace Corps begai» to
incorporate information from the Volunteers into new training programmes®
The 1964 summer courses had the assistance of seventy-five Volunteers who
had completed their two years service» These returned Volunteers often
proved to be the Peace Corps' most productive source of "feed-back"
to the training process# Mother improvement was the Training Division's
cognisance of the broader question of the Volunteer's "role" overseas
rather than juat his narrowly-defined job& M  a. policy paper on Peace
Corps training stated in 1964:
"The Peace Corps may teach trainees how to build a school, but they 
must also know French of a local African tongue to work with their 
co-workers. A .school teacher trainee should know some linguistics 
in order to help in English instruction, but he also should know 
the game his students will play and perhaps how to organise young 
people to dig fish ponds or latrines after class hours 0 A
Volunteer who travels by canoe shou].d know how to swim as well as 
how to organize 4-H clubs and teach community health*' 93»
Academic institutions were given more "lead time" to prepare for training
programmes and much more specific detail on overseas assignments* Also,
programmes containing huge numbers of trainees were abolished; an optimal
size was found between fifty and one hundred®
However, having made all these improvements, the Peace Corps came to
much the same conclusion in 1964 as it had done in 1961s "It has been found
that the single most significant factor of good training, is the people 
94involved»." . The Volunteers realised that training could not possibly
prepare them for every aspect of their service* " Everyone should expect
at least a couple of months floundering around," wrote a young Volunteer
in Nyasaland, "There are some things which unfortunately can’t be
learned in the training program" Another Volunteer in Ethiopia
encountered difficulties which he felt "no American experience and no
95amount of verbal orientation can prepare one for*" ■ Yet Bill Hutchison,
an early Peace Corps instructor who had administered Foreign Service 
programmes, reckoned that the Peace Corps* methods were a vast improvement‘s 
Also, compared to the voluntary service programmes of other countries,
Peace Corps training often proved far superior® For example, in Ghana, 
évaluator Picliard Richter noticed that, comparing Peace Gorpsmen wich 
Canadian and Brii:ish volunteers, "we come off well, displaying special 
superiority in training* The Canadians and the British have to spend 
an awful lot of time finding out things about Ghana they feel it Is 
essential to ioiow if they are to operate effectively»" likewise.
Peace Corps Volunteers seemed better prepared than their Russian
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counterparts in Ghana. According to Richter, the Soviet teachers
looked "pretty much like our Volunteers as to age, dress and physical
characteristics." They served two-year terms and their living allowances
were similar to the Peace Corps, However, the Russians spent little
time socialising or becoming involved in extra-curricular activities with
their hosts and they had not received as much training in Ghanaian politics,
geography and history as the Peace Corps Volunteers® "Clearly,"
Richter concluded, "Peace Corps Volunteers.are- better teachers, are
better liked, have more Ghanaian friends and have fitted more fully into the
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fabric of Ghanaian life -"
The major contributing factor to the general success of Peace Corps
training was the quality of trainees. To a significant extent, they
selected themselves. After all, Volunteers asked to join the Peace Corps.
Although only 20 per cent of all* applicants were invited to training,
roughly 55 per cent of that group then chose to decline the invitation#'
Their various reasons include career concerns, emotional commitments,
parental fears and so on. Those who accepted the invitation were reminded
that selection for training was not a guarantee of selection for overseas
service. .Indeed, the invitee was advised: "Do not sell your home, furniture
or car, or ,cut your ties completely, wren you accept an invitation for
training. Before reporting, and during training, make arrangements
for these things but try to postpone final action until you are sure you
99are going overseas®" Before final selection, applicants had to withstand 
the rigours of a Peace Corps training programme during which they were 
continuously assessed. Poor performance during training, health problems, 
psychological instability or general uns suitability were all potential 
grounds for "deselection^ trainees were also subjecu no an inspacoior: into 
their background with respect to character, reputation and loyalty.
The discovery of a major criminal misdemeanour or a serious social 
indiscretion could well lead to the trainee being requested to withdraw* 
However, each case was judged on its merits. For example, in 1961, Bill
Josephson defended and won the case of a trainee who had been
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given a 35 “ dollar traffic ticket a few years previously. Likewise,
Charles Kamen's controversial social gaffe at the Rotary Club in Miami was not 
of itself deemed an act meriting deselection. On the other hand, 
in 1961, the F.B.I® discovered a confessed habitual homosexual among 
the trainees at Iowa State University® Another nnn in training at ftutgers 
University had concealed a larceny conviction. Both were asked to 
withdraw from their programmes.
Dr Joseph Colmen, the leading psychologist in the Division of
Selection, felt that his unit had, in some ways, the most important job
in the Peace Corps - for the agency depended upon personnel it selected to
go overseas® "An ounce of selection is worth a pound of training"
Codjnen told Shriver in a staff meeting jji 1962®^^^ If the. applicants
were of poor quality then no amount of training would make them into
first-class Volunteers. In a policy statement '"Vith Respect To The
Qualifications Of Peace Corps Volunteers", Shriver emphasised he would
malce every effort to ensure that those going abroad would be "the cream-
of-the-crop, talented, fit, well-adjusted and devoted American men ,
102and women." To meet these standards, the Peace Corps decided upon
a process of selection by continuous testing and review*
By the time an. applicant arrived at his designated training site, an 
Assessment Summary - an analysis of the information from the Volunteer 
Questionnaire,-.personal references and assorted tests — had been compiled©
This was the first part of a cumulative record on the prospective 
Volunteer® Throughout the training period an ad hoc Selection Board 
(usually made up of the Training Officer, the Project Director, a doctor, 
a psychologist, a host country national and sometimes, the country Ren), 
observed the progress of trainees. Training instructors pro^ /ided information 
on their participation in courses and furnished impressions of academic 
values and attitudes^Trainees themselves contributed extensive peer
evaluations and pooled ratings on each other. Also, staff
psychologists assessed each trainee on the basis of tests and clinical
interviews. All this material was reviewed in Selection Board
conferences held halfway through the training period and again at the
end* Trainees were rated on an ascending scale of 1 to 5* Obviously
unsuitable characters were "selected out" at the halfway stage; others
who.'iscored below an average of 3 were deselected at the meeting of the
Final Advisory Selection Board®
The most well-publicised "deselection" controversy of the early
years centred on Mi's Janie Fletcher, a 65 -year old Texan in training
for a home economics programme in Brazil in Flay, 1962® Mrs Fletcher
alleged she was selected out because she had been unable to run a mile
before breakfast, do push-ups each morning and swim with her feet tied
and her clothes on® Senator John Tower (H® ^.Texas ) defended Ffrs
Fletcher's allegations and accused the Peace Corps of physical cruelty
towards an elderly citizen. "She fell while swinging from a rope on an
obstacle course where she was expected to participate along with those in their
early 20*s," Tower told the Senate. With Peace Corps appropriations
for fiscal year 1963 Just about to pass the Congress, the brouhaha
came at an awkward moment for Shriver® All the same, he defended the
Selection Division's decision and pointed out that Mrs Fletcher had been
deselected because of her low language facility rather than her
inability to master the physical exercise schedule at Puerto Rico® The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee was satisfied with the "excellent
report" which Shriver submitted and took the matter no further* However ,
the incident was an indication of the serious attitude trainees held
103toward the final selection decision®
Indeed, there was much disappointment and bitterness surrounding the 
deselection process. An applicant from a small town who had been invited 
to training often left home with brass bands playing and front-page headlines 
in the local newspaper. If he was then selected out, his homecoming could 
prove a humiliating experience. Most trainees were haunted by the fear of
"deselection"* Indeed, some became neurotic about it. As one Volunteer 
explained i
"It was in the front of everybody's mind. 'I've got to be 
selected' was a constant desperate refrain in the mind's 
ear® If you sat in the coffee shop and the psychologist or 
one of the staff came in, you became self-conscious of 
everything you did. People were scared to death they wouldn't 
make it. Most of them had left their small towns like 
returning heroes, with the flags flying and the drums beating , 
and you could hardly face making it.-’ You tried*to avoid any 
action or word that might prevent selection ...... it cast
a poll over the whole of training.104
Several found the tension unbearable® A Volunteer in Sierra leone told
David Gelman that during training "we weren't worried about Sierra Leone,
we were worried about selection. It always felt like you versus
3 05Washington until you were finally selected© ' Undoubtedly the
pressure was intense as selectors from the training institution and
Peace Corps/Washington watched over proceedings# Trainees from India at
the University of Illinois complained of the "Big Brother atmosphere#
Trainees selected out at the halfway stage literally disappeared
overnight from their programme. Rumours of deselection were rife.
Since the factors governing selection were variable and often
intangible, Shriver ordered that no attempt should be made to explain
assessment methods to the trainees during their programmes. Of course,
given these circumstances it was inevitable trainees would criticise
selection as clandestine, inhumane, arbitrary and even farcical®
Sometimes there was a time gap of a few weeks between the end of training
and the final decision on selection. T^rainees at Georgetown University
waiting for confirmation of their selection for Ethiopia, described this
period as "limbo - haunted"© At the University of Pennsylvania in
1962, trainees bound for Ceylon told of the "torture and hellish
107apprehension" they endured before the final selection decision.
The trainees' antipathy towards anyone from Peace Corps Alas hmgton
grew as the date for final selection drew near# All officials came
to be regarded as potential " deselectors"o Joseph Foxj Peace Corps Rep in
North Borneo noted that all iiis Volunteers, without exception,
felt that "anyone who voluntarily discussed problems with any staff
member at training was an idiot and deserved the deselection he would 
lOSundoubtedly get#" There soon developed a general feeling among trainees
109that "the best way to beat selection was to keep your mouth shut."
This applied particularly to the incessant questioning of the 
psychologists. No section of the training staff was more detested 
or derided by the Volunteers, Most trainees deemed the psychologists 
not just irrelevant, but downright silly® Evaluator Richard Elwall reported 
that trainees "generally" laugh when the psychiatric interviews
U  0
are mentioned*" ' One Volunteer described his interviews:
"You'd come in and they'd ask* 'Well, what crisis are you going through?"
Other trainees remembered questions such as "Do you have a dirty word in your 
mind which you cannot get rid of?" and "Do you love your father and mother?" 
Some Volunteers complained that the outstanding or extrovert candidates 
who dared poke fun at the psychologists' questions were often the ones 
selected out of the programme*
Another of the trainees' grave dislikes was the use of peer ratings 
as a selection de^ /ice* They were sometimes asked crude questions like 
"Who are the five trainees you woijld least like to be stationed with?"
This type of negative questioning not only helped foment a plot-ridden 
atmosphere during training but sometimes produced the- worst Volunteers in the 
field# For instance, evaluator Dee Jacobs noted that the most effective
1 ]0
Volunteer in Panama had received "very low" peer ratings during training,"  ^
Most evaluators called for the abolition of peer judgements. However, 
Charles Peters disagreed* He argued that it was better for trajjiees 
to be partly assessed by their fellows who imew them intimately rather 
than judged solely by objective observers from Peace Gorps/Washington or the
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training institution. However, he stressed that only positive 
questions should be asked - "Skilfully drawn, positive questions will 
elicit the necessary information." he told Shriver.
Like recruitment and training, selection had mixed results.
Even low quality groups had their share of successful individuals and 
highly- effective groups often contained the ©£C©isional "drone"
Volunteer. Dee Jacobs described the Volunteers selected for Uruguay 
as "the right group for the right project in the right coimtrj'',"
In 1965?Charles Peters ranked the first group of Volunteers to go to rather 
nebulous assignments in East Pakistan as "one of the great Peace Corps 
groups. Not one quitter when most of them had every excuse to quit.
We may have screwed up in every other way with them, but we sure as hell 
didn't when we selected them." Likewise, Volunteers in Costa Rica were 
a " top-notch group", while selection' for Nyasaland had been 
"excellent, with only a few who are not first-class
Of course, all was not perfection. While selection for a project 
in the Dominican Republic had been "reasonably successful", there was one 
Volunteer who was an alcoholic and a gambler; his main prowess was 
"shooting one handed pool" and he had "close connections" with nationally 
known undenvorid figures. Another Volunteer in the same group had been 
selected despite a history of mental disturbances. In the rural 
public works project in West Pakistan, evaluator Tim Adams saw some 
Volunteers of the highest quality, but he also noted, "the general level 
is not high enough,,,, there are probably a good thirty who shouldn’t 
sent in the first place," In Guatemala there was reckoned to be 
only one absolutely top-class Volunteer anioung a "barrel-scraped crew" 
were generally much too young and iimoaturs; the U.S, ambassador 
had been forced to send a couple of them home, "A below average group," 
was how evaluators Herb Wegner and Paul Vanderwood assessed the Volunteers 
they saw in Brgiail, The root of the problem was that trainees had been
"inadequately weeded by the final selection board". Group
moral was damaged when two trainees who had been "selected out" were then
selected back in. One of them claimed that his father (a leauing Democrat
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in North Carolina) had used his "political pifLl" to get him reinstated.
Again, selection was deemed "the real culprit" in tne failure of an 
agricultural extension project in Venezuela, Evaluators Jacoos and Delany 
reported that the group was riddled vâth" greedy, complaining, 
unimaginative, immature, unproductive Volunteers." For the Ceylon teacning 
project in I962 some Volunteers had been invited to training before tney nad 
taken the prerequisite aptitude and language tests. Evaluator ;-.rthur 
Dudden fumed when he discovered that "the trainees for Ceylon were chosen 
from among applications left over or passed over by Peace Corps Reps choosing 
people for their projects....Ceylon, in other words, got what was left."
Sent to a country accustomed to exacting British educational standards,
Dudden felt the low quality of the group bore witness to the failure 01 the
n L. 116selection process. ^
in their scathing critique on the Peace CorqDS, nevin Lowunar and .
Payne Lucas claimed that the early Peace Corps programmes were ridden 
with "drone" or marginal-performing Volunteers, To compensate for 
shortfalls in recr"iitment numbers, Lowther and Lucas argued vhat tne Peace 
Corps often relaxed its selection standards and discouraged Peace
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Corps from dismissing "borderline" Volunteers,
Certainly'there was substantial evidence of questionabl e 
individual and sometimes group selection choices; bur this had only 
to be expected. Peace Corps selectors had little relevant experience 
on which to base their predictive findings; to a grea» extent, Lney v/e^ e
working in a va.cuum.
Naturally, with the Peace Corps still to prove itself oefore Congreso 
and the public, there was a reluo'cance to admit Volunteer shoruages or 
low-quality performances overseas. In this respect, George Garner, Peane 
Corps Rep in the very first project in Ghana was much to blame » He set 
his fellow-Reps the highest of standards, by not sending home a single
Volunteer. After that, no Rep wanted to be responsible for dismissing
batches of weak Volunteers, Garter’s precedent sometimes led to Peace
Corps Reps retaining low-performing Volunteers. For instance, in
Panama the Rep persuaded a Volunteer described as "discouraged, inflexible,.,.
listless and hitting the bottle hard", to stay on when he wanted to
resign®. Volunteers in the Philippines also gained the "definite impression"
that their Rep preferred not to send anyone home in their first year;
although they later noted a change in this attitude^^^
Certainly it was Peace Corps policy to discourage early quitters.
Most Volunteers lost heart a few weeks after their arrival in-country and
so the agency had to guard itself against people just leaving when they
felt like it. Early returnees - for other than medical reasons - were . .
required to pay their own fare home and forfeited their termination
payment. However, these necessary precautions did not in any way amount
to an active policy of discouraging Reps from sending home "drone"
Volunteers. Indeed, in a letter to George Carter in 1962, John Alexander
(chief Coordinator of Programmes) admitted it was inevitable that problem
Volunteers would "slip by" selection and training or might even develop
in the field. He defined a weak Volunteer as one who "jeopardises the
effectiveness of the Peace Corps program," Alexander wrote that the Peace
Corps did not want a situation where - at all costs - Reps "keep as many
Volunteers in the program as possible" moreover hs advised Carter on
the procedure-for dismissing any troublesome Volunteers. "The evidence
required need only be reasonable," noted Alexanderp "You have to be
satisfied that', not only have you been fair to the Volunteer in
terns of af.firmatively conselling him and giving him an opportunity
to improve bub that you could defend the .fairness of your conduc' end
decision to an inquiring .Representative or Senator or in some public forum,
119should you ever have to do so*"
In September, I964, Warren Wiggins revealed that Volunteers were sent
home "for personal adjustment reasons" at the rate of about one per day;
that is, 8 per cent of those selected for service. Another 7 per cent
returned for purely medical reasons or "compassionate causes"; 85 per cent
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of all Volunteers stayed on the job for the full two years. It would
have been difficult and dangerous for the Peace Corps to settle for
mediocrity in its selection of Volunteers, With Charles Peters and the
Evaluation Division constantly on the look-out the Selection Division could
not afford to rely on marginal Volunteers, In September, I963, Peters advisee
Shriver to "make nonfeasance just as much a ground for sending Volunteers
home as malfeasance presently is. Our highest duty at this moment in the
history of the Peace CorpS|" Peters continued,"is to concentrate our
efforts on making Peace Corps service tougher and more demand ing -
because the natural tendency is increasing softness, and softness, the Cuerpo
121de Tourxsta, is the thing that can kill us," In May I96I, Interim
Policy Directive 3,6 - Criteria Per Selection of Peace Corps Volunteers - 
had seated, "merit alone will determine admission to the Peace Corps,"
In a memorandum to his senior staff in August, I962, Sargent Shriver 
re-emphasised this rigorous guideline:
"In case of any serious doubt regarding a trainee’s suitability 
for-overseas duty, it is advisable to resolve the doubt in 
favor of the Peace Corps and the project. Perhaps, it would be 
well for each member of the Pinal Adviso;ry Selection Board to 
imagine himself in the role of the prospective Peace Corps 
Representative for the project and ask himself: 'Do I want 
this trainee on my country team?* Only if the answer is an 
unequivocal 'yes’ should the decision be to ’select in’
The above guidelines may seem unuuly rigorous, but remember 
th&t the Volunteers’ tour of overseas duty is much longer and 
far more stressful than the training program» Trainees not 
selected are, of course, usually greatly disappointed and 
sometimes' indignant, but they are far less of a problem for the 
Peace Corps than maladjusted, or noneffective Volunteers overseas 
who can embarrass not only themselves but their country,"122
Between 1961 and I963, the Selection Division generally adhered to these 
high standards. Accordingly, approximately 22 per cent of all trainees 
were "deselected"
A major criticism of selection was that far too many Volunteers 
rated as "3’s" - qualified trainees but not outstanding ones - were included 
in overseas programmes. The ability, proven or potential*, of 3's was 
the subject of constant debate within the Peace Corps, Charles Peters and 
many evaluators maintained that if ;-3's were not outstanding in training 
then they were not likely to be outstanding in the field. For example, 
Volunteers in Panama were described as "mediocre,...unobtrusively 
ineffectual"; evaluator Dee Jacobs attributed this to the inclusion of eleven 
3's in the.programme. In a biting memorandum to Sargent Shriver in 
October, 1965 evaluator Tim Adams wrote that " We* seem to have 
learned,,,,, we are inviting disaster when we load a group with trainees 
who are assessed as 3's,.,,Too often when the Peace Corps has found itself 
forced to make a choice between shortfall (or cancellation) and a dip in 
selection standards, we have gone for the dip," Adams concluded, "The results
125of such a choice are not happy, " Adams claimed a direct correlation
existed between the general weakness of Peace Corps projects in 
Guatemala, Ceylon and Pakistan and the high percentage of 3's in those 
programmes - 55 per cent, 68 per cent and 59 per cent respectively.
In an attempt to provide a certain measure of quality control, Adams 
proposed that’"'Shriver should put a mandatory 20 or 25 per cent limit on the 
number of 5’s in each Peace Corps group. However, in a spirited reply, 
Shriver denied any direct link between 3’s and poor programmes:
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"I disagree enthusiastically with this approach which implies 
that 3'3 are automatically we ale, Overseas, 3’s have done as 
well as 4's and 5's* Under your theory we should take only 
5’s, But even then I doubt whether we would improve overseas 
performance by more than 5 per cent,"124
Shriver had a point. In Venezuela some of the best Volunteers 
in the field had been assessed as 3's in training. And, in Jamaica, 
evaluator Richard Elwell reported that of the nine 3's in a programme 
of thirty-eight Volunteers^ one was "outstanding"^ five were doing 
"good work", two were "marginal" and one had been dismissed.
On this evidence, he found it difficult to generalise that 3’s should
. T j 125 never be selected.
If there was a relation between performance in training - on which
selection was based - and performance overseas, then it was a nebulous one.
No matter how meticulous the'Selection Division was, the difference
betweentth<0 training site and actual field conditions was glaring.
This factor lent an air of unpredictability to the entire selection
process. Indeed the Volunteers themselves - more than a little
sceptical of the psychologists' contributions to final ratings -
126adjudged selection "a hit-or-miss affair," One Volunteer in
St, Lucia in I963, had been dropped from another programme bound for
Latin America because of his poor Spanish; his undistinguished"academic
record almost got him selected out of the St, Lucia project. Yet, once
overseas he was rated, "The best of a. good lot in the field, Ke come to
St, Lucia to help and he doesn't see anything stopping him." One of the
bast Volunteers in Iran was a girl who had been described as "beatnicky" in
training, -Jhe had had to be warned about social niceties such as
crossing her legs and not slurping her soup. Yet, she was one of the most
effective Volunteers in Tehran, She taught English in girls' vocational
schools, Iranian government offices and the University of Tehran's
medical institute; and at night, she supervised hair-dressing, knitting
127and dress-malcing classes for Iranian women.
On the other hand, a Volunteer in British Honduras who had been
assessed as a ’'5"' by his selection board, turned out to be a
’’plain phoney” overseas, ”He left the project early’’ rioted Richard
Slwell, ”he tried to get others to leave with him, and now he writes them
letters about the easy life back home,” A Volunteer teacher in
Somalia - described as intellectually "brilliant” by the training staff
at Hew York university - took to heavy drinking overseas, "And
when he drinks, he gets nasty, ’’ reported evaluator Richard Richter,
At a Somalian party the Volunteer accused one of the guests -
a native education official - of sleeping with the girls in the school
where he taught, "That the incident didn't lead to at least a minor
12Ôexplosion is due to the official's good humor", wrote Richter,
These examples were enough to suggest that although the 
psychological, medical and educational information amassed during 
training might act as a rough indicator of overseas performance, it was 
far from being a precise prediction. Indeed, in the Philippines in Ifol, 
Eugene Burdick and William Lederer found that "no necessary connection 
existed between those Volunteers who seemed "^ he best in training and those 
who turned out to be the best in the field," They also came to some 
perceptive conclusions on the Peace Corps' selection process in general. 
Most startingly of all perhaps, they suggested that it was the "average" 
trainee who often made the best Volunteer:
"The Volunteers -le met in the Philippines w’:io seemed to be 
functioning best, fitted into the following very rough out- 
linesj They were neither the brightest nor the best educated; 
they were less rather than more interested in politics, and 
they were motivated by a mixture of re'^sons for joining the 
Peace Corps rather than being driven to the Peace Cor.ps by 
a compelling desire to get away from it --ll (whetevo.r"all” 
may have been) or an intense commitment to sex'/ice. Overall, 
they were more average than extreme,"129
This became a common finding of evaluators. The quiet,
unobtrusive, hard-working Volunteer often fulfilled the aims of the Peace
Corps more satisfactorily than the multi-talented, brilliant fellow who was
always very "visible”. Moreover, Burdick and Lederer advised selectors to be
wary of the "all-American, cheerful, rah-rah, outgoing, extroverted
campus hero or heroine," Equally, of course, they warned against the
introverted graduate student, buried in his books and his thoughts.
Certainly, the Peace Corps preferred applicants to have a college
degree. Early experience in training and overseas indicated that graduates 
were more amenable to language - learning and general community contact
than the skilled technician or tradesman. Hence, college seniors were
regarded by recruiters as "prime" peace Corps personnel. However, people
from all walks of life, volunteered, were selected and went on to prove:
themselved overseas.
It would be dangerous to attempt across-the-board value judgements 
on Peace Corps selection. In one country alone - East Pakistan - Tim 
Adams reported one group "of very high quality", another was "relatively 
weak", while a third was "better than the second but not nearly as good as the 
first," In Senegal, evaluator David Hapgood noted the great diversity 
within a group in-which ten Volunteers were "complete failures" and nine 
others were "doing an outstanding job’h Evaluator Charles Caldwell 
described the Peace Corps programme in Iran as a colourless mosaic of 
Volunteers cemented together by Villiara J, Cousins, a patient and sensitive 
dsp. ■'ih'w? are e f e •; bril^‘;n.t tiles a cor ride r-ible numb u* e: 
slightly cracked ones, and one or two which have shattered, wrote 
Caldwell, ^Veverthel;:-, the tot -1 impression :Lg one of moderate succ ess 
in the vV’^’ling cult re e ■' toria.; ' s : ; r . vcr-nevor land.
In the light of this type of report, the Peace Corps gradually 
began to refine its elaborate selection process. Application forms were 
simplified, psychological tests minimised. These had not taken enough 
cognisance of the hman factor - the changes that might affect a 
Volunteer under the hot-house conditions of a developing country.
Under the pressures of overseas service, quirks or strengths of character 
could emerge which no amount of testing could predict. By 1963, the 
Peace Corps had realised that the best selectors of Volunteers were 
Volunteers. Nicholas Hobbs, the Peace Corps' chief of Selection and 
Research explained this irony;
"I'diat happened was that the Peace Corps appealed to a
very select type of American usually educated, college
graduates. So the elaborate screening apparatus that was 
developed was not appropriate and was rather quickly abandoned 
on the research evidence. that the tests were not making 
any difference, that just a few of them, notably language learning 
were holding up, because we were dealing with such a select 
population already. They'd already been self-screened 
so that the screening tests had no real function."131
Eugene Burdick and William Lederer reinforced this finding in their
report to Shriver on the Philippines programme, "Just as very few men come
out of the military forces better than they went in," they wrote,
"so too we think the Peace Corps can do little more than reinforce those
132personal qualities the Volunteers already have, "
A pattern soon emerged for the "typical" Volunteer, He or 
she (the male - female ratio was 3:2) was usually a recent graduate in the 
liberal arts, unmarried, and eged between twenty-one and twenty-five,
Vithin Peace Corps circles. Volunteers were sometimes referred to as the 
"in-betweeners. " Most and just finished college but were undecided as to 
whether they should find a steady job or continue on to graduate school.
Some were already involved in further education courses; for ochers, 
immediate job prospects had fallen through and they felt the Peace Corps 
would aliothem time to think about their future, ?or many then,
Peace Corps service provided a useful breathing space at a decisive time in 
their lives. -
Altnough no degree was required and there was no unper limit on 
age, applicants wno had not attended college or who were over thirtv 
years old, were in the minority. In fact^S6 per cent of all Volunteers
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had a degree and only 0,7 per cent were over sixty.
There y/ere few "blue collar” Americans in the Peace Corps; they never
really found a home in an organisation which had an essentially
middle-class, liberal ethos. Indeed, journalist Andrew Kopkind's major
criticism of the Peace Corps was that "the 12-page application form is
13/enough to put off almost everyone but college types, " However,
in 1964, the Peace Corps sent out 40,000 application forms to automotive workers
in Michigan in the hope of getting skilled mechanics for programmes
in Latin America, Only 300 applications were returned, producing about
25 "blue collar" workers - a reflection of the Peace Corps' lack of
appeal to that group. Most applicants came from the established groups
in American society - White, jlnglo-Saxon and Protestant - and were the
children of middle-income, financially-secure parents. Poorer children could
not afford the two years of economic sacrifice. This also largely
explained the, vast under-representation of minority groups, despite
repeated specialised recruitment efforts and the Peace Corps' outstanding
record of non-discrimination.
Two-thirds of all Volunteers were Democrats rather than
Republicans. Although Peace Corps applications came from every part of
the United States, the West Coa.jt always led in the number of Voluntosrs per
capita evidence of Kennedy's superb political intuition in choosing San
Francisco for his first public espousal of the Peace Corps idea. Next
to California came New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts
and Michigan. (APPENDIX X ) The Southern States lagged behind. The 
segregationist policies of Southern colleges prevented the Peace Corps 
from using them as recruiting or training grounds. Indeed, in June
1962, The New '”ork Herald Tribune reported tbr-t not s single coll ego
or university in the South had a Peace Corps training contract. ' A staff ,
member was quoted as saying there had been "racial incidents" at an early
stage when the Peace Corps had miscalculated by using college facilities
in a Southern community. In the North, the Peace Corps had contracts
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with black universities like Howard and Washington.
The reasons why Volunteers chose to join the Peace Corps was one of 
the questions most commonly asked of them, John Demos, a Volunteer 
in Ghana, described his annoyance at the tiresome queries:
"From the very start the question of motives was raised i.e. k/hy 
did you join the Peace Corps?’ Bvervone seemed to want to know - 
newspapermen, psychologists, politicians and even the people you 
met at cocktail parties. Im/ariably we gave these queries an 
unfriendly response - partly because they soon acquired the hollow 
ring of a cliche, partly because the reasons were complex, profound, 
and personal and partly, perhaps, because we weren’t quite sure 
of the answer ourselves."137
A more cynically-minded Volunteer in India admitted that one of his
strongest reasons was to avoid the draft; another claimed that the
"glamor" of the new agency attracted him - "I would never have joined I.V. 3,
He .said, B'ormer Deputy - Director of the Peace Corps, Brent K.
Ashabranner described Volunteers as "the last of the old-fashioned 
13 Bpatriots," Various analyses indicated that Volunteers* motivations
were usually complex. In 1962, Suzanne Gordon and Nancy Sizer undertook
139a systematic study of B/hv People Join The Peace Corns. Their
results were based on the replies of 2,6l2 applicants (22,5 per cent of the 
total at the time) to a question asked by the Volunteer Questionnaiie:
"I'/hat do you hope to accomplish by joining the Peace Corps?" Answers had 
a widespread range - to help the poorer countries, ^ to develop or improve as an 
individual, to work ith people and help them help themselves, to pet to V:now 
or understand people in general. Some gave the selfish reason "to further 
my career" while others ware moved by an altruistic impulse "to build a 
better world and encourage intor-n-tione 1 brotherhood." (APPENDIX 
Pew applicants gave a single answer and most attributed their 
joining to a mixture of motivations. By far the most recurring answer 
was "To help people and humanity in general"; next was "to improve 
international relations and promote international understanding" followed
dOO
by, "to gain intercultaral experience. " At the bottom of the list 
was " to fight communism" followed by," to spread or promote freedom 
and democracy" and "to travel, and have some adventure. "
However, although these sets of reasons were at opposite ends of the 
spectrum, applicants often combined both types in their answers. Indeed^
Peace Corps officials preferred to see a mixture of motives. As 
Burdick and Lederer pointed out:
"Volunteers who gave signs of too intense motivation need to be 
looked at with some degree of uncertainty. We tliink it better to 
have Peace Corps Volunteers whose motivations are nut totally 
pure, who openly admit that they are interested in the Peace Corps 
because, for example, among other things it gives them an 
-opportunity to travel they might not othervise have. Obviously, it 
is going to be difficult to determine the nature of an applicant’s 
real motivation for, since the Peace Corps recnrlting stresses service, 
the potential Peace Corps Volunteer will try to project the face he 
thinks most likely to win approval of his application. Better 
a Peace Corps Volunteer with a capacity to admit his mixed 
motivations. Such Peace Corps Volunteers may be better able to adjust 
■to the realities of life in the Peace Corps than those who say they come 
primarily to the Peace Corps for purely altruistic motives. In 
addition, too strong protests of commitment may be covering up 
less desirable characteristics, "I4O
Nevertheless, nearly all Volunteers expressed a desire "to give" to other 
people,. Indeed, 93 per cent of Volunteers reported a desire "to gi'^ e^" 
as basic to their applying while only 65 per cent reported a desire 
"to gain,-" The all-important over-lap between the two was 60 per
, u i
cent.
Another major reason was the special affinity -/hich most young 
Volunteers felt with John V, Kennedy, Paul 3, Tsongas, who volunteered 
in 1962 (and later beceme a Democratic Senator for Massachusetts), 
recalled that Kennedy's influence was the "major factor" .•;hic:i 
inspired him to overcome all obstacles ..in his path - including the
T/2
grave doubts of his Republican father. ' On the day after Kennedy's
assassination, the Peace Corps was flooded with requests from young 
people on college campuses all over America, In the week after his 
death, the Peace Corps received its all-time record number of applications -
2,550.^ 43
Aside from these very broad generalisations, few Volunteers cared to 
pin-point any single reason for their decision to join. Moreover, they 
considered it a simplistic and extremely infuriating question. Sensing their 
frustration, Vice-President Johnson deliberately avoided asking it 
while addressing a group of Volunteers in training at Puerto Rico in 
July, 1962:
"I flatly refuse to ask you, "I'/hy did you join the Peace Coips?"
I understand you expect that question now for the thousandth time , 
Let me suggest the next time someone asks you that question, simply 
turn it around - like Thoreau turned Emerson's question around. 
Emerson had paid a visit to his friend in the Concord jail* "My 
dear Thoreau," Emerson said, "Ivhy are you here?" To which Thoreau 
replied, "My dear Emerson, why are you not here?"144
Inevitably Peace Corps recruitment, trailing and selection were very 
much like the curate's egg. It was a new venture into uncharted territory. 
Its members could only learn by osmosis. Experience - mistakes and 
successes - led to gradual improvement and refinement* Yet, despite 
blunders, the^record of those early years was far from disastrous*
By the end of IRoJ, over t-.relve thousand of this new breed had been 
recruited, trained and placed in forty-four countries. The "quality" of 
that personnel is, and always will be debatable. In that respect, 
the Peace Corps' Evaluation Division '-as its c>,n sternest critic.
Even so, in July, i960 evaluator Kenneth Love conceded that the Peace Corps' 
record thus far had been "remarkably good, especially in view of the 
flailing haste with which most of it has been done. When an organisation 
g:rcw3' by leaps and bounds, it is likely to recruit a lot of leasers and
■ ■ I i \ ' ( I, ,  ^' ' : , ' . . . .
bounders* We. have been pretty lucky on this score,
Ctt^ PT'EH T U
-ponrta&miTWG FOR P?aCS
"Programming is the key. Having proved that 
we can recruit, select, tra in, and send abroad 
large numte rs of committed Americans, we cannot 
stop there* . .As a tree grows up the roots must 
find rich sources of life to sustain it. ■ 
Programming is to the Peace Corps what those 
HO-foot roots are to the 20-foot willow tree in 
my hack yard."
-BILL MOYERS
(Memorandum to Warren T/igglns, 
August 17, 13Ô3)
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The project descriptions by the Office of Programme
Development and Operations (p.D.O.) - the Form 104's -
were responsible for the context and tone of every Peace
Corps programme. Recruitment, training and selection, though
indispensable, were dependent upon the quality of the work
produced by 7/arren Riggins and his programming Division.
If it was well dona - comprehending and adapting to the
socio-cultural conditions of each host country - it could
compensate for the inadeauacies of other Divisions, however,
badly conceived or poorly executed programmes could negate
even superlative efforts on the part of selection and trainin
or the Volunteers themselves. Situated at the heart of the
Peace Corps, P.D.O. integrated and directed the professional
efforts of all the other Divisions. The general direction
of these efforts was decided in an early staff meeting
attended by the economist John Kenneth Galbraith. During a
discussion on the development priorities of the Third Vorid,
Galbraith proposed tha.t the nswly-indepsndent countries of
Africa needed education and exposure to modern ideas, wherea
in Latin America- the essential requirement was change in th
rigid social stratifications which prohibited all but the ri
from participating in the decisions which affected the major
ity. Galbraith^ 3 astute analysis provided the basis far th
t"wo major types of prograin:: a undertaken by the Peace Corps:
te-ching, and various kinds of work in societies which cane
*1under the sinula heading cf Community Develanment.
Varren "aggins, first Chief of the Office of PyD.O. 
explained what programming for Peace Corps Volunteers meant 
"Essentially," he said, "it is answering the Questions: 
vhere do you go? 7/hen do you go? Rhat do you do? How much 
do you do? 7/hat kind cf an institutional framework do you do 
it in?" ^
Kevin Lowtlisr and C, Payne Lucas defined programming 
as "understanding people and institutions in their cultural, 
political and economic environment.-^” At best, it was a 
broad concept; a congeries of often conflicting interprétationE 
In the lexicon of traditional foreign aid agencies it had 
become a word freighted with bureaucracy. Preparing a pro­
gramme in the International Cooperation Administration (l.C.A.) 
had been a protracted process involving a great deal of time, 
'hordes of people and vast sums of money. Sargent Shriver, 
with his administrative inclinations geared towards speed, 
experimentation and thrift, was determined that the Peace 
Corps’ daring initiatives in the Third World would not become 
hidebound by convoluted programming procedures. Yet, not­
withstanding his personal abhorrence cf .almost everything 
"bureaucratic", Shriver realised that programming would be 
the vital link between the Volunteer and the people served. 
Without it, the Peace Corps could not possibly obey President 
Kennedy’s command to send abroad Americans who were "wanted 
by the host country - who h^ve a real job to do - and who 
are qualified to do tlia : job. ” Chriver’s task was to devise 
an incisive, flexible programming mechanism adaptable to the 
adventurous aims of the new agency. To prevent any possible 
blunting of directness, he decided early on Lhat the Peace 
Corps would have ultimate control ever all its projects. This 
was a contentious but highly significant move because it 
virtually ensured that the \asz majority cf programmes would 
be directly administered by the Peace dorps rsther than by 
different private agencies, higher educational institutions 
and international organisations: - as had at first been 
envisaged. The continuous bureaucratic battling that ensued 
between P.D.O. and the urivats sector over the administration
of programmas has already been described* At the end of the 
day, Rarrsn "hggins and his programmers had the final say on 
all Peace Corps projects.
Riggins, principal drafter of T he T o we r iny Task, v/a s a 
composed and experienced forsi ■n aid administrator and a 
master of bureaucratic in-fighting* However, 'le was 
in no sense a traditional "bureaucrat”. Certainly, he 7;as 
ambitious, but he was also brilliantly creative. P.D.O. was 
the most highly-structured, tigntly-disciplined unit within 
the Peace Corps - situa.ted at the centre of a somewriat anarchic 
organisation - but its compass was always the bold and bright 
imagination of Rarren Riggins. Shriver v m s i n  total agreement 
with Wiggins’ broad definition ...of Peace Corps programming:
"Our charge is relatively simple, the charge we 
received from the Congress. We have three purposes.
The first purpose is to provide skills to interested 
countries when desired. Our second purpose is to increase 
the understanding cf Americans by other peoples. And t.’is 
third purpose is to increase the understanding of 
Americans of other peoples. These are rather simple 
notions and they don't give too much of a guide to
programming. You can’t t-lk about GÎTP for example, as a: •;
goal to be achieved,. What you can talk about is the 
provision of middle-level skills and the increase of 
understanding end in a world as big as it is and the
skills stretched as wide as they are,.you can do almost
anything you want in the Peice Corps,"
Ihils non-specific interpretation v;as subject to two major 
restrictions. Firstly, the Peace Corps was dependent upon 
’’volunteers", the vast majority of whom were 3 .A.generalists. 
Tiiis :'ut a severe limitation on c no tea. TachnicalA./ aoilled 
and professional people could not be drafted. Thus, F.D.O-. 
was obliged to create a role for the unskilled generalist 
overseas - something never before attempted. Secondly, P.D.O 
could only respond to projects which had been requested by
host countries* It could not just set up progrs.#M^ which it 
thought best.
Ironically then. Peace Corps programmers cid not have
total control over their own programmes. They were subject
to the limitations imposed by both the domestic supply of
Volunteers and the demand for specific projects abroad. Thei:
difficult predicament was compounded by the chronic shortage
of time. In those early days the Peace Corps had yet to gain
credibility. It could only achieve this by producing program
and getting them into the field immediately. Despite the
problems, Wiggins maintained his characteristic sang-froid.
On May 1, 1961, he assured a perplexed Shriver - who was in
India trying to "sell” the Peace Corps - that finding "sound
6projects......... will not be the major Peace Corps problem."
However, there were few precedents for finding and estab 
lishing Peace Corps programmes. Indeed, by the end of March, 
1961, despite worldwide media interest, the Peace Corps had 
not received a definite project request from any Third "'orld 
government. Hence, Shriver and other Peace Corps officials 
began to "invite invitations" through various channels.
For instance, on April 5, 19o1, Shriver met with Ambassador 
Aub A'ziz Ahmed of Pakistan in Ra^hlngtdn and discovered that 
Paklst-n - .c uld wslcome secondary school tescoars, a; roc oui sc 
doctors and engineers. Ambassador Ahmed thought it best to 
place Volunteers in the cities at first and not subject the 
to the ri'O urs of “'il^aya life until "they are re-du^ for 1 
i few days later. Bill Josephson met witn Tongsun Park, an 
enterprising young administrator in the Korean government, 
an: discussed the possibility of a Peace Corps mire arologicàl 
study project in Korea; Josephson thought the idea "promising 
but it did not materialise? Overseas, some official rspres 
atives of the U.S. government had been making preliminary
overtures on behalf of the Peace Corps. In India, Ambassador 
Galbraith told Shriver in late April tiia t his discussions 
with the government had not been fruitful:
"The-'-e have been very few official reactions by 
Indian officials to the prospect ofhPeace Corps 
p-sraonival pleeemant-B in India; ©-fficl'al comment, to 
the extent there has been any, h^ -s largely emphasised 
the applicabilty of Pe^ce Coras to Africa and other 
even less developed areas. Although there have bean 
several expressions of skepticism and few of enthusiasm, 
the attitude may be characterised generally as cautious 
and only mildly interested^"
In the face of this unanthusiastic response, Shriver 
visited eight Third 'I/orid countries in the spring of 1961 ,
This proved exactly the needed catalyst. By the end of May, 
over two dozen interested countries had made specific reqiiests 
for Peace Corps Volunteers-., On August 28, 1961, President 
Kennedy met the first group of fully-fledged Volunteers in 
the Rose Garden. They were teachers and road surveyors 
bound for Qîiana and Tanganyika. "Re’ re all proud of you," 
began Kennedy, "the fact that you are willing to do this 
for your country in the larger sense, as the name suggests, 
for the cause of peace and understanding, I think should 
make all Americans proud and make them all appreciative,... 
we put^a good deal of hope in the work that you d o " Thus,
Ly t.i-? beginning of I ptember, tre ^irst two Pe^ce Corps 
programmes had. been established.
\1 though most of "'iggins’ nr-o-"'rammers were former I C . ; 
administrators, vary fer h d experience of actual fiel 2 
conditions in the developing world„ Thus the initial planning 
and development- of programmes was done on .9 completely ad hoc 
basis. The most outstanding example was the very first 
Peace Corps project - road surveys for Tanganyika. It was 
negotiated almost single-handedly by Lee bt Lawrence, 'iggins s
choice as Chief of the Par* HR stern regional office in P.D.O.
St Lawrence, a former programme officer for l.C.A,, had 
worked in some of the most politically turbulent Third V/orld 
countries of the 1950’s - Laos, Vietnam the Congo* He
had the reputation of being both a brilliantly astute 
programmer and something of a swashbuckler. Bill Josephson 
described St Lawrence as "foolishly courageous". Certainly, 
he played an important role in the early history of tre 
Peace Corps. During a staff meeting in March, 1961,
St Lawrence had suggested that Tanganyika (which was due to 
gain independence in December, 1961) might be an appropriate 
Gouiÿ'y for the Peace Corps to begin a programme. To his 
surprise, Shriver gave him the task of researching into its 
feasibility. According to Josephson, St Lawrence left the 
meeting and without any official guid@.nce whatsoever, "he 
got into a plane, went to Tanganyika and vanished. 7/e didn’ 
hear a word from him for weeks - literally. Then he 
appeared one day with this program, having visited most, if 
not all, of the surveying sites, checked out the jobs with 
the people the surveyors would be working for, checked out 
their living- conditions, emergency procedures, health care 
and so forth and so onl”^" In the first few weeks of April 
St Lawrence "bushwacked" T--<nv-'.nyika from end to eni invest' 
igating the conditions under which Volunteers would live. 
After meeting Prime Minister Julius ITyerere, St Lawrence 
returned to ’"bshington r/ith the first ’^e-^ce Cores overseas 
contract and the first details of a programme.
In terms cf speed, first-hand knowledge of the field 
and audacity, St. Lawrence’s "bushwacking" in Tanganyika s 
his fellow programmers a remarkable precedent, With enough 
determination and imagination, it seemed anything v/as possl
On April 21, 1961, less than two months after the Executive 
Order, President Kennedy announced that the Peace Corps 
was sending twenty surveyors, four geologists and four civil 
engineers to Tanganyika in response to a request from her 
government. Basing his remarks on St Lawrence's findings, 
Kennedy claimed, "There is nothing more important in 
Tanganyika than the development of roads to open up the 
countryl^"
Not all successive Pe^ce Corps projects were as 
thoroughly and accurately researched s the first, but 
Lee St Lawrence’s example die contribute to the establishmen 
of some ground rules* In particular, an in-country examin­
ation of every proposed project by either an official from 
Peace Corps/Washington or by the Peace Corps Pep in that 
country became standard programming procedure* All proposal^ 
were investigated by the appropriate Regional Division .of 
P.D.O. (Africa, Latin America, Par East, North Africa/
Near East/ South Ahist and only after the potential benefi 
and liabilities had been assessed was a final decision 
reached on whether to initiate a programme, For example, in 
January, 1962, Richard Griscora of the Latin American Divisibi 
travelled to Colombia and reported on the "Possible ?it-Falfls 
of community develonment programmes there. C-riscom noted t'r 
danger of Volunteers becoming involved in "liberal-conservd- 
ative-communist controversies." he advised that as few 
Volunteers '->s nossible should be rlaced in "potential areaè 
of conflict." -inobhsr problem would be the pervasive inf-1 
luencs of the activist Catholic priest in Latin America„ 
they were to penetrate the campesinos. Volunteers would bs 
forced into "intimate association" with these local pa,dr; 
Obviously, this would make the programme vulnerable to
Congressional criticism. However, despite these "possible
pit-falls", community development programmes in Colombia,
13and throughout Latin America, went ahead.
Over the years. Peace Corps programmes originated from
a number of sources - a meeting between Shriver and a foreign
head of stats, a suggestion by a U.S. Ambassador, A.I.D. chief
or Peace Corps programme officer, or a direct request from
a host country institution or official. The specific details
governing each programme varied. Some host governments
insisted on maintaining an element of independence by paying
part of the cost of the Volunteers’ service; for instance,
Ghana provided Volunteers with their living allowances.
Other projects were partly administered by an American
private organisation ~ in St Lucia, Heifer Project Inc.
helped in the Peace Corps’community action programme. Some
host institutions - like the éducation board in the
Philippines - allocated each Volunteer a native ’bounterpart"
who worked side-by-side with him in a reciprocal learning
process. In dealing with these new. sensitive^ foreign
governments, programming policy had to be flexible. However,
there were two fundamental - if bro^d - preconditions for
-ny project; it should meet "felt needs" of the host country
nd it shou 1 d be wantsd by the local reoples. In th-a "ield.
Volunteers were the employees of their host government, not
th5 United St- l-es* Uhriver put it, "The Volunteers ao to
w% ft with people, not to - naloy :he,t, use th e or a .vise
them. They do what the country they go to wants them to -do,
1 h '
not what we think is best, "
Of course, once requests from Third Rorld countries 
began to flow in, the Peace Corps h-d to establish some 
CO editions of priority. There simply were not enough
Volunteers to ss-tisf;/ the overwhelming demand, John 
Alexander chaired P.D.O,'s Coordination committee which 
gave final approval to programmes. Before these infamous 
"murder boards" (where many nrogramm es were"killed"), the 
Regional Chiefs argued their cases for new programmes. Of 
prime consideration was the supply of Volunteers. If the 
necessary Volunteers for a proposed programme were not in 
the "pool" of applicants or could not be recruited, then it 
was scrapped. However, this decision w^s complex. Since 
most Volunteers - were generalists - and, in theory, adaptable 
to any job situation, - there was intense competition 
between the four Regional Chiefs over both the quantity and
the quality of Volunteers assigned to their programmes. For
example, there was always conflict between the African .
Division which dealt with teaching programmes, and the Latin
American Division which was concerned mostly with community 
development. The African Division thought it should get firs’ 
choice of the best Volunteers because its progranm as showed 
"definite" results, whereas the effects of unstructured 
community development were problematical. Ultimately,
John Alexander r^n his cold, objective eye over all programme 
proposals and settled any disputes arising between the power- 
brokers in the diff areYi i: Regional Offices.
Tlie potential impact of a project received hign priority. 
Preference was given to programmes involving maximum contact 
with host country peoples rather than tuone "hich r"’paired 
SL finely-honed skill but minimal participation in t:ie native 
community. Riggins gave an'-.example of the nature of this / 
priority;
"If 9 decision were necessary between a project 
calling for thirty laboratory technicians and one 
calling for thirty physical education instructors-- 
both skills which ai'e available and which are consistent 
with the middla-rnanpowsr concept - in terms of satis­
fying the purposes of the Peace Corps Act, the letter 
should be selected. Although the l-’b technicians 
might make a more apparent contribution to the social 
and economic development of the host country, ta-. 
physical education instructors would have an opportunity 
to relate more closely to more people of that countr;/ 
and the direct results of their work would be more 
obvious. They would therefore.serve mors effectively 
all three purposes of the Actl^*'
Further important criteria for all programmes were general 
economic, social and political: considerations. Interim 
Policy Directive 2,1 stated that while need, desire and 
feasibility should be the major prerequisites, Peace Corps 
programmes should not be "inconsistent with U.S. foreign 
policy," Shriver was always insistent that the Pe^ce Corps 
supported "peorlea not governments7 and maintained that it 
was not an arm of American foreign policy. All the same, he 
was a realist. If he had allowed Volunteers to be employed 
by governments of countries openly hostile to the United . 
States - say, Cuba - the political consequences would have 
been disastrous both in the Congress and in other "neutralist" 
states. Of necessity, the Peace Corps, had to take account of 
■•■el .1 t'} cwl ores sure 8 -» n-" I he se ha 5 -^or e be - h  g • on " ' a r r^ 
deci siens,
After P.D.O.*8 Coordination unit h-=c unproved a project, 
a -vorhip- agreement mas sipned by tha "^-ce Icros a ni t he 
host country government. The nooyramma was then assigned to 
the appropriate Regional Chief, Under his aegis fne Peace 
Corns Form 104 - the detailed description, of the proposed 
assignment - was written. Based upon the 104, training and 
selection procedures got under way. On ayarage, the entire 
programming process - from initial suggestion or request, to
arrival of Volunteers in the field - took between sixty to 
ninety days. Although, in 1961 and 19o2, when there -.vas 
tremendous pressure to produce programmes quickly, many 
were set up in an even shorter time. 3y the end of its first 
year, the Peace Corps c working in three continents and 
by 1964 over seven thousand Volunt aers were in the field in 
forty-six countries. In this respect, the"towering task" 
vras sccompli shed *
W  r»ren Riggins described the Peace Corps as being in 
the "people business":
"Our speciality is the people at the middle level.
Hot the man with the shovel, - although use shovels we 
will if the job requires that vve lead by sharing toe 
labor. Hot the man engrossed in remote research - 
although doctors, engineers and scientists are seir/ing 
and teaching'as Volunteers;.;... the bulk of our^g , 
Volunteers are the man and worn^n 'in the middle’.
Kennedy's original idea had been to recruit young college 
■graduates and train them for a relatively simple task over­
seas. In fhe main, Volunteers would not hove highly special­
ised skills but they would be capable of doing - and of 
teaching their hosts to do - a basic job. The Peace Corps 
described Volunteers as "middle level manpower" - in a 
category between the few highly-trained experts and the 
com ole t 'Ü y , ntr^ iced es. fi lultan : cusly, He a -e hopad
Volunteers would contribute to an understanding between 
Americans and Third Vorid peoples. These objectives were 
ref; acts! in Vis 'rlrGs ^ims of the fe-ce doi'ar let.
In early -e'ce Corps councils it had been ser_ously 
questioned whether there was.a "middle-level" role for the 
3.A. generalist; some proposed that only technically skilled 
and ruHifled people should be used. Another major debate 
had concerned whether Peace Corps jobs should be "structured*' 
(detailed, secure and specific, like teaching, engineering
and construction), or "unstructurecî" (vague, and reliant 
upon the Volunteer's personal initiative, like community 
action). Although only tnree hundred and sixty-four 
Volunteers actually took ;:o overseas assignments In 1961, the; 
provided significant illumination on both these nointsl^ 
During tlia.t first year, the five btxsic models for programmes 
were set up; skilled technl<^ues in Tanganyika, teachers of 
general subjects in Ghana and Nigeria, teachers’ aides in 
the Philippines, teachers of English as a foreign language 
(T.E.F.L.) in Thailand, and general community action workers 
in Colombia and St Lucia. Early reports on these projects 
confounded those ?/ho had doubted the use of generalists. Of 
course, there were problems of adjustment for the Volunteers 
involved in teaching In Africa and community development in 
Latin America; but there were no complaints fio m their host 
governments about l^ck cf skills or failure to participate 
in the local communities. On the other hand, the original 
Tanganyika programme experienced severe difficulties. The 
skilled surveyors and engineers had nc problem finding the 
specific jobs outlined for them by Lee St Lawrence; but, a 
sudden cut in the road development budget by the Tanganyikan 
government rendered' much of their work ineffectual. These 
V 'foreve -cn local .^ overn-'-'>■;t ec 1 rc -ies r ant hist e'.X their 
clanning and surveying did net culminate i-i actual road 
construction by their hosts. P e l n p s  even more i^oortantly^ 
the Itrner^nt n-ture of their work effectively -revente] t/i 
Volunteer technicians fro.-n establishing m y  close, personal 
relationships with their hosts, George Carter, first Peace 
Corps Hep in Ghana, recalled.
"The Tanganyika experience taught us that the 
provis^gn of technical skills was no guarantee of
SUi^ cess, "
The leasons of these first few projects had a salutary 
effect on both the size and the nature of all future Peace 
Corps programming* Indeed, 7/arren Riggins was heard to 
remark that the Peace Corps would never do another "Tanganyikâ- 
In terms of satisfying the Three Aims of the Peace Corps Act, 
the early programmes seemed to indicate that the trained 
generalist would be mors effective than the technician - in 
either structured or unstructured work situations. Certainly, 
the generalist did not have the expertise of the technician, 
but he had a greater aptitude for language and was more 
receptive to training in a wide range of basic skills - 
teaching, elementary construction, agricultural extension, 
public health improvement -and so on. The relatively snort 
training period could not transform the generalist into an 
"expert", but it could make him proficient in a limited skill 
area such as poultry-breeding, literacy-teaching or malaria- 
eradication. Former Depiity-Director of the Peace Corps,
Brent K. Ashabranner, described this process for one programme 
in India:
"The generalists spent their time on just one thing: 
learning the rudiments of starting and taking of
small poultry units in India. They learned about the 
right kind of mud chicken houses by actually building 
them; they learned the deep litter, close confinement 
system of raising c h i c k e n s h e  y learned the right 
feed formula s and how to improvise “1 th in gr-d ; 3 
available in India. Thiy l a m e d  la vaccinate, debeak, 
and kill diseased chickens. After three months of 
sharply focused training these Volunteers were as 
ignorant as they had ever been ab. ut general farminv 
and inimal hucbandry.,.f5ut tv.ey knew on 3 t*lng reason­
ably well: how to house, raise, cull^and kee- healthy 
9 small flock oi' cdickens in India^D
Moreover, the generalist was more adaptable to working 
conditions in the under-developed countries. The specialist 
was sometimes inhibited by the rigidities of his formal 
training. Thomas Quimby, Chief of Recruitment and later.
Peace Corps Rep in Liberia, explained that the B.A.generalist
proved much more resilient then the skilled expert who
tended to "climb the wall" on discovering that his host
country co-workers could not conceive of a straight lineal 
Perhaps of most importance - in terms of the Th? ee Aims - the
generalist usually turned out to have a more effective social
imract than the technician. The generalist cl id not rely on
his technical skill as the sole means of communication with
his hosts. No matter what specific job he was given, he was
usually prepared to take part in local society in as many
ways as possible. In particular, it seemed the generalist
was suited to community development work. Since the job vras
unstructured and sometimes completely undefined, it allowed
plenty of scope for individual initiative and personality.
All things considered, ' the first programmes in i9o1 convinced
Tom Ouimby and the Peace Corps staff that there was "something
about an ?b ility to sustain yourself in the cross-cultural
experience that was helped by a college education, partic-
O O nularly liberal arts as opposed to a technical educationf^
The early projects implied that the promotion of mutual under 
standing - perhaps the quintessential Peace Corps aim - would 
be better achieved by generalists than by skilled technician^* 
. This finding was not; displeasing to Shriver and Wiggins 
'-It ho ugh the ^irst few pronramres - esneci-'lly In T-ng-nyika 
xiai included a fair proportion of technicians, specifically 
skilled workers became increasingly difficult to recruit,
:''oc t erica - tr-^esmen - n ' ' technicians iended tc establisn 
themselves „n jobs, r:w cry, -uw‘ generally t ' he on co :w.i w sen 
which prevented them from applying for Peace Corps ser"/i cé 
The first year's recruitment figures made it patently 
obvious that the Peace Corns' nrincipal ootchment would be 
B.A, generalists. Hence, four out of five of the model 
programmes set up in 19o1 consisted mostly of this group.
pu 4
Clearly, had these programmes been outright failures, the 
very future of the Peace Corps would have bean at risk. t 
the very least, Shriver and Riggins would have been obliged 
to dismiss The T o ;ve rin g T a sk's notion cf a large Peace Corps. 
As it happened, the opposite was true. The one programme - 
in Tanganyika - which had relied almost totally upon sîcill 
and technical expertise liad proven to be the least successful 
in its neople-to-people impact. Indeed, evaluator David 
Gelman described it derisively as a "junior A.I.D." technical 
assistance programme where the highly skilled Volunteers had 
only an eoiploysr-amployae belationship with their hosts?^
On the other hand, the generalist programmes appeared to be 
thriving. As early as March, 19o2, evaluator Dan CliamberlLAu 
reported on the "outstanding group" of young generalists ' 
working in community development in Colombia; "To those who
think there is no such thing as the practical do-gooder.....
that helping mankind is the work of evangelists and cranks, I 
suggest tie catharsis of a visit to Colombia.24 These rerortsj 
were a signal for the Pence Corps - based upon the 3,A. 
generalist - to expand. In a document entitled "Programming 
Guidelines for Second and Third Years", Riggins directed the 
Peace Corps ' em p h - : is to wa rds p r o g r a m m e s vhi c h i n v o 1 v e c both
bviiced mannower and a a
"Many programs eveloped so far tend to place too 
is on the specific job to be donx, whic 
a aultipiicity cf Volunte arc r ores^nt 
n-rticul^r skills, jaoh ieeot/; : to a p , rtici:! ; v , :n 1
i ' :  ..-k S '  . V'J -a . -  ' •  _-4 - -> T5 -f- - '1. -  V> “ ) / ' v  ' n  '  ' S '  ,4 ^  r ' ’
complicated the work of the ^eace Corps, both in 
’'Washington and overseas,, and it has led to undue 
concentration on only one of the three purcoaes of the
Peace Corps A ct Rhile the provision of neaeeiman-
po'.ver is of central importance to the fence Corns and 
must always be recognised in ti':e course of project 
development, it should never be so strongly emphasisec 
tl'iat it jeopardises our success in meeting the second 
and third purposes of the Act, dealing with the arc:' 
of int ernational understaO'ding^.'25 "
in
Given these guidelines, school-teaching 'iras a "naturel"
Pe.GS Corps pro gramme. It could be established -uickly, 
liberal apts cegree-hcldsrs could Co it, it had 3 definite 
structure and it had a. direct people-to-psonle impact. 
'Worsovsr, the newly-indeuendent nations of Ardrica and the 
Far East Cesseratsly sought the intellecbual stimulus so 
necessary for the responsibilities of self-government. 
Teachers - of Cnglisli and general subjects - ;ere in great 
demand in the Third V/orld. In 1962, the overage illiteracy 
rate in Sub-Saharan Africa w a  g between 80 and 85 per cent, 
with only 3 per cent of all children receiving a secondary 
school education?^ Thus, in the first year, 65 per cent of 
all Volunteers were sent overseas as teachers. Throughout 
the Kennedy era, they always represented more than half of 
the Peace Corps' total work force. The majority of these 
teachers were in secondary schools in Africa, although there 
were large numbers diao in Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines, Most taught English, but 'there wa s substantial 
concentration on physics, maths, biology, chemistry and ,-.ensr 
science. Besides, Shriver stressed that the teacher's role 
in the Peace Corps went beyond the narrow confines of 
academic subjects and classroom timetables.
Pe 'lis_ng th" t te- chi eg ouli i.ifluencc studeo '.s, 0 ta f i 
members -nd the local society in general, Shriver put a 
broad : • u’-reta t iren on t. '1 e ce Coros tea her's ro 1 ? : he 
“a s to be an "agent cf change" in hir aest community. Pea Ct 
Corps teachers were encouraged t.; ■c beyond tneir prof es si or 
duties, to lead, and t-ake part in extra-curricul-r activitlet; 
from organising summer camps and taking adult literacy classe 
to constructing new classrooms and building latrines a no . 
bridges. In April, 1962, Shriver expounded his catholic
V13W Ox teaching in the Pence ^orns;
Ii-^ vs cent five liunared ' tea chers overseas.,/Ve 
brought one of them back because he refused to 
participate in the social ^nd recreational life of 
Nigeria, he wanted only to be a teacher. But we're 
not sending neonls overseas -vho want to be onl.y 
t e a c h e r s A  teacher whose role is restricted to 
the classroom is like a fighter with one hand tied 
behind ;iis back. Gur Peace Corps teachers must be 
human beings who participate in tae full life of a 
foreign country^7!'
ohriver’3 philosophy of "participation" found its 
fullest expression in the other major activity of Pe^ce Corps 
Volunteers: community development. By 1963? over 30 per cent 
of all Volunteers were involved in community development in 
nineteen countries. Again, these projects could be set up 
almost immediately, were ideally suited to generalists, and 
made an immediate grassroots impression. In terms of 
specific work, community development was almost impossible to 
define; literally, it could be applied to any action - even 
the most elementary - which led to the "betterment" of the 
local community. For instance;* children i n . underdeveloped , 
countries often had distended stomachs caused by a parasitic 
germ in their drinking water* Their parents regaréad this aé 
quite "normal" and nctid little attention to it. Volunteers 
could help simply by giving the example of sanitising water
1nd friendliness. Indeed, the community development concept 
sarung from Shriver's belief th^t ^ny intelli -ent, cccpips- 
pionate, young ïme^dcan, :giv-~ 1 brief training in a basic 
skill, could make a positive contribution to developing 
societies,
Shriver's staunchest ally in the espousal of community 
development was Frank Mankiswicz, first Peace Corps Sep in 
Peru and later Regional Chief of all Latin American program:
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Mankiewicz described community development as, "essentially 
revolutionary: the ultimate aim of community development is 
nothing less than complete change, reversal - or a revolution 
if you wish - in the social and economic patterns of the 
countries to which we are accredited." In Latin America, 
where Mankiewicz estimated 97 per cent of the population 
had no say in the political, social, and economic decisions 
which affected their lives, he deemed it the Volunteers' 
duty to "call attention to his fragmental community, to ease 
the sense of alienation, to function, in short, in the best
Christian sense of the word, as a 'witness’ to the existence
28of the majority of the nation’s citizens.’ " Thus, the 
central purpose of the Volunteer working in community develop 
ment was to encourage and inspire - by his example - apathet:. 
villagers and dispirited slum-dwellers to participate in 
the development of their o m  community. Although in manyoa^'g 
native peoples worked with the Volunteers to alleviate 
physical poverty - by improving agricultural methods or 
initiating a local industry or by building homes, schools anjd,
sanitary sewers - community development was aimed more at th 
poverty in m e n ’s minds. Mankiewicz recalled xne poor people 
of the barrios (local communities) in Latin America drawing 
pictures of themselves without hands or feet - an indicatio 
of how they saw themselves as powerless with absolutely no 
control over their own destiny. "People talk about them­
selves as abandoned or forgotten," wrote Mankiewicz?^
"Accion communal" aimed to show the lower classes they would 
not be"forgotten" if they made the best of their local 
resources - labour, material and money - and tried to help 
themselves rather than wait for aid from the alcalde, the 
Church or the entrenched aristocracy. Therefore, although
community development was often the source of greater food 
production, purer water and cleaner streets, its effects 
were not measurable solely in those terms. For it also 
sought to change attitudes in such a way that the poor would 
grasp an understanding of collective action and its power 
to solve their problems. Ultimately, it was an attempt to 
convince people of the value of the democratic process, A 
successful community development was one that left a self- 
reliant local movement or community organisation which would 
continue to function long after the Volunteer's departure.
As Mankiewicz put it: "If the aims of community development,
as the Peace Corps sees it in Latin America, can be summed 
up in one sentence, it is that success is in sight, not when 
the economic statistics have reached a certain level, not 
when a certain number of miles of roads or cinderblock house 
have been built, but when the forgotten and ignored have 
been invited to join in society?^"
Between them, teaching and community development projec 
accounted for the activities of approximately 80 per cent of 
all Volunteers. The-other major types of Peace Corps 
programmes were agricultural extension , health care, physida 
education, university education, public works and public 
administration. (APPENDIX XII) Different groups of Volunteer 
were sent to individual countries, each group concentrating 
on a different type of project. However, Peace Corps assign­
ments, especially in communit.y' development, were never ■ 
narrowly defined; there was a great deal of overlap between 
jobs. Indeed, Peace Corps programmers incessantly exhorted, 
all Volunteers to "participate" overseas in as many ways as 
possible.
The quality of the programming which shaped that 
"participation" was the subject of the most serious ongoing 
debate within the Peace Corps. The biggest criticism of 
P.D.O. in the Kennedy era was that it played what evaluators 
called the "Numbers Game". That is, in order to make an 
immediate impact on the Congress at home and on foreign 
governments abroad, the Peace Corps pushed too many unskilled 
Volunteers into too many countries - to the detriment of 
both. lowther and Lucas wrote that "In its quest to become 
a credible force for international amity and development..... 
the Peace Corps sought to overwhelm human problems with 
massive numbers of Volunteers. Quality was sacrificed to 
quantity." Brent K. Ashabranner, noting that Volunteer 
numbers rose from none in 1961 to fifteen thousand in 1966, 
also claimed, "commitment to growth dominated all other 
thinking." Evaluator David @Slman was only one of many who
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described "rapid growth" as the "religion" of the Peace Corps.
The philosophy of"bigness" had originated with The Towering
Task. .However, Wiggins' aim of.having thousands of Volunteers
first in one country and then in a few others, was never
realised. Rather, relatively small groups - ranging from
twenty to six hundred - were assigned to very many countries.
Still, the concept of "bigness' was there, even if not in the
sense that Wiggins had originally intended. In a memorandum
of September 1961, Shriver told his senior staff that "The
world will not wait while we attempt to fill an ocean with an
eye-dropper." Taking a firm stand against small programmes
and a cautious approach, he warned,"We must achieve optimum
utilisation of our administrative capacities. To anticipate
our limits before we must would be a disastrous e r r o r ) 2 "  
Accordingly, the Peace Corps began with a quantum jump.
Between July 1961 and June 1963, it placed nearly six 
thousand Volunteers in forty-four countries. (APPENDIX XIII 
However, as early as January 1962, Annie Gutierrez of the 
Latin American Division warned her boss, Jack Vaughn, that 
it would be dangerous to produce too many programmes too 
quickly and thus "sacrifice quality for quantity?^"
There was no doubt Sargent Shriver preferred large 
programmes to modest ones. This was only practical. In 
terms of expenditure on selection and training, programming 
and administration, it often cost as much to set up a small 
programme as a big one. Also, in the early days, the Peace 
Corps had to make a godd impression on Capitol 'Hill.. Placing 
significant numbers of Volunteers overseas was the beat and 
most obvious way to do this. However, these considerations 
sometimes led Shriver to make over-optimistic projections 
He favoured country Heps who were bold, who spoke of 
"expanding" programmes and "significant" numbers. During hdjs 
visit to the programme in Thailand in 1962, Volunteers 
noticed that Shriver "seemed to have taken special pride in 
talking big numberê'f" Tom Quimby recalled that Warren Wiggj.r 
could also be "bullish" over numbers?^ In 1963, Bob Hellawell 
Peace Corps Rep in Tanganyika, proposed a small programme I 
which called for twelve surveyors to work in teams under two 
experienced civil engineers, Wiggins rejected this as too 
expensive and complex a training programme to mount. Howeye 
evaluator Richard -Richter argued the real reason was, "the 
number did not satisfy Washington which finally came throu 
with a nice round proposal for two hundred teachers?^"
The very first "numbers game" was played in the 
Philippines - the country which Wiggins had used for his 
example in !fhe Towering Task. The historic relationship
between America and the Philippines suggested the likelihood 
of a conducive atmosphere for a spectacular programme. Thus 
hundreds of generalist Volunteers were quickly channelled 
into ill”“ConCeived job# as"teacher's aides". Rep Larry Puch 
recalled :
"The Philippines was the place where you could get 
the largest number of bodies most quickly, because 
you had the fewest intergovernmental problems. And 
what problems would emerge could be dealt with inter- ■ 
governmentally and hidden from the public and so on.
So we planned 600 people over there and we got them 
over within one and a half years - three hundred in 
the first year. The first year we had one third of 
all the Volunteers in the world in the Philippines.
But people didn't knowthis g e n e r a l l y w e  talked about 
being in fifteen different countries?f"
Evaluators consistently uncovered other examples of the 
'înumbers game". In 1963, David G.elman and Kevin Delany hit 
out at P.D.O.'s proposal to assign 150 additional Volunteers 
to Liberia - where there already were 300* With the native 
population well under a million, they reckoned that any 
enlargement of the programme would make the country top-heavj'y 
with Volunteers. The 104 had jp'stifled expansion in terms oi 
the United States' "historic commitment to Liberia." Gelmar. 
suggested that it more probably reflected the Peace Corps' 
"present commitment to wedge a thousand more Volunteers int 
Africa by hook or by crook?^
P.DoOo's plan to push more Volunteers into Morocco in 
1963 evinced - in the words of evaluator Kenneth Love - "a 
Ibiat for growth that would put a cancer cell to shame « " A 
it was, many Volunteers were already struggling in ill-defi 
jobs. The pressure to meet the growth targets set by Peacp 
Corps/Washington deterred project officers in the field fr 
admitting that suitable work .simply did not exist for hundr
of young American generalists. In West Pakistan, the 104
for a salinity project called for 240 Volunteers in one fell
swoop, while a technical school project wished to assign 150
Volunteers to one place. Evaluator Tim Adams described these
plans as at best, "hyperbolic examples of the numbers game"
and at worst, "grandiose and dangerous." Likewise, in
Turkey, evaluator Thomas Dugan felt the voracious desire for
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increased numbers of Volunteers "overshadows'sound reasoning" 
The evaluation report on Ecuador in 1963 was concerned 
that there were far too many underemployed Volunteers visibly 
congregating in the streets - a sure sign that the numbersgac 
was being played» The report warned that while big numbers of 
Volunteers might please the Ecuadorian government and make a 
"good reading in the U.S." it was nonetheless "a sham and a 
delusion to 'sell' it as either necessary or desirablef^"
For a project in cooperation with the 4-*H foundation in 
Venezuela, P.D.O. was faced with the choice of either cancel 
ling or using "bottom of the barrel" Volunteers (many were3' 
It went ahead with the project!^ In 1963, 210 Volunteers werje 
already working in an undistinguished programme in Brazil. 
Yet, despite its inherent weakness, P.D.O. ordered the Peac 
Corps staff in Rio to prepare for 300 more Volunteers, In 
an angry memorandum to Sargent Shriver, Charles Peters gave 
vent to his feelings on this matter:
"When one sees the Peace Corps idea being prostitute! 
by an attempt to play the numbers game with a sick 
project, one's blood pressure tends to rise an- a dispa 
sionate tone is hard to come by. As an evaluator, you 
feel you have a duty to ,raise hell - that, regardless 
of the consequences to you, you've got to make clear l[o 
the people in Washington how demoralising the number; 
game can be when witnessed by unemployed Volunteers;'
It was not the numbers per ae that infuriated Peters, 
but rather that they too often consisted of unskilled
generalists for whom P.D.O. could not provide definite jobs. 
The 104 for an agricultural extension project in Panama had 
called for a dozen agriculturists; . but only three Volunteers 
turned up with the required skills. Perfirio Gomez, the 
Panamanian Director of Agrarian Reform, implied that he had 
been a victim of the Peace Corps’ numbers game; "Next time 
if I ask for thirty who know agriculture and you have only 
ten, please send only the ten." The omlyrqua11fifoation 
of the Volunteers assigned to a fishing project in the 
Dominican Republic was that they "liked the outdoors". None 
had any experience Of 'commercial fishing; the natives they 
were going to "help" had been fishing all their lives. "It's 
a great experience for the Volunteers," noted Dee Jacobs and 
Philip Hardberger, "When they get home they’ll knov/ something 
about fishing. But how much the old weather-beaten Dominican 
fishermen will be edified in the process remains to be seen»" 
In Pakistan, there were only two hundred Volunteers. Even 
so, local Pakistanis appeared indifferent at the prospect of 
further expansion. Indeed, they were already disappointed 
that so many of the current Volunteers lacked the necessary 
skills for their jobs. "Our current task," wrote Tim Adams, 
"is to expand at their speed, father than at ours. Selection 
for Pakistan must cease to be careless; v;e must s-nd only 
those Volunteers who have both the skills and the sensitivity 
to function in this most trying Peace Corps country. "
The great programming problem was how to match the 
applicants in the Peace Corps pool - mostly generalists - 
with the needs of the host country. Charles Peters felt, 
"too often this problem has been met, not by giving the host 
government what it needs, but by talking it into taking what 
we have. The country says 'We want 16 agricultural : '
specialists*,' We say 'We're fresh out of those, hut we 
have some lovely English teachers^^" In a memorandum of 
August 22, 1963, Peters warned Shriver of the great risks 
the Peace Corps was running in "dumping" more groups of 
unskilled Volunteers on the Third World. "V/e played that 
game in the Philippines," said Peters, "and it brought us one 
hell of a lot of trouble^^" The Volunteers realised that 
their presence alone did not constitute an effective 
programme. As a Volunteer in West Pakistan told Tim Adams;
"One of the major probt“>e,ms plaguing the effectiveness 
of the Peace Corps is that it is expanding too fast.
It is compounding failure and problems by g r o m n g  
in response to government requests (mainly forwarded 
to be polite to the S. government or because it is 
. . free ), on the premise that this indicates success. I'r 
not contending that numerically we have too many peop 
but for. Petals sake get jobs that exist and are neede 
Then get people that have needed skills and have the 
character to take them into their positions. The ma 
things missing are skills, skills, skills^-®"
As early as December 18, 1961, Bill Moyers argued that
the Peace Corps should be recruitment-oriented rather thar.
»
programme-oriented; , "Rather than going out to take orders,
I.
I strongly recommend that we begin to pick good Volunteers 
from the pool,train them, and ship them where they are 
wanted^?" It was understandable that, 'in 1961, when the Peace 
Corps had neither Volunteers nor programme requests, Bergen 
Shriver should go to the Third World to find out the demand 
and then try to satisfy it. It had been a critical siruatjfo; 
and Shriver's reaction had been fitting. However, by 1^62 
there were enough Volunteers in the pool to begin matching 
supply with demand, rather than vice-versa. "I'm simply 
asking for a shift in emphasis," Moyers wrote to Shriver, 
"from saying 'What can we do for you?' to^  'These people aije 
available and qualified. Can you use them?' This change p:
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direction would have guaranteed that a project would never 
have to he cancelled for the lack of qualified Volunteers - 
because it would never be accepted in the first place.. It 
would also have freed the Peace Corps from playing the 
numbers game and allowed it to concentrate on excellence in 
the field. Moyers concluded;
"The Peace Corps came into being, Barge, not primarily 
because foreign governments were beating us over the 
head asking us for Volunteers but because of the desire 
of thousands of Americans to serve their country. Our 
first priority now should be to match the desire and * 
qualifications of those people who do volunteer with 
the needs that exist abroad, rather than to go out and 
try to turn up people with desire glus qualifications 
for requests that originate ab r o a d ? "
The direction of the Peace Corps, though modified, 
never changed as much as Moyers, Peters, and the evaluators 
would have liked. Shriver and Wiggins continued to sign the 
programme contracts first and worry about finding the 
required Volunteers later. Often the qualified Volunteers 
could not be found and programmes had to be either cancellei 
or diluted. Dilution - filling programmes with unqualified 
people - sometimes led to anguish for the Volunteers and 
the host country. As evaluator Kenneth Love put it;
"In the beginning we needed above all else to establlii 
programs. V/e went out and sold our ideas to governmen* 
that had their own preoccupations and were too busy tjo 
have noticed this new thing, the Peace Corps., Vve 
accepted soft programs and hard programs alike because 
we wanted to show Congress and the world that we wer^ 
established in many different countries. The soft 
programs, the ones where the jobs for the Volunteers 
were illusory or where the hosts only accepted the - 
Peace Corns reluctantly, were the ones where we ran 
problems49"
The numbers game stemmed partly from the so-called 
"empire-building" tendencies within the Peace Corps hieraijcl
In an uncompromising evaluation report, David Gelman 
questioned the motivations of the Peace Corps leadership's 
drive for expansion:
"It's been said that in every revolutionary movement, 
the rank and file remain fervently devoted to the 
bread-and-butter goals of the revolution, while the 
leadership develops a growing investment in the movemer 
itself. At the Peace Corps, the majority views with 
alarm what it regards as a precipitous and dangerous 
growth, while the leadership seeks, endorses and', 
encourages this growth..... the leadership must make 
plain the reasoning that supports an expensive, exhausi 
ing, deleterious effort to double the size of the Peace 
Corps within a given time.....The danger lies in sub­
stituting the goals of the organisation for the goals 
of the movement. Twenty thousand Volunteers? Pine,
But why 20,000 by August of nineteen sixty-blank?
That is _the kind of goal that baffles many staff 
members^O"
Notwithstanding the extraordinary honesty and.openness of 
leaders who could allow such an evaluation to be published, 
they were also extremely a m b i t i o u s f o r  themselves as 
well as the organisation. Most had reputations still to win 
They wanted the Peace Corps to make an immediately favourahl 
impression on the world. And in the America of the early 
i960’a, bigger was always better.
Prom Shriver's point of. view, there were political 
considerations to be taken into account. A small, slow, 
expansive Peace Corps - even if it had been of absolutely 
unquestionable quality - would not have won favour and 
appropriations on Capitol Hill, Congressmen reading a quidk 
resume of Peace Corps achievements before a vote did not 
normally take the time to analyse the sophisticated socio 
cultural implications of every programme. They looked at h^i 
many Volunteers were in how many countries. Quite simply, 
they correlated success with numbers. Evaluators tended t 
ignore this fact. "Our basic strategy for Congress," advijs 
David Gelman, "needs to be nothing more complex than excn
and service* Numbers have little to do with either?^" 
Unfortunately, things were not quite that straightforward.
As Peace Corps Director, Sargent, Shriver had always to be 
conscious of his domestic political constituency. Evaluators 
did not. They could afford to analyse the Peace Corps in 
"pure"terms. To his credit, Shriver realised this; after all. 
it was he who employed the evaluators.
A miniscule, cautious Peace Corps would not have been 
in harmony with the order which President Kennedy had given
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Shriver to "create a New Frontier image abroad; " Kennedy
wanted to give aid of a personal kind to the developing world,
but equally, he wanted as many young Americans as possible to
have the experience of living and working with Third World
peoples. One of his major reasons for proposing the Peace
Corps in I960 had been to break down the prevalent American
ignorance of foreign cultures. Shriver strove to comply
with the President’s wishes. Even so, he consistently denied
that the Peace Corps was committed to numbers for numbers'
sake. "We have no such expansionist policy", he told 
53evaluators.^ His response to the "numbers game" charge was thà 
a Peace Corps of twenty or fifty or even a hundred thousand 
Volunteers would do no more than scratch the surface of the 
gargantuan development problems confronting the Third World.
He argued that if he had heedad"numbers game" critics in 
February 1961, then the Peace Corps would never have got off 
the ground :
"There were also arguments in tnose early days about 
"saturation" of the foreign country, either in terms, of 
jobs or the psychological impact of the American 
presence. I have since noticed that the same arguments 
made about a 500-1,000 man program in 1961 were also 
made about our plans to expand to 5,000 Volunteers 
(March 1963), to 10,000 Volunteers (March 1964) and to 
13,000 (September 1964). I am not suggesting that
the Peace Corps should continue to grov indefinitely. But I am 
proposing that much time and energy are wasted in theoretical 
musings, introspections and worries about the future. Peace Corps 
Volunteers are a new type of overseas American. Who is to say how many 
of them will be welcome abroad next year, or in the next decade? Our 
country and our times have had ple.ntj of experience with programs 
that were too little, too late.*’^ ^
Shriver did not agree that the mere twelve thousand used by the Peace 
Corps in the Kennedy years constituted an "excessive" number. In fact, 
the Peace Corps only managed to respond to a tiny minority of both 
those at home who applied for service and those abroad who requested 
that service. As Harris Wofford noted, "the pressure for increased 
numbers is real, but it comes mainly from the field in response to the 
demands and needs of expanding programs in 46 host countries and 
requests-from countries where the Peace Corps has not yet gone,"
The Peace Corps was born into an immediate crisis. With little 
experience and no help from history, Sargent Shriver was asked to take 
unskilled American college graduates and make a favourable impression 
on the world., Shriver - a business man to trade ™ solicited programmes 
and matched them with substantial numbers of Volunteers. It was an 
experiment. He could not be sure of success. Nevertheless, he was 
nothing but optimistic. Given these circumstances surrounding the 
launching of the Peace Corps in I96I, he had no choice but to operate 
by crisis and - to an extent— the Peace Corps always functioned in that 
manner. Indeed, it was a major cause of the "numbers game” problem. 
"Reckless expansion and frantic scrambling - initially necessary to get 
the agency on its feet - seems to have taken on the qualities of 
absolute virtue," complained evaluator Thorburn Reid in IQop. "The 
Peace Corps has aoruired a certain momentum. This is desirable, but 
only so long as we control it. Presently it seems to be controlling-
us."56
This strong element of uncontrolled momentum was inevitable if the 
Peace Corps was to begin on the speedy and significant scale demanded 
by President Kennedy, However, the pressure for speed and numbers 
locked the Peace Corps into a mode of operation by crisis and led to
problems overseas - nebulous prograraming and sometimes, inferior
Volunteers, In August, 19&3, Bill Moyers sought a remedy. He
proposed the Peace Corps should move into a "second stage" of
development whereby the quantity of programmes would be commensurate
with the quality;
"And programming is the key. Having proved that we can recruit, 
select, train, and send abroad large numbers of committed Americans, 
we cannot stop there. Neither can we safely assume that the 
excitement and creative tensions of the Peace Corps will continue 
to be supplied by constantly expanding numerical goals; it is 
important to grow, and I am personally committed to a Peace Corps 
that gets larger in size from one year to the next. But as a tree 
grows up the roots must find rich sources of life to sustain it* 
Programming is to the Peace Corps what those 40-foot roots are to 
the 20-foot willow tree in ray back yard,"57
In a -d-amnittg- indictment of Kennedy's Peace Corps, Kevin Lowther and 
C, Payne Lucas blamed most of its weaknesses on inept programming. As 
they saw it (both were part of the Peace Corps at this time), "Thousands 
of Volunteers arrived overseas to discover that their jobs did not 
exist, did not need doing, were beyond their ability and training, or 
were better left to local nationals," In complete contradiction to the 
"suces8 stories" printed in the American press, Lowther and Lucas 
claimed that "the great majority of Volunteers were sent abroad,...withoujt 
a clear or critical job assignment." They described Shriver as an 
"incorrigible optimist" who, in settling for less than perfect 
programming, compromised the potential of the-Peace Corps and made a 
virtue of "amateurism," Certainly, Lowther and Lucas's conclusions 
were extreme; however, there were, undoubtedly, many errors of judgement 
surrounding Peace Corps programmes.
Some of these were directly attributable to Shriver. His uninhibite 
enthusiasm sometimes led him to over-obligate the Peace Corps' limited 
resources. During his trips abroad in 1961 to "invite invitations", he 
promised more than the Peace Corps could deliver. For instance, he lef'f 
Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana with the impression that the 
Peace Corps would provide him with qualified plumbers and maths teacher 
In fact, the Peace Corps sent few tradesmen and of the first fifty-one
2c:u
teachers, only thirteen had a background in maths. Indeed, a minor , 
row ensued when Nkrumah discovered some Volunteers teaching history 
in Ghanaian secondary schools - something which he had specifically 
prohibited*^ 9 Gerald Maryanov, Peace Corps Rep in Malaya, also found 
that Shriver had*'oversold" the qualifications of Volunteers, Instead 
of the qualified teachers promised, the Malayan Ministry of Education 
actually received recent college graduates without any previous teaching 
experience,Prom time to time Shriver's unrestrained gusto led 
Volunteers into irrelevant projects. The plan for a street-sign 
project in the slums of Addis Ababa was only one of many Shriver- 
inspired ideas which Volunteers considered "silly,"
In his zeal to avoid the expense, delay and over-bureaucratisation 
which had plagued American foreign assistance programmes In the past, 
Shriver took a "laissez-faire" approach to programming. Thus in I96I 
and 1962 especially, officials from Peace Corps/Washington rushed in 
and out of Third World countries, setting up programmes which sometimes 
proved unrealistic. With a view to establishing 8, community development 
project in Panama, a P.D.O. officer visited some forty villages, spending 
no more than an hour in each one, "In all fairness," commented evaluatoi 
Dee Jacobs, "the most experienced, professional community developer 
would have difficulty coming to valid conclusions on the basis of such 
short visits," Andres Hernandez, Rep in the Dominican Republic, noted 
that the IO4 for the community development project xhere had been wri tt 
after a two-day flying visit by the Washington programmers. 62
Programmers tended to establish projects at "policy" levels in 
foreign countries- a shake of hands with state leaders or ministers - 
without finding out whether there was any enthusiasm for the Peace Corp^ 
at the working level. It was not uncommon for Volunteers to find great 
resentment in the localities. While the host country's Minister of 
Education may have appeared delighted at the prospect of a few 
inexperienced young Americans teaching in his schools, local headmaster 
might not be quite so enamoured. On occasion the local peoples were 
not even informed - either by their own government or Peace Corps/
Washington ~ that Volunteers were on their way. In southern Brazil, 
evaluator Leveo Sanchez described the local reaction to Volunteers as 
"hostile and indifferent.Most people knew nothing of the Peace Corps
and some wondered why it was in Brazil," In Panama, Bee Jacobs reported
on the unenticing prospect which had greeted the Volunteers upon arrival;
"Like so many other projects programmed as quickie visits from 
Washington, it had been achieved by an agreement at high levels 
with inadequate follow-through at medium and lower echelons of 
the cooperating agency»,,.few people knew who the Volunteers 
were, what they were to do, or even that they were coming," 63
Given Shriver and V/iggin^s reliance upon daring, imagination and
flexibility, such misunderstandings were inevitable. Moreover, 
"imagination" and "flexibility" sometimes o&fuscated feasibility and 
reality, "Bo we really think that Americans are so superior that they 
can do anything?" asked one sceptical Volunteer in Pakistan, "Do we 
really think that an economics major with no construction experience
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can build a bridge or a road?" Time and again evaluators asked the 
same type of questions about Peace Corps projects. Their answers were 
often negative: not enough Volunteers had sufficient skills, not enough 
programming had addressed itself to skills that were absolutely essentia 
for the success of a specific programme. In an evaluation report on 
Pakistan in I964, Tim Adams emphasised that if the Peace Corps persisted 
in sending Volunteers overseas without a basic skill then the 
consequences would be disastrous for them and for the host country;,
"Of the six 'mechanics' in the vhanewal Cooperative Project in 
West Pakistan, I was told only three are qualified, And of the 
seven in agricultural extension in the Rural ïfiblic Works urogram 
in East Pakistan, only tliree meet what ace called the 'misimum 
requirements' in the I04. Their performance in the fie^u a
strong correlation: the ones with the skills are out-performing the 
others by a great margin. And this pattern is repeated in every 
project in both East and West Pakistan. Aside frr>m the idleness, 
and even failure, that can result, the ones without skills often 
become hangdog Volunteers whose self-confidence has been jostled, 
if not shattered, by misassignment65
Indeed, such was the poor quality of some of the early programme 
descriptions, Lowther and Lucas called them "literary documents 
bordering on fiction,"
One of the major difficulties was that Peace Corps programmers - 
along with everyone else - did not have an exact idea of what Volunteers 
could or could p;ot do. overseas. Their confusion was reflected in the -early 
"shopping list" programmes which assigned Volunteers to do everything, 
from teaching to public health care, agricultural extension and physical 
education, in a single country. Programmers were often forced to rely 
on little more thæi personal instinct. While this left scope for 
individual creativity, it also guaranteed that there would be an 
unevenness in quality. Different officials in P.D.O, had different 
ideas about what a Peace Corps programme should be. Bill Josephson |
complained to Warren Wiggins about this "lack of uniformity" in the 
way project descriptions were written and circulated,
Since most of WigginëSi' staff had come from some of that
organisation’s bad habits re-emerged from time to time. For example, 
a project description for Nigeria was copied verbatim from a 104 on 
Sierra Leone On another occasion. General Counsel Bill Delano 
discovered a Peace Corps programmer in the Latin American Division 
about to transfer a project from one country to another without any 
change in the original description, Delano prevented this particular 
scandal, but the incident reminded him of I , C h A . ’s tendency to lump 
the "underdeveloped world" into a single, bland category without 
sufficient reference to the unique locale of each area. In a memorandum 
to John Alexander, Delano criticised P.D.O,'s blatant neglect of the 
local political, socio-economic and religious ramifications of any giver 
project and he condemned the "cursory attitude which P.D.O, appears more 
and mote to be taking towards 104's when actually they should be becoming
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more and more comprehensive." Peace Corps Rep, Gerald Maryanov, also 
noted how "insensitive" Washington programmers could be to a particular
country’s customs and mores while their project descriptions often
revealed, "unrealistic, overenthusiastic notions as to how fast
70economic and social change could occur."
A hurriedly produced or badly written 104 took its toll on every 
other component of the Peace Corps operation. Possibly the worst 
affected were selection and training. Their functions were to choose 
and prepare Volunteers for a specific job overseas. If the 104 was 
vague or mistaken about the work, then selection and training could be 
rendered virtually irrelevant. In September, 1962, Chief of training, 
Joseph Kauffman, made a scathing attack upon P.D.O.: "For most programmes, 
the project and job definitions are too vague and cause undue anxiety.
It is our feeling that a principal cause of Volunteers’ unhappiness
overseas is a feeling of nothing worthwhile to do or a feeling of
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inadequacy about what needs to be done," This was the Training Division’s 
common cry. Too often the 104 did not contain precise information. For 
example, the description of a teaching project in Senegal in 196$, 
maintained that only "some few" of the natives did not speak French. 
Naturally then. Peace Corps instructors concentrated their efforts 
on French language. However, after a few hours in Senegal the 
Volunteers came to realise that the vast majority of people spoke 
Wolof - only the educated classes spoke French. Similarly, the 
instructors at Syracuse University, training Volunteers bound for 
Tanganyika, complained of the "slap-dash prograrnning ^ which required, 
them to contend with eighty-eight trainees in fifteen different job 
categories, A 104 for Sierra Leone in 1963? had described preventive 
medicine and public health projects as "felt needs." However? on 
arriving in the country. Volunteers discovered that the local Ministry 
of Health was interested in neither of these occupations. Thus, the 
Volunteers had been trained for jobs which were not wanted or deemed 
important by the host country. The effect on the Volunteers was 
shattering, "It has taken them one and a Half years to reorient 
themselves psychologically," reported evaluator Robert Me Guire.
Ultimatelyj, it was the Volunteers and the host coiuntry nationals who 
suffered most from what Peace Corps evaluators referred to as "spilt-milk 
projects,"
"Only innocents continue to rely on the 104 as some reflection of 
reality," wrote Bee Jacobs in a highly critical evaluation report on 
the Dominican Republic.,The IO4 had stated that, along with host country 
counterparts, the Volunteers would be helping to construct low-cost, 
"self-help" school houses. However, when the Volunteers arrived,they 
found that they were actually expected to build the schools, on their 
own, not just assist. In addition, several key host goverriment officials 
were obviously hostile to the Volunteers. After a few months, the 
school construction project collapsed and the Volunteers moved into 
general community development work, Jacobs blamed P.B.O. for the 
superficial planning which had pushed Volunteers into ill-conceived ■ 
work situations; "The pressure to produce was on and it shows in the 
104'3 and in the field. Not enough time was spent to investigate 
carefully the need for, and feasibility of various projects. "
The Jamaican -programme was another which gave the impression of 
being a hasty improvisation. According to evaluator Richard Elwell, 
it was "as if the Rep had been given a planeload of randomly selected 
applicants and told to find an island. Indeed, he estimated that some 
of the Volunteers working in a library in Kingston would "make about 
the same impression if they were working in the back rooms of the 
historical society in Springfield, Illinois,.,.They get the same 
mysterious satisfaction out of working with cards and books that 
librarians get everywhere, but it is far from a Peace Corps as-ignment*" 
In Nigeria, Peace Corps Rep Sam Proctor, reported that the Peace Corps 
lawyers teaching in the universities of Ibadan and Ife were almost 
completely superflous to the nation’s basic needs. Even worse was an 
irrigation project for the Ganges-Kobadak valley in East Pakistan - 
ambitiously described in a IO4 outlining jobs in irrigation management, 
agriculture extension and irrigation extension. Unfortunately, the '
Volunteers discovered that they had been assigned to an irrigation 
project which lacked one essential ingredient - water. The IO4 had 
not reflected the grave doubts voiced by those familiar with the area 
as well as the gloomy forecast of a Ham/ard Study Group, Franklin 
Williams (Chief of the Division of International Organisations) had 
been desperate for a Peace .Corps link-up with the United Nations; 
collaboration with the Food and Agricultural Organisation on the Ganges- 
Kobadak project appeared to provide the opportunity. However, as evaluate 
Tim Adams pointed out, the result was" a pitiable operation, sloppily 
researched, unrealistically planned and, thus far at least, poorly 
executed." Furthermore, Chief of Evaluation, Charles Peters counselled 
Shriver that AdamsH description of the Ganges-Kobadak project should be 
read by all programming officers as a guide to "how we don’t want things 
done."
Derek Singer, author of the IO4 for Brazil in 1963» specifically 
advised the Peace Corps against undertaking an agricultural extension 
project in the Sao Francisco valley region. His warning was ignored. 
P.D.O. pushed ahead with a programme which became one of the least 
effective in Peace Corps annals, EVaiuators reckoned that, due to 
faulty planning, a mere 13 per cent of the Volunteers were working in 
their original job assignments. In Turkey, evaluator Thomas Dugan 
compared the effect of the Volunteers working in an agriculture and 
forestry programme to, "young,semi-skilled foreigners entering the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture in the dead of winter with little or
no advance warning and stating that they would like to assist in
' 75programs,"
Some of the errors perpetrated by P.D.C. were downright careless.
One Volunteer bee-keeper was sent to a part of India where bees were' 
almost totally unheard of, A Volunteer horticulturist was sent to 
work on date palms in Niger — only to find an absolute deficiency 
of date palms there, A Volunteer fluent in Spanish and with a Latin 
American background was sent to Sierra Leone - despite his request to
be assigned to Latin America; he could only conclude that someone in 
P.D.O, must have thought Sierra Leone was in Latin America, A married 
couple of Volunteers were first assigned to Burma, then Thailand, then 
Chile, then West Africa, then Malaya and then North Borneo; finally, 
they were told they were going to "perfect jobs" in East Pakistan - 
these turned out to be in the disastrous Canges-Kobadak project.
Another young Volunteer in the Ganges~Kobadak valley recalled: "When 
they told me I was going to Pakistan, I assumed it would be West 
Pakistan, because cotton is my speciality. But there's no cotton in 
East Pakistan - and here I am." On July 19, I963, Charles Peters 
emphasised to Shriver, "Good Volunteers join the Peace Corps to work 
overseas* When the Peace Corps indicates by weak or non-existent 
technical training and by sloppy programming that we really don’t
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take their work seriously, we're playing a dangerous game," Nowhere
was that game more dangerously played - or more vehemently criticised
- than in the sphere of community development. Since community
development sought to reorganise societies by encouraging positive
attitudes on behalf of the natives, it was exceedingly difficult to
plan in advance. Moreover, since local situations were changeable
from day to day, li. could not afford to be too rigidly programmed,
Frank Mankiewicz, the dynamic force behind the Peace Corps' community
development philosophy, admitted this made it, the "easiest thing in
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the TO rid to do badly*" The plight of the community development worker
was that he often had no specific skill and - what was worse - no
specific assignment. After a few months training, the Peace Corps
plunged him into a totally alien environment under the vagi.ie instruction 
to "participate."
Experience was to show that only the very best Volunteers could 
carry out community development entirely successfully, P.D.O.'3 
mistake was to make it the Peace Corps’ second largest programme. By 
19o3? nearly three thousand Volunteers were involved. Evaluators’ 
reports from Latin America reflected the discrepancy between numbers
and achievement. In criticising the Peace Corps* community 
development project in Panama, T h o r o u m  Reid reported;
"The project's aims were not clearly understood in either Panama  
or Washington because the Panamanian Health Service does not seem 
to have a clear conception of community development. To what 
degree the project was to emphasise community development as 
against public health and sanitation has never been resolved.
The selection and training of the Volunteers reflected- this 
confusion. Some Volunteers are generalists, while others have 
skills in health and sanitation. During training neither Berkeley 
n or the trainees ever quite knew what the jobs would be. There 
still is confusion in the Panamanian Health Service about the role 
of the Volunteers,"
In Venezuela, inadequate preparation led to disaster for the
community developers working with the 4-H Foundation» The project
had actually been programmed by a- Peace Corps official who never
strayed from his cosy office in Caracas* Not surprisingly then^
nobody knew the Volunteers were coming, they had no counterparts
and no jobs* Evaluators Delany and Jacobs ranked the programme with
’’any of A»I»D* smaller fiascos., » » everything that could possibly
go wrong has gone wrong»” hi Guatemala, evaluators found it
difficult to assess the ’’rationale” of the original community
development plan;, the actual work done by the Volunteers turned
out to be completely different from the jobs outlined in the 104*
likewise^ in El Salvador by September 1963 only ten Volunteers
(out of twenty-three) remained in the ’’swamp of Imprecision and
generalities”' which P»D*0* had prepared for them*"^ '^ '
Charles Peters claimed that ’’imprecision” chai^acterised the
programming for most community development projects in Latin
America* Indeed, in later years^even Frank Manlciewicz- admitted
community development major flaw was that it had been applied
too quickly in too many^countries* He also felt the Peace Corps 
had been slightly over-optimistic in its belief that nearly every 
young American generalist could make some sort of material
contribution without a basic sldJJl and a definite job*.'^  ^Other 
critics were even more severe, Brent K, Ashabramier put the
community development failure rate as high as 50 per cent* Lowther
and Lucas maintained most programming for community development
was "pure fantasy” and that only one Volunteer in every twenty was 
81truly effective*
Lowther and Lucas were also critical of the job to which most
Volunteers were assigned - teaching, "Peace Corps teaching programs
«never justified the allocation of large numbers of Volunteers
to the classroom^” they tarots* "Teaching programs have served the
Peace Corps by providing sa^ placement for thousands of generalist 
82:Volunteers," In Africa and the Far East^ more than SO per cent
of all Volunteers were teachers; in the Hear East, Latin America
S3and South East Asia the figure x^ras around 33 per cent. With such 
large numbers of inexperienced college graduates involved, mistakes 
were inevitable. Again, much of the blame lay with P,D,0«. For 
example, in 1962, English teachers could hardly be described as one 
of Ceylon®s most desperate "felt needs"/ Ceylon*s teacher-training 
colleges were already over^-staffed in this subject and besides, the 
Ceylonese were trying to repudiate their colonial past by 
de-emphasising English teaching» This made education in Ceylon a 
delicate and controversial issue. The situation was exacerbated by 
the Volunteers* low facility in Sinhalese and by their arrival in 
Ceylon in the middle of term. Hence, as far as their actual job 
was concerned, they were regarded by their hosts as irrelevant 
Incompetentsa "To send a group of Volunteers with sub-professional 
qualif ic at ions into such a situation was to invite trouble," 
commented evaluator Arthur Dudden»^^
The 104 for Senegal had justified a ToE,.F*L, project there by 
arguing that English xfas essential for "inter-African cooperation," 
Evaluator David Hapgood called this, "nonsense" and went on to 
describe the programme as "conceived in illusion and suckled on 
ignorance," The schools in Senegal did not need English teachers 
and most were unaware that Volunteers were coming in this capacity* 
Besides, the host officials in Dakar had asked for fifteen Volunteer
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teachers at the most - P.D.O*. assigned twenty-three* Their Jobs fell 
through irnmediately and ma%r were soured by months of unemployment*
In the Philippines in 19o2, Eugene Burdick and William Lederer noted 
that host nationals were not impressed by Volunteers teaching English:- 
"Since .English has been taught by Filipino teachers, this activity 
has no novelty, no fresh Impact on the community,.,*the teaching 
function is not only invisible - it is also unimportant,"^^ Likewise 
in Niger, in the Dominxcan Republic and a goodly number of other 
countries where it was of marginal significance, T*E*E»L» was a 
slot—filling programme.
Even more subject to abuse was the nebulous "teacher*a aide" 
assignment. This reached scandalous proportions in the Philippines 
x/here hundreds or Volunteers served as “aides" to native teachers.
The 104 said Volunteers should observe, participate and help, in- 
elementary and secondary schools* However, since no specific status 
or responsibility x/ent with the Job, they Xfere, In effect, required 
to define their own role, Larry Fuchs, Rep in the Piiilippinea> 
described the Volunteers * assignments as useless "non-Jobs"'*
Burdick and Lederer noticed that the teacher *s aide "usually <^ lmitted 
that ills sense of dissatisfaction grew from a basic sense of 
Inadequacy about his formal Job;.: the aide program Just does not allow 
sufficient outlets for the energy and talents of the average Volunteer*."' 
In 1963, they recommended that this disastrous programme should be 
phased out as quickly as possibleSo-called “conversation assistants" 
in other countries also found themselves in meaningless and., often 
demeaning. Jobs® One female Volunteer in Costa Rica summed up her 
six-hour contribution to classworkt "The teacher said to me *S^ horsel* 
I stood up and said ’horse * and sat down» That was it for the day*"^
Between 1961 and 1963 the Peace Corps landscape became littered 
with the ill-begotten refuse of P.D.O. Evaluator David Gelman 
attributed this to the arrogance of Washington officials who took the 
attitude that the Volunteers® Jobs were “not too important in the long 
run and somehow we succeed anyxray, no matter what the problems,"
Brent K* Ashabranner blamed the "fictional documentation" passed off as 
projecu descrxptxons which inevitably caused inadequate training and 
selection follox;ed by poor programme execution. He concluded the whole 
process was a 'Vici.oa^ circle" usually beguu by a badly-writteu 104.88
Yet, although multitudinous mistakes xfere made, these were only one side 
of the story. Peace Corps programming also had many outstanding 
successes». And, since on many occasions P.D.O® accepted its culpability,
so too — on many occasions — it deserved tremendous credit.
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"This is a country where the Peace Corps looks almost too good," 
wrobe evaluator John Griffin in Thailand, The Volunteers had been 
thoroughly prepared and most were well placed in structured teaching 
jobs in the secondary schools. The programme was tightly administered, 
there was close cooperation between Rep Glenn Ferguson and the Volunteers, 
and not one Volunteer resigned or was sent home. Indeed, such was its 
success, Griffin recommended that the Peace Corps s h m i d  eicpand into 
university teaching where an impact could be made on the future leaders 
of Thailand. "This program deserves its reputation as one of our best run 
and anyone looking for real trouble will be disappointed," he concluded.
In Gabon, the school construction project was "one of the most 
successful programs the Peace Corps has ever put into the field... 
meeting a direct and immediate need of the Gabonese government, " The 
Volunteers were enormously popular with their hosts, they had personal 
contact with at least thirty local Gabonese communities, and native 
counterparts were plentifulrand enthusiastic. Evaluator Philip Cook 
was ecstatic:
"The Gabon project, to date, proves that the Peace Corps can 
make effective use of young, low-octane Volunteers in structured 
assignments... one can certainly conclude that the Peace Corps 
can put nineteen and twenty-year olds together in groups of *-en 
or fifteen, show them h-’-; to do a relatively complex job, and 
then leave theg^to continue the performance with little direct 
supervision,"
Similarly, Volunteers working in f.E.^.It , nursing and mechanical 
engineering in Afghanistan were all busy performing needed tasks ann were 
described by T h o r b u m  Reid as, "excellent...not a word, not even a 
suggestion, oT criticism oo' the Peace Corps program did I hear In K a b u l . ’’ 
Despite the mysterious Afghan environment and a delicate political 
situation, their work presented a good example of a small, well-directed 
Peace Corps project with high standards of programming.
Dee Jacobs noted that the home economists and agriculturalists in
Uruguay had scored a "definite, if unspectacular, success in meeting
all three Peace Corps goals." An d  the physical education and sports
programme in British Honduras - as in almost every country - was an
outstanding success. Indeed, Richard Slwell saw it as a great force of
social education which gave the Peace Corps its "greatest exposure. " lor
were there any major problems for the solid agricultural extension
project in Costa Rica which in July, 1p63, was already "good. ..with
91prospects of becoming better, "
The more structured teaching programmes were consistently praised
by evaluators - despite lowther an d  lucas's contention that it was a job
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at w hich "surprisingly few Volunteers have excelled.""' ' If providing 
trained manpower in education can be equated w i t h  success, then Peace 
Corps teaching programmes were, by and large, eminently successful. Hot 
only did Volunteers provide knowledge and help break down the Third World 
students' traditional fear of attempting anything beyond his texr book's 
rigid instructions, but they also initiated school libraries, school 
newspapers, the adoption of audio-lingual methods, sports clubs and 
numerous other activities associated with the " m o d e m "  'festem school.
In the secondary education project in Hyasaland, evaluator Richard Rlwell 
reckoned that not a single V o l u n t e e r  was less then first-class. "lo-'here 
in the Peace Corps have I seen a mure foroun^to combination cf o 'emc, 
purposes and people," he 7^rote. "It proves that under the right 
conditions a few sincere, hard-working, young Americans can be as 
powerful an influence as the Peace Corps had p l a n n e d  they should be."''
Likewise, the groundwork done by P,It.(Xfor the 10L on the teaching 
programme in Ethiopia was detailed, accurate and - as Elwell put it - 
"heroid". Hardly any Volunteers were ill-assigned and there was little 
underemployment. Four hundred Volunteers taught approximately SO per cent 
of the twenty-five thousand secondary school students in Ethiopia, In 
1964, the Ministry of Education asked for an additional six hundred 
teachers. Elwell left Sthdqpda with the teaching programme "going 
beautifully". He was convinced of the "basic rightness of the project" 
and confident it would be of great and enduring consequence to Ethiopians. 
The teach]jcg project in Ghana was also deemed most satisfactory. The 
morale of the Volunteers was universally high and there was a sense that 
they were really making a positive contribution to Ghanaian society.
In 1964, Richard Richter described the Volunteer teachers in 
Tanganyika as "exceptionally able...exuding an aura of courage and devotion* 
Evaluators in Higerda, Liberia, Togo and many other African countries, came 
to similar conclusions. Indeed, even in non-African countries, teaching 
programmes were generally effective., For example, in Turkey, the
Volunteefs'overcame substantial provincial scepticism and conservatism
05
to make their teaching project a "res unding success,"'
Besides, even where teaching programmes o" themselves did not 
appec^ very s.ccessdul, Volunteors often made ' ^ rth.diile c:n :ributions 
outside the classroom. Teacher's aides in the Philippines, 
disillusioned with their ill-defined assignments, participated in every 
type O'f community project in the barrios. Thus, although evaluators
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Burdick and Lederer criticised the irague teaching jobs, thev
recognised that the reservoir of good will which Volunteers were
building was a "key achievement." There was a "genuine feeling of
warmth" for the Peace Corps and there was little doubt that it had taken
on a special meaning for most Filipinos:
"Perhaps most Filipinos are still convinced that all Americans 
8j.e rich and live in big houses but they are also convinced that 
these rich American youth are willing to live in barrios. The 
children, especially, will always carrv this memory with them: in
the long run, perhaps this alone makes the whole effort worthwhile 
even if it might be done better in some important w a y s . " 9o
In Ceylon, little more than half of the Volunteers' talents were 
p roperly utilised in a "spilt-milk" project. Yet, Arthur Dudden 
reported, "people-to-people successes between the Volunteers and 
Ceylonese are to be found everywhere... and in general it must be s^id that 
the Peace Corps is probably the most successful institution in Ceylon 
today." Likewise, although the conversation assistants in Costa Pica 
found their jobs superfluous, they threw themselves into nhysical 
education, library construction and the organisation of all sorts of 
community activities. Thus, while the evaluation report was critical 
o the teacning programme. Dee Jacobs was n o n e : e s s  imcressed at ho 
the Volunteers had "wholeheartedly and enthusiastically become a part of 
theis communities a n ’ in most oases have rade a : revendras in- s t uoon 
Costa Rica.
li teaching, projects were usually sound, the programming for 
community development was by no means al'.'sys disastrous. Cn the 
contrary. The 104's for community development projects i n  Peru oroved 
remaa. .vabiy accurate. Indeed, evaluator Kerb Vegner nicknamed Peru
The L a n d  Of The Happy Volunteer. "The Peace Corps program in Per u  
is healthy, " he reported, "There appear to be no big or dramatic 
problems. In general, the program exhibits vitality, maturity and 
stability. " S o o n  after arriving, the Volunteers found themselves in 
structured nutrition and medical projects.. '.Che local Peruvian agencies 
were eagarlv waiting to put them to '.'ort. By 1963, Volunteers -/ere 
helping to feed 4,000 children during the school year. ’T h e  question 
in P eru is not so m u c h  of going from bad to good - but from good to 
better, " concluded Vegner. "We are in Peru, './e are accepted and 
we are wanted. The Peace Corp idea is working. " The 104's for the 
Peace Corps' largest country programme - in Colombia - were also 
basically sound. By January, 1964, over six hundred Volunteers were 
w o r k i n g  in various community action projects and, despite the huge size 
of the programme, it was a significant success. Indeed, evaluator 
M e r i d a n  Bennet claimed, "the P eace Corps' ability to work in 
community development has been proven in Colombia. " Since much 0.'^ the 
work was undefined, the Volunteers were free to tackle everything. This 
they did w i t h  a vengeance as they took on literacy-teaching, arts and 
crafts classes, agricultur al extension and pre and post-natal care.
Female Volunteers w o r k i n g  in the machismo-dcninated camp a3inos p r o v e d  as 
effective as males and Bennett concluded the fear - held by some 
W ashington officials - that girls could not function as community 
developers, should be benished ^orever.
In 1962, fharles Peters describad the community development
programme in the Dominican Republic which consisted of chicken-
breeding, ■ ■ell-ligging, ani msrkot-garieniny, «.2 ’'a successful Pe^ce Oirps
project...making good use of the Volunooers' talents and m-eting rosl
needs of the Dominican R e p u b l i c . " Likewise, the rural action programme
in Chile was "faring well" and had established the Peace Corps' good 
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n a m e . ' Community development in Bolivia was another effective programme. 
Jack Vaughn, Chief the Latin American Division and later Peace Corps 
Director, recalled how Volunteers helped the hostile Indians of the high
plains nea r  Lake Titicaca build their first-ever school, their first 
clinic and their first sewage system : "They had made more physical
progress in a couple oC years than the/ had made in the previous 
thousand. But more important was the attitude, the openness, the 
willingness to look you in the eye and tell you about w ho they ware and 
what they had done, and the pride and self-respect o f  citizenship. This 
was done b y  the Peace Corps... in about three years.
Of course, not all Peace Corps programmes had such happy endings! 
Indeed, every project was an inextricable mixture o"^  success and failure 
w h i c h  defied simplistic "good" or "bad" value judgements. Conditions 
could be altered by the appointment of a new Rep, a change in the host 
government, an infusion of a new batch of Volunteers or - quite simply - 
time, I'/hen the community development prog r a m m e  in Panama began in  
1963, trouble abounded. It was a victim of i n s tant programming, p o o r  
selection and miserable training. The m a j ority of Volunteers felt 
inadequate and unhappy. However, only one y e a r  later, the programme 
had been completely transformed b y  Rep David Boubion. He hod found 
the Volunteers useful jobs, boosted morale, a n d  put the programme on 
a sound footing. Indeed, in I964, Jack V a u g h n  (then U.S. Ambassador to 
Panama) complimented the Peacu Corps as, ‘ _,he best ching the U.S. has 
done in P a n a m a ! E v a l u a t o r  David Gelman hod l e f t  Sierra Leone in 
December, 19o2, w i t h  grave reservations about tn.e future^bf the teaching 
programme there. Yet, in Februrry, ifo4, 3 no the evaluator, Robert 
Mg Guire, argued it had shown "vast improvement in job productivity, 
progr a m m i n g  and morale during the past year." There was virtually no 
underemployment among the 102 teachers -nd, "or she most rt, they were 
competent and highly regarded by both the government and the local 
peoples. On H o v e m b e r  1S, 19&3, Charles Peters told Shriver the Peace 
Corps should "get out of English teaching in H i g e r . " Peters described the 
history of that project as "sad," Nevertheless, he remained optimistic 
about "a reasonably good second year" for the P e a c e  Corps in N i g e r  if it
transferred from T.E.F.L. to village literacy, agricultural extension, 
fire control and other community projects. Thus, the "quality" of 
Peace Corps programmes could change from year to year and sometimes, 
from day to day,
In a 1963 evaluation report on East Pakistan, Tim Adams mads a
typical analysis of the ■■/ide range of cuality likely to be produced in
any one programme:
"The health of the Peace Corps in East Pakistan ranges widely from 
the stumbling, ill-advised Ganges-Kobadak project to the a’most 
ideally-suGcessful operation at the Pakistan Academy for Rural 
Development in Corailla. ,.In between are a multiplicity of 
individual assignments. Some have worked out extremely well; 
others have suffered from inadequate Volunteers and/or unpromising 
assignments."102
Similarly, in Liberia in 1963, David Gelman's rather vagus conclusion
was that "about fifty per cent" of Volunteers were doing an "average
tooitstanding" job, slightly less than that were "breaking little
ground", and a "few cases" were actually hindering the programme. An
evaluation of the Peace Corns programme in Ethiopia in I964, noted the
disparity between the secondary education project which was "firmly
established", the medical health project which was in "disorder", the
university education extension project which was "groping for its
place" and the university teaching project which was downilght "bad". In
Venezuela, a jointly-administered Peace Gorps/Vî'lCA project showed
programming "at its best" while - in the same country - a Peace Corps//-H
105^ouni'H tion coo^o rativc veu o u ’e hat bsen "sick since It' inco : Lon. ''
No Peace Corps programmes were ever described in terms o*f absolute 
success: Iran was a "moderate success", Tunisia '/as a "mixed success ",
El Ealvador was "good, but not exciting" and, in the Caoneroons, success 
could only be measured "in degrees. "
However, there was usually something positive to be taken even 
from the least successful programmes. For example, the community 
development project in Guatemala vjQs by no means one of the Peace Corps' 
leading lights; yet, evaluator Dee Jacobs conceded it had "scored solid
results in meeting all three Peace Corps aims." Shriver officially
recognised the teaching programme in Somalia as one of the weakest of the
Kennedy era. Indeed, it provided an almost perfect study in how not to
conduct a Peace Corps operation - inadequate training, dreadful
programming, poor administration, a Volunteer attrition rate of 4'C per
cent and finally, in March, 1964, war broke out between Somalia and
Ethiopia and the Volunteers had to be evacuated. Nevertheless, in 1963,
evaluator Richard Richter re%)o rted that the Po^oe Corps in Somalia
was "on the right road at last, ..a solid little project proud 0  ^whet it
has achieved and praying that Peace Corps/'lashington will see fit to send
in a large replacement project." The diversified Jamaican project was
described as a "fiasco." Yet, even in Its most troubled moments, Richard
Elwell perceived "patient, constructive efforts by individuals that
measure up to the best Peace Corps work anywhere." In 1963, Elwell
went so far as to recommend the phasing out of another "shopping list"
programme in St Lucia; but again, he noted a "bright spot" in the shape
of the adult education project. Even in the outrageously ineffective
programme in Brazil, at least 17 per cent of the Volunteers were well-
utilised and an even higher percentage had developed close, personal
104relationships wibh natives. ^
The "quality" judgement oh any project depended upon the individual
standards by which it was evaluated. Shriver had a running battle ith
ovaluatore ■•/ho, •/'lilc adritt-’.cg th^^ a Pcico Corps programme
satisfactory, would nevertheless describe it as "nice, comfortable,
dull, b-'-sically useful but uninspiring." ’fnen Dee Jacobs described a
programme in ÏÏruguay as "unexciting", Shriver retorted, "This t'.-q'C cf
10-5evaluation doesn't mean a goddamned thing! " ' Indeed, eccperienco
proved that it was often the nuiet,unobtrusive programmes which 
permeated beneath the skin of a culture and mads a real and lasting 
impression. Besides, to be "exciting" was not one of the Three Aims of 
the Peace Corps Act.
Some evaluators emphasised the "job" aspect of Peace Corps
programming whereas others stressed the "people-to-people" purpose.s.
Of course, Shriver strove for the ideal of success on both fronts.
This was n t always achieved. On many occasions P.D.O. did not provide 
Volunteers with relevant jobs. Yet, as Charles Peters reminded Shriver 
in a memorandum of July, 1963, any meaningful evaluation of a programme 
could n-'t afford to look only at the job.. "Our most important
success is often the people-to-people success," -/rote Peters, "and e;en
our most underemployed projects usually do have a people-to-people
, M 106impact.”
Long before the first programme had begun, Shriver knew blunders 
would be inevitable. All the same, he was determined to preserve 
programming from the "bureaucratosclerosis" which had beset Point Four,
I.e.A, and A.I. D. Shriver never intended 104's to be taken as gospel. 
Indeed, in the Peace Corps' Handbook, issued to all Volunteers in 19o1, 
Shriver wrote:
"No matter how good a job of programmirgthe Pecce Corps has done,
the job to which you are assigned may turn ou3 to be quite
different from the way it is described to you,..The Volunteer 
must anticipate that the job may be different from the way it is 
described and be prepared to adjust to the new circumstances or 
even be reassigned to a new position within the country. In many 
cases, we ask the Volunteer to help in the development of the job 
to its full potential. We expect Volunteers to be versatile. " 107
In the newly-independent countries of Africa and the perpetually
turbulent states of Latin America, there were so many imponderables that
it would have been foolish, to expect programmes to work out exactly as
ol:. nned. Latin American countries were no tori :o for the gap ohich
was apt to occur between the glowing promise of a host governiaant * s
support in the project agreement and the notu'tL p e r^ orrnnc,e which ae often
tantamount to indifference or intransigence. ^^ou can do e ."oryching, '
said a frustrated Volunteer in Colombia, "but if you can't get a two-
lOCpeso bag of cement when you need it, everything goes to pieces."
Many host administrators, especially in the post-colonial 
countries did not really know what to expect of the Peace Corps,
Similarly, the Peace Corps was not aware of the nature or value of the 
local cooperating organisation. Volunteers often had to argue and
cajole for months before local government bodies would supply
necessary equipment. Host country governments or personnel involved, in
the original agreement could change, leaving Volunteers to face
uncooperative or even hostile new masters. This happened to Volunteers
in Tanganyika and Jamaica. Also, funds could be cut back and proposed
projects shelved. Harsh local economies struck at the very first Peace
Corps programme in Tanganyika; and in Jacobina, Brazil, the hospital
109where several nurses had been assigned never opened.
With such vicissitudes in mind, Shriver knew that project
descriptions could never be more than rough outlines upon which "felt
needs" perceived in the field could be transposed. Shifting and
searching for jobs and personnel characterised the first few months
of even the best projects. Shriver gave enormpus power to Peace Corps
Reps and placed his faith in the initiative o'" the Volunteer. Sometimes
performance fell below expectations. Still, Shriver resisted the
temptation to establish a new overseas bureaus r^cy staffed by professional
programme officers. Despite the arguments of Peters and other
evaluators, Shriver was not persuaded that programming "experts", "job
kits" and in-depth "analyses" would - in the final outcome - produce
better projects than P.D.O. In a sarcastic reply to yet another critical
evaluation, Shriver predicted what would become df the Peace Corps
should it succumb to the regimental charms of "efficiency" and
"professionalism":
"He create ’programmers'... They will be 'experts’. They will 
issue ^orth from a program 'office'. They will -/oom around telling 
the overseas staff what is permissible - huge 'p.rogram documents’' 
will be prepared in the eld ac huge ere:case in time cn I mo'.ay. 
Secretaries will t;/pe them '.'imh copies for five different 
la shin g ton cilices, all os' '-hoc wi'”l hcv- to 'siyn c":'. ly 3 
will begin to display their program 'submissions’ to visitors 
instead of the Volunteers. It will all be done to r^ise 'cuclity', 
maximise Volunteers' time and.talent and save money. The Peace 
Corps will receive an a'/ard for clean-cut, hard administrative 
efficiency from Forbes Magazine and the Director of the Peace Corps 
will move from his post to an executive Vice-President's post in a 
a large industrial concern in Dayton. " 110
Kevin Lowther and C, Payne Lucas argued that the Peace Corps did 
not supply nearly enough skilled manpower to the developing countries
and that it took the softer option of sending huge numbers of
111generalists who "could be had simply by shaking the nearest tree".
Certainly the range of the Volunteers' skills and the quality of their
performance were inadequate to the needs of the developing world; but
given the magnitude of those needs, that was (and probably always ‘H I  be)
unavoidable. Even so, the Peace Corps' skill contribution to Third
V/oridi countries was not inconsiderable. Ho Volunteer .was sent
overseas without training - albeit elementary- in a skill. As Kevin
Delany and David Gelman noted in June 1963, "even such rudimentary matters az
112how to dig a hole or put together a wood frame can go a long way in Africa. '
Besides, the provision of trained manpower was only one of the Three Aims
of the Peace Corps. Building social relationships with host peoples
was at least half of the Volunteer's job. Initiative, energy and
friendliness were as important as technical expertise, lihile Charles
Peters stressed that the Peace Corps should beware of becoming a
"glorified. Experiment in International Living", indifferent to one job
and 3ole.Sjiyconcerned with improving relations between Araeri.cans and the
host people, he also warned against metamorphosis into a "junior AID"
113concentrating merely on technical skills. The Volunteer's attitude
towards his hosts was as significant as the task he sought to perform
with them. As an old missionary in Morocco told Kenneth Love in 1963:
"*14'The quality of the man counts more here than the technical a'rill. "
Andre.; hop kin 1 of the Ko'.; Republic -moto that "Alhr:u_v -y ;
between the hopes it raises and its own performance is huge... the
 ^ 1
experience seems to energise rather :,h'=n enejrrate the Peace Corps. "
This was certainly true o;'' programming. By 19 of, there were signs th-1 
it was learning from its mistakes and becoming much more sophissicased in 
its approach to the "felt needs" of-the Third Vorid. The Peace Corps 
was established in many countries and additional projects could be 
programmed from the field with relevant expe.rience and support.
"Shopping list" programmes were dispensed with and "pyramid programming"
- placing a few technically-skilled Volunteers at the base of
generalist groups - was introduced. Also br 19o3, the Peace Corps
had realised that its most useful commodity - in ,^erms of preparing
programmes - was- the advice of its two thousand returned Volunteers.
They were employed in P.D.O.,'in the Evaluation and Training Divisions
and as overseas staff. At long last there were people in the Peace
Corps administration who had actually had the Volunteer experience.
This was invaluable. For example, during a staff meeting on the
perennial "skills" versus "people-to-people'' controversy, former
Volunteer Roger Landrum could say with a conviction derived !"rom his
service in Nigeria:
"If a technical Job is all the Peace Corps contributes, it makes 
no profound impact either for social change or in person-to- 
person relations...if the Volunteer is only a technical 
assistant, then the Peace Corps' days and contribution in these 
countries are limited and will wash away the rising tide." 116
By the summer of 1963, Peace Corps programmers had accepted
that it was a Volunteers' right to have a relevant job with definite
responsibility awaiting him overseas. From that necessary base he
could work his way inio a community and create his own role,
P.D.O. had also learned that big numbers - of themselves - did not
provide solutions. The Peace Corps continued to expand, but not at the
breakneck speed of 1961 and 1962. Indeed, beb./eer. 19'£4 end 1966, Peace
Corps expansion was limited to two countries': Kenya and Uganda.
"Uhere do we go from here?", Bill Moyers asked Varren Wiggins in
the summer of 1963. "The answer is not in the ^umbers of" people 'ou
ask for, not 'from 9,000 to 13,000' but in the nature of the programs
you develop. " Lucidly, and with his customary sensitivity, Moyers
raised the serious questions to be asked if Paace Corps programmers
were to improve and move into the future with confidence and
integrity:
"Do they make it possible for the Peace Corps seriously to affect 
the development of a country? Do they provide Volunteers with 
real possibilities for creative service on Peace Corps terras?
Will they be programs from which the Volunteers return satisfied 
that they have made at least a little difference?" 117
C, Payne Lucas claimed that Third World countries only 
accepted the Peace Corps because they were too polite or too frightened 
to say "no" to President Kennedy, "To satisfy our requirements" 
said Lucas, "we put people abroad whom no one really wanted..,,We ended 
up doing jobs that the host country was not. realty Interested in.
This was a gross exaggeration. Certainly there were many mistakes.
Sometimes Volunteers succeeded almost in spite of, rather than because 
of, programming. Projects were not perfectly prepared. They never 
could bOa. As evaluator Robert Me Guire put it, "in two years, 
even our most conscientious and sensitive Volunteers cannot get through
H Q
all the barriers. " ' Yet, in April, I964, in an over-all evaluation report
on Peace Corps programmes, Dr William Craig, then Chief of Training,
estimated that only 20 per cent of Volunteers in unstructured job situations 
were not performing as desired; in structured jobs the .figure fell to a
•in . 1 2 0Lure 10 par cent.
Perhaps even more convincingly, in 1964 there were requests from the 
developing countries for ever-increasing numbers of generalist Volunteers . 
This demand persuadai Shriver that - even in its ;orst programs - the Perce
Corps "must have been doing something right. Moreover, in the Cow
Palace Auditorium on November 2, I964 - the fourth anniversary of Kennedy's 
first address on the Peace Corps - President Johnson suggested thro the 
single mosv importent indicator o? the success of Peace Corps programmes was 
that "nearly every country --rhere Volunteers are now serving has asked for
more - often two, three or four times more. Many countries are on the 
1 po
waiting list."
Peace Corps programming in the Kennedy era was not faultless. Various 
factors contributed to weakness; big numbers, haste, inexperience, 
over-optimism. However, failure - and its extent is a vexed question - 
was only one aspect of programming. There were many triumphs - although thes 
too can be judged only in relative terms. Perhaps the most useful 
measurement of success came in the Third Vorld's cc incessant clamouring 
for more and more Volunteers. Meridan Bennett, one of the first returned 
Volunteers to be employed as an evaluator, gave a hint of the difficulty 
involved in making any kind of glib value judgement on the contribution 
of Peace Corps programmes to the felt needs of underdeveloped countries.
"One always hates to talk too boldly of success in the Peace Corps," 
he wrote. "vVhat we have undertaken to accomplish is so difficult and
123elusive that failure is always lurking just around the corner from success.’"
CHAPTER ELEVEN
A SPECIAL GROUP OF YOUNG AMERICANS
"I want to express niy great pleasure at welcoming.,..the 
first members of the Peace Corps to go overseas.. ...There 
are of course a great many hundreds of millions of people 
scattered throughout the world. You will come in contact 
with only a fewj, but the great impression of what kind of 
country we have and what kind of people we are, will 
depend on their judgement, in these countries, of you.
You will be the personification of a special group of 
young Americans, and if you can impress them with your 
commitment to freedom, to the advancement of the interests 
of people everywhere, to your pride in your country and 
its best traditions and what it stands for, the influence 
may be far-reaching and will go far beyond the immediate 
day-to-day tasks that you may do in the months that are 
ahead,.•.we put a good deal of hope in the work that you 
do."
- JOHN F, KSÎINSDY -
(Remarks In The Rose Garden 
To The First Group Of 
Volunteers Before Their
Departure For Tanganyika 
And Ghana, August 28, 1961)
Sargent Shriver was fond of reiterating that "The front lines of the Peace 
Corps are overseas."* Indeed, the most hallowed maxim of Peace Corps/Washington 
officials was: "The Peace Corps is the Volunteer," The strenuous efforts to 
shape the organisation in a flexible, "anti-bureaucratic" mould, to ensure that 
selection and training were relevant, to streamline programming and leave enough, 
scope for the individual, were focused on one objective - to give the Volunteer 
the best opportunity possible to do the best job possible in the field. At 
the end of the day, the Peace Corps would stand or fall by its chosen 
representatives overseas, Warren Wiggins roughly outlined what was required 
of them:
"For every Peace Corps Volunteer the miles and expectations 
were that living was simple, allowances only covered basic needs, 
learning the language of the country of assignment was a 
prerequisite, host countrj^  job supervision vas the standard, 
int g^gration into the culture was a - necessity,mn&t.'privileges 
and immunities were foresworn, and learning about the people 
with whom one served was equal in importance to providing 
them with needed skills. These expectations qiplied world­
wide." 2
Yet, despite these "rules and expectations", as the first Volunteers left for
Africa in the summer of 1961, no one could predict whether this great
experiment would be a spectacular success or a dramatic failure. In an
impromptu speech to the Volunteers boarding the plane for Ghana in August,
1961, Shriver reminded thenwthat "Foreigners don't think you've got the stuff
to make personal sacrifices for our way of life. You mustdiow them. And
3
if you don’t, you'll be yanked out of the ball-game," In those early 
days, the Peace Corps rested on little more than faith - a belief in the 
talent and maturity of the people it had trained and selected to work in the 
Third World.
Shriver* s first major concern was the health of the Volunteers. '“*-he 
Peace Corps represented the largest single group of Americans who had ever 
tried to live abroad at "grassroots" levels. More Americans had been sent 
overseas during World War Two, but the troops were in ' organised units with 
safe food, clean water and medical care - these relative comforts would not
always be available to Volunteers. Shriver recalled:
"I used to wake up in the middle of the night with the 
question tearing at me: How are we ever going to protect
the health of the Peace Corps Volunteers? %is question 
seemed to have no ready answer. And yet, could we go to 
the parents of this nation and say to them, yes, we want 
your sons and daughters, and admit at the same time that 
for two years they would be overseas - many of them in primitive 
and remote towns and villages - with no medical assistance?" 4
Dr Luther Terry, Siucge on-General of the United States, solved Shriver's
problem. He proposed that, since the Peace Co:rps was a public service.
Public Health Service doctors should be assigned to each Peace Corps
country. Under Dr Leo Gehrig, first chief of the Peace Corps' Medical
Programme Division, a unique service was created whereby preventive health
measures for Volunteers would be provided by American doctors while actual"
illnesses and diseases which developed in individual Third World countries
would be handled by host country doctors. It was a system suited to
Peace Corps needs and consonant with Peace Corps ideals. In addition,
it was supremely effective. Of the first 117 early terminations only
20 came back for medical reasons. Inevitably, there were many cases of
hepatitis, amoebic dysentefj and malaria, as Well as exotic fevers and
multifarious skin ailments. Also, in the first two years there were five
accidental deaths, In general, however, Shriver need not have been unduly
worried about the health of the Volunteers. .Indeed, by i960, Charles Peters
was advising Shriver that instead of aealousl^r pio)tecting Volunteers
against Illness, it might be better in. the long run - for them and for the
Peace Corps - to "let 'chea get sick and develop immunities."
To the Volunteers the problems of ''culture shock" and - more seriously -
"culture fatigue" were much more troublesome than physical illness. Culture
shock was experiencsd by every Volunteer immediately after arrival in his
host country. It could be triggered off by a combination of various factors -
strange food, pervasive disease, extremes of climate, dire poverty, or
indigenous class and caste distinctions. One Volunteer in the Philippines
admitted, "Vihen I arrived here nothing appealed to sense of taste - not
sights, nor sounds, smells, food....I felt completely cut off from
-3%6
everything I had ever Imo’wn, and came as close as possible to having a nezr;rous 
breakdown without actually cracking up." More succinctly, another Volunteer
7
stated, "My being felt repulsion and I wanted to draw away," In Keeping 
Kennedy's Promise. Kevin Lowther and G. Payne Lucas complained that "Nothing 
(the Peace Corps did) fully prepared Volunteers for the cultural shock tiat 
all experience in some degree,"^ This was, of course, true. However, it was 
unlikely that relatively affluent young Americans could ever have been "fully" 
prepared for the shock of living in a culture of poverty for the first time. 
Peace Corps training programmes did try to stress the bad sanitation, the 
poor health and the physical ugliness endemic to underdeveloped areas; cut 
this could noi? prevent the Volunteers' inevitable horror on encountering - 
for themselves - the "starving dogs, sore-ridden children, spitting women
Q
and constant lice-picking," Volunteers were bound to be disgusted by some
of the habits and mores of Third World societies - the streets being used
as a toilet, the indifference to and sometimes the downri^t enjoyment of
human suffering, the perennial pres 'cnce of beggars in the cities and the
unhygenic preparation of foul-smelling foodstuffs.
These aspects of life in the developing countries could never be
adequately described before the Volunteer's arrival. As Neil Boyer, a
Volunteer in Ethiopia, put it, "it is a baptism by fire,..,a collision of
different values and different expectations, of values that are never wholly
10transferable, of expectations that are never fully realised." A female 
Volunteer stationed in the Par Sa.-t agreed that when faced with "rotten teeth, 
foul breath, smells, sores, filth, rags, I couldn't take it, I was 
astonished to find that my reactions were so diametrically opposed to nry 
ideals.,,.I simply and truthfully hated it and wanted to go home^  ^ Most 
Volunteers were shaken and depressed on initial contact with their host 
culture. Certainly, their expectations ‘.and motivations were severely tested 
by the raw physicality of an alien environment. "I spend much of my time 
looking for places to urinate and being angry with the presence of mosquitos," 
said a Volunteer in one of his first letters from the barrios, "I am 
constantly annoyed by spibters and careless coughers. I request napkins in
vain and eat and drink the most disagreeable concoctions sometimes until I
can explode."The rate of early returnees was always highest during these
first few months of service. Tom Carter, an able and sensitive Volunteer in
Peru, described the horrible feeling of culture shock:
"I get a lot of letters from people saying ’how exciting 
your work must be’ or 'how picturesque' or 'how much you must 
enjoy it’ ....But there comes a day when things are no longer 
picturesque, they are dirty, no longer quaint but furiously 
frustrating and you want like crazy to just get out of there, 
to go home. This is called culture shock and you don't find 
it mentioned on recruiting posters. It happens to one and 
all, usually about the third or fourth month. How hard it 
hits you and for how long depends largely on this problem 
of false motives. More Volunteers quit and go home at this 
stage than any other. Unhappy, with a lot of time out of 
their lives washed, full of bad memories of their experience, 
they fell victims to their own imagination." 13
Despite these few "victims", the vast majority of Volunteers overcame
culture shock and went on to complete their two year term. Indeed, most
Volunteers stated that once they got over their initial revulsion, the
actual physical conditions>of their host surroundings were the least irritating
aspects of their service,(Appendix XIV) I'hch more debilitating than culture
shock was "culture fatigue". "Fatigue" set in after nine months or a year of
the Volunteer's seirrice. It was a term used to describe the psychological and .
emotional exhaustion that invariably resulted from the Volunteer’s gradual
discovery that his efforts - no matter how laudable - were ultimately not
enough to satisfy the mountaitnous needs of his hosts, "I sat for a long
time tonight just thinking of all the things I'd seen" wrote Volunteer Maiy
Seberger in Venezuela. "Vnat can I -one person- do in two years that will
help reduce in any way, the problems that I've seen?" Another Volunteer
in Colombia wondered, "just how beneficial our project is and if we could
14
ever make a dent in the situation?" Training instructors tried to warn
Volunteers that they should not expect to be "world savers." Nevertheless,
as one Volunteer perceived, "Even when your expectations are low, they may be 
15too high." The result was that the Volunteer's morale hit rock-bottom as
he slid into a depression.
When asked how she rated her impact on the barrios, a Volunteer in the
1 (SPhilippines commented, "It is rather like pouring water into a sieve."
A major obstacle was that the Volunteers came from the fast, profit-oriented, 
high-achieving American society. It was painful for them to adjust
to the relaxed and ponderous ways of ‘Riird World peoples. As one Volunteer 
serving in a Mosi-^ m country put it, "We're in competition with Allah" - a
17reference to his hosts’ passive acceptance of their poverty-stricken lives,"
The pace of life in the underdeveloped nations was radically different from
America, Volunteers who complained to Peace Corps/Washington of being
'’underemployed" were often considered "over~iridusti*ious" by their more
restrained hosts.. As one Volunteer in Morocco noted, "To avoid frustration,
18you kind of have to gear yourself down," One of the main causes of "culture
fatigue" was that the Volunteers' hosts did nob necessarily want to be 
"Americanised." Many Volunteers expected willing converts to hard-working, 
rational, efficiency. Although this seemed natural to a Westerner it was 
anathema to an Asian, African or a Latin American. A Peace Corps Volunteer 
teaching in the Ivory Coast was confronted by uliis stark cultural gap during 
a lesson:
"I spoke to a class recently about life in the United 
States, saying that everyone had a chance at education 
and that after you had completed it, you went to work,
There was a silence, then one student raised his hand,.,,
’What,’ he asked ’if you do not want to work?’ And do 
you know, the question stopped mel" 19
To the chagrin of Volunteers, work was not regarded as the supreme virtue by 
all Third World peoples. Quite unconsciously, most Volunteers e.xpected that 
all "decent people" would yearn for the material aspects of American culture - 
money, luxury gadgets, plenty of food and the other benefits to be gleaned 
from a shared work ethic. They were distressed to f:ind that not everj'-one held 
these values. As Eugene Burdick and William Lederer wrote in an evaluation 
report on the Philippines, "the psychic underpinnings of the puritanical 
American which . have seeped into the Volunteer - whether he knows it or not ~ 
are outraged in day-to-day life,"^^
The realisation that their hosts often lacked initiative, were not self­
motivated,had to be constantly supervised and accepted bribery and corruption 
as the natural order, came hard to most young Americans. Moreover, it had the 
single most devastating effect on their overseas experience. A disenchanted 
Volunteer in TogO- complained:
"V/hat we have accomplished seems insignificant, We are 
tired, a little bored, discouraged by the lack of cooperation
....we have a strong urge to quit such a discouraging 
situation and find some place where you can really do 
something,.because the people we came to help don't
act as if they needed or wanted any help. Also., they
don't appreciate it when they get it." 21
In St Lucia where - as one Volunteer noted - 75 per cent of the children were
under-nourished and 90 per cent of the adults had syphil .is or other social
diseases, the biggest problem was an unshakeable conservatism: "Everyone is
positively afraid to try anything new. Often an idea is rejected not because
it is bad or impractical or too expensive but solely because it has never
22been done before," Volunteers in a small town in Colombia were frustrated
by the intransigence of petty bureaucrats. After their fourth visit to the
local mayor in the town hall, a couple of Volunteers were finally promised
a much-needed bulldozer. Yet, they remained sceptical that they would ever
receive it. "As we walked down the hall," said one, "we looked at each other
and laughed because we knew the son-of-a-bitch was lying - just as he lied
23before." Evaluator Kenneth Love noted that, while the Volunteers in
Morocco were annoyed by the flies, the dirt and the climate, their real
frustration came from "the corruption, the indifference to suffering, 
in animals and people,, petty bureaucratic obstructionism, and the lack
^  ^ ' ■■ ■ ' • rt, ■ ' ■
of trust and cooperation among the Arabs," Stephen Chesebrough, a
Volunteer in. Ethicrpia, ■ felt he and his coll’sagues 7/ere '-beating oui' heads
against a brick wall," He wrote of the "unheard and unimagined problems 
that you face here, one is frustrated, one despairs, one' wants to give it up 
as hopeless and go home,...How much do you think it" is worth to personally 
stand knee-deep in desperate poverty and stinking filth and hopeless 
illiteracy?
A different set of cultural values and attitudes was the problem at the 
heart of every Volunteer's "culture fatigue". The various other, relatively 
minor, hardships did not help - the tedious diet of fish and rice, the con­
voluted process involved in posting a letter, the same predictable questions 
asked about America, and the embarrassment felt at being constantly stared at 
and pointed out ajjf the "Yanqui" or the "ghingo." It was difficult for young 
Americans to come to terms with a country where - for example - farmers used 
urine as a disinfectant, women defecated on the beach, and teachers spat out 
of the classroom window during the course of a lesson.Confronted by these
cultural opposites, even the best Volunteers faltered. A Volunteer in the;
Philippines - described by her Rep as "extremely dedicated and determined" -
admitted that she too h^d gone through the period of frustration when she had
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felt "very small and weak in the light of this thing called culture,"
Most Volunteers were well-balanced enough to accept what they could not 
hope to change and by their second year had managed to shake off the ill- 
effects of "culture fatigue." They became more settled, more accepting of their 
limitations and more understanding towards their hosts. This majority conscien­
tiously persisted in trying to contribute to the overall objectives of the Peace 
Corps, A Volunteer in Morocco exemplified the more philosophical approach: 
"There are times when one needs to look to a power greater than onesStf in 
order to overcome the loneliness and frustration and to persevere long enough 
to be able one day to bask dn the warmth of a job well-done, a smile genuinely 
returned or a friendship and trust well-merited." In, a rather more straight­
forward fashion, a Volunteer in Sierra Leone cladjned that he was much, more
28effective, "now that the idealism has been knocked out of me,"
Unfortunately, not all Volunteers were as resilient. Some were so 
disillusioned by the various cultural shocks received during thed_r first 
year that the Peace Gojps experience was virtually foreclosed for them by the 
beginning of their second, ^hey sank into a well of cynicisw: and apathy; it 
was usually the uncompromising idealists who were hurt most. However, the 
most tragic consequence of a Volunteer’s failure to cross the great cultural 
divide was not an uncaring apathy but more an activist, brutish, American 
arrogance. With no respect for, and little understanding of the mores of 
their hosts, some insensitive Volunteers plunged into their jobs determined 
to show the natives "how things should be done," In Peace Corps terminology 
this was known as the "gung-ho" syndrome. "Cf course we’re better teachers 
than they are" was how evaluators in Liberia described the supercilious 
attitude of some Volunteer teachers towards their native colleagues, "They 
are reluctant to do a goddam thing," wrote another boorish Volunteer about 
his Somalian students. "Add to this the fact that 99 per cent of them are 
intrinsically stupid and 100 per cent of then can’t understand English, and 
teaching becomes a job which is sometimes funny, often frustrating and always;
futile," Gung-ho Volunteers preferred to effect immediate, though often 
superficial, change in their host country rather th^n go through the painstakirq 
process of waiting, establishing confidence and trust and making a long-term 
contribution. They were usually domineering and sought to force their 
opinions upon their hosts, "After all," said one arrogant Volunteer in 
Liberia "all they know about tk&Lr ..rice farms," A Volunteer in Easo 
Pakistan had been excited at the prospect of discovering the delights of 
"the mysterious East," However, halfway through her service she came to the 
rather astonishing conclusion that "The fact is there is no culture here 
whatsoever. Nothing." These gung-ho Volunteers never accepted that they 
were the victims of their own cultural,effrontism, that their job was to persua.c
and give example rather than blatantly,impose ; As evaluator Thorbum Reid 
noted, the gung-ho Volunteers retained the attitudes of "American guests who
29think as Americans in a foreign country."
In more severe cases, where the Volunteers had utterly failed to adapt to 
their new environment, their resentment was transferred into a thoroughgoing 
antipathy towards the indigenous culture, "I thought I had no prejudices," 
said one disillusioned Volunteer in Pakistan, "but here I am hating people 
I've never met," Another operily admitted to evaluator Tim Adams that he 
"hated Pakistan aid Pakistanis." A dejected Volunteer in Indonesia persuaded 
himself that his failure was the fault of his hosts who were "so stupid....I 
feel they don't deserve me, I don't think they deserve anybody. They should 
just rot," One despondent Volunteer in India explained why he preferred to 
forego the company of his hosts in the evening "I've had enough of the 
Indians all day long," he said. In Tdgo, an exceptionally coarse Volunteer 
wrote, "I'm for the Peace Corps image and all that - but I'm never going to 
get that interested in uneducated Mobo women that I'm going to really learn 
to speak the language." The feeling of-the culture-shocked, disillusioned 
Volunteer was summed up by a young man in Morocco when he commented on "the 
injustice that such a lovely country should be inhabited by such dull and 
unattractive people," These negative Volunteers were the most dangei’ous kind - 
unhappy, prone to gossip and eager to utilise all the arrogance they could 
muster in a last-ditch defence against their own sense of failure. They were
not many but their influence sometimes belied their paucity. A Volunteer
in Pezu described his destructive colleagues, "counting the days until their
two years are up, hating each day, souring themselves, their friends and
all the natives they talk with. What a waste I, Two years of their lives
ruined by idealistic daydreams
Completely negative Volunteers were few and far between. All Volunteers
suffered "culture fatigue", but most came through it without a total
capitulation to self-pity and frustration. Some went "nativeThat is,
they went through a phase of trying to live as much like their hosts as was
humanly possible - they would not boil their water, or use mosquito netting,
or take precautions against the sun. On a few occasions this had disastrous
consequences. One Volunteer in the Philippines died after he had refused
medical treatment for an intestinal complaint - because he wanted to be "like 
31the natives." At the other extreme, some Volunteers got sucked into what 
was referred to as the "expats, syndrome", spending too much time with 
Americans in the embassy compound or in exclusive private clubs. A poor 
language facility or underemployment were always factors that could entice 
a lonely Volunteer to fraternise more with fellow westerners than with his 
hosts. One of Sargent Shriver’s few iron laws was that Volunteers should foregc 
the pleasures and privileges of the "expat," community; but sometimes, during 
a bout of homesickness or frustration, even the best Volunteers were tempted.
In Tanganyika, evaluator David Gelman argued that, after a few hard weeks 
work in the bush, Volunteers could not be blamed if, during a weekend in 
town, they wanted nothing more than "drinks and darts at the pub or ’cherchez
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la femme’ In a few cases the "expat, syndrome" got out of hand. Some 
Volunteers actively excluded themselves from extra-curricular contact with 
their hosts and spent most of their leisure time in the P.a . bar or on 
the tennis court. In East Pakistan, Associate Rep Jay Crook reprimanded 
Volunteers for not making enough people-to-people contacts outside of working 
hours :
”A great deal has been said jokingly about the ’Golden 
Ghetto’, in which Americans overseas are presumed to 
reside like potentates. But the Peace Corps can, and 
to some extent has, established its own little ghettoes.
That is not to say that Volunteers set out deliberately 
to make their own world, but sometimes in answer to 
weakness of flesh and spirit, they unconsciously slip 
into a secluded existence where their contacts with 
Pakistanis are limited to work contact and their 
private lives remain unintruded upon...." 33
However, the Volunteers who wAN) "native", spent all their spare time in 
the P.X., or became totally negative forces, were the exceptions. The 
vast majority managed to find a happy medium between going "native" and 
joining the "expats, syndrome". Even if Volunteers did not conquer every 
aspect of their own cultural absolutism, most at least initiated a cross- 
cultural dialogue - which was, after all, the quintessential Peace Corps 
purpose. Volunteers in Uruguay lived with the locals, paid rent to them, and 
developed such intimate relations that they referred to their host family 
members as "my father, my mother, brother or sister." In British Honduras, 
Volunteers could not walk down the streets of Belize without becoming 
involved in several, conversations with clusters of local folk. Evaluator 
Richard Elwell adjudged the Volunteers to have been "ve.ry successful" in 
making social contacts. The Volunteers in Thailand disappeared among the 
natives and worked with a "quiet earnestness." V/hen Volunteers melted into 
their host society in this way, it was a sure sign they had established 
effective cross-cultural relations. The natives of Senegal took note of how 
the Volunteers, lived simply in their midst - an indication that these were 
white men who had come to help rather than exploit. "Unlike the French," 
observed David Hapgood, "the Volunteers mix with the people instead of staying 
aloof; they work with their hands with the Senegalese instead of handing 
down orders," When Volunteer teachers in Siarra Leone ms-ie their way to work, 
the natives ran after them chanting "Peace Corps, Peace Corps." I'/hen 
evaluator Dan Chamberlin asked them why, they replied "because no other 
white people would do this."^^
David Espey, a young Volunteer teacher in Morocco, established a warm 
rapport with his host students whom he found friendly, cooperative and 
grateful, "I have no trouble getting in contact with Moroccans," he wrote
since I live and eat with the students. It’s amazing how much help is needed,
can be so easily given and is so greatly appreciated," Likewise a young
Volunteer building water filters in the schools of Togo received a "terrific
amount of cooperation....from all parts of the community and the remarkable
amount of work that the kids did was encouraging and very satisfying." He
felt he had broken through the cultural barrier and established a base for
mutual respect. Certainly, the concept of self-help - working to ameliorate
problems in the community with no promise of remuneration - was strange.to the
Togolese. "Yet, once they see it in action," he wrote, "they pitch in with
far greater enthusiasm and good will t h^ I ever expected. This is surely
35one of the answers to progress 1j£?> Africa." In Iran, a Volunteer who
married a native girl was described as having a superb "affinity for the
culture, ably abetted by his attractive wife....one of the best Volunteers
in the terms of relating to Iranians." Likewise, a female Volunteer working
in Asmara, Ethiopia, was regarded as something of a "legend" both by the
natives and her fellow Volunteers, She taught herself the local language
(Tigrinya), visited her students in their homes, and was known to "every
urchin in the streets,
Similarly, two married couples of Volunteers teaching English in the
small town of Bolu in Turkey were known by just about evelyone of the
fourteen thousand natives ; their adult education classes were looked upon as
one of the town's highlights, and were very well attended. Evaluators in
the Dominican Republic came across a robust sixty-year old Volunteer named
Pete who was "respected, even loved, by nearly eveiyone." His hog-breeding,
rat-eradication and water-filtering projects had become the talk of la Vega,
Evalucvbors Dee Jacobs and Piiilip Hardbergsr described him as "opinionated,
straightforward, demanding, honest and shrewd. He has fantastic energy
and ingenuity... .although he is a threat to those who want things done 'manana\'^
Another Volunteer in Afghanistan mixed in so well with the natives that two
mullahs asked her to give them English lessons, "This is a breakthrough,"
noted Charles Peters, "roughly equivalent to Hubert Humphrey being asked to
37lead a John Birch study group,"
Few Volunteers broke through all the inter-cultural barriers, but the
vast majority did make a beginning. At the very least they were forced to
confront their own ethnocentrism. Many did this successfully and went on to
involve themselves in the lives of their host peoples. For evaluator Richard
Richter, this was the Peace Corps’ "big message":
"They prove it can be done. This message is crucially 
important because there are so many on our training 
faculties, in the Peace Cofpsadministrâtion, in the 
American communities, in the host countries, who 
really think it can’t be dome and whose siren song of 
defeatism threatens to make the Peace Corps in Africa 
a pure technical assistance project in the field of 
education," 38
David Szanton, one of the first Volunteers in the Philippines, agreed that
despite "culture fatigue" and its accompanying frustrations, many of his
colleagues learned and accepted that the American way was not the only way,
that bigger was not always better, that work and efficiency were not
qualitatively superior to an appreciation of aesthetics. "After some while
in the field," he wrote, "many Volunteers did finally begin to accept
emotionally the idea - and. its extraordinary implications - that a people
could be equally human, could be equally entitled to consideration, while
at the same time they were significantly different in their values and 
39behaviour,"
Cultural confrontation permeated the Peace Corps experience. However,
as well as coming to terms with living in an alien society, the Volunteer
had also to learn how to work in it. Although never entirely independent of
the ubiquitous cultural dynamic, the Volunteer’s job en-qndered its own
problems. In the summer of 1962, after the Peace Corps had been one full
year in the field, Nicholas Hobbs, Chief of the Research Division, resorted
to Sargent ohriver that, thus far, the major problem faced by the Volunteer
was not culture shock, disease or physical hardship but rather, the
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difficulty in finding "meaningful work to do." In the Kennedy era. 
Volunteers did not often gripe about cross-cultural differences per se. By 
far the most common Volunteer complaints were about underemployment and 
boredom. "How to avoid being half-occupied ranks as the number one problem
in the eyes of most Volunteers," wrote evaluator Kevin Delany in I963.
"The Volunteers who never lack for activity always seem to be in the 
minority of any project." A frustrated Volunteer in Thailand explained that 
"The big culture shock comes when you find that they (the host nation) don’t 
really need you, that maybe they don't know what to do with y o u T o  an 
extent, the blame lay with Warren Wiggins and kis programmers, A combination 
of haste, inexperience, over-optimism and imprecision on their part often 
left the Volunteer in a vulnerable position overseas. And yet, faulty job 
programming notwithstanding, the Volunteer's role could only ever be what 
each individual made of it. Volunteers reacted in different ways to both 
structured and unstructured work situations, Tu many, the vague or ill- 
defiuied nature of their jobs was the biggest single source of frustration,
A Volunteer who had been assigned to Morocco as an agricultural extensionist, 
discovered after his arrival in-country that it would be up to hims&Lf to find 
work. "But in a country where fiscal funds are often lacking and sometimes 
non-existent," he wrote, "finding useful occupations can be a tiresome
chore."42
In this respect, community development was the most maligned assignment
in the Peace Corps. Volunteers had to spend their first three or four months
just getting to know their community before they could even begin to help
meet its "felt needs". There was no official method of introduction into
local society, no specific projects outlined, and often, no material support.
In effect, the Volunteer was left without a "handle" on his job, fne
Volunteer described the great potential for frtjstration inherent in any
community development assignment:
" The community developer comes into tom and takes 
up residence with a local fumily. For weeks he 
seemingly does nothing. He plays with the children, 
talks with the shopkeepers, drinks in the bars. His 
Spanish or his Quechua is a little- halting and quaint.
It takes quite a while until the people see that he 
sincerely wants to help them tackle a few problems.
In any event the Volunteer, is faced with the task 
of making himself acceptable, and he remains guilty 
(or at least suspect) of all types of contrived 
motives until he proves himself innocent." 43
This type of unstructured charge left enormous scope for either ezxtensive
individual initiative or severe underemployment. Some Volunteers appreciated 
the opportunity to create a role for themselves. Indeed, to the bright, 
dedicated Volunteer, an ill-defined or even badly programmed assignment 
could be something of an asset, since it offered him a challenge and gave an 
"edge" to his attitudes in general. Others did not relish the prospect of 
adapting to new situations as they arose or of introducing themselves to 
strangers and inviting themselves along to work sites. For them, the loosely 
structured assignment was little more than a license to be miserably 
unemployed. Almost every Peace Corps programme consisted of a combination 
of these two opposite reactions, Kevin Delany sent back a typical report 
from India:
"A remarkable number of Volunteers in India know 
precisely what they are doing, and are doing it well.
It hasn't been automatic, a good percentage of the *
Volunteers have arrived to find either a non-existent 
job or a small fragment of one. A number of Volunteers 
did nothing for the first three months and then found 
■ work for themselves. Many others enlisted the assistance 
of the staff. Some have acquired lots of small jobs that 
add up to full employment, A few Volunteers have many 
small jobs that add up to nothingc" 44
In a similar vein, the community development project in Peru started 
out on a shaky footing. The Peruvian government was tardy in giving support 
and many of the initially assigned jobs fell through. However, ably 
supported by Peace Corps Rep Frank Mankiewicz, the Volunteers proved 
versatile and most managed to adapt to the trying circumstances. “Everything 
has not worked out as they expected it or wanted it," wrote evaluator 
Herb Wegner, "But. vliere they have been overcome by their problems they 
have not surrendered. They have fought back ~ or they have moved on to 
other work on different Peace Corps projectsFour Volunteers around Puno 
had begun a small nutrition programme which by the summer of 19o3 was 
helping to feed ninety-five thousand students in thirteen hundred schools 
In Panama, a young Volunteer began to participate in his local community by 
castrating pigs and giving inoculations to cows. Through his work he came 
in contact with many natives and, after a few months, he had won their 
confidence to the extent that they became willing to experiment with his 
ideas for new types of rice plants, fertilizers, insecticides and seeds.
Another Volunteer in Chile gradually helped develop - campesino co-operatives 
to the point where twelve hundred host families were involved. He had not 
been specifically assigned to this task but he was resourceful and had 
"an integrity about him and a dedication to his work," On the other hand, 
a Volunteer in Brazil - described by evaluators as a "sun-bather" and a 
"playboy" felt no compulsion to participate in his local community, "I 
was sent here as a co-op expert," he complained, "and I know nothing about 
co-ops," Two other Volunteers from the same programme admitted that they 
considered themselves little more than tourists. Eighteen Volunteers in 
Bolivia were supposed to be acting as social workers, mechanics and 
agricultural extensionists around Santa Cruz, However, when evaluators 
Philip Cook §nd Thorburn Reid visited the area in 1963, they found that 
the Volunteers had yet to embark on any kind of meaningful projects,
Likewise in Guatemala, there were a couple of Volunteers who showed a definite 
aversion to work and a disinclination even to attempt speaking Spanish.^^
Many Volunteers working in community development eventually surrendered 
to frustration and created tight, specific jobs for themselves where they 
could see each day that they were producing something definite* To 
counteract local indifference to theii’ schemes. Volunteers sometimes fired 
ahead on their own. However, in a way, this defeated the whole purpose of 
community development, which was to persuade the natives to do things for 
themselves. Certainly the Volunteers felt more fulfilled when they were 
constantly acbive; but, in the long run, their indivilualistic efforts were 
not conducive to the nurturing of the self-help principle, Volunteers in 
Chirabote, Peru, refused to put a roof on a local school building until the 
natives offered to help. "It would be a ten dollar project and about one 
day's work for two three Peace Corpsmen," noted one of the Volunteers.
"Yet, we don't do it. If we gave that school a roof, it would always be a 
gift^ ' the 'gringos' iroof. When it needed fiodLng no one would fix it. If it 
takes a year to talk our neighbours into putting on that roof, it will be 
worth it,. Because it will then be their roof on their s c h o o l . "4^
Some Third World governments - the Ivory Coast was an outstanding
example - took Volunteers simply because they wanted the status of having a 
Peace Goprs project in their country. Vlnan Volunteers arrived they quickly 
discovered that as "teachers' assistants" they would be seriously underemployed. 
Again, reactions to this varied. In Sierra Leone, the teaching assistant 
jobs were described as "hopeless". Yet this did not prevent a number of 
enterprising Volunteers from becoming sports instructors, librarians and 
even broadcasters on local radio. Volunteers who were assigned to teach 
English in Venezuelan universities found their services required only three 
hours of the week. Some became embittered and took to grumbling among 
themselves; but others went out into the barrios and instigated general 
community projects. At first, the Volunteers! teaching duties in Iran 
utilised only a small portion of their normal working week. However, after a 
few months of readjustment, one Volunteer happily reported that he and a 
fellow teacher no longer had any idle hours. "Jos has taken on the teaching
of first aid," he wrote, "and I teach English in Rasht two mornings per
T-i / 7week, and maintain English and French clubs for interested students
Underemployment often led to boredom ~ nicknamed "Teacher's Blight!! 
by the Volunteers, Letters or documents from Peace Corpa/Washington to 
the Volunteers in the field began enthusiastically - "If you can afford a 
few minutes from your busy schedule to read etc...." - but were greeted 
derisively by teachers whose time often hung heavily on their hands.
However, in the course of two years in a foreign setting it was somewhat 
inevitable that even the most exciting, tiine-consuming job would have its 
boring interludes, "If someone had told me I'd be bored sitting at the 
foot of Kilimanjaro with elands galloping around me, I would have said,
'You're out of your mindj" reported one bored Volunteer. In Tanganyika, 
Volunteers worked in the wild out-back, living the kind of vibrant life that 
many restless Peace Corps teachers dreamed of. Yet, as an astonished 
David Gelman reported, not only were the adventurous Volunteers bored but 
"the majority are convinced that teaching must be the only satisfying and 
useful work a Volunteer can do,"4^
The sometimes harrowing isolation of Volunteer life contributed to the 
tedium. It was ironical that although one of the principal aims of the 
Peace Corps was to foster people-to-people contact, a few Volunteers never 
established any deep extra-curricular relationships with their hosts. Worst 
afflicted were the teaching programmes in West Africa where classroom 
friendships were sometimes never extended beyond the school compound. Some 
Volunteer teachers preferred the narrowest possible definition of their job, 
while others never found the courage to breach the social gulf that existed 
in Africa between the professional classes and the uneducated masses.
Evaluator Richard Elwell noted that a couple of the Volunteers teaching in 
Addis Ababa showed "little interest in over-coming the comfortable barriers 
of status and convenience to make contact with a thicker slice of Ethiopian 
life," But again,the isolation of Peace Corps teachers was only one side of 
the coin. For example, some teachers in Ghana refused to allow either their 
job or social convention to isolate them from the local population. 'They 
instituted a weekend programme of bike zd-des whereby they ■ travelled aro'und
as many outlying villages as they could. In this way, observed evaluator 
Robert Lystad, they established "excellent rapport" with native Ghanaians.^^ 
One of the major causes of frustration overseas was the widespread 
fanlure of the "Counterpart System." The influencing of host country 
nationals through professional .$uid technical training by Volunteers, was one 
of the essential goals of Peace Corps service. Accordingly, at least 
one native counterpart was supposed to be assigned to every Voluntoer, For 
various reasons, this rarely occurred. Either the host government did not 
send anyone, or the person they did send quickly lost interest and stopped 
turning up, or else, the generalist Volunteer was simply not proficient enough 
to impart knowledge of a skill to his counterpart. €n occasion, financially 
embarrassed Third World governments merely used Volunteers as stop-gap 
labour. To them, the main advantage of the Peace Corps was that it saved them 
paying wages to natives. They cared little for the long term educational 
value, ^or instance. Volunteer nurses in Tanganyika were kept so busy 
dealing with day-to-day emergencies, they had neither the time nor the 
opportunity to impress upon their native counterparts the virtues of sterile
techniques. Sometimes Volunteers were resented because they worked longer
hours - bosses would expect their native colleagues to do the same after
the Volunteers left - or because they earned more and thus had higher social
status. For instance, in East Pakistan the native overseers of an
agricultural extension project earned 130 rupees per month, while the
Volunteers working under their supervision got 380 rupees - and most of the
Pakistanis had families to support. In 1963, evaluator Dee Jacobs stated
that friction, rather than cooperation, with counterparts had become "an old
story (and) conflict is likely to continue for some time to come."^^
Nevertheless, the Peace Corps adjudged it an idea worthy of perseverance. In
August, 1963,Bill Moyers suggested to Warren Wiggins that it was time the
Peace Corps established "as a program necessity" the condition that every
Volunteer must have the opportunity to train a counterpart. After all,
as Moyers put it, "the fundamental premise of the Peace Corps philosophy
51is that people can affect people,"
Eve.py Peace Corps job had its occupational hazards. The nebulousness
surrounding unstructured community development was infamous. However,
structured assignments also carried their own handicaps. Certainly,
Volunteer teachers had set positions to go to - but this factor alone did
not make their task any less formidable. For example, maintaining
discipline in rowdy African classrooms was a thorny problem for young,
basically inexperienced Volunteers. Native African teachers freely wielded
the cane to discipline pupils who were badly behaved. Of course, once the
students realised that Americans were not accustomed to using corporal
punishment, they took every advantage. At least one Volunteer broke under
the strain -md resorted to using the "paddle" (a wooden stick) to reprimand
an unruly Liberian youth. In the process he transgressed the fine line
between discipline and assault and instigated an ugly incident. On another
occasion, a Volunteer in Nyasaland was not quite sure of what action to take
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when he caught his pupils smoking marijuana in class.
Volunteer teachers also had to overcome apathy among students, colleagues 
and temperamental headmasters. In Sierra Leone some Volunteers came across
a.n odd British headmaster who walked around all day hugging a chimpanzee to
his chest. Others had to deal, with an eccentric African principal who would
not permit electricity to be installed in his school because it would attract
the "devil". Old fashioned teaching methods - rote learning and out-of-date
syllabi - were additional bugbears. In one classroom textbook a Volunteer
found sentences such as "a nurse is pushing a pram across a zebra-crossing on
her way home to afternoon tea," He wondered what sense this could possibly
53make to the native Togolese,
The Volunteers came to associate such irrelevancies with the school 
system in Africa as established by the British who - as one Volunteer put 
it - had only wished "to produce automatons for the colonial civil s e r v i c e . " ^ 4  
Indeed, many Volunteers claimed that their greatest "culture shock" was not 
in coming face to face with Africa and Africans but rather, having to live 
and work in a remnant colonial society. Volunteer teachers often found 
themselves in uncomfortable and uncreative situations vis a vis the natives 
because they taught in a school system set up by the British (or the French) 
which actively discouraged any extra-curricular personal relationships with 
Africans. The rules of the old colonial game sometimes made adjustments and 
adherence to Peace Corps philosophy very difficult. One Volunteer in
Tanganyika told David Gelman that her biggest "culture shock" had been her
55introduction to the snobbish and sometimes racist British expatriates.
As the sun set on the British Empire, many "expats" retained teaching
and administrative posts in the decolonised lands. Tnay were often hostile
towards the young "amateurish" Americans. Professionally qualified
British school - teachers looked down their noses at U.S. university degree-
holders. At the same time, they felt jealous or threatened chat America
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was about to fill the void left in the developing countries by a Britain 
rapidly declining as a world power. Volunteers in Nigeria also sensed that 
some resentment still lingered on from the days of World War Two when the 
cliched British description of American troops had been "overpaid, over-
56dressed, over-ssxed and over here." Volunteers angered the British because 
they would not accept the colonial interpretation of the "African Mentality" - 
that Africans were basically ignorant, greedy, violent, and hence had to be
kept in their place. Fraternisation with the natives outside of working 
hours was frowned upon, "The vanishing colonialist is a bitter fellow." 
said one Volunteer, "he came not to help but to exploit; most of them sought 
a prestige - the white shorts, the white socks, the club, and the house­
hold servants - they could not attain in the U.K...,,many of them would not
57give an African the right time of d a y T h e  British applied strong pressure 
on the Volunteers to conform to colonial patterns of behaviour, '^ he 
colonial educational system was based on the "Cambridge exam"; the economic 
system provided luxury housing and black "stewards" for Europeans; and the 
social system dictated that whites should remain "aloof" from natives. In 
effect. Volunteers had not only to satisfy African standards and expectations • 
but British ones too. Africans were not rpite sure how to react to the 
Volunteers who did not behave in the usual "white" way - distant, wealthy 
and condescending.
On the other hand, if the Volunteers did not conform to British standards 
then they often found, themselves ostracised and hated by the "expats".
Volunteer teachers in Nyasaland had to contend with rumours-spread by their 
British colleagues that they were only there to relieve the U.S. unemployment 
problem, that they ran around naked at night and that they jaad become 
pregnant by African men, British doctors were highly indignant that Peace 
Corps nurses were not qualified in midwifery - a standard part of the 
British nurse's training. Yet, despite what David Gelman called the "sbit- 
and-polish first, patients last" attitude of the British surgeons, Yslunteer 
nurses were always in high demand in the Third World and they did have a
58measurable impact on both the technical and human values of hospital serrice.
To be fair, the British sometimes aimitted that the Peace Corps provided
certain worthwhile benefits. In 1962, despite some concern at the prospect
of the Peace Corps moving in to Nyasaland and Rhodesia, the British
government announced its pleasure at the way Volunteer teachers were "fitting
into Africa", Indeed, a crusty, old "expat"' in Tanganyika conceded that
59"I don't know how we did without you chaps before this,"
The British were not the only "expats" with whom the Volunteers had to
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contend. Indeed, they sometimes found their ovm. compatriots the bigger 
nuisance. However, relations between the Peace Corps and the American 
diplomatic community varied from one country to another. In Gabon, 
relations with the embassy were "good"; in Ecuador, Ambassador Bembaum v/as 
"friendly"; while in Guinea, v\mbas3ador Loeb and his staff were "extraordinarily 
helpful". Conversely, in the Philippines, some members of the embassy staff 
were resentful that the Peace Corps did not keep them informed about its 
activities; Ambassador Stevenson was angry that he was not fully briefed on 
the whereabouts of all Volunteers. In Bolivia, evaluators sensed that the 
official Mission was intent on making Volunteers "more subservient to the 
goals of U.S, policy." Similarly, in Togo, Ambassador Poullada was desperately 
keen to exert more control over the Peace Corps, Evalus^ fcor Philip Cook was 
equally as determined this should not happen. During a meeting in the 
embassy on the subjectcof the Peace Corps' role in Togo, the Ambassador's staff 
spent the entire time discussing whether Volunteers should take part in a 
"sack race" planned for the Fourth of July celebrations. In Costa Rica, 
relations between the Peace Corps and the Embassy were strained when the 
Ambassador sent out his own "evaluation team" to investigate Peace Corps 
operations* To his chagrin, they returned with an entirely favourable report.
More troublesome than disagreements over Peace Corps operations was the
resentment felt at the style in which they were carried out. Professional
American diplomats consistently accused Volunteers of being self-righteous,
priggish and downright unfriendly^ The problem stemmed from the policy laid
doivn by Shriver that Volunteers should avoid the P.X, club, the embassy
restaurant, swimming pool and so forth. Indeed, he made it clear th^t it was
preferable for Peace Corps offices to be established outside the embassy
compound/. Some ambassadors fcmd this infuriating*. "They refused to come
into our embassy or have offices there," recalled ihnbassador Stevenson. "They
(the Volunteers) came with stars in their eyes....they thought they were going
to fix the Philippines in eighteen months....this, I thought, was absolutely
foolish, that they had to take this attitude that they knew the right way to
i)
handle people, that we were all wrong and all that business. However, if
Stevenson had had his way, he would have stationed the Peace Corps office on
the sixth.:floor-of the embassy - the same floor as the C.I.A. The consequences
of such an obviously maladroit arrangement would have been disastrous for the
Peace Corps' image and impact. Thus, although Stevenson continued to complain
to Shriver about "renegade" Volunteers, it was to no avail,
Officials of other U.S. agencies in the Third World were quick to point
out that not all Volunteers or Reps lived at the "grassroots"level - despite
the Peace Corps' pontifical statements about American diplomats living in
"Golden Ghettoes" overseas. Embassy staff in Morocco laughed at the luxurious
housing rented by Peace Corps officials, "especially after all this bullshit abou
6 2the Peace Corps image and the new kind of American", . . All the same, while 
Sargent Shriver recognised that not every Peace Corpsman lived up to the 
organisation's ideals, he deeply resented expatriates poking fun at Volunteers 
who were at least trying to make sacrifices - no matter how small - like 
shopping in the local bazaars or taking the bus instead of using a U.S. vehicle, 
"Why don't they do so?" asked a furious Shriverc. "It would save taxpayers 
some money if all U.S. persons abroad did likewise.
A.I.D. officials in Guinea were "openly hostile," to the Peace Corps; they 
offered no help by way of logistics or equipment, "There must be well over a 
thousand hard-core Communists in Guinea," noted evaluator Philip Cook, "but they 
are no match for the U.S. Embassy/A,I.D. contingent when it comes to making 
trouble for the Peace Corps," In Morocco the United States Official Mission 
objected to the Peace Corps' mode of operation on the grounds tri^ t it was 
"slap-dash, emergency style, grandly indifferent to costs, ungrateful for help, 
impatient with the red tape imposed; upon those who gave the help, end hoggish 
for the c r e d i t . T h e  United States Information Agency in the Par Past was 
also extemely annoyed at the Peace Corps' 'aloofness", and throughout Latin . 
A^merica there was periodic friction with the Alliance For Progress,
To an extent, the Peace Corps got caught in a trap of its O'f/n making. It 
did not w.;int its name to be associated with A.I^D. or U.S.I.A, or the 
traditional Foreign' Sewice, yet it did want the help of those bodies when it 
came to supplying Peace Corps programmes with materials and equipment. In
private, the Peace Corps wished to cooperate with the other American agencies 
hut publicly,^ it kept them at arm's length. It was no wonder A.I.D. and 
embassy officials were mistrustful of the Peace Corps and slightly bewildered 
as to its stance. In the.early days, Shriver had worried! that the ^eace Corps 
would be identified with big-money U.S. foreign aid programmes; his favourite 
slogan was "we deal in people not materials." Yet, in one of the first projects 
ip. Colombia, Volunteers were mistaken for officials of the Alliance For Progress 
~ Kennedyls economic aid, programme for Latin America. They found that a typical 
greeting was for the locals to ask them 'T/here's the money?" ^ ^his was exactly 
what Shriver was determined to avoid. However, Volunteers soon came to realise 
that it was to their advantage to work closely with the "Kennedy cum Alianza" 
organisation. Since Kennedy was associated with the Mliance, the Volunteers 
also reaped the harvest of its resounding popularity. Besides, AJ.liance official 
were much more thoughtful about the placement and disbursement of their funds 
when the Volunteers did not treat them like social lepers outside of working 
hours. Thus, in January I963, Bill Haddad advised Shriver that it was high 
time the Peace Corps relaxed its "artificial" policy towards its fellow agencies 
overseas. With a view to changing the somewhat priggish attitude which 
Volunteers sometimes adopted, Haddad proposed, "we.should now work more closely 
with other agencies, while still maintaining our apartness."
The problem of "separateness" cropped up again when Volunteers were 
assigned to religious schools or had to work in the campesinos with missionaries 
Notwithstanding the Peace Corps’ policy of avoiding any organisation or 
assignment that involved direct religious proselytising, Volunteers were 
advised that in a variety of field situations a certain amount of flexibility 
would be required,. Peace Corps officials were well aware that in Latin 
America the Catholic Church had the power (if it wanted to use it) to block 
all community development projects. Therefore Volunteers were told in training 
that they should approach the local padre upon first alighting in their 
community. They were wary of being used as religious propagandists but, where 
necessary, they worked hand-in-hand with activist priests. For example, in
Tamopata, Peru, Pr, Kearns helped a Pee.ce Corps project for teaching natives
mechanical skills; and in Guatemala, the local priests helped Volunteers
establish agricultural co-operatives. In some areas, the Volunteers came
dangerously close to appearing as if they were working through the Catholic 
Church,. In. EcuadLor^■ Volunteers taught-in Catholic schools, worked in 
agencies directed by priests, and one Volunteer even lived in the rectory* 
Hovæver, the Peace Corps P.ep was vigilant and ensured that the 
programme was kept free of religious entanglements. Although, as Richard
Elwell noted, he was realistic enough to recognise "the necessity of working
v/ith things as they are in Ecuador," In its railk-distribution, health care and
agricultural extension programmes in Bolivia, the Peace Corps took a further risk
by working with Catholic Relief Sem/ices (Caritas); but again, all these projects
were absolutely free of proselytising* In Senegal however, evaluator David
Hapgood adjudged that Volunteers teaching: in mission schools beside monks were
actually "aiding a proselytising effort". To avoid further infringement of
the First Amendment, he advised that the Volunteers should be immediately
transferred from mission schools to the government's public schools.
Missionaries could also prove personally troublesome to Volunteers - 
especially in Jlfrican countries where they sometimes viewed the Peace Corps 
as a competitor in the field of education rather than a helper. Besides, they 
often deemed young Vounteers neither strict enough with their students nor 
religious enough in themselves. For their part, Volunteers found some 
missionaries imbued with much the same educational "zeal" as the British 
colonialist3£. One Volunteer teacher in Liberia described hi,s religicus colleeg’ue 
as being "full of contempt for the Liberians — they think they're dirty ana 
cheat and steal, and they beat them," .Another Volunteer in El Salvador 
dissuohed the good friars from beating pupils with sticks by beating the good 
friars with sticks. Many Volunteers; working in mission schools experienced 
some awkwardness with the staff over religious participation. For example, 
a Volunteer assigned to a Presbyterian mission in the C.ameroons was quite bluntly 
told by her colleagues that she was not whated because she was a Catholic; 
the mission had to relent when the Cameroon government insisted she be allowed
to take up her appointment. Again, when Volunteers working in the Evangelical 
United Brethem, and the United Brethem in Christ mission schools in Sierra 
Leone refused to attend religious services they were insulted by their British 
headmasters. However, in the vast majority of cases religious resentment was 
finally overcome and Volunteers worked effectively with all religious groups.
For instance, Protestant Volunteers managed to work intimately and successfully 
with Catholic padres in the highlands of Ecuador* Moreover, by I963, Volunteers 
of every religious persuasion were established in both Catholic and Protestant 
schools all over the underdeveloped world - without too much injury to either 
private conscience or constitutional principle. Indeed, in Latin America, 
where the danger of over-stepping the fine line between Church and State was 
greatest, evaluators Philip Cook and Thorburn Reid thought it "worth a 
reminder now and then, that the Peace Corps- in many Latin American countries 
does ask and receive a good deal from a remarkably tactful and undemanding ■ 
Catholic Church - especially its American missionaries and relief agencies,
Sargent Shriver claimed that, in many ways, the "most difficult problem"
69for Volunteers overseas was racial disharmony in the United States, In 
Africa especially, Volunteers were continually being asked difficult questions 
about racial discrimination back home. Racial incidents in America were 
widely broadcast in African countries. In an emotive letter to Peace Corps/ 
Wahington in June, I963, Jim Crandel - a young Volunteer in Niger - described 
the effect racial unrest could have on an overseas project;
"Our time here in Africa has really opened our eyes to many problems 
of the U.S. and given us a look at our country from a different 
viewpoint. Peace Corps in Africa is very important, not only from the 
standpoint of educational, technical and agricultural help, but to show 
the Africans that not all American whites are antiHlegro,*„ But) it 
sure is a funny feeling attending a, show with some close African friends 
and have a newsreel show those white bastards in the South hosing, 
turning dogs loose on people and men beating coloured women."?0
There was "polite disappointment" among African nations that only four of the 
first one hundred and twenty Volunteers were black. Throughout the Kennedy years
Peace Corps Reps (lO per cent of whom were blacks) were subjected to embarrassing 
questions about the low number of non-white Volunteers, Despite the commendable 
efforts of Sargent Shriver and Harris Wofford to recruit blacks for service in 
Africa, Asian-Americans for service in Asia and so forth, 95 per cent of all 
Volunteers were white; furthermore, a few held segregationist views. In March 
1962, evaluator Dan Charaberl.uvV'overheard some Volunteers speak disparagingly 
about "niggers", "spies" and "Jews" in front of native Colombians, "To some 
degree," wrote Chamberlu-VV) "this is the kind of barracks humor that one hears 
a great deal in the army, but I think that it is pretty dangerous especially 
when the Volunteers do it in public places," On the other hand, a white 
Volunteer from Alabama - who-admitted he had been guilty of racist feelings at 
home — was shocked when the Peace Corps assigned him to Liberia* Yet, it proved 
to be an enlightening experience; for the first time in his life he worked with 
blacks and by’ 1963 he admitted that his attitude "towards the Negro race" had 
been revolutionised. Many others became very close both to black natives 
and fellow Volunteers, One Volunteer in Nigeria found that his association 
with the locals had given him a profound insight into the problems faced 
by blacks in America, Moreover, he acknowledged, "Vlnat was before a rather 
distant, ideological commitment to Civil Rights....has become a very personal 
one."71
Significantly, the few black Volunteers there were always emphasised
that their colour gave them an advantage in establishing people-torrpeople
contacts in Africa, Inevitably, Volunteers found that some Third 'Jorld
countries had developed their own brand of racial hatred. For instance,
in British Honduras, Volunteers were criticised for consorting with blacks,
A local white bax’-man told a Volunteer that the blame lay with "all that
72Kennedy business in the U.S." To win over such attitudes was one of the 
Peace Corps' primary aims. President Kennedy helped. In Africa and in the 
Caribbean he was widely renowned as the knight-errant of black equality.
This gave the Volunteers a firm base on which to build relationships with 
native Africans and Creoles, Howevever, it was somewhat ironical - and
Kennedy would have been the first to appreciate it — that, in the Caribbean 
at least, the other famed charnpion of black aspirations vras Fidel Castro, 
Although the Volunteers were glad to have Kennedy's popular imag-e 
behind them, they tended to regard the Washingfon officials who ran the 
Peace Corps as "bumbling idiots who don't know what the heck they are talking 
about." The Volunteers' attitude was similar to that of front-line soldiers 
towards the general staff - the individuals who worked and sacrificed in 
the field were unlikely to feel kindly towards their bosses whom they imagined 
sitting in their comfortable Washington offices. In Peace Corps terminology 
this dichotomy was known as the "we/they" syndrome. The Volunteers felt 
that Peace Corps officials had no sense of the realities of the field and 
when they spoke of the Washington bureaucracy it was as "it" or "them".
Once overseas, the Volunteers formed their own exclusive "subculture." To 
them Peace Corps officialdom soon came to resemble an alien - even a hostile - 
outside body. According to David Gelman, the Volunteers' feeling of being 
pitted against Washington "begins in training and never lets up. The Peace 
Corps administration to them is a bureaucratic bungler. The inadequacies of 
training cultivate this feeling. Selection methods heighten it, then break­
downs in field support, wrongheaded publicity etc....all add to it." Gelman 
concluded that "most Volunteers feel they succeed despite fasnii.gton,
Ironcially, a.0 one idolised the Volunteers more than the chief official 
in Washington - Sargent Shriver, He travelled tens .of thousands of miles to 
every comer of the world to ccngro/tulate and encourare then* Volunheers wrote 
long, personal letters to him; he always replied. Vfnen one disgruntled 
Volunteer in Colombia asked an evaluator to "Tell Sargent Shriver not to make 
promises he can't keep, Shriver's comment was, "Th-b 's right!" He then
asked what promises were being referred to and attempted to have something 
75done about them, Shriver was inspirational - guaranteed to motivate even 
the most lacklustre Volunteer, Volunteers were often deprecating of Shriver's 
lightning visits to the field, his "hail-fellow-well-met" style, and his pep- 
pill speeches» However, as Eugene Burdick and William Lederer noticed when 
Shriver visited the Philippines;
"All the Volunteers went to considerable trouble to get to the places 
where Shriver was talking, analysed his talk in very great detail and 
were somewhere between bemused and admiring about his appearance - even 
when this attitude was carefully buried under cynicism* And when he did 
not arrive as he had been scheduled to do, they were openjy disappointed 
....he is an important element in Volunteer enthusiasm."
Yet, although he spent a substantial amount of time in the field, Shriver
was never as sensitive to the Volunteers' problems - cultural, logistical or
personal - as they would have liked. \'Jhen Shriver visited some disgruntled
Volunteers in Niger, Philip Cook recorded that "they accosted him like the
77English barons cornering King John at Runnymede." However, it must be
doubtful whether any leader could have lived up to the Volunteers' lofty
expectations. As Burdick and Lederer told Shriver, "It is inevitable that
there will be hostility from people in the field directed at whatever admin-
78istrative headquarters are set up," The insurmountable obstacle was that
neither Shriver nor his staff had undergone the Volunteer experience. No
matter how hard they tried, they could not possibly be aware of all the
complexities involved in living and working at a grassroots level in the Third
World. Robert Textor, an early Washington staff member noted, "Many of the
79Corps' most serious problems stemmed from that simple fact." There was a 
certain lack of empathy between Peace Corps/Washington and the field*
Volunteers detested the manner in which Peace Corps officials paid flying visits 
to their projects, asked a lot of elementary questions and then speé"off with 
reports back to Washington, At an end of term conference on Colombia, one 
Volunteer described how a staff person came "whizzing through his town, stayed 
for a quick meal, asked 'How's your sex life?', gave me a whack on the back 
and told me to keep up the good work**- .and then the Volunteer was waving wanly 
at the trail of dust disappearing down the road. On another occasion, Volunteers 
in Nigeria were upset by the visit of a chronically ill-informed official 
from Peace Gorps/Washington. Their annoyance became all the greater when they 
discovered that she was the niece of a well-known Democratic leader. They 
concluded that she had been sent on a "junket" to Nigeria — at the Peace Corps' 
expense - for the sole purpose of currying political favour with her uncle 
The sometimes over-exuberant messages relayed to the field from Peace 
Corps/Washington which began "You are the pioneers etc...." were treated
whimsically by the Volunteers, "I was prepared for urinating in the streets,
for rats, fleas, malaria, leprosy" said one sceptical Volunteer, "but I was
not prepared for slow as molasses response from Washington," Certainly, the
general level of communication between 806 Connecticut Avenue and the field
left room for improvement. Often the "bunglers" in Washington failed to get
the Volunteers' sea freight delivered on time or took months to assign him
to a new job or forgot to send his monthly subsistence allowance. The policies
laid do\m by Peace Corps/Washington were, of course, a constant source of
friction. Indeed, evaluator David Gelman claimed that some official directives
only semred to confuse, and even mislead, the Volunteers:
"One week we send them a man who tells them their role is to work for
headmasters as docilely and anonymously as possible. Next week we send 
them a man who tells them they are going abroad to serve in the front 
line of the battle to stem the communist tide. One week our man tells 
them their role is to teach the leaders of the future, next week some­
one else tells them theg^ve got to go out and make friends for us, the 
teaching is secondary."
In later years, Peace Corps/Washington became much more receptive to the
exacting demands of Volunteers in the field. In June, 1962, a Division of
Volunteer Field Support was set up to maintain the liaison beizTeen Peace Coro 
Washington and the Volunteers overseas. It responded to Volunteers' .inquiries, 
supplied them with various support materials and published a magazine The 
Volunteer - to which every Peace Corpsman was encouraged to contribute, Many 
officials saw the Volunteers' difficulties at first hand when they served as 
in-country Reps and hundreds of returned Volunteers were incorporated into the 
administrative side* This gave the bureaucracy a new- perspective on the proffers 
faced by those overseas. However, in the first few years of the Peace Corps, 
the "we/they"syndrome persisted. Indeed, in 196p it was at its height. One 
Volunteer in Morocco told Kenneth Love, "A lot of kids, myself included, aren't 
quite sure if somebody didn't just pull a big joke - a big political ploy of some 
kind, I don’t know what to write home. T don't want to write all the things I 
have against the Peace Corps because they wouldn't understand. And I don't want 
to write that everything is hunky dory when it isn't.
A common complaint from Volunteers was that Peace Corps/Washington was 
encroaching far too much on their individual initiative. There were regulations 
on dress, travel during vacations, social activities and use of vehicles.
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Volunteers claimed that, while Peace Corps/Washington preached self- 
reliance and individualism, it practised a stultifying paternalism. 
Volunteers valued their independence* The feeling of being "on their 
own" in-a far country gave them a sense of adventure and responsibility. 
However, by 1963, many had begun to fear that the regular check-ups 
from Washington, the conferences and questionnaires (in the interests 
of research and assessment) and the proliferation of rules would 
eventually erode their autonomy. In I963, a Volunteer in East Pakistan 
claimed, "The Peace Corps attracted more bold adventurers in its early 
days - before it was safe,"^^
The Peace Corps administration's difficult task was to strike a 
balance between support and interference. If Peace Corps/Washington 
did not provide enough information or equipment, it would be accused 
of indifference to the needs of the Volunteer; if it provided too 
much, then it was doubting his maturity. Each Volunteer had his otm 
idea of where the golden mean lay. Some Volunteers in East Pakistan 
who had set up an impromptu minor medication centre were deeply 
resentful when Peace Corps/Washington ordered them to shut It down 
because - technically speaking - they were not qualified ts deal with 
medicine, 'T/e*re becoming the typical American bureacracy," opined 
one Volunteer,In 196I, Margery Michelmore, a .young Volunteer in 
Nigeria, lost a postcard on which she had graphically described the 
less salubrious aspects of life in Ibadan, The card fell into the 
hands of radical native students and an international incident ensued. 
Prom then on, the Peace Corps placed a ban on postcards ~ but some 
Volunteers resented this as a curtailment of their personal freedom. 
Volunteers in Jamaica became furiously indignant when Sargent Shriver 
attempted to interfere with their weekly newspaper - The Bullsheet -
which was critical of Peace Corps/Washington, Shriver deemed it 
negative and insensitive but evaluators Elwell and Love agreed with 
the Volunteers that there should be no censorship of their publications. 
However, Charles Peters supported Shriver. While he agreed that censor­
ship should be restricted to material offensive to host citizens, he 
also recognised that "even the best young people can be damned silly 
at times, I think Margery Michelmore is a good illustration, Margery 
was as sensitive and as intelligent a Volunteer as we ever had. in the 
Peace Corps, Yet, she wrote that postcard, "Peters argued that mild 
censorship was sometimes necessary and not always the last resort of 
"frightened bureacrats." Volunteers in Malaya and Morocco - whose 
publications were also modified by Peace Corps/Washington - failed 
to ag3:ee* "Big Daddy Peace Corps is too much, "■'moaned one Volunteer, 
Unfortunately, it was the in-country administrators - the Reps 
and their staffs - who had to bear the brunt of the Volunteers* 
resentment of Peace Corps officialdom in general. This was slightly
ironical since, as Shriver pointed out, most Reps shared the Volunteers’
87feelings of being "out of touch" with Peace Corps/Washington,
After all; beth were victims of the same bureacrat:c bungling. For 
example, in the autumn of 1962, P.P.O.’s African Division sent out 
a new contingent of Volunteers to Nigeria but, to the consternation
of Rep Murray Frank, Washington neglected to inform him of their
88intended arrival,^ Situated between uhe Peace Corps hierarchy and 
the Volunteers, the Reps formed their ovm unique "subculture,"
Their job was all-encompassing. As the head of the Peace Corps 
mission in the field, the Rep had great prestige both with host country 
nationals and with other American agencies. Therefore, although
somewhat removed from official protocol and routine, he had to be 
skilled in the arts of diplomacy. He also had to be a vigorous admin­
istrator, Endowed by Shriver with an enormous amount of responsibility, 
the Rep had to be capable of delegating and exercising power in strange 
circumstances with very few procedural guidelines to aid his choices.
The long distances separating the Rep’s country headquarters (usually 
in the capital city) from the various regions where the Volunteers 
worked, complicated the administrative picture even more. Communication 
became difficult and confusion almost inevitable. It took a Volunteer 
stationed in the back-country of Brazil, three days to reach the Peace 
Corps headquarters in Rio where he had been told an urgent telegram 
awaited him; but when he arrived he discovered the cable was for 
someone else. Despite such mishaps, Peace Corps Reps retained an aura 
not usually found within government agencies. Indeed, Burdick and
Lederer deemed that the in-country Rep had "thixsingle most important
89external and internal role in the Peace Corps,"
The Rep had to have outstanding qualities of personal leader­
ship. Given the youth of ..most Volunteers, their inexperience in 
foreign countries, and their commitment to the Peace Corps, it was 
axiomatic that they would look to their Rep not only for guidance but 
for approbation. Par-his part, the Rep had to win their confidence, 
fuel their enthusiasm and - at the same time - enforce discipline when 
necessary* Somehow the Rep had to avoid being regarded by the Volunteers 
as a "tyrant" but, simultaneously, he had to beware of becoming overly- 
perrnissive. As Rep Roderic S. Duller in Venezuela put it, "You've 
got to give them a kick in the butt when they need it and still make 
them like it.
As a result of their high demands upon the Rep, the Volunteers 
often became disappointed if he did not measure up to what they expected of
him - even though their expectations were sometimes totally unreasonable. The
Rep soon became aware that everything about him - ' ■ .
luxurious, whether he sent his children to local or expatriate schools, whether 
his wife shopped at the local market or the P.X* commissariat - was under the 
continual and critical 'Scrutiny of the Volunteers in his programme. His 
proximity to the field meant that his time and his home always had to remain open 
to Volunteers; a private life was impossible. Every programme had its 
information network or "jungle telegraph", which operated over thousands of miles, 
keeping the Volunteers up to date on their Rep’s most personal activities. Gossip 
was rife and programmes were often divided into factions. Volunteers in
Venezuela "revolted" against their Rep. He had made little effort to keep in
contact with them, had allowed private agencies to take advantage of them, and 
when it became known that he had sauntered off to Mexico on vacation, it was the
last straw. The Regional Director for Latin America, Jack Vaughn, travelled to
Venezuela to placate the angry Volunteers and the Rep was fired. In May, I963, 
there was a "mutiny" in the clique-ridden programme in Somalia. The nitration 
was only resolved when the Rep and seven other Volunteers were dismissed. In 
Turkey twenty-ei^ht out of thirty-nine Volunteers would not sign a petition to 
have their Acting Rep made permanent - he was replaced. There was also a small 
"mutiny" in Ethiopia in January, I963, when a few Volunteers spread the false 
rumour that their Rep had been guilty of a "racist" action against a black member 
of his staff. The Rep in question, Harris Wofford - a former Special Assistant 
To The President On Civil Rights and the founding father of the Peace Corps’ 
positive discrimination policy in favour of blacks - was easily able to clear up 
the misunderstanding. Nevertheless, that a man like Wofford could ever be 
accused of racism was a lesson for all Reps to be on their guard against
incestuous gossip-mongering in the field,
The Rep and his staff were assisted by a Volunteer Leader - an outstanding 
character usually chosen during training - who was supposed to help his colleagues 
with their personal and occupational problems. Sometimes these Leaders won the 
respect of their peers and ..stimulated camaraderie; they were given an extra
stipend for this purpose. However, more often than not, the Leaders came to be
regarded by their fellows as "errand boys" for Peace Corps/Washington; 
their extra money merely became a "booze fund" for themselves and their friends.
A typical Volunteer Leader in Brazil - a Harvard law graduate who enjoyed playing
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the "big shot" - infuriated, rather than inspired his colleagues. Charles Peters 
and most evaluators felt the Leader role was too vague and that it inspired 
jealousy more than anything else. Hence in a memorandum to Sargent Shriver in July,
9:
1963, Peters recommended that the entire Volunteer Leader concept should be scrappeé 
In the final outcome, the relationship between the overseas staff and the 
Volunteers depended almost entirely upon the Reps. "Their personal leadership," 
wrote Shriver, "is the least known but most vital factor in the overseas 
achievements."^^ The Rep had to cope with difficulties in communication and 
administration, gross under-staffing and bureaucratic bloomers in Washington ~ 
and yet he had to make his programme a success. In a tongue-in-cheek memorandum 
to Peace Gorps/Washington, in May, 1962,Glenn Ferguson, Rep in Thailand, 
eloquently analysed his "no-win" occupation:
"Peace Corps existence is a lonely existence. To the Volunteer, the 
Rep is too inaccessible for a companion, too harried for a confidante, 
too committed for a friend. To the Foreign Sem/ice compatriot, 
the Rep is too youthful for equality, too idealistic for acceptance, 
too busy for golf. To the counterpart, the Rep is too n w  for sharing 
ideas, too alien for sharing problems and too affluent for sharing a 
home....If the Rep is approaching success, he is lonely,...Loneliness 
is his credo, independence his cause. Too close to the Volunteers, he 
becomes a crutch. Too distant he becomes a threat....The skills of the 
Rep are the skills of the den mother, the clerk, the personnel director, 
the salesman and the diplomat..,.His family vill decry his schedule., 
the Volunteers will decry his motives, his compatriots will decry his 
approach....His headquarters becomes a.n adversary, his home becomes a 
haven, his job becomes his life. Select the man who is introspective; 
the man who enjoys being alone, and the man who communicates with all,"
Despite the difficult nature of the job, the Pence Corps produced some 
marvellously successful Raps, Frank Mankiewicz, in Peru, was the epitome of the 
Peace Corps Rep par excellence. Almost without exception, the Volunteers liked 
and respected him and - along with his staff in Lima - he was constantly 
involved in negotiations with Peruvian agencies to improve and adjust programme 
deficiencies. Evaluator Herb Wegner estimated that Mankiewicz reached "about 
the best possible mix between leadership, guidance and free-rein in programming 
Volunteer projects.” Likewise in Costa Rica, Rep Frank Appleton provided a first- 
class example of how to build effective and mutually amicable Volunteer-staff 
relations. "It would be hard to find a man more personally concerned with the
welfare and success of his Volunteers, " reported Dee ^acobs. Robert Steiner in 
Afghanistan was another model Rep, "Very soft-—>spoken, Bob works in a'gentle, 
smooth, soft-sell way that is equally effective with Volunteers, Afghans and 
the U.S.O.M.," wrote Thorburn Reid, "Patient, good-humoured, understanding and 
perceptive, there is little to fault him." Steiner set his Volunteers an excell­
ent example by speaking fluent Farsi, including native Afghans among his staff 
and by living at a "grassroots" level. Of a weekend, Steiner was to be found in 
the local bazaars shopping and bargaining for various items such as rope beds 
for his Volunteers. In Togo, Rep G. Payne Lucas covered thousands of miles in 
his Peace Corps jeep to maintain communication with his far-flung Volunteers,
The roads were bumpy and dangerous and Lucas had many accidents, However,
he broke through some serious bottlenecks and kept in touch with his Volunteers 
while managing to uphold an uneasy truce with a somewhat hostile U.S. Embassy 
staff. As Philip Cook pointed out, Lucas was "young, frenetic, and a bit 
unsteady in his management, but he has generally done a superb job."
Sargent Shriver consistently stressed to in-country support staffs that
they were there to satisfy the needs of the Volunteers. "Let it be clear, he wrote
"not one staff member is more important to the Peace Corps than the
97freshest, most apprehensive Volunteer in the field." Even so, Shriver*s instruct 
ions were not always followed to the letter. The most serious shortcoming was
a failure to keep up communication. In many countries, the Rep’s reluctance to
visit Volunteers in faraway projects contributed to his general lack of aware­
ness and understanding of Volunteer attitudes, problems, behaviour and jobs.
Some Reps over-emphasised the Peace Corps' diplomatic relationship with 
the Embassy and the host government - at the expense of Volunteers, Others
acted as if the field was an annoying nuisance which interrupted the really
important work of admin^tration and organisation. A Rep in Sierra Leone did 
not make a habit of travelling long distances to see his Volunteers. "He makes
it pretty clear that he likes his comfort," wrote David Gelman, "he likes the
98gracious life, he likes his leisurely lunch on the vergpdah,"
One staff member in Morocco obviously regarded the Volunteers as "pains in the 
neck that cause her to get up earlier than she likes”; a Rep in the Ivory Coast
was reported to Shriver as being "not exactly warmly human with the Volunteers."
In the Philippines a Rep was "too lax with the staff and the Volunteers"; and, in
99Brazil, another Rep was just "too nice" to be effective. Fearful that a high
number of early terminations would reflect badly upon their administrative capa­
bilities, weak Reps sometimes retained unsatisfactory performers in their 
programmes - much to the disgust of the other Volunteers, Some staff members did 
not make any attempt to learn the language of their host country - yet, they 
expected the Volunteers to do so. When Shriver discovered that one Contract 
Representative Overseas in the Ivory Coast could neither speak French nor knew 
about French customs, he ordered Rogers Finch (Chief of Whiversity Relations) to 
"Take prompt action.... this must be changed immediately." In 196^, Charles Peters 
advocated that all'Reps - as well as Volunteers - who did not maintain an 
adequate language proficiency, should be dismissed from the Peace Corps. "We talk 
a lot about Peace Corps service being tough,” be told Shriver^tet's make it 
tough by giving language tests every six months and throwing out all Volunteers 
and staff who fail to show reasonable improvement. Between 1961 and 1964» many 
Reps were ordered to "take a purgative"; indeed, attrition was greater among 
overseas staff than among Volunteers.
One of the more conspicuous excesses of the Peace Corps administration - 
caused by Washington as well as country Reps - was the amount of money, materials 
and supplies which it provided for Volunteers in the field. Despite the popular 
media image of the Peace Corpsman living in a "mud hut", very few Volunteers 
suffered extreme physical hardship. They were paid a monthly "subsistence 
aIlowa,nce" from which they had to feed, clothe and shelter themselves. The amount 
of this allowance varied according to the general standard of living in different 
countries. In some countries - for example, Peru, Panfuna, India, Morocco - 
Volunteers were paid almost the same as their native hosts» However, in most 
cases, the Volunteers* subsistence allowance - although meagre by American 
standards - permitted them to enjoy a lifestyle far above that of their counter­
parts, For instance, the 110 dollars which Peace Corps nurses in Tanganyika 
received was twice what their native colleagues earned in salary. In Costa Rica, 
Dee Jacobs reckoned that the Volunteers* 125 dollars "subsistence" payment
was at least 10 or 15 dollars too high. In Senegal, Volunteers admitted that
1 01“ with a little effort - they could save a full half of their living allowance.
In many places over-generous payments to Volunteers led to extravagant
living conditions and - more seriously - social ostracisation from the poorer
native peoples, "The Peace Corps is known to exist in hsukka, but is not seen,"
wrote one native Nigerian, disappointed at the Volunteers’ social exclusiveness,
"One of then just speeds on his scooter all the time,...were J.P.K, to resurrect
in Nsulcka, I am sure he woiiLd be sad," Another Volunteer in Venezuela was able to
afford a brand new motor bike on which, according to evaluators, he clocked up
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"five thousand, fun-filled miles" - far ay/ay from his host community.
Almost all Volunteer teachers had very comfortable accommodation; indeed,
sometimes evaluators deemed it too comfortable. Herb v/'egner estimated that in
Brazil, nehrly two thirds of all Volunteers were living in "pure luxury", Hor
did Volunteers in Ethiopia endure a spartan existence; in fact, evaluator Richard
Richter’s main criticism of an otherwise excellent programme was that too many
103Volunteers were enjoying "la dolce vita,"
In Africa, Volunteer teachers usually employed native stewards, houseboys
and cleaners who could be hired for a few dollars a month. To a great extent, the
Volunteers were pressurised into this situation, African teachers were expected 
to have a comfortable abode and at least one servant. Ha:, the Volunteers 
refused, they would not only have been guilty of contravening an important social 
custom, but would have found it impossible to win the respect of their native 
colleagues and students alike. Seme Volunteers reluctantly accepted whet they 
found personally repugnant, while other heartily enjoyed the pleasure of cross- 
cultux-al readjustment, A number of Volunteers is Sierra Leone had their own 
cooks, i'Tjl one fellow went so far ac to have breakfast served to him every 
morning - in bed, A few Volunteers admittea that they "never had it so good in 
the States", Only a tiny minority of Volunteers lived in excessive lucaurr, but 
the general danger of too much comfort was that Volunteers were tempted to spend 
time enjoying themselves at home when they should have been making people-to- 
people contacts outside. Some Volunteers’ relationships with natives soon became 
limited to their students, houseboys and cooks - like the teacher in Brazil who
worked fourteen hours a week but otherwise enjoyed "reading and resting and 
lolling around the nice house," In early 1964, Charles Peters intensified his 
campaign to discourage Volunteers from employing servants whenever possible.
"It's important to show that the Volunteer can do the dirty work around the 
house," he told Shriver,"^
The Peace Corps administration did not help matters by supplying Volunteers
with a constant stream of equipment - from pencil-sharpeners, pots and pans
and refrigerators, to Polaroid cameras, G-estetner machines and tape recorders.
Some overseas staff members complained that they spent half their time
requisitioning and paying for goods - household and work - for the Volunteers,
In some countries, the supply of "goodies" got completely out of hand. In British
Honduras, Volunteers were provided with two 19-foot fiberglass yachts and four
28-horsepower outboard motox*-boats allegedly for "recreational and working
purposes," Whether they were used for work or not, the 'boats reinforced the
1 05stereotyped Latin American image of the ostentatious, affluent "Yanquis."
The most prominent sign of what evaluators sarcastically referred to as
the "Cuerpo de Tourista" image of the Volunteer#, was the proliferation in
almost every country of the Peace Corps' blue-coloured jeeps. In the poorer
countries of Latin America, Philip Cook and Thorburn Reid pointed out, "Peace Corps
vehicles stand out like. President l.ennedy's white Lincoln .with the armour plate
For many assignments there was little need for vehicles — but programmes were
usually liberally sprinkled with them just the same. The jeeps caused fights
between Volunteers'as to who should have them at what tires, they were a
distraction from tho job, they were expensive, tine-consuming and, most of all,
they served to symbolise the difference in standards of living between the
young Americans and the natives. To the peoples of the car.pesinos and barrios,
the blue jeeps represented the typical soft-living, easy-going crowd of ■'gringos''
out for a pleasant vacation. Besides, it was not the best advertisement for the
Peace Corps when - as in 'Venezuela - the blue jeeps were sometimes spotted parked
outside the local brothel. With a view to making Peace Corps jeeps slightly
less prominent, Sargent Shriver had them painted from blue to green in the 
summer of 1963*^^^
Moreover, by 1963, the worst health hasard to Volunteers had proven to be
not malaria or beri-berl, but rather. Peace Corps jeeps. Some Volunteers tended
to drive the jeeps on the dirt roads of Africa and Latin America a,t much the
same speed as they would have driven them in New York. There were numerous
accidents involving Volunteers, natives and livestock. In the Dominican Republic,
Dee Jacobs counted three major and thirteen minor accidents in two years. In
some countries there were law suits over injuries to host nationals and animals.
In short, jeeps were a menace* They cost the Peace Corps money in gasoline and
repair-bills and wayward Volunteers were inclined to use them for unscheduled
vacations, visits to fellow Volunteers in faraway towns - occasionally - for
drag races. Of course, in s ome countries vehicles were necessary. In Peru, they
7/ere essential for getting Volunteers to 'the coastal areas; and in Nyasaland,
evaluator Richard Elwell commented on the moderate'and "level-headed" way in
which jeeps were being used*^^^ In general however, most evaluators reckoned
that: the fewer Peace Gbrps jeeps in a country, the better it was for the
programme. In September, 1963, Charles Peters recommended a policy to Shriver
of "no Peace Corps-suppU.ed vehicles for Volunteers", V/here jeeps were
absolutely necessary, Peters suggested the Peace Corps should get A.I.D. to
supply them through the host government. He added impishly that the difficulty
involved in getting vehicles through A.I.D, would serve as-a deterrent against
Volunteers asking for too many,too often, "Of course," Peters concluded, "?re
109should continue to supply motor bikes, bikes and horses - where necessary."
The dan -er of giving Volunteers too nuch money or equn.pment was ever-present
in the Peace Corps, Inevitably, there was a good deal of miscalculation. To
define exactly appropriate "living standards" for all Volunteers in every country
was on impossible task. There was some abuse - and not only by the Volunteers,
Peace Corps Reps and staff members often lived very well overseas, V/hnle they
were not expected to live at the "grassroots" level, if they wallowed in luxury
they could not expect to be taken seriously when they asked their Volunteers to
live more austerely. For example, some Volunteers in Caracas rented pretentious
apartments in the best part of town. However, their Rep had set a precedent by 
ensconcing himself in a lavish house formerly occupied by an American oil company
executive. Evaluators looked more favourably upon the Peace Corps offices 
established in a slum in Dacca; "most appropriate," commented Tim Adams, Charles 
Peters and other evaluators noted that the Peace Corps administration sometimes 
supplied Volunteers with equipment to make up for their being badly-programmed.
A Volunteer who had,, a jeep and a stereo would not have as much spare time to 
spend complaining that he had nothing to do. Or, as Peters put it to Shriver, 
"It's a hell of a lot easier to get a Volunteer a tape recorder than to find him
.  .  n 10a gooa joo."
Yet, with a fe?/ exceptions, Volunteers did make a physical sacrifice
during their Peace Corps service. For example, although jeeps were regarded as
extravagances by host nationals and evaluators', most young Volunteers - used to
having a car back home - complained that the Peace Corps did not provide enough
vehicles. No Volunteers had to starve or sleep out in the open, but there wezre
varying degrees of discomfort. A "subsistence allowance" which ?/as very
comfortable by Third World standards, was still very meagre in American, terms.
Each Volunteer managed his finances in his own way. Some saved their money for
travel during summer vacation, others used their personal allowance to invest
in materials for their projects - like the Volunteer in Brazil who bought food
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with her own money'to supplement the diet of local children.
Volunteers were usually the biggest critics of the relatively affluent life
which they led in the underdeveloped world. One Volunteer in Liberia chided
himself and his colleagues that "Vfe're not living as the natives live, "e have
plenty of clothes, we eat better and ride around and drinic rants and have lots
of books," Paradoxically, evaluator David G-elman reported that Volunteers in
Liberia were living much more stringently than the majority of their colleagues
in Africa, The same subsistence allowance which implied Ircaup/ for one
Volunteer could easily mean hardship to another, w'hile fev/ Volunteers had to
SLiffer abject poverty, few lived the life of an opulent nabob. "To the average
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Volunteer", Kevin Delany noted, "happiness is a cold beer."
The American press tended to associate physical deprivation with a 
successful Peace Corps programme. This was.a simple-minded distortion of the 
Peace Corps' purpose. The Peace Corps Act said Volunteers should be "willing to
seive under conditions of hardship"; hut discomfort, par se, was not a goal.
Certainly, as Sargent Shriver insisted, Volunteers had to show a willingness
"to share the life of another people, to accept sacrifice when sacrifice is
necessary and to show that material privilege has not become the central and
113
indispensable ingredient in an American's life." However, although Volunteers 
did not live in mud huts, the majority fulfilled those objectives.
It was often the case that the happiest Volunteers were those with the 
most difficult living conditions. Host Volunteers seemed to enjoy lonely jobs 
in the remote outback more tlian big city work. In the city there were many 
expatriates and the Volunteers could easily become just another face in the 
crowd. Also, cities were impersonal; it was difficult for Volunteers to make 
a contribution that was distinctly their own. While they had the company of 
each other in the city, there was the danger of social clannishness and that 
contacts with natives would become limited; Volunteers would congregate for 
"bull" sessions where they could gripe, complain, gossip and generally waste 
their time. On the other hand, although up-country assignments lacked social 
amenities and conversation with Americans, they held the attractions of a freer, 
more informal style of life, increased contact with the local folk, and greater 
opportunities to make a personal impact.
Naturally, not all Volunteers preferred to be on. their own an! the best 
results were not always produced working - as they called it - "à la Schv/eitser." 
The needs of different projects varied and many demanded the application of a 
group of Volunteers working in close harmony. However, Volunteer morale wes 
almost always higher in the up-country progranules. Thejh were studded with 
characters who thrived on the freedoyyyand responsibility which isolation 
allowed them » In Panama, a young Volunteer working with the Caribbean coastal 
Indians dia not visit Panama City for ‘ten months; every few weeks he took a boat 
upstream to deliver fish, rice and pig-meat to the natives, A Volunteer working in 
the Liberian bush became so popular that he was adopted as a son of the local 
tribe and had a baby named after him. In West Pakistan, a lone Volunteer 
taught agricultural classes, organised a local P.T.A., set up demonstration 
gardens and coached the school basketball team; he was even given 700 rupees by
the Katlang Town Council to develop a farm. An arts and crafts worker in
Peru helped the native Indians of Arequipa with their designs and took advantage
of the.great love of music in the harriadas to organise a local choir. In
Ethiopia, Paul Tsongas not only taught hut, with the help of his students, cut
do-\vn trees and built footbridges over muddy streams and ditches. During his
vacation he remained alone with his students to construct a hostel for the
village of G-hion. Evaluator Richard Richter noted that Tsongas - like many
other Volunteers v/orking alone in isolated areas - had achieved " a very close
11A
relationship" with his hosts*
Not all Volunteers were as outstanding* Indeed, many were guilty of both
public and private indiscretions. One Volunteer in Nigeria was "terminated" for
taking a completely unauthorised fifty day vacation in Europe,. In Ethiopia,
evaluator Richard Elwell noted that some Volunteers' manners had deteriorated so
badly that "they fart out loud at meal-time" . A Volunteer in Indonesia spent
most of his working day writing up his Master’s thesis; another 7/as described
as having "the experience and most of the attributes of a Californian beach-boy."
Some Volimteers in Latin America were dismissed for becoming involved in the
local "black market"; others for showing "poor judgement" in joining a public
demonstration against their school administrators* A couple of Volunteers in
Africa were,'3 ent home for smoldLng marijuana^ "In Morocco., a Volunteer 7/,?n "a - - -
spoiled, lazy oaf, he yawns and complains.- of hunger and,.avoids Moroccans*"
Another Volunteer in Brazil, a welder by trade, ordered and received, two thirty-
pound clamps for use in his work, but he preferred to use them as bar-bells; he
was reported as being "passive, doesn't relate well with nationals, doesn’t
115want to v7ork - and has tremendous biceps*"
Inevitably, ,sc-hie Volunteers over-indulged in alcohol* The most cumragoous
incident occurr&iin 1963 w hen a groupfrcWiEast Pakistan visited a bar in dc.wn-
town Dacca, When the party broke up, one Volunteer had to be carried out of the
place; meanwhile, his colleagues commandeered the bicycle rickshaws at the kerb,
put the ■ native drivers in the passenger seats, and raced each other through the
streets. The local Pakistanis were not impressed at this particular form of
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"people-to-people" contact. A few characters made frighteningly ^unsuitable
Peace Corps Volunteers. One teacher in the Cameroons insisted to evaluator
Wilson Me Garthy that she had been sent by God on a "mission" to save the
natives. A rather sadistic fellow in Liberia took great delight in. telling
evaluators how he had burned a live rat with kerosene. In one of the more macabre
incidents overseas, tvro Volunteers drove around Guatemala in a Peace Corps jeep
purposely running over dogs - some tvro dozen of them. Ambassador Bell ended the
'117incident, by sending the obviously deranged pair home. These two extreme cases 
joined one hundred and fourteen other Volunteers who, between 1961 and 1965, 
received the "Braniff Low Achievement Award" .- the Volunteers* facetious 
euphemism for an early plane ticket home.
Sexual relations presented the Volunteers with some of their most sensitive
personal dilemmas overseas. Peace Corps/Washington established seme very general
policies: cohabitation was forbidden, contraceptive devices were not supplied,
brothels were off-limits. During training Volunteers were told that, while the
Peace Corps wanted to give them maximum freedom in their personal lives, going
overseas 7/as not a license for sexual adventure. They were left in no doubt tliat
any sexual conduct which endangered either the success of their programme or the
reputation of the Peace Corps, would res ult in instant dismissal,. However, it
was impossible to regulate the sexual behaviour of thousandsof young men and
7/omen,, .ITnder lonely and often frustrating circumstances, Volunteers did not aiways-
act discreetly. In Togo, evaluator Philip Cook reported ample evidence of
"affairs involving female Volunteer teachers and Togolese men. There are affairs
involving female Volunteer teachers and Peace Corps men. There are affairs
involving Peace Corps men and Togolese women. ,And where is a bit of V.D." ï.'hile
such behaviour did not necessarily offend the moral code of Sub-Sahara Africans,
Charles Fetors emphasised to Shriver that Volunteers must be made to unierstani
that "even though their particular hosts might not object to nightly orgiss, a
world-wide reputation for such behaviour could get the Peace Corps un-invited in
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a lot of other places and unsupported in the U.S. Congress,"
Peace Corps Reps struggled manfully to limit imprudence, but not always
with complete success. Despite the Peace Corps* ruling against cohabitation, 
the problem of "mixed housing" - male and female Volunteers sharing the same
accommodation - persisted in several countries» When evaluators in Venezuela
discovered a male Volunteer and a female Volunteer living under the same roof
together with a native male and female, they dubbed the situation "the ultimate
119in counterpart relations." Both Volunteers were sent home. In West
Pakistan there were three Volunteers* households containing two single girls and
/ ^
a single man. These manages a trois had become the subject of a good deal of
Pakistani gossip and had strengthened the already prevalent feeling that
"American women were immodest and immoral. As evaluator Tim Adams pointed out:
"In a Muslim . country where separation of the sexes is so 
strictly observed, it is curious that v/e Americans should 
import a living arrangement that is opprobrious even in 
our own relaxed society....To be sure, the relationship between 
male and female Volunteers in such households is quite clearly 
that of brother and sister. But the housing arrangement 
has the appearance of a greater intimacy than that, and in 
Pakistan the appearance is the reality."
In the margin of this report Shriver ordered Warren Wiggins to take immediate
1 20action on this "inexcusable" situation.
While the vast majority of Volunteers behaved with exemplary modesty : and
tact, there were a few embarrassing faux pas. One Volunteer in a Latin American
country went around throwing herself "literally and figuratively at the opposite
sex." Another immature girl whose sexual proclivities had already got her
transferred from Nigeria, again brought herself to the brink of scandal in
Liberia, A number of female Volunteers became pregnant and thei'e were cases where
native girls filed paternity suits against male Volunteers. A few Volunteers
became fathers to "Peace Corps babies:" there were also instances of "marriages
of ne ce si by" be CTreon Volunteers, In some P ar Eastern c o . n t r i e s , even blie most
casual relationship with a native female was regarded as a prelude to marriage.
Hence, several impressionable young men found themselves married to native girls
after only a few months of Peace Corps s e r v i c e . A twenty-one year old Volun t e e r
1 21
in Colombia was sent home after marrying a native grandmother.
Most Peace Corps programmes suffered at least a few cases of venereal disease* 
In Thailand, the Peace Corps staff was concerned that only three cases of V.D, 
had been reported among the more than' sixty male Volunteers - it ?/as felt others 
might be getting inadequate or no treatment, "But before I left," vrrote evaluator
John Griffin in February 1965, "other reports came in, building the number up to 
what the Peace Corps doctor called a 'healthy average*'" By way of comparison,
1 ;
Griffin noted that some U.S. army units in Thailand suffered 100 per cent infection.
Most of the Volunteers' sexual quandaries stemmed from cross-cultural 
differences. In some Moslem countries, native women were forbidden to go out 
with westerners. In Tanganyika, male Volunteers told David Gelman that, a,s fa.r 
as sexual relations were concerned, they "might as well have been eunuchs"*
Another exasperated Volunteer in Indonesia claimed that not only was "dating 
impossible, but even visiting a native girl v/as difficult. In countries such % 
Turkey, Iran and Ceylon, male Volunteers had to come terms with the homosexual­
ity prevalent in those societies. As evaluator Arthur Dudden noted in Ceylon, the
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widespread homosexuality was "an alarming challenge to some Volunteers."
The complications raised by a different culture's approach to sexuality 
were exacerbated for female Volunteers* In some Near Eastern societies where 
females were closely protected, only a certain type of woman walked the streets 
and took active part with men in community life. In other countries, it was 
against "social etiquette for an unmarried woman to be seen alone with a nan.
Then again, in Africa, men often expected a physical relationship to develop on 
a first "date". Female Volunteers had to overcome these predicaments and, at 
the same time, avoid offending racial and cultural sensitivities. Sometimej 
Peace Corps training courses did not give females enough warning of the sexually 
aggressive attitudes of African and Latin American men. In the Third forId, the 
image of the Axierican woman was that projected by Hollywood - mlamcrous, smtp'- 
headed and promiscuous.. Evaluator Thomas Dugan noted that in.Turkey, American 
films had given the Turks the impression that "the American woman jumps from 
bed to bed," As c. result, American girls were regarded as "fair game' h" their 
male hosts. In Ecuador, Richard Elwell warned Peace Corps girls that they 
would have to be careful - "an unescorted female is very liliely to gat raped 
after dark in Guanquil," In the Philippines, .nearly evezy female Volunteer 
had been either "pinched, grabbed, abused, attacked, raped or near-raped
Although difficulties and temptation abounded, only a tiny minority of
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Volimteers chose to over'-indulge their sexual appetites. Normal human v/ealcness 
notwithstanding, most Volunteers proved to he dedicated, healthy personalities 
who held a responsible perspective on their ov/n moral priorities. Nightly orgies 
and cohabitation were far from being the "norm" overseas. The Volunteers general 
level of morality was more typified by the Volunteer vdio spent his vacation 
digging dirt roads in the slums of Santo Domingo, or the Peace Corps nurse in 
Vicos who made rounds to her patients by long and difficult foot-trails, or the 
young man who spent six hours a day at a leper colony in Liberia.^Volunteers 
were rarely "holier-than-thou" types. However, they did pzlde themselves on 
being different from the swaggering, loud-mouthed, "macho" American, too often on 
view overseas. If a Volunteer was in danger of disgracing his programme, his 
colleagues usually reprimanded him before Peace Corps/Washington did. In 
Thailand, evaluator John Griffin noted one case where a Volunteer took up with 
a prostitute; but the other Volunteers had a serious talk, with him to the effect 
that he was spoiling Peace Corps impact by behaving like a G.I, He promised 
to mend his ways.^^^
Despite the many problems of cross-cultural adjustment, the vast majority 
of Volunteers - both male and female - did make a favourable impact on their 
host societies. Evaluation reports - written from a critical standpoint - were 
freighted with stories of the positive contributions made by Peace Corps 
Volunteers, "On the job, most of them resemble A1 Ca^p," wrote'Philip Gook'in 
Gabon, "Bearded, sweaty, the few clothes they wear dirty or tom, they are a 
frightening sight.»*.(but) Volunteers are providing sound, on-the-job training 
in carpentry and construction to unskilled Gabonese villagers." Incidentally, 
these Volmiteers rose at 5*30 a.m. and were in bed at 5.00 p.m. In the Toledo 
district of British Honduras, Volunteers "biased romantic trails thrcugn the 
bush" moving from village to village teaching handicrafts. One Volunteer in Peru 
- in addition to teaching - invented a skin/ cream from the water left over from 
wool-making and thus began a new "cottage industry" for the native Indians,
And, in a comjnunity development project in the Dominican Republic, evaluators 
reckoned that at least one Volunteer would leave behind evidence of his 
significant contribution:
"A town council already convinced that it can bring about 
civic improvements by utilising its own resources* He 
will leave behind scores of farmers using modern methods of 
feeding and breeding their animals, along with others v/ho 
realise the advantages of prime seed, fertilisation and use 
of insecticides. Unless we miss our guess, he will also leave 
a model home construction and agrarian reform project to be 
admired and copied," 128
In criticising, Kennedy's Peace Corps, Kevin Lov/ther and C. Payne Lucas 
argued that the agency surrendered to "benign mediocrity" and retained "non­
performing" Volunteers in order to give the American public the impression that
the bold experiment was succeeding. They described the majority of Volunteers
1 29as "do-gooders and dilettantes....the unmet hope of the Peace Corps,"
Certainly there were weak links, With so many young people sent overseas for the 
first time there were bound to be problems, embabrassing incidents and personal 
indiscretions. Indeed, the Volunteers were their own most virulent critics. 
However, it is impossible to generalise about the quality of Peace Corps 
Volunteers, In every programme there were at least three very broad levels» There 
were a few absolutely outstanding Volunteers who were effective in achieving all 
three Peace Corps goals; they worked hard, showed real empathy with their hosts 
and colleagues, and were the epitome of capable, selfless Americans striving for 
understanding of another culture. In the middle was the largest group, vrho made 
a contribution in terms of providing knowledge and exchanging cultural values 
but - because of difficult local conditions or a lack of talent, energy or 
empathy - did not have first-class, all-round impact. At the lower end of the 
scale were a minority of Volunteers who, for various reasons, ended up frustrated, 
defeated and perhaps even embittered; but o.t all costs - at least for s .me of 
their time overseas - even this group acted as good-will ambassadors. Evaluators 
observed both strong and weak Volunteers in every country/ - and often the pendulum 
sv/ung between the two. Paraphrasing President Kennedy, on Volunteer described 
his Peace Corps experience as having a rhythm which ebbed and flowed every aay.*^^ 
In Ecuador, two groups of Volunteers had a completely different morale and 
impact. Group X had the "weary, independent pessimism of tired soldiers", whereas 
Group.II were "a bunch of sweethearts - amicable, enthusiastic and fearless - 
perfectly at home in Ecuador." In El Salvador one Volunteer had an alcohol
problem, another had "a talent for community development and ivomen" and a third 
individual v/as "thoughtful, hardworking, logical and successful," Cne lazy 
Volunteer in Brazil admitted that he joined the Peace Corps for "a joyride." 
However, a colleague worked " izventy-four hours a day" ministering to sick natives; 
indeed, the evaluators were delighted when she excused herself from their 
intensive questioning because she had to get back to work* In Sierra Leone, a 
Volunteer felt he had little in common with Africans because, he said, "their 
educational level is so much lowers" Other Volunteers gave up their vacation 
and stayed with their host community to build ne?/ schools. A chauvinistic 
Volunteer in East Pakistan "crowed loud and long about the superiority of 
American life," while another Volunteer in the same programme, "immersed himself 
deeply in Pakistani life*" It was not uncommon to find good and bad combined in 
a single Volunteer. Evaluator Arthur Dudden gave the example of a Volunteer in 
Ceylon who was "perpetually and publicly scratching the itch in. his groin, or 
exploring the contents of his nose"; his "skinny-dipping" in the stream near 
the school where he taught had earned him a reprimand from his principal. Yet, 
the principal also said the Volunteer was "a good influence on the other teachers 
because of his dedication and enthusiasm"; the young man gave up his vacation 
to help the staff devise new curricula and - mostly through hard study at night - 
he had made himself fluent j;i Sinhalese, "In effect," concluded Dudden, "the- 
two exist side by side. One is unpredictable and capable of doing serious
1 ^-1damage. The other is generous and willing as well as anxious to be helpful," 
Again, Lov/ther and Lucas claimed that most Volunteers weze bland and in-
1 52effective ™ "The truly exceptional Volunteer became the exception," they wrote. 
This statement vfas true enough in the sense that few Volunteers were "supermen."» 
Although, it might be suggested that yo.ng people who willingly gave up Iwo 
years of their lives no help the underprivileged co'uld hardly be called anything 
but "exceptional". The majority of Volunteers worked attentively, lived modestly, 
and made friends where they could. The efforts of most went unrecorded. Often, 
the Volunteers' most satisfying work was done during shammer 'vacations when they 
travelled up-country and became involved in local communities. Sometimes their 
most long-lasting successes were achieved in unconscious moments when they taught
their hosts - hy "doing" - how to put a fence around chickens, or cover the
juncture in electrical wires, or sterilise water before drinking. Volunteers
probably made their strongest impression on the minds of children - teaching them,
laug’ning with them, shewing them that not all Americans were "ïs.naui imperialists,"
These subtle forms of impact were not easily or immediately discernible* Ahat the
Volunteers were doing did net anrea-r "exceptional". Although to natives - ■
especially in the decolonised lands - there was alv/ays something unique about the
Peace Corps nurse and the Peace Corps teacher. As Charles Peters pointed out, the
really "outstanding" Volunteer was rarely the brilliant innovator or the tireless
adventurer, but rather " the dependable, self-reliant, feet-on-the-ground man" -
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and there were many Volunteers in that category.
All Volunteers experienced moments of lonhappiness, disillusion and despair
overseas, Brent K* Ashabranner estimated that in community, development v/ork, "job
frustration" was as high as 75 per cent, Lowther and Lucas felt that ”ms.ny
Volunteers" only remained in the Peace- Corps because they feared they would be
labelled "quitters" back home, Tim. Adams wrote that Volimteers needed the
"imagination of Leonardo, the patience of Job, the courage of Sergeant York and
the hide of an elephant," ^  One crestfallen Volunteer in morocco made his
disappointment plain:
"Something has been wrong with this project from- the.goddam 
beginning. We have no transportation, no -work, no instruments 
that are any use. It's embarrassing. If things won’t work 
out the v/ay they are, then for God's sake change it, I can 
just see it. For two years we'll fuck up here and get sent
home to mild dishonor and that’ll be it," 135
It was uifficult for Vciunteers ever bo feel fully sariszion with their worn, In
the early programmes especially, there were fe,v definable gCUAges of achievement.
For mosb Vcliunt'ers, Peace Cores service involved the gainful process of 
accommodating themselves to alternate feelings of frus-kration end satisfaction.
As Arnold Deutchman, a Volunteer in Halai/a,' put it, "actors on the stage of an 
imperfect world must of necessity accept imperfect solutions."
Some Volunteers never managed to bridge the gap between their expecations 
and reality, A few became cynical time-servers. However, the majori-ty proved 
resilient, "A really good Volunteer receives little credit - keep that in mind
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. vihen you read peace Corps success stories," wrote a young Volunteer in Peru.
"I have a lot of failures, a few tangible successes and a great deal of
frustration, (l was a dreamer once too, and my fall v/as hard), Now, all things
considered, I think I ’m doing something worthwhile, I don’t thinlc I ’ll sign up
for another stretch, out you can’t drag me away from this one," /mother girl in
Tunisia complained, "The red tape, inefficiency and lack of comprehension seem
insurmountable walls blocking any progress»,..but, if I had the chance to do it
over again, knowing what I do now, I v/ould not hesitate» It is a remarkable 
i 37experience," Between 1963 and 1965 a massive 94 per cent of all Volunteers
agreed; despite all the drawbacks, they would go through their Peace Corps
experience again. Indeed, 10 per cent of them extended their seir/ica for a 
1 38 _further year, in a letter to Sargent Shriver, Mike O’ Donnell, a Volunteer in
Morocco, explained^ v/hat made the Peace Corps experience worthwhile:
"Peace Corps Morocco I is, at the very least, typical of 
projects everywhere insofar as it has had its share of 
work shortage, partial success, entanglement in bureaucratic 
red tape, and so on. But these negative factors have been 
. in the minority, a minority richly interwoven- with success 
in personal contact at the grassroots level, with the 
satisfaction of having passed on technical Icnov/ledge, though 
basic, to Moroccans who will do the job when the Peace Corps 
is no longer here, and with the fiimi realisation that v/e here 
are part of a .vital and growing community of good-will 
ambassadors to developing countries throughout the world." 139
Peelings such as this reinforced President Kennedy’s suggestion that, indeed.
Peace Corps Volunteers were " a special group of young Americans,"
Cne Volunteer in the front-lines of the Peace Corps in Sthiooia described
1 i 0the life as filj.ed with "excitement, boredom, achievement and frustration 
Many Volunteers went through " culture shock"; but making some adjustment to . 
another way of life 7/as the basic idea behind the Peace Corps* Tiie administration 
- in Washington and the field - v/as often lacking in sensitivity and support; 
but to the independent Volunteer busy v/orking in the outback. Peace Corps/Washingto 
v/as almost..completely irrelevant. There were many mistakes and personal 
indiscretions on behalf of the Volijnteers; but unpleasantries were only a small
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part of the story, especially when compared to the 'willingness of the
Volunteers to make personal sacrifices on behalf of others, Vnsx'a was much
disillusion and disappointment involved in the Peace Corps experience, but the
vast majority of Volunteers had not the slightest regret about joining. As one
young Volunteer in British Honduras put it, in a letter to Peace Corps/Jashington,
"ilany Volunteers feel frustrations and discouragements of one liind or another -
1 A'tbut no-one writes of failure," '
CHAPTER TWELVE
THE IMAGE
"Not many people took the Peace Corps seriously during its 
first five years. It was welcomed as a gesture, an antidote 
to The Ugly American, a symbol of a friendlier .America. In 
the American mind, it took its place somewhere between the 
Boy Scouts and motherhood."
- HARRIS WOFFORD -
(From "The Future Of The 
Peace Corps" The Annals,
May, 1966)
Even as President Kennedy launched the Peace Corps in March,
19615 Sargent Shriver was aware of thousand suspicious eyes
peering over our shoulders» Some of them were the eyes of friendly
1
critics but many "belonged to uhfriendly skeptics." From the time
of the Cow Palace address, the Peace Corps was the subject of constant
media exposure. Shriver cautioned Volunteers and staff that life in
the Peace Corps was akin to living in a goldfish bowl; he warned
them that the Peace Corps would be under continual, and sometimes
critical, scrutiny by the press. At the same time, he avidly sought
publicity. Shriver was aware of the new agency’s vulnerability
to criticism but he also recognised that without papular support -
at home and abroad - the Peace Corps would surely fail. Accordingly,
he deliberately encouraged media interest, knowing full well that
"the fourth branch of government" had the power to make or break the 
2
Peace Corps,
In a memorandum of April 20, 19^1, Ed Murrow, Director of the 
United States Information Agency, informed Sargent Shriver that "world 
press reaction to the Peace Corps to date has been predominantly 
favourable." As expected, the new programme was ridiculed ûy the 
communist press as a "spy corps", but editorials in Western Europe, 
Latin America, Africa and the Far East were generally very positive. 
The Voice of Ethiopia lauded the enthusiastic response of American 
youth and "the sincerity of the United States in its efforts to 
promulgate policies that lead to the establishment of world peace and 
the encouragement of peaceful pursuits," In Brazil, the Jormal do 
Gommercio predicted the idea would permit young Americans to "put 
into practice their ideas of democracy, human fraternity and the 
dignity of work by means of person-to-person contracts." The
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Express of India said the outstanding feature of the programme
was that "the Volunteers will be sent only to the countries which
need them and request them." In Vietnam, Tu Do praised the young
Americans who would "win the hearts of Afro-Asian people,”
Notwithstanding this positive reaction, there was considerable
concern as to whether the youth selected for the Peace Corps would
be able to cope with unfamiliar environmental factors in strange
lands. In an article entitled "Peace Corps Must Behave’', Britain’s
Daily Telegraph warned Sargent Shriver to expect "certain scepticism
in many quarters','- Typical of this scepticism was an editorial in
Austria’s Wiener Z'eitung;
"Experts on the developing countries of Africa, and Asia 
are not very, enthusiastic over the proposal of the U.S.
President, who wants to send some 1,000 Americans into 
the world.so they can help where there is need. They 
doubt that these youths,.. who have grown up with the 
benefit of air conditioning, would stand a summer in 
India, could sleep in an adobe hut, or simply with the 
stars as their cover, and yet find the strength for work.
What the developing areas need are experts and capital 
rather than idealists without skills."
The most influential newspaper in Thailand, Siam Rath, praised 
the principles and objectives of the Peace Corps, but it wondered 
whether Volunteers would be willing to "sacrifice their personal 
comfort." In Tanganyika, the conservative Standard carried a 
bitingly humorous article captioned "Eager-Beaver'Invasion," This 
described the Peace Corps as consisting of thousands of students 
who would "pour into underdeveloped countries....spreading peace and 
the American way of life." The editor suggested that the Peace Corps 
WB%ld be put to better "educative" use in the com-growing belt of 
America’s mid-west. In general, however, the Peace Corps was more 
applauded than attacked by the foreign press. James Morris of the
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Manchester Guardian typified the warm reception "for one sceptical 
alien at least, John Kennedy’s Peace Corps has restored some of the 
decency in patriotism, regenerated some warmth in our reluctant 
alliance, and, above all, for all our poor sakes, revived a little 
of the romance of America."^
On the domestic front, the Peace Corps was received with a 
similar mixture of scepticism and enthusiasm, with more weight on 
the latter. The responsible press - The Hew York Times, The 
Washington Post, The Los A^ngeles Times — advised caution and careful 
planning, but generally endorsed the idealism inherent in the programme. 
The Hew York Times saw it as "an experiment in international brother­
hood." An editorial cited the hero of Burdick and Lederer’s Ugly
5American as the prptotype for the Peace Corps Volunteer, Hè would 
"give the lie to the notion that Americans are dedicated only to the 
suburban split-level, the dry martini, and the vice-presidency of the 
company", proclaimed The Nation.^  On a less serious level, the popular 
newspapers and magazines latched onto the glamour of the Peace Corps, 
"Telephones jangled, the switchboard blinked and drifts of incoming 
mail accumulated on the desks" reported Time magazine, "The Peace 
Corps has captured the public imagination as has no other single act 
of the Kennedy administration," From the beginning, romantic images 
were conjured up of "emotionally cool and dedicated workers," "ever- 
youthful dreams of forging a better world" and "idealistic, patriotic, 
freedom-loving, adventuresome youths (with) the patience of Job, the 
forbearance of a saint and the digestive system of an ostrich,"
Newsweek wondered whether Volunteers should have an official uniform 
or a slogan or a Peace Corps song, "Do you know Spanish, French, 
Itali.an, Portugese, Urdu, Mandarin or Arabic?", asked Time. This type 
of glib coverage suggested that although the uopular press supported 
the Peace Corps, they did not take it very seriously, "It was just
like a wedding," said Time, reporting on President Kennedy’s meeting
with the first group of Volunteers to go overseas, "A long line of
young men and women stood among the rosebushes in the White House
garden,,,,and everyone was smiling and chatting amiably - sometimes
in Swahili and sometimes in Twi For brains and looks and vem/e,
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those chosen so far would rank high in any enterprise."
As well as the facile reports, there were also the cynical.
The Hew York Daily News had a vision of "hordes of well-meaning
youngsters, sticking their snoots into people’s private lives telling
them how to bring up their children and what or what not to eat and
drink," The conservative National Review wondered why American
youths were "so caught up in the enthusiasm for bringing electric
dish-washers to the Angolese?" There were headlines such as
"Crew-cut Crusade," "Brownie Troop of Do-Gooders" and "Kennedy’s
Kiddie Korps,"^ Sceptics viewed the Peace Corps as }!pony-tailed
co-eds and crew-cut Jack Armstrongs playing Albert Schweitzer - an
appalling army of innocents abroad." The New Yorker conceded that
while the Peace Corps had fired the imagination of American youth, '■
"a distressing number of Asians and Africans are saying that they
want no help from it, and some of their leaders have predicted that
it will turn out to be nothing but a youth division of the C.I.A»"
At a more humorous level. Art Buchwald offered to sem/e as a Volunteer
on the French Riviera where, "people wenz around half-naked, lacking
shelter, and many still don’t have their ovm boa.ts. " Satirising
President Kennedy’s address lo Congress on the ïeace Corps, Mr.
Buchwald promised, "to live the way they do, sh .re their homes, a -.:
the food they do, and show them that an Anerican is not too proud to
9
become one of them, no matter what hardships he has to face."
A cautious editorial in The New Republic in March, I96I, suggested 
that a voluntary service would have been more sensibly begun at home, 
where Volunteers could be tested before going overseas* Rather
surprisingly perhaps, this liberal journal questioned the ability
of young Americans to adapt to Third World cultures and doubted
their resolve to live at the "grassroots" level: "The first time
one of them has an attack of appendicitis in say, Nigeria, we shall
10see how conditional this resolve is," As the detractors awaited 
the first catastrophe, pressure mounted on the Peace Corps.
Shriver and his staff knew there would be blunders, but they worried 
that a spectacular calamity in the early days - a death, a rape, or 
a case of communist,infiltration - would completely destroy the new 
agency’s credibility. After only one month in the field, disaster 
struck; but in a most unlikely manner. In October, I96I, a young 
female Volunteer in Nigeria lost a postcard and brought the Peace 
Corps its first crisis.
After seven weeks training at Harvard, Margery Michelmore, a 
twenty-three year old former researcher with Reader’s Digest, was 
assigned to a school-teaching post in Nigeria, The daughter of a 
wealthy manufacturer, Miss Michelmore was shocked on encountering 
slums, squalor and open sewers in Ibadan, She wrote a postcard to 
a boyfriend in Cambridge, Massachusetts, describing her new 
environment :
"I wanted you to see the incredible and fascinating city 
we were in. With all the training we had, we really were 
not prepared for the squalor and absolutely primitive living 
conditions rampant both in the city and in the bush. We had 
no idea what ’underdeveloped’ meant. It really is a 
revelation and after we got over the initial horrified shock, 
a very rewarding experience. Everyone except us lives in 
the streets, cooks in the street, sells in^^he streets, and 
even goes to the bathroom in the streets,”
Unfortunately, she dropped the postcard on the way to the pose office
and it fell into the hands of some left-wing students at the University
of Ibadan. They distributed copies of the card and staged a
demonstration. Volunteers were denounced as "agents of imperialism"
and "members of America's international spy ring." The protest was
widely reported in the Nigerian press and it created a minor
international incident.
There was a flurry of czbles between Peace Corps/V/ashington
and Rep Sam Proctor* Sargent Shriver met with the President.
They decided it would be best for all concerned - including Margery
Michelmore - if she were brought home* However, they refused to
accept her proffered resignation, Kennedy felt she had been a
victim of circumstances and he sympathised with her predicament,
"I want you to know that we are most appreciative of your steadfastness
in recent days," he wrote in a personal note to Miss Michelmore, "V/e
are strongly behind you and hope that you will continue to serve in 
12the Peace Corps," Shriver did not panic; he was not intimidated
by sensational headlines* Miss Michelmore came back to V/ashington
and worked in the Division of Volunteer Support, "I regret very
much my part in the unfortunate affair at Ibadan," she wrote to
President Kennedy, "I hope that the embarrassment it caused the
country and the Peace Corps effort will be neither serious nor 
1 3lasting," Miss Michelmore need not have been over-worried.
Five weeks after the postcard incident, a second contingent of 
Volunteers arrived in Nigeria to be greeted warmly by Prime Minister 
Abub.akar Balewa,
However, the more fickle American magazines pounced on the story. 
Their etti hude was more patronising thzn ruthlessly critic-1, but 
nevertheless, they made much of the dropped postcard, "Prom the 
moment of its inception, despite laudable aims, the Peace Corps was 
bound to run into trouble," commented Time* H,S, Hews and World Herort 
condemned the naivete of the entire concept and claimed, "this is only 
the first big storm," Newsweek said the Michelmore episode would 
damage "the whole idea of young /vmericans qiding less privileged 
people's," Associated Press reported the protest was "communist- 
inspired" and that thousands of Nigerians had taken part. President
Eisenhower fuelled the furore by adding that there was now "postcard 
evidence" of the worthlessness of Kennedy's ideas.
The serious press attempted to place the misadventure in a more 
reasoned perspective. "The problem involved," noted a sensible 
editorial in Commonweal, "is really bigger than the Peace Corps, for 
it reflects the gap that exists between the wealthyU.S, and most of 
the rest of the world. Given this fact, incidents like the postcard 
affair are bound to happen. Peace Corps officials did the right 
thing by refusing to panic," The New York Times pointed out that 
only 150 to 200 students had joined in the demonstration, not 
thousands. The New Republic made it clear the protest was not 
"communist-inspired" but merely an indication of sensitive African
15nationalism, James Weschler of the New York Post made a plea^  for 
common sense:
"Nothing in the card was sinister. It contained the 
instinctive expression of horror of an affluent American 
girl in her first direct encounter with the gruesome squalor 
of Nigeria (which might have been East Harlem), She was 
neither patronising nor self-righteous in her comment; yet, 
whoever found the lost card managed to stage a big production.
Like many other people, the Nigerians need and want help; but 
they do not like to be told how desperate is their need. The 
demagogues in their midst swiftly exploited the incident,"
Tai Solarin of the Lagos Daily Times agreed with Weschler, "if Michelmore
was out to ridicule the country, she would be intelligent enough to
protect her stings with an envelops....not a single Nigéri an who knew
this part of Nigeria would suggest that she was sending home a made-up
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story. However, the Nigerian press was generally kinder to the Peace 
Corps than the sensation-seeking popular magazines in .'America which 
exploited and ridiculed the episode, "'Jhy, " asked James Weschler,
"is there so much desire burlesque-the Peace Corps?* The answer 
lay in the popular press's superficial view of the new agency.
Yet, to a,n extent, the "dropped postcard" proved fortunate for 
the Peace Corps, Its first mishap - whatever it had been - would 
have attracted a disproportionate amount of publicity. Certainly, 
the "faux pas" was embarrassing and was treated as a genuine "crisis" 
by Peace Corps officials; yet, that it was of such a relatively mild 
nature was a blessing in disguise, "Something more serious could 
have done us in," recalled Warren Wiggins, In later years, there were 
much more sensational incidents - female Volunteers were raped.
Volunteers stood trial, one Volunteer was even eaten by a crocodile - 
but the media paid little attention* To the press and the public the 
Peace Corps* first tragedy was its greatest - a dropped postcard.
Thus, the new agency survived its ordeal before the public, "We took 
on the anti-bodies," said Warren Wiggins, "and we overcame them,"^
After Margery Michelmore*s blunder, the American media viewed the 
Peace Corps with an almost totally uncensorious eye, "From the front 
porches of the U.S.", said Time in July, 196$, "the view of the Peace 
Corps is just beautiful," Volunteers were seen as "a battalion of 
cheery, crew-cut kids who hopped off their drugstore stools and hurried 
out around the world to fage peace," To rhe popular press the Peace 
Corps was virtuous and wholesome. It would show the Third World that 
America was "a loving country" said Vogue, "Goodbye to the *Ugly 
American*", proclaimed Parade magazine, U,S, News And World R^cort 
described how Volunteers would explain to natives that "the U.S. is 
determined to build a peaceful world and that Americans oppose any 
government that tries to make war and spread tyranny." Indeed, the 
Peace Corps was credited as a new instrument of American foreign policy. 
Broadcaster Howard K, Smith told his television audiènce that Peace Corps 
was "America's answer to Moscow*s possession of local Communist cadres 
in all emergent countries," Comparing the Sold War to a football game.
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19Newsweek called the Peace Corps America's "freshman team."
Certainly the press supported the Peace Corps, but only in a
shallow, usually lighthearted fashion. Articles were not balanced
or well-researched. Emphasis was on adventure and hardship. In
the Philippines - probably one of the least effective programmes —
Volunteers were reported "living in mud hutments among the natives,
teaching in the schools and travelling freely among the people,"
Time praised one Volunteer who walked eight miles every day to and from
the school where he taught; another was reputed to be living in a hut
along with goats and snakes. One female Volunteer in Chile was said
to have "revolutionised" her community by giving local women the recipe
for apple pie/ A typical story, headlined "Peace Corps Life Is Rugged",
appeared in the Baltimore Sun in May, 1962;
"Wading hip-deep in swamps with hippos snorting behind a 
curtain of tall grass, riding the river in a dugout canoe, 
palavering with tribal chiefs at sunset after a long day 
on Safari, sleeping under thatch-roof shelters, getting up 
in the morning to find a crowd of natives wanting to join 
the hike because there is safety in numbers in elephant 
country. Such is the rugged outdoor life that enlistment 
in the Peace Corps has brought,"" ^
The .American press approved of the Peace Corps, but preferred its 
romantic, quaint and amusing aspects to the munaane but realistic.
There were tales of great works performed. In Pakistan, Volunteers 
invented a new machine to par-boil newly harvested•riee; in Colombia 
a loom was invented to weave bamboo. Sr, Luci'ns wanted to leair 
"the Twist" but, as Time noted, "the Volunteers did not know how to 
twist and ended up by learning instead an island dance called Sangantine." 
ii Volunteer geologist became an honorary blood-brotber of the nomadic 
Wagogo tribe because he had saved the life of a pregnant tribeswoman 
by rushing her in his jeep to a hospital thirty miles away. In the 
Punjab a young Volunteer's achievement was that he persuaded his 
Indian counterpart to take down the hammer and sickle emblem which he 
had placed on top of the chicken coop they were building. In a
nightclub in Accra, two Volunteers "proudly won", second place in a
Ghanaian High Life Dance Contest, Another Volunteer in Bangkok
"Thai-boxed" a native and held him to a draw. There were reports
on romance and marriage in the Peace Corps, lush descriptions of
evenings in the Andes and banner headlines such as "Colombia's
21Peasants Love Peace Corps."
Sometimes the exotic and bizarre stories printed by the American 
press caused great embarrassment overseas. In a letter to friends 
back home, a Volunteer in Ethiopia described the national dish 
"Injera-watt" as, "a terrifying assault on one's innards by tomatoes, 
peppers, eggs, chicken, sheep's intestines and a murky sponge-rubber­
like bread," He then added whimsically, "and maybe a' few, fat pussycats," 
Pour months later, a letter from Peace Corps/Washington informed him 
that an Associated Press article entitled "Peace Corps Diet: Pat Pussy
Cats", had appeared in nearly two hundred newspapers across America.
After a few months, a front-page headline in the Voice of Ethiopia 
read, "Peace Corps Volunteer Says Ethiopians Eat 'Pat Pussy Cats'
A furiously indignant editorial accused the Peace Corps of telling 
"Damned Bad Lies" and concluded, "the infected eye muck be plucked out," 
Fortunately, Rep Harris Wofford was able to pacify native officials 
and persuade them of the trivial nature of the entire affair. The 
Ethiopians accepted his c- flogr,^ and a nasty incident was averted.
The Volunteer - completely dumbfounded bo find himself at the centre 
of the furore — was allowed to remain in service. However, by its 
thoughtless distortion of a Volunteer's innocent observations, the
2?American press hid placed the Peace Corps in a compromising situation.
Only on very rare occasions were the Peace Corps ' real problems 
mentioned by the press. In March, I963, the Hew York Times hinted that 
all was not well with the Jamaican programme. In the same month Ü.S,
News and World Report heard "whispers" that young Volunteers were
"running wild" in Venezuela. In a cover story in July, 1963? 
reported on some minor "Poul—ups" overseas; Newsweek carried a story 
on a Volunteer in Ghana who lived in luxury and spent his weekends 
"surSng^ and sun-ba,thing in the company of a most delightful blonde,"
In the Washington Star, journalist Prie Sevareid prefaced a critical 
article entitled "Pure Intentions Backed By Pure Publicity" by saying 
he was well aware that, in the current atmosphere of euphoric reverence,
"an expressed doubt about the Peace Corps will receive the same treat- 
mea&'t as a doubt expressed about virginity," All the same, he was 
highly sceptical of the "jazzed up publicity that surrounded the 
birth and recruitment of the original Peace Corps, the romanticising
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of their missions, the lionising of individuals in the glossy magazines,"
Sevareid and the critics were a tiny minority* By 1963, even the
Republican press endorsed the Peace Corps, "They have won the en‘'ry 
and the enmity of the communists, and the admiration and affection of 
forty-six countries," said the New York Herald Tribune, The Los 
Angeles Times praised the Peace Corps as the most effective U.S. agency 
operating overseas. Of course, the more liberal newspapers were 
eulogistic, "that is amazing is that the adverse ir.oidents have been 
so few," exclaimed the Washington Post, "indeed only the famous affair
of the postcard is worth mentioning at all," In ,an editorial
conrritulrting rhe Peace Corps on reaching its "Second Birthday", the 
New York Times stated: "Now and then, some new agency of government clicks
from the start - mark this one down with a plus sign.
The foreign press followed suitp Indeed, by the summer of 1963? 
even the normally restrained London Times commended the Peace Corps 
thus:- 'Many of their stories could have come straight from "The Ugly 
American* in which the hero revolutionises the irrigation methods of 
Asian peas-mts by showing them how to make an irrigation pump,"
However, in an article in the Manchester Guardian, Alec Dickson -
founder of the British Voluntary Services Overseas - warned Peace
Corps administrators of the dangers of being lulled into a false
sense of security by glossy success stories. He suggested success
did not necessarily lie in spectacular individual achievements and
tha.t failure often came "in the apparently placid projects where
Volunteers may feel themselves completely superfluous." The
American press was in no mood for Dickson's informed analysis of
the realities of Volunteer existence. Indeed, by I963» even the
New York Times had succumbed to the glamorised image of "ruddy-cheeked
youths and idealistic oldsters," Volunteers were described as living
in hovels, digging with picks and shovels, and working in leper colonies.
Their only complaint was that Peace Corps life was not tough enough.
This was the Volunteers' image in the press; a simplistic stereotype.
The American public was never told that most Volunteers were teachers,
most lived in big cities in relative comfort, most suffered periods
of extreme frustration. Instead, the New York Times informed them:
"Female Volunteers have learned to grind meal for flour, to 
laumder clothes by stomping on them in a bathtub, to fashion 
curtains oub-of feed sacks, to live alone in outnosts two days 
from civilisation and to contend with daily visits from snakes 
and lizards, Male Volunteers have created crude furnishings 
out of boxes, made mattresses from car tyres, and prepared 
pickles on a hot-plate. Too commonplace to be included in 
reports home is the fact that most shiver through winters, 
sweat through summers end exist without adequate heating? 
cooling and plumbing facilities,
To some extent, the stereotype was fostered by Sargent Shriver and 
his staff. From the beginning, they sensed there would be intense 
public interesc in the Peace Corps and they decided to make the most of it 
"This is the kind of program that is best run in a goldfish bowl," A1 
Sims (then Chief of the-University Division) advised Shriver in March, 
1961, "I believe public participation should be invited from the 
beginning and at each step of the way. This is the way to provide am 
outlet for mounting interest, the basis for continuing support and a
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much needed new formula for public involvement."^^ To inspire and
harness public enthusiasm, Shriver established the Office of Public
Affairs. Led by Bill Moyers, it kept up a constant stream of brochures
and documentaries to the general public and h-mdled the recruitment
function. Shriver also set up a Division of Public Information which
produced stories and news releases on the Peace Corps and dealt directly
with the press and media. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, Shriver
spoke of a "planned campaign to dramatise as widely as possible" the
27advantages of the Peace Corps.
The Advertising Council (a non-profit voluntary organisation
established by American advertising agencies) adopted the Peace Corps
as a public service programme; this meant millions of dollars worth of
free advertising. The New York advertising agency, Young and Rubicam,
advised the Peace Corps on how to plan and execute a media campaign.
By 1963, it was at the top of the public advertising list. At the same
time, the Division of Public Information formed an excellent rapport with
the press. Articles appeared in almost every kind of magazine and
newspaper, from national sellers like the New York Times and Time to
smalH-’-tovm rural dailies. All types of trade papers for engineers,
doctors, miners, teachers and farmers carried stories on the Peace Corps.
In August, 1962, Shriver informed President Kennedy that between three
and four hundred editorials, articles and suecial features on the Pe\ce
28Corps appeared in the national press each week. Ed, .Bayley, first Chief 
of the Division of Public Information, estimated that 98 per cent of all
newspaper stories and 80 per cent of editorials were favourable to the 
Peace Corps;
"Publicity regarding all aspects of the Peace Corps has been 
lavish. Almost no phase of our operation has been considered 
too small for public notice, and only one or two of the 50 
releases issued by my office h.as failed to produce news stories 
....Most of the reporters with whom we deal, both in Washington 
and elsewhere, are sympathetic to the idea of the Peace Corps and 
anxious to help it along," ^
Shriver was particularly pleased 'to tell the President that, the 
black press, though sceptical at first, "has now generally endorsed 
the Peace Corps.
The Peace Corps* public relations exercises were slick, pro­
fessional and effective. Shriver sent letters to thousands of 
newspapers and magazines asking for their support, offering them 
Peace Corps stories, and so forth. Television cameras were invited 
into training camps. Volunteers appeared as guests on What's My Lina. 
Celebrities' visits to training sites or programmes overseas made
national headlines, like Senator Edward Kennedy's trip to Puerto Rico 
31in 1962. Of course, the President's association with the Peace Corps
was well-publicised - meeting Volunteers in the Rose Garden or
congratulating them on their return* Sometimes Kennedy wrote personal
letters to journalists or broadcasters who had been particularly kind
to the Peace Corps, In April, 1962, he wrote to Stephen Riddleberger,
President of the American Broadcasting Company; "I want to thank you
for the significant help the ABC owned radio and television stations
have been to the Peace Corps....Much is said and written about radio
and'television public service time, I think this is an example of public
32service at its best."
There were several former journalists within the Peace Corps;
Bayley, Haddad, Moyers, Kiker, even Shriver had been a "stringer" for 
Time in the 19)0*3 and an assistant editor of Newsweek in the 1940*3.
This allowed the Peace Oorps informal as well as formal ties to the 
media. For example, Peter Braestrup, a journalist with the New York 
Times, was very friendly with Bill Haddad (Chief of Special Projects).
At propitious moments - at the time of the battle for independence, on 
the Peace Corps* anniversary and so forth - very positive articles tended 
to appear on the front page of the New York Times; they were usually
written by Braestnap,^^ As Ed Bayley noted, "We have a considerable 
number of former reporters among our staff members - this has made hay
34for us on many occasions and saved our necks on others." Peace 
Corps officials, with their experience and knowledge of the newspaper 
world, knew exactly how to "sell" a story.
In a memorandum of August 4, I96I, Bayley confirmed that many 
Peace Corps stories were"planted". "We have been told to steer the
direction of news," said Bayley to Richard McGuire of P.D.O., "and to 
take part in policy decisions within the organisation which affect the 
public image of the Peace Corps," Referring to the informal links with 
the media, Bayley reckoned, "Most of our best work has been done on the 
telephone and in conversation with reporters." He concluded it would 
be possible, "if done deftly, to subvert the press by playing up to 
its prejudices, its traditions and its own values," Since the media 
seemed to "value" glamorous - albeit superficial — news, that was what 
the Division of Public Information sought to provide. Little attempt 
was made to explain the complexity of Volunteer life or the frustration 
and failure which often accompanied success. Instead, Peace Corps 
releases .stressed one "magnificent" accomulishment after another, A 
few officials attempted to quell this penchant for self-congratulation. 
Reviewing the Peace Corps' Annual Report for 1963» Bill Josephson 
complained there was far too much emphasis on the .glib "Jack-the-Giant- 
Killer" type of success. Se noted that t few Congressmen and almost 
all Volunteers already felt the Peace Corps "brags too much about itself," 
He called for a more modest tone in Peace Corps releases to tiie press:
36"Let us say what we have done and let that speak for itself," However, 
most staff members worried that if the Peace Corps became too candid 
and admitted too many weaknesses, then the public might become confused 
and even turn against the idea. As Doug Kiker, appointed Chief of 
Public Information in I962, explained; "We are neither in the business 
of publicizing our mistakes nor of hiding them. Our obligation is to
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state what the Peace Corps is doing simply and authoritatively,,,.and 
withon k raising an unnecessary ruckus by the failure to explain 
properly or emphasising those parts of our operation which are matters 
of delicacy. When asked, it is necessary to respond; it is not 
necessary to raise issues ourselves." Kiker argired that if "enough 
goofs" became known in the press, the Peace Corps would soon be out
57of business.'
Sargent Shriver played a central role in the creation of the 
Peace Corps' public image. Indeed, Shriver himself became the epitome 
of that image. He was young, handsome and athletic, always well-groomed 
and highly photogenic. The press soon built up a picture of a superbly 
cool but enterprising executive; to save money, he travelled "tourist- 
class", to save time, he took "cat-naps" on the floor during long plane 
journeys. Of course, when he went abroad he never carried a tuxedo. 
After a visit to Africa he appeared before a Congressional committee 
still suffering from amoebic dysentG^^ Sleepless nights, pre-dawn . 
telegrams and constant action were associated with the Director of the 
Peace Corps. "He never stops," said the New York Times, "even in his 
pajamas.' Look magazine described him as "A combination of Billy 
Graham ^nd Tom Dooley - with a dash of advertising salesman thinown in." 
The press nicknamed Shriver "Mr. Clean." Even the Republican-minded 
New York Herald Tribune conceded? "this seems te have been one case in 
which a little nepotism was good for the country." Shriver took
considerable care to ensure that he and che Peace Corps were always 
seen in the best light. In March, l^ol, he ge-ve Ed Bryley the
following instructions;
"In connection with all releases, ■ I believe we should play 
up the fact that I was President of the Chicago Board of 
Education, a businessman, and have been active in interracial 
matters. Overseas, the brother-in-law relationship is probably 
very important to emphasise, but domestically, at least, let's 
focus on the educational, civil rights and business background,"
Hundreds of articles appeared under Shriver*s name, he became a
regular guest of television and radio inberviewers ^ud, by July,
1965, he had even made the cover of Time magazine. In many ways,
Shriver was the ideal public relations man - ever ready with an
amusing anecdote, sophisticated under pressure and invariably
congenial, "Surge was never much of an administrator," said Ed
Bayley, referring to Shriver's somewhat idiosyncratic style of
management, "but it wasn't an administrator that was needed at the
outset, it was a person like Sarge who was a promotions man really,"^
Enthusiastically, but not ingenuously, Shriver promoted the good
name of the Peace Corps. He suggested to staff - in Washington and
overseas - that chey should be willing "at all times, to respond to
newspapermen's requests for information (and) provide them with Peace
Corps stories and literature.Shriver often sent notes of thanks
to editors or journalists who had expressed confidence in the Peace
Corps. At the same time, he reacted strongly to criticism. Through
the pages of Saturday Review, he waged a literary battle with journalists
Eric Sevareid and George Sokolsky. In JanU'-r-y, 1962, he rebuked a
television show for mistaking i.WS, workers in Vietnam for Peace Corps
Volunteers,He also chastised the editor of the Washington Star for
printing an "inaccurate" story that government officials in India had
complained about the inexperience of Volunteers assigned "here.^^
Shriver was in Colombia when he read about Eisenhower's criticism of
the Peace Corps as a "juvenile experiment"; he immediately sent a copy
of the report to President Kennedy. "Articles like this which greeted
us upon our arriv.il in Bogota are creating great'obstacles to acceptance
4-4-of the Peace Corps in Latin America," he told the ^resident. V/hen the 
David Brinkley Journal television show featured a. "Disenchanted Volunteer", 
Shriver explained to Kennedy that the Volunteer in question was completely 
atypical, "one of the weakest of all Volunteers....persistently troublesome
and a loud-mouth." Then, in a not unrevealing conclusion, he 
wrote, "It's incredible how the press, radio and T.7. can always
45ferret out this kind if they are ar#%nd."
Shriver harboured a suspicion that the press were always 
looking to publicise something disparaging or seamy about the 
Peace Corps. After it was discovered a reporter had got a 
Volunteer drunk in order to get a storyShriver told Bradley 
Patterson that sometimes he thought the .American press was the 
Peace Corps' real " en e m y ", T o some extent, Shriver was over- 
protective of Peace Corps operations. He clamped down on "leaks" 
to the press (from people like Bill Haddad) and he was prone to 
exaggerate the Peace Corps' achievements. He faced down reporters 
over the "dropped postcard" affair arguing, "it won't happen again, 
we've got some money in the bank now." He rarely admitted a mistake 
or a problem. "I sometimes say the Peace Corps is like a Volkswagen," 
he told a Meet The Press panels "We continue to improve it all the 
time inside, but it remains just about the same externally,"
Shriver presented the romantic .image of the Peace Corps to the public. 
Occasionally verging on the trite, he depicted Volunteers as happy-go- 
lucky, all-American kids leading a physically tough but spiritually 
rewarding life in the boondocks. "The first law of the Volunteers", 
he wrote in National Geographic,"seems to be: the rougher it is, '
the better we like it," Volunteers disdainfully referred to this 
kind of hyperbole as "Shriver's hair-shirt stuff.
Indeed, between I96I and 19o3? almost every report coming out of 
the Evaluation Division was sure to contain some observations on the 
displeasure, or even bitterness, of Volunteers over the "phoney image" ' 
or the "fake glamour" projected by Peace Corps/V/ashington and the 
American press. Almost unanimously. Volunteers resented the stories 
of physical hardship, self-sacrifice and devotion to duty, "The 
American image of the typical Volunteer is pretty distorted," wrote
Volunteer Chuck Guminer in Senegal. "I guess the image depends
on whether you read the jokes in Playboy, the New Yorker or the
Saturday Evening Post or the various editorials in the syndicated
newspapers. Another angry Volunteer in Chile vowed that when
he returned home "if there's one thing I'm going to do, it's destroy
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the Peace Corps' image." Volunteers rebelled against the bland
newspaper reports about "mud huts", suffering and fighting communism
in the out-back. Real hardship lay in adapting to subtle cultural
differences and frustration. The American media preferred a
sentimental image of the Volunteer as a "hero". Peace Corps/Washington
did little to refute this. Indeed, as Volunteer Roger Landrum argued,
"Public Affairs and Public Information are the furthest away from
understanding the Volunteers' outlook....This is most obvious in the
50mud-hut and forces-of-light-marching-into-darkness picture."
Volunteers bitterly attacked the image-making proclivities of
Peace Corps/Washington. "I just wish they’d stop trying to make ua
51something we're not," said a Volunteer in Brazil* Peace Corps 
publicity devoted a disproportionate amount of attention to community 
development because it provided more "exciting" news than beaching.
Yet, most Volunteers were teachers and their quiet, uv.obtrusive 
efforts were often the most effective* Volunteers comrlained of 
the "Mickey Mouse tone" of publications like The Volunteer and 
Peace Corps News, printed by the Division of Public Information,
A Volunteer in Tanganyika criticised The Volunteer for promoting
an image of "American kids going around the world and putting their
52finger in the dyke," Volunteers were scathing of headlines such
as "Sing Along With Volunteers in Ibadan", "One, T’^-ro, Three - Kick/
Volunteer in Thai Boxing Match", and "West Indies. Island Welcomes 
53Geese Corps." Of course, Sargent Shriver was regarded as the 
biggest "P.R," culprit. Volunteers in Tanganyika recalled Shriver 
visiting them - photographers in tow - wanting "mud hut" pictures.
In East Pakistan, Volunteers ridiculed a "rosy" article written by
Shriver for the New York Times. It neglected to mention any
problems but, as one Volunteer commented, "everybody over here
knew better," One of Shriver*s most oft-repeated anecdotes
concerned a mob in the Dominican Republic who allegedly broke
off from t>hanting "Yanquis go home" to explain to a Peace Corps
Volunteer, "We want the Yanquis to go home, not you," However,
Charles Peters discovered from Volunteers in the Dominican Republic
that the episode had actually involved an American priest, not a 
54.Volunteer. Some Volunteers felt that no matter what difficulties 
he witnessed in the field, Shriver retained hiS,o'vn image of the
Volunteer. Few doubted Shriver*s personal sincerity and belief in
that image, but most wished that "we could work without publicity,
55as missionaries have done for many years,"
There was an element of truth in the popular image. Very few
Volunteers lived in a "mud-hut" but equally, few had the usual 
comforts of their American homes. Relatively speaking, they did 
endure some hardship. Besides, some Volunteers - especially in 
Latin America - did genuinely live on the romantic edge of the 
Peace Corps, For instance, Volunteers in Chimbote, Peru, lived in 
houses made of woven straw mats; and, in Tanganyika, David Gelman 
described Volunteers "living rather like white hunters, operating 
out of a tent in the bush,.walking through- vast herds of zebra at
56sunrise with gentle winds bending the brov/n grass." The glamorous 
stories were not false, but they were representative of only one 
small aspect of Pe?ce Corps service.
Nor was life in the Peace Corps all jolly camiraderie; there 
were internal jealousies and arguments. Indeed, Volunteers were 
often sceptical of the much-publicised "esprit de corps," For 
most Volunteers there was "no crashing of guns, no booming of heavy 
seas against our frail ship, no firm resolution in the face of death;
but instead, an English classroom, a hot African town and the
57relative pronoun * who * and ’whom*," Most lived much more
comfortably than they had expected, "They like a cold drink
and a good meal at the end of the day," wrote evaluator Richard
Richter, "They like music and pleasant surroundings,.This is
the expressed attitute of many of the most committed Volunteers
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as well as the average or poor ones," There was nothing
whatsoever wrong with this - except that it rendered the media’s
glib "mud-hut" image completely inappropriate,
"I’m sick and tired of reading stateside papers my parents
send me which Contain nothing but positive comments about the work
59of the Peace Corps," said one Volunteer in the Philippines," In 
Tanganyika another asked 'Wiat’s all this ’suffering^ jazz?" The 
press took the Peace Corps’ smallest triumphs and blew them up out 
of all proportion; the slightest hint of tangible success was 
exaggerated. Volunteers, who quickly learned that any successes 
would most probably be intangible, were bound to feel resentful.
In an interesting footnote to a 1963 evaluation report on Tanganyika, 
David Gelman pointed out that th* favourire magazine of all the 
Volunteers he interviewed was New Republic (although many had never 
heard of it until they got a free subscription through the Peace Corps), 
Gelman suggested this indicated their increasing awareness of the sham 
and excess of the popular American press which had given the .American 
public an almost completely distorted image of the Peace Corps Volunteer.
Yet, perhaps this was the image which the American public wanted.
In the early 19oO*s, the influence of Burdick and Lederer’s Ugly American 
was pervasive. Basically, it had said Americans were not liked overseas 
Reacting to this, Americans desperately wanted to believe that their 
countiry was capable of doing something good. They looked to the 
Peace Corps. In the process, they invested it with a degree of virtue,
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idealism and piety which could never have been matched by the 
realities of the field; but, in a sense, Americans wanted something 
which would outstrip reality. Quite literally, they wanted it to 
be "fantastic". The image of American youths, dressed in T-shirts,
Levi jeans and tennis sneakers, living in hovels and feeding African 
children, gave the public the psychic income they had craved* In 
August, 1963, a Harris poll showed that the Peace Corps was the 
third most popular act of the administration (behind Kennedy’s 
general positions on "national security" and "Berlin"). A massive 
75 per cent of all Americans approved of it*^^ "We older, squarer 
citizens love our Peace Corps," wrote journalist Ira Mothner in 
Look magazine. "It is homey as.a hound dog, healthy as vitamin D*
And it’s a success - because we just couldn’t bear for it not to be«
The Peace Corps is our dream for ourselves and we want the world to 
see us as we see the Volunteers - crew-cuts and ponytails, soda- 
fountain types, hardy and smart and noble.
The press enhanced this image by printing only the specious, 
exceptional accounts of Peace Corps life, A Volunteer in a "mud-hut" 
made better copy than a teacher living quietly and comfortably in a 
big city. As evaluator Tim Adams put it, "much of the rosiness in 
our clippings is due to the sloth of the Washington press corps.
Yet, "sloth" aside, American journalists found themselves in a somewhat 
compromising position. They bad to write about an organisation involved 
in highly sophisticated, complex, socio-cultural issues. At the same 
time, they had to disseminate an impression of that organisation which 
would be readily understood by a public which had already made an 
emotional investment in its "good image". This made it almost 
impossible to write seriously about the Peace Corps, The problems 
and the more subtle aspects of Volunteer service were not usually 
suitable for mass consumption. Therefore, difficulties were not 
reported and the Peace Corps was not treated in a serious manner.
Harris Wofford outlined the press’s conundrum; "If the .American
press had taken the Peace Corps seriously enough to report the
failures and frustrations of the Volunteers instead of just the
romantic success stories, the public might have been confused and
the Peace Corps' image tarnished,^
Of course, Volunteers felt exploited by all this "image-making."
They accused Shriver and the Division of Public Information of
demeaning Peace Corps service by supplying the American press with
trivia* One particularly bitter Volunteer concluded;
"The Peace Corps wanted to expand because it was 
politically ’hot*....To expand, it would make the 
Kennedy administration look good. What the Peace 
Corps failed to do was look in at itself. It 
became a 'P.R,* operation. The line was to tell 
everyone at home that everything was rosy overseas.
The line overseas was to tell the different countries 
theymany things a Volunteer could do. In the process, 
they oversold the Volunteer abroad and oversold the 
American people on the idea of ’making friends for 
America'•"^5
Bill Haddad admitted Shriver always had "one eye on the press."
Shriver himself described how he had sought to build a "Peace Corps 
m y s t i q u e . I n  pursuit of a "good image", Peace Corps/Washington 
did oversimplify the role of a Volunteer, However, in 1961, the 
new agency had needed support from Coagress and the public. To 
achieve this, it was necessary to have a basic, "concrete" image which 
would be generally identified and accepted. Therefore, Shriver 
believed in "human interest" stories and even "schmaltz!', when 
necessary. He conceded that the glossy image expanded out of all 
proportion, but he had to satisfy the Peace Gores' domestic 
constituencies.^^ The Volunteers never truly appreciated this; 
they jumped to the conclusion that Peace Corps/Washington simply did 
not understand the realities of field conditions. It was not quite 
that simple. Charles Peters recalled that there were some "inspired 
hustlers" who contributed to the "credibility gap" between what 
happened in the field and how it was reported back home; but he also
noted that the press and the public were "willing partners" in this
exercise in s e l f — delusion*6S
By 1963, the Peace Corps had begun to openly publicise some of 
its weaknesses. Peace Corps press releases, Congressional 
presentations and articles written by staff members became much more 
balanced, "The Volunteers have many discouragements," noted The 
Volunteer:In September, I962, "success or failure is difficult to
69measure," In December? 1963$ Shriver informed President Johnson 
that the Peace Corps’ news releases were beginning to move towards
70
"realism" with as much emphasis on frustration as achievement.
However, Shriver also recalled that in I963, when he offered an 
article entitled "Failures in the Peace Corps" to This Week magazine, 
the editor refused it. He told Shriver that his readers did not
71want to know about the Peace Corps' "mistakes".
There was no question of the Peace Corps "covering up" its 
problems. Indeed, Shriver instituted the Evaluation Division to find 
out about difficulties in the field. The Division of Public 
Information never "killed" a,n unfavourable story, "We certainly 
didn't advertise our mistakes - no govemiaent agency does," recalled 
Chief of Information, Doug Kiker, "but nobody asked about them. If
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they had asked, we would have told them,” The "sensational" 
stories were there to be written - the "numbers game", weak programmes 
in the Philippines, Brazil, East Pakistan, Volunteers' foibles and 
peccadilloes - but journalists were not interested in following up 
"leads" to disasters. There was a. general feeling that the Peace 
Corps was new and idealistic and therefore it deserved a "honeymoon" 
period. More importantly, in the early 1960's there was no great 
zeal for the investigative journalism so characteristic of the 
American media after Vietnam and V/atergate, In the Kennedy years, 
the nature of the press and public reading habits were basically 
simpler and more innocent than in later years, James Reston of
the New York Times, one of the more perceptive journalists of the
postwar era, suggested that I96O was the "perfect time" for the
Peace Corps to be established. Quite simply, Americans wanted a 
73"success story."
The irony of this "success story" was that, to cm extent, it 
was based on a distortion of what Peace Corps life was really like.
The vast majority of Volunteers did not live in mud-huts and most 
had no intention of actively counteracting communism. Therefore, 
despite the overwhelmingly favourable impression which the Peace 
Corps made on the American public, not many people had any accurate 
perspective on what Volunteers were actually doing. They only 
read about dropped postcards, sultry days in exotic climates and 
other ephemera. Most Americans did not ponder long on the Volunteers’ 
painstaking efforts to break down often imperceptible cross-cultural 
barriers. Instead, the Peace Corps was regarded as something quaint, 
inoffensive and wholesome. As Warren Wiggins joked, "in most 
people’s minds we were right beside Smokey the Bear,"^^
In general, the American.press and phbli: had a mubh too simplistic 
view of the Peace Corps, Encouraged by Sargent Shriver and Peace 
Corps/Washington, an image was projected of the heroic Volunteer 
enduring physical hardship in the Third World for the sake of democracy 
and freedom. Volunteers bitterly resented this stereotype* A 
compromise was never really struck between the un-heroic but nevertheless 
admirable and burdened Volunteer. The media avoided complex or 
unfavourable reports» Straightforward "success stories" made better 
news and, since the American public regarded the Peace Corps as an 
embodiment of their personal ideals, there was no great market for 
investigative "exposes," Prom the Peace Corps administration’s 
point of view, its publi^ relations were excellent. Within two
years, the new agency had won the support of Congress, t)a@ nation
and millions of people all over the world. It was a momentous
achievement in the field of public communications. Although,
whether a truly accurate message was communicated is another
question. As Harris Wofford noted, in the American mind, the
Peace Corps remained "somewhere between the Boy Scouts and 
75motherhood,"
CHAPT3E THIRTEEN
THE PEACE COBPS AMD POLITICS
"The Peace Corps is not an instrument foreign policy 
because to make it so would rob it of its contribution 
to foreign policy. •
PSAN RUSK -
(Remarks To The Peace 
Corps National Advisory 
Council, May 22, 1961)
As the Peace Corps began in 1961, the Cold Par was still 
very real to both the United States foreign policy estab­
lishment and the American public. The Soviet Union was seen 
as the embodiment of the international communist menace, with 
Red China looming forebodingly in the background. In 
Moscow, on January 6, 1961, Nikita Khruschev, the Soviet 
Premier, predicted a communist world victory would be 
achieved through wars of national liberation, with the Third 
World the main battleground. This belligerent speech 
confirmed John Kennedy and America's belief that communism 
continued on the offensive.^ During his State of the Union 
address on January 30, 1961 - in which he announced the 
formation of a "National Peace Corps" - Kennedy told the 
nation he was convinced that the struggle between communism 
and democracy would reach its climax in the 1960's:
"I speak today in an hour of national peril..... 
Before my term has ended, we shall have to test 
anew whether e nation organised and governed such 
as ours can endure. The outcome is by no means 
certain,... Each day the crises multiply. Each day 
their solution grows more difficult. Each day we 
draw nearer the hour of maximum d a n g e r " , ^
Given tnis intense atmosphere, it would have been impossible 
for any foreign policy initiative not to have Cold War 
implications. The Peace Corps was no exception. Launched 
in the spring of 1961, it coincided with America's biggest- 
evar armaments budget and the Bay of Pigs invasion. Yet, 
Sargent Shriver was always insistent that the Peace Corps 
should not be thought of, or used, as a means of achieving 
the short-range political aims of the United States. In a
mémorandum of September, 1961, entitled "The Shape Of The 
Peace Corps Program," Shriver emphasised that the Peace 
Corps would not just go to countries deemed politically 
favourable to the United States. Moreover, the Peace Corps 
would avoid states ruled by small, militaristic elites 
unresponsive to the will and needs of the majority; it would 
algo avoid countries where massive financial and military 
assistance had served only to identify the United States 
with an unpopular ruling circle. At the same time, Shriver 
was realistic about the Peace Corps’ position vis-a-vis 
American foreign policy: "We cannot shut our eyes to the 
realities of world conditions. The Peace Corps is a part of 
the United States foreign policy effort even though it has 
a special role and separate identity. We must be conscious 
at all times of the contribution the Peace Corps can make to 
that effort. The effect and quality of the contribution 
depends upon its uniqueness". This was the paradox at the 
heart of. the Peace Corps. It had no direct political ai ms ; 
indeed, most Peace Gorpsmen - staff and Volunteers - saw 
themselves as distinctly apolitical. Yet, they were 
employees of the U.S. government and as such had responsib­
ilities and obligations to it. Besides, foreign observers 
were bound to see Volunteers as representatives of American 
foreign policy in its broadest sense. The Peace Corps could 
not escape the rimes into which it was born; it was iriYolved 
in the Cold War - whether it wanted to be or not.
Kevin Lowther and C. Payne Lucas viewed the Peace Corps 
as a new weapon in America's Cold War arsenal - "a daring 
stroke in the ideological contest between Western democracy 
and the socialist doctrines for the allegiance of the post­
colonial world". Likewise, historian Charles J. Wetzel wrote 
that the Peace Corps was a direct "product of American anti­
communist foreign policy".^ Certainly, the anti-communist 
argument was used by early proponents of the Peace Corps idea. 
Indeed, Congress’s original study of the Peace Corps in I960, 
had been authorised under the terms of the Mutual Security 
Act which sought to "maintain the security of the United 
States and the free world from communistic aggression and 
thereby maintain peace". Moreover, Hubert Humphrey told his 
colleagues in the Senate, "This program is to be a part of 
the total foreign policy of the United States....to combat 
the virus of Communist totalitarianism", Himphrey gave the 
specific example of Soviet "incursions" into Guinea and how 
America could compete by sending in teachers of English.
Many congressmen were convinced that the Peace Corps would 
help the United States win the Gold War, Senator Randolph 
(P., 7/.Ya.), urged the prompt passage of S. 2000 because it 
would combat "atneistio communism" in the Third World, 'h'- 
dire threat to the Communists in the developing nations" was 
how Senator Pell (D., R.I.) described the Peace Corps. 
Congressman Landrum (D,, Ga.) predicted the new agency would 
become America's "most effective weapon" against the Soviets-'^
John Kennedy's public espousal of the Peace Corps at the 
Cow Palace in November, I960, was also tinged with Cold War
rhetoric. He spoke of Russian geologists, electrical 
engineers, architects, farmers and fishermen working in 
Ghana and "Castro-type or Communist exploitation" in Brazil:
"The Lenin Institute for Political Warfare exports 
each year hundreds of agents to disrupt free 
institutions in the uncommitted world. A-.friend 
of mine visiting the Soviet Union last year met 
a young Russian couple studying Swahili and 
African customs at the Moscow Institute of 
Languages, They were not language teachers - 
he was a sanitation engineer and she was a nurse. 
And they were being prepared to live among 
African nations as missionaries for communism. 
Already Asia has more of these Soviet than 
American technicians - and Africa may by this 
time. Russian diplomats are the first to arrive, 
the first to offer aid, the only ones represented * 
by key officials at diplomatic receptions.
They know the country, they speak the language - 
and in Guinea, Ghana, Laos, and all over the 
globe, they are working fast and effectively. 
Missiles and arms cannot stop them - neither 
can American dollars."
It was in this context that Kennedy called for skilled and 
dedicated Americans to counter the Soviets - "If I am 
elected, I ask you to help me find those Americans"7 
Newsweek called the Peace Corps "America's latest weapon in 
the Gold War" and Reporter magazine compared it directly to 
the Soviet Union's Institute of Africa (which trained 
Russians in the languages and customs of developing countries) 
David Halberstam. also inferred that the pervasive sense of 
competition with the Soviets - over politics, economics and 
ideas - was an important factor in persuading "bright young 
men off the Eastern campuses" to. join the Peace Corps in 
1961.®
Certainly, the Peace Corps was not impervious to 
America's obsessive Cold War comolex. No government agency -
especially one that was new and rather "liberal" - could be. 
To win the support of Congress, the press and the public, 
it was necessary for Sargent Shriver to imply that the 
Peace Corps would make a contribution to the anti-communist 
cause. "Either we do these jobs or the Communists will," 
Shriver told an audience at Indiana. "The Communists are 
offering a totalitarian system, we must demonstrate and help 
the developing peoples of the world to show that democratic 
methods are ultimately the most successful way to solve their 
problems/* Shriver never over-emphasised the point, but in 
public speeches and during congressional hearings, he often 
referred to the Peace Corps as *'a new American export, one 
that the Soviets can’t match; the Russians can export every­
thing except people" ^ When Senator Prank Church (P., Idaho) 
asked if the Peace Corps would go to communist countries like 
Cuba, Shriver replied that no relationship would be estab­
lished with any country which did not have formal diplomatic 
ties with the United States.
Yet, despite these public concessions to the realities 
of American foreign policy, Shriver strove to safeguard the 
Peace Corps from becoming a mere diplomatic or propaganda 
venture. Indeed, in the Report To The President of February, 
1961, he asked Kennedy to take steps to ensure that the Peace 
Corps would not be seen as an attempt to export surplus 
American political seal:
"In a message to the Heads of State of all member 
governments of the United Nations or to the 
United Nations itself you could explain the 
purpose and policy of the Peace Corps and suggest 
that every nation should consider the formation 
of its own Peace Corps. You could propose that
the United Nations sponsor the idea and form 
an international coordinating committee for all 
peace Corps w o r k ,underway• You could express 
your hope that peace Corps projects will be 
truly international and that our citizens will 
find themselves working alongside citizens of 
the host country and also volunteers from other 
lands. You could offer to supply U.S. Peace 
Corps personnel as technical helpers in devel­
opment projects of the U.N. and other inter­
national organisations" H
In this way, Shriver hoped to show that the Peace Corps was 
not advanced as an "arm of the Cold War", but rather as a 
contribution to the world community and a genuine experiment 
in international understanding. During a staff meeting in 
December, 1961, Shriver again stressed that Volunteers were
not to be regarded as instruments or agents of American Gold
War policies:
"They were not expected to represent official 
American views on current affairs; they are 
not ’instructed'; they are, of course, to be
prudent. They are rather free men and free
women, the products of a free society, sent 
abroad to serve and to do their assigned work 
with such dedication and such skills that their» 
hosts will, by this example, be brought to 
reflect on the nature of the society that pro­
duced them," 12
Shriver pleaded with President Kennedy not to ?9nd 
military "civic action" teams - like the Special Forces - 
into the Third World to carry out peaceful projects such as 
digging roads and building bridges. He was concerned that 
native peoples would be confused by military units doing 
"Peace Corps-type" work. "This icould kill the Peace Corps,*’ 
he warned the President. Besides, he argued, "past exper­
ience shows that large numbers of U.S. armed forces, 
stationed abroad, tends to accelerate a general militar—
ization of less developed countries...which is something we 
should prevent, not encourage. The whole rigmarole of 
huge P.X.’s, big automobiles, and special privilege has done 
the U.S.A. little or any good. Let's not add additional 
millions for civic action undertaken or supervised by 
soldiers rather than civilians," Shriver had no hesitat­
ion in sending the Peace Corps to "neutralist" states like 
Ghana, Guinea, Pakistan and Indonesia, although they did not 
always support U.S. policies. "The fact that a country might 
vary back and forth from friendly to not-so-friendly, should 
not mean we move the Peace Corps in and out like an 
accordion," he told a Meet The Press panel, "We are not there 
for political purposes,"
Shriver emphasised this point to Third World leaders.
For example, the mercurial but highly influential President
✓
of Guinea, Sekou Toure, was reputed to have set his country
on a communist course. However, in offering the Peace Corps 
✓
to Toure, Shriver told him the United States recognised that
each country had to choose the political system most suited
to its needs. Shriver explained there were no political
strings attached to the Peace Corps, It was not concerned
whether there were "one, two or four Communists in the
Government or outside it," but only with, "the desire of the
people of Guinea for a better society and a higher standard 
ISof living," , Indeed, Shriver claimed he would send the 
Peace Corps to Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union so 
long as Volunteers could be guaranteed freedom of speech, 
travel and association.^^ Obviously, the Soviets would first
have to request the Peace Corps, but this never transpired. 
Interim Policy Directive 2.1., Subsection 2, "Relationship 
to U.S. Foreign Policy," attempted to define the Peace Corps' 
role in this difficult spherey "A project must not be incon­
sistent with U.S. foreign policy. However, in order to make 
the maximum contribution to the foreign policy effort, a 
project should maintain the unique role and separate identity 
of the Peace Corp%"
Of course, the Peace Corps' claim to a "separate identity" 
did not preclude all political calculations. In an early 
memorandum to his senior staff, Shriver ordered that special 
efforts should be made to establish Peace Corps programmes in 
countries where the United States "has not yet succeeded in 
making a significant social, economic or political impressionj’^ ^ 
Shriver's main motivation was not to win over "neutralist" 
countries for the United States; although, he was not totally 
unaware of the political advantages to be gained from making 
a favourable impact on non-aligned Third World nations.
Rather, he knew that if the Peace Corps v;as to win credibility 
as a force of change, it would have to prove its worth not 
only in already friendly, pro-Wesrern states, but also in the 
turbulent, uncommitted ones. In order to gain prestige in 
America and the world, the Peace Corps had to court disinter­
ested or suspicious governments as well as those which 
traditionally requested American aid programmes. Accordingly, 
on September 18, 1961, Warren Wiggins outlined "high-priority 
countries" in terms of socio-economic needs and American 
policy in the developing world.
In Africa, V/iggins placed most importance on Ghana,
Guinea, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Mali, and Senegal. In the Far 
East, Indonesia and the Pacific Trust Territories were said 
to he of particular value. Indonesia had "a tremendous 
development potential," wrote Wiggins, "and its size, location, 
and leadership make it a key to much of the Far East," The 
Trust Territories, in which Wiggins envisaged an education 
programme, were "of high priority in terms of American 
foreign policy as a result of their status as one of the last 
U.N. trusteeships. All American activity there will he 
closely scrutinised hy the rest of the world". Wiggins also 
argued that the proposed programme for Japan would he of vital 
concern to both the. United States and the Peace Corps;
"To a great extent, that country will determine 
the future of America in Asia, and the proposed 
English teaching project can be expected to have 
a widespread and favorable influence upon our 
imagé there.;. In addition, the fact that such a 
relatively advanced country would accept a Peace 
Corps project on its merits would do much toward 
enhancing the prestige of ’the Peace Corps in 
other countries at a relatively high stage of 
development, who might be suspicious of the 
motives or the utility of the Peace Corps/'
The entire Latin American region was given high priority, with 
Argentina especially singled out as "significant for political 
reasons"; Mexico's unique relationship wirh the United States 
was also stressed. In the Near East and couth Asia, Wiggins 
suggested that Iran, Afghanistan and Nepal had a "a political 
importance resulting from their geographic locations/' Re 
also mentioned "local political considerations" in Greece, 
Turkey, Cyprus, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Finally, he
included Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic because of 
their "particular political priority" Wiggins noted that 
Yugoslavia might open the door to an eventual Peace Corps 
presence in Soviet bloc countries; and, if programmes could 
be established in the United Arab Republic, he felt, "we may 
expect to find the possibility of participation in other Arab 
countries, which have so far been unenthusiastic about the 
Peace Corps".
Wiggins’s programming decisions were by no means based 
solely on political circumstances; social and economic need, 
as well as an indigenous desire to have the Peace Corps, were 
always more important, Indeed, because of the latter, the 
Peace Corps never entered Japan, Argentina , Mexico, Yugoslavia 
or the United Arab Republic, Nevertheless, that they were 
given "high priority" in the early days, indicated that the 
Peace Corps was not immune to political considerations.
Since the Cold War often spilled over into the Third World, 
the Peace Corps could not afford to be entirely indifferent 
to its inevitable repercussions.
Evaluators sometimes noted that the Peace Corps was not 
always completely non-political in its programme choices.
Dee Jacobs seriously questioned whether the Peace Corps should 
be in Uruguay. The country had advanced social welfare 
programmes, educational levels were high and half the popul­
ation lived in sophisticated, cosmopolitan Montevideo. 
"Certainly it is not an underdeveloped nation," wrote Jacobs. 
Yet, the Peace Corps began making overtures to the Uruguayan 
government in 1961; eventually, it accepted eighteen Volunteers
in 1963. Jacobs suggested that the government's "neutral- 
to-rnildly-hostile stance" towards America was an important 
element behind the Peace Corps' eagerness to begin a programme 
there :
"The Peace Corps has a vital role to play in 
the U.S.'s effort to combat strong Communist 
pressures in Uruguay. Ambassador Coerr says he 
feels the Volunteers are already fulfilling 'a 
political purpose,' He says the United States 
'needs their presence* especially in the northern 
and western areas where the Communists and far- 
leftists are concentrating attention on the rural 
sugar workers. He maintains the presence and 
activities of the Volunteers definitely weaken 
the leftist, anti-American and anti-democratic 
stand^" ' 20
Indonesia was another politically lucrative country where the
host government was courted by Shriver and the Peace Corps.
"At the top, we more begged than were begged to come to
Indonesia," reported evaluator John Griffin, "The fact that
we are there is more.a tribute to our persistence and patience
and to political considerations than to any sudden recognition
of our potential value/* Peace Corps teachers in Ceylon
found themselves superfluous in a country with one of the
highest literacy rates in Asia, a large class of trained
intellectuals and nearly one thousand unemployed native
teachers. Evaluator Arthur Dudden could only.conclude that
the Volunteers were there for reasons of political prestige.
"U.S. - Ceylon relationships on tne matter of the Volunteers'
presence/' he noted, "seem to be a mixture of package deals, -
coercion and reluctant acceptance on the part of the host 
PIcountry,"
In Guinea, the Peace Corps soon became aware of the 
presence of some twelve hundred Soviet and Chinese teachers 
and technicians. Evaluator Philip Cook felt this direct 
competition provided "an especially appealing challenge,.... 
if we can continue to recruit, train and find proper assign­
ments for the right categories of Volunteers in Guinea, the 
Peace Corps may succeed in upstaging the Chinese and Bloc 
technicians now working there/*,, The Russians were also making 
persistent efforts to penetrate Togo; indeed, the Peace Corps 
contingent and the American diplomatic staff combined, did not 
total the numerical strength of the Soviet embassy in Lome. 
Yet, again Philip Cook was pleased to report that the Peace 
Corps was making a "substantial impact" in communist strong­
holds, In Ghana - one of the most volatile of the non-aligned 
states - evaluator Richard Richter described how the arrival 
of 98 Russian teachers had "spiced up" the Volunteers' 
experience :
"There is a Volunteer in almost every school 
where there is a Russian teacher. In fact, the 
yolunteer without a Russian pet feels cheated. 
The presence of the Russians, while perhaps 
somewhat distressing politically, can be viewed 
favorably in just about every other respect. It 
adds unusual dimension in the Volunteers' exper­
ience and gives us an opportunity to influence 
some Russians/' ■
In a not unrevealing conclusion, Richter acknowledged that
the Peace Corps was fully aware of its political implications,
"So far," he reckoned in 1964, "we have outshone our cold 'Var
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antagonists both in and out of the classroom/'
Of course, while the Volunteers were aware of the element
of compétition between themselves and their Russian counter­
parts in the field, they never engaged in narrow, anti-Soviet 
activities. For examole, in Ghana the na, tives tended to be 
disparaging about "those Russians" who did not speak Twi and 
always appeared diffident. Yet, as Richard Richter happily 
reported, Volunteers intelligently avoided any comments that 
would lead to tension. "They (the Russians) know who we are 
and they’re the Russian equivalent of the Peace Corps," said 
one Volunteer. "Last year one of them was convinced we were 
spies. Later we used to joke about this with him".
Indeed, the Volunteers usually enjoyed cordial relations 
with their Russian colleagues and there was often a good deal 
of professional - and sometimes, non-professional - frater­
nisation. In Guinea, sick Volunteers were occasionally 
attended by Bloc doctors. In Ghana, Volunteers invited 
Russians to dinner, went out for drinks and played sports 
together. One Volunteer was supposedly friendlier with a 
Soviet teacher than any of the other four Volunteers in his 
town. Moreover, in some cases of Peace Corps-Soviet amity, 
there were signs of incipient romance. Richter lightheartedly 
described the scene at a Ghanaian Ministry of Education party 
when Volunteers and Russian teachers had been thrown together:
"One male Volunteer, spotting a fair-haired lovely 
across the crowded room, asked a Russian official 
if he might have permission to date the girl.
The official very emphatically said the girl was 
free to do as she wished. The implication was 
clear: why should anyone suppose that Russia 
would want to keep a tight rein on the actions 
of their bright young teachers? It is somewhat 
disappointing to report that our hero never did 
date the lass, but he did find another Russian . 
girl teaching in his school/’ .
Peace Corps Rep, Prank Broderick allegedly had a recurring
nightmare about a Volunteer and a Russian falling in love and
wanting to marry. The Gold War notwithstanding, Richter
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concluded, "The possibility is not remote"
These less serious diversions aside , Sargent Shriver
was very conscious of the potential political power of the
Peace Corps. like most Americans in the early 1960’s, he was
imbued with the Cold War spirit. In June, 1961, he told
#
President Kennedy, "The impression we (the Peace Corps) could
25make on the neutralist nations could be profound/' , Shriver 
met and spoke with more of the great Third World leaders 
than Kennedy himself - Nehru, Nkrumah, Selassie, Toure, Sukarno, 
Betancourt, Tubman, Nyerere, Ayub Khan and many more. He had 
the unprecedented opportunity to impress these men at a 
personal level as well as make an impact upon their countries 
with the Peace Corps. "Countries and leaders all over the 
world, give every appearance of expecting and wanting something 
new in the policies and attitudes of this new administration^"
he advised Kennedy. "They will be disappointed if all they
26 ‘ ^ get is the same old treatment," After meeting Sekou Toure,
Shriver reported to Kennedy that he was convinced the Peace
Corps could help steer Guinea and other strategically-positioned
states away from Moscow's influence:
"Here we have an opportunity to move a country 
from an apparently clear Bloc orientation to a 
position of neutrality or even one of orientation 
to the West. This is the first such opportunity 
I know of in the underdeveloped world. The 
consequences of success in terms of our relations 
with countries like Mali or Ghana, or even Iraq or 
the United Arab Republic could be very good indeed," ??
Kevin Lowt’aer and G. Payne Lucas claimed that Shriver
was intrigued by the idea of placing large numbers of 
Volunteers on the faculties of Latin American universities
to "counteract the revolutionary appeal of Castroism among
28 ^
students," While in Latin America in September, I96I,
Shriver informed Kennedy that the "leading Commie in Colombia"
had just returned from Moscow along with 230 Colombian
students whom the Russians had taken for a three-month
educational trip. "Therefore," wrote Shriver, "to make a real
dent in the Colombian situation, we should plan on 500
Volunteers/* He proposed that Volunteers should be assigned
to at least half of the twelve thousand small towns in
Colombia. "Y/hat’s more," he c o n c l u d e d " t h e y  should have been
there for the last ten years/' ,Shriver was always pleased to
report that the Peace Corps had gained a little ground for
the United States in its fight against Communism. In March,
1963 y he told Kennedy that in the Cuzco province of Peru,
eouinunists hsd infiltrated all the campesinos except one; the
pocket of resistance was a village where Volunteers had set up
a medical clinic and were working in home economics, irrigation
and public health* While visiting Volunteers in the Philippines
in 1962, Shriver relayed his obvious delight (in a personal
letter to his wife, Eunice) that he had been invited to Jakarta
to discuss with President Sukarno the possibility of a Peace
Corps progra.:mie in Indonesia. "Sukarno has been very .:co-
Soviet," he wrote, "and this is the first time since Jack has
been President that Sukarno has invited any operating agency
of the U.S."29
However, although Shriver greatly appreciated the Peace
Corps' political benefits, these were secondary to the aims 
of supplying trained manpower and establishing people-to- 
people contact. No project was set up for purely political 
purposes. Even in Uruguay, where, as Dee Jacobs noted, "the 
political overtones weigh heavier than usual," the Peace 
Corps' primary objective was to improve the country's economic 
situation through working with the agricultural sector.
Shriver categorically denied that Volunteers were assigned to 
Latin America to combat Castro's influence. "V/e are not doing 
it for political reasons," he insisted; more simply, he 
explained that parts of Latin America were in dire need, a lot 
of young Americans wanted to help and a good many already 
spoke Spanish. Shriver argued that the Peace Corps could 
not be classed alongside standard foreign policy initiatives. 
After all, it went to "neutralist" states and it did not go 
where it was not invited - even if sometimes it had to beg an 
invitation. Mors convincingly perhaps - despite Shriver*s 
response to Senator Church's earlier inquiry about diplomatic 
ties - the Peace Corps did go to countries which had broken 
off relations with the United States. In the Dominican 
Republic and Honduras in 1963 and in Panama in 1564, the Peace 
Corps remained in service despite military coups which had 
caused the breakdown of formal relationships with the 
American government. Indeed, the Congress legitimised such 
unusual behaviour by approving an amendmenz to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1963. Proposed by senators Humphrey and 
Keating, the amendment authorised Peace Corps programmes to 
continue even in countries which nationalised or expropriated 
American property without compensation.^^ If the Peace Corps
had been a mere political tool then such extraordinary 
license would have been most unlikely. Shriver explained 
the Peace Corps’ essentially non-political philosophy:
"7/ith the newly-developing nations of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, we must be clear about 
our aim....Peace Corps Volunteers are not on 
the front lines of the Cold V/ar....\Vhat we are 
seeking is not the support of these nations but 
their success. If they succeed in their plans 
for economic, social and political progress, 
it will not matter much whether they agree or 
disagree with us, even whether they like us.
If they become healthy, democratic societies 
in their own right, they will not become threats
to world p e a c e / ' .  82
The traditional foreign policy establishment took a 
similarly non-political view of the Peace, Corps, Since it 
was a semi-autonomous agency, a 1.1 the Peace Corps’ programmes 
had to be cleared by the State Department. However, while 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk occasionally requested the Peace 
Corps to give priority status to some pivotal, no^-aligned 
states - such as Ghana or Guinea - he agreed that the Peace 
Corps would best operate outside the framework of American 
foreign policy. The strength of Rusk’s conviction on this 
subject was underscored by his spontaneous remarks before the 
first meeting of the Peace Corps National Advisory Council 
on May 22, 1961:
"The Peace Corps is not an instrument of. foreign 
policy because to make it so would rob it of ins 
contribution ^  foreign policy.... the Peace Corp; 
is an opportunity for the nations of the world 
to learn what America is all about. This is one 
of the most important things our country can do 
in the world today. Outside of the shadows and 
struggles of the cold war, outside of the 
military rivalries which heighten dangers all 
over the world, outside of the constant sense 
of national advantage which pervades diplomacy,
if the Peace Corps can let other peoples find 
out what this country is all about, we shall 
be surprised to discover how many allies America 
has all over the w o r l d " , 83
Like Shriver, Husk believed the Peace Corps would best serve
American foreign policy by remaining distinctively separate
from it. At the end of the day, he reckoned the United
States would profit - in terms of political good-will - from
the Peace Corps' altruistic initiatives- However, Rusk
acknowledged, "any foreign policy benefits would simply be a
by-pi’oduct to be cherished but not an aim to be deliberately 
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sought/'.,;
McCeorge Bundy, Special Assistant tq President Kennedy, 
did not recall the Peace Corps ever meriting formal discussion 
in the National Security Council. In retrospect,
Harris Wofford suggested that the "Cold Warriors" in the 
White House did not consider the Peace Corps important enough 
to use as a weapon against communism - even if they had 
wanted t o . However, on the extremely rare occasions when 
political pressure was exerted from the top, Sargent Shriver 
fought doggedly to preserve the Peace Corps’ individuality,
In 1962-3, the foreign policy establishment urged the Peace 
Corps to move into Algeria, The ostensible reason was to 
help with rural rehabilitation projects; but there was also 
a strong political motivation to maximise American presence in 
the newly-independent state led by the socialist 
Ahmed Ben Bella. Shriver persistently refused to send the 
Peace Corps where it was not invited. Irritated by this 
stubborness, Harold Saunders and Robert Komer (two National
Security staff members) asked McGeorge Bundy to make sure 
Shriver received "a gentle straightening out" on this 
matter. Saunders was sceptical of Shriver's argument that 
the Peace Corps was "independent of strategic concerns"; he 
pointed out that, as a foreign policy priority, Algeria 
outranked most other countries in which the Peace Corps was 
already working. -"Shouldn't we quash this nonsense that the 
Peace Corps is independent of U.S. Policy interest?" asked 
Saunders.
In turn, Bundy tried to persuade Shriver to initiate a
' '
programme in Algeria. "I know you don't like to get into^ 
nasty international political considerations," Bundy wrote, 
"but nevertheless there are only two or three countries in 
Africa that are as important, and none more so for the long 
run". Bundy also suggested the Peace Corps' presence in 
Algeria would be "mildly irritating to some of those in 
Europe who are giving us most trouble at the moment" (an 
allusion to the French, from whom Algeria had gained indep­
endence in 1962 after a bitter war). "But fooling aside," 
he concluded, "the real point is that Ben Bella is impressed
with the Peace Corps, with you, and with the President. And
37a little help here might butter a lot of parsnips/'
Despite Bundy's eloquent plea, Shriver remained unmoved 
by what he considered to be an attempt to use the Peace Corps 
as a political instrument. "I really see very little 
evidence of the Algerian government's interest in having a 
Peace Corps project," he told G. Msnnen Williams, Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs. "If the government 
were really interested, I believe that we would have had a
specific request by now- Ben Bella’s ambassador is free to 
come and see me here in Washington at any time/' Needless
to say, the Peace Corps did not go to Algeria. Nor did
Shriver bend to President Johnson's request in 1964 to send 
Volunteers into Vietnam. Indeed, he infuriated Johnson by 
insisting that the Peace Corps would never go to countries 
where the United States was actively waging war.
However, in general, American foreign-policy makers let 
the Peace Corps go its own way. Any political gains were 
seen in terms of promoting a good "image" for the United 
States in the underdeveloped world. In this respect,
Lucius D. Battle, Executive Secretary of the Department of 
State, described the Peace Corps as "superbly successful/' 
Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State, George McGee told 
Shriver in 1962, "It becomes increasingly obvious that the 
work the Peace Corps is doing in many countries is playing a
decisive part in fostering good-will for the U.S. among the 
peoples of those countries/'. Under-Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, George Ball, went even further when he 
told the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "I and the top 
group in the State Department are extremely well pleasod with 
the experience which we have had so far with the Peace Corps," 
Ball concluded, "7/e probably are getting more for our money
in' the Peace Corps than in slmost anything we are doing.....
the publicity they get, the image that they create, all these 
intangibles"
President Kennedy had no illusions about what a few 
thousand young Americans could achieve overseas - either in
socio-economic or political terms. When Sargent Shriver was
asked whether Kennedy had considered the Peace Corps one of
his larger political successes, his answer was quits candid:
"He never said anything like that to me and I never suggested
it to himf.,'^^ Kennedy rarely intervened directly in Peace
Corps matters- Occasionally he made a suggestion to Shriver
or asked a question. For example, in August, 1962, he hinted
that the Peace Corps should "keep in mind the importance of
Latin America, which I think should he a primary area/* When
he asked in June, 1961, why there were no Volunteers going
to the Ivory Coast - a newly independent and politically
important state in West Africa — Shriver replied matter-oi-
factly: "I have looked into this matter and find that
Houphouet—Eoigny (the President) has made no overtures to us
42requesting the Peace Corps.
Kennedy's first concern was with the educational impact 
the Peace Corps might have on Americans and Third World 
peoples.' He was determined to break down the tremendously 
insular outlook characteristic of most Americans in the early 
1960's- "The Peace Corps Volunteers will learn far more than 
they will teach," predicted Kennedy, "and we will therefore 
have another link which hinds us to the world around us/'
He also knew that in the eyes of many underdeveloped countries, 
the United Stares appeared as a "harsh, narrow-minded, 
militaristic, materialistic society/' Kennedy was particul­
arly worried that students, "the future leaders of these 
countries, 'nad never seen any of the "cultural" aspects of 
America. "There may he only a thousand Volunteers scattered 
thinly around through millions of people/' he said, "hut they
give us a a ban ce to call attention to this side of our life 
which is extremely important and which is so frequently 
ignored" ^
Kennedy also hoped the Peace Corps would touch the 
traditional American idealistic spirit. Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr., Special Assistant to the President, remembered Kennedy 
remarking almost wistfully about Cuba, "Each weekend 10,000 
teachers go into the countryside to run a campaign against 
illiteracy. A great communal effort like this is attractive 
to people who wish to serve their country" Kennedy saw
the Peace Corps as a means of tapping a comparable fund of 
idealism which he believed was present in Americans* Time 
and again, he stressed that this physical representation 
of American altruism was the most valuable and enduring 
advantage of the Peace Corps:
"The Peace Corps, it seems to me, gives us an 
opportunity to emphasise a very different part 
of our American character, and that which has. 
really been the motivation for American foreign 
policy, or much of it, since Woodrow Wilson, 
and that is the idealistic sense of purpose which 
I think motivates us, which is very important 
and a real part of American character, and has 
motivated a good deal of our international policy 
in the private church groups, in the aid groups, 
and all the others. It is a part of American 
character and purpose and policy which is sub­
merged frequently by the press, by political 
speeches, by the political dialogue that goes 
on in this country. But the great efforts which 
have been made by American missionaries in so 
many parts of the world, the AID programs and 
all the rest, have their roots not only in the 
national self-interest of the United States, 
but also in this quality. -.The Peace Corps it 
seems to me, gives this particular side of 
American life a channel for expression and also 
gives us a chance to express it overseas," 15
At the same time, John Kennedy was a vigorous proponent of the Gold 
War. His Cow Palace address on the Peace Corps made it clear that his 
brand of idealism was utterly pragmatic. Indeed, "an idealist 
without illusions," was how he liked to describe himself When it 
came to resisting communist subversion, Kennedy claimed, "you cannot 
separate guns from roads and schools." He often spoke of halting the 
communist advance by developing agriculture, industry and educational 
resources in the Third World, To this- e>rtent, his view of the Peace 
Corps was influenced by his staunch anti-communism. Kennedy 
maintained that every American had a duty to participate in the Gold 
War “ Volunteers were no exception:
"Two thousand years ago, the proudest boast was to say, I^ am. 
a citizen of Rome,’ Today, I believe, in. 1962, the proudest 
boast is to say, ’I am a citizen of the United States’„.«the 
United States is the great and chief guardian of freedom, all the 
way in a great half circle from the American soldier guarding 
the Brandenburg Gate to the Americans now in Vietnam, or the 
Peace Corps men in Colombia,..at a time of climax in the struggle 
for freedom." 4?
Kennedy was convinced communism was making insidious inroads into the 
developing nations, "every day, without fanfare in thousands of villages 
and markets,, .and in the c l a s s r o o m . I n  this global struggle, he 
felt America was entitled to use all the means at her disposal - 
including ..counter-revolution and counter-insurgency - to compete for the 
hearts and minds of native peoples , At a military level., he introduced 
the Special Forces (of "green beret" fame). Their instructions were to 
■ combat communism: with constructive civic action programmes where
possible, with torture and destruction where necessary. In this 
context, the Peace Corps might have been interpreted as a more genial . 
and definitively unmilitary expression of Kennedy's counter-insurgency 
philosophy.
Yet, although he considered the Peace Corps to have a part to pla} 
the fight against communism, Kennedy’s perspective was never one-
dimensional. He instinctively sympathised with the decolonised
countries struggling-for survival. In an address before the General
Assembly of the United Nations, he said: "My nation was once a colony,
and we know what colonialism means; the exploitation and subjugation
of the weak by the powerful, of the many by the few, of the governed who
have given no consent to be governed, whatever their continent, their
class and their color.M Kennedy treated the new Third World leaders
with the utmost repect and he welcomed them to Washington. "îty country
intends to be a participant and not merely an observer, in the peaceful,
expeditious movement of nations from the status of colonies to the
partnership of equals," he informed them. "That continuing tide of
self-determination which runs so strong, has our sympathy and our
support." The Peace Corps, headed by his brother-in.-law, was a striking
manifestation of that s u p p o r t . "There can be no better evidence of
our good will," he told the Peace Corps National Advisory Council,
50"than days of honest work-in behalf of our neighbours."
In another way, the Peace.Corps helped Kennedy fulfil his desire
to place a more informal, adventurous emphasis on American diplomatic
initiatives. "(He) wanted to replace protocol-minded, striped-pants
officials by reform-minded missionaries of democracy," wrote Arthur 
51Schlesinger Jr. Kennedy instructed this new breed to make people-to-
people contact, speak native languages^ eat the same food and participate
in the comniunity life of the uneducated and the needy. "Peace Corps
Volunteers will give a fresh, personal meaning to our diplomacy," said
52Kennedy, "by building human relations." Also, that the Peace Corps was 
assigned to non-aligned states spoke volumes for Kennedy’s stance in 
favour of "neutralism" and pluralistic political systems. Indeed, 
rather than defeating communism, Kennedy suggested the Peace Corps’ 
greater contribution would be to help realise his dream of a "world 
of diversity." In the long run, he did not regard the Peace Corps as 
an instrument of political power. Rather, Kennedy felt its value to his 
foreign policy was that it stood as a symbol of the moral impulse of
America. "That the Peace Corps is a vivid and obvious demonstration
of this side of American life," he said, "is of great material
help to the foreign policy of the United States, and therefore to the
53peace of the world."
Kennedy also emphasised that the Peace Corps sought to "encourage 
the responsibility of local people and not to repress but tor^^pect the 
individual characteristics and traditions of the local culture,
However, one of the major charges levelled against the Peace Corps by 
contemporary critics and revisionist historians was that it functioned
as an arm of American imperialism - economic, cultural and political.
\
In his Marxist critique, The Peace Corns And Pax Americana. Marshall
Windmiller (an academic who taught "World Affairs" courses to Peace Corps
trainees at San Francisco State College) claimed that Volunteers acted
as "advance men" for American capitalism. By establishing friendly
relations, Windmiller surmised that the Peace Corps made Third World
peoples amenable to American business promotions. "The more I examine
the Peace Corps," he wrote, "the more it seems that its essential role
is this kind of nublic relations work in behalf of American power and
influence in the developing world," Sargent Shriver deemed this
55interpretation ridiculous. The Peace Corps had no ties whatsoever to big 
business and there is no evidence that it helped create an economic 
climate favourable to American enterprise. The Peace Corps went to some 
of the most poverty-stricken countries in the world where people did not 
have enough money to buy basic food let alone American products. Indeed, 
many Volunteers worked in the remote out-back where natives were not 
likely to be influenced by advertising campaigns and Western sq.les 
techniques. Moreover, the predominant, aim of .the Peace Corps was not to 
persuade Third World peoples to buy American goods, or any other goods.
On the contrary, the Peace Corps aimed to encourage natives to be 
self-sufficient and to produce for themselves what their communities 
needed. In this light, a Marxist analysis of the Peace Corps is not 
convincing.
Windmiller also charged that the Peace Corps’ major function 
was"to assist in the expansion of American cultural values to develop
pro-American, English speaking elites, and to make America's role in
world affairs more palatable." Comparing the Peace Corps to the
nineteenth-century British colonial civil service, he argued that it
impinged Western education, arts and morals on Third World peoples
with the express aim of keeping a firm grip on their political sympathies.
A British critic, Henry Fairlie, agreed that Kennedy sent the youth of
America to "the outposts of the empire, to exercise the right to the
moral leadership of the planet," Fairlie claimed the Peace Corps
fostered the idea that empire-building was ah'"exciting moral
adventure, good for the character." More flippantly than Windmiller,
he compared the Peace Corps to the British Outward Bound movement as
"a school for the youth of the United States as it turned outward
5 7bound on its course in the world." Although these analogies were 
somewhat extreme, there 'was a hint of cultural imperialism about the 
Peace Corps in the Kennedy years. Endemic to that era was the idea 
that the export of American values and traditions per se, would be of 
inestimable benefit to the rest of the world, "Much more than most," 
noted Larry Fuchs, Peace Corps Rep in the Philippines, "Volunteers 
believed in America's historic mission to spread the value of freedom 
of choice.they agreed with President Kennedy that it is 'the 
American people who should be marching at the head of the worldwide 
revolution'
Certainly, many congressmen felt American answers - partially 
provided by the Peace Corps - would solve Third World problems.
Senator Saltonstall (R., Mass.) saw Volunteers as "missionaries for the 
American way of life," and Congressman Dumo (R,, Ore.) claimed the 
Peace Corps' major task was to "export Americanism." Likewise 
Congressman Libonati (D., HI.) praised the Peace Corps for giving 
"the backward nations a sense of understanding as to our American 
ideologies." Perhaps the Peace Corps' role in imparting American 
values and customs was most forcefully explained by Senator Frank
Moss of Utah:
"What could be more magnificent than sending well-prepared 
and useful Americans to other lands to help teach and train 
them there for a better life?...acquainting the people of 
other countries, and particularly of the underdeveloped 
countries, in which freedom is new and raw, of the basic 
concepts of America through contact with our most effective 
apostles, our American youth. ..we must make them understand 
that the fruits of self-government are far superior to those 
of an authoritarian state, and we must make them realise that, 
in choosing the direction they will take, it will be wisest and 
most rewarding to walk in the ways of freedom,"59
To Peace Corps administrators, the aim of cross-cultural exchange was 
always of primary importance; but sometimes they tended to over­
emphasise the "American" element of the programme. In a speech 
reminiscent of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (one of the "imperialists of 
189S"), Warren Wiggins proclaimed in 1963-* "America: must go abroad.
It is our only hope. If we in America*, .don't go abroad, we will find 
a our once rich, easy, healthy and educated society distorted, disfigured, 
and ultimately overwhelmed by world forces. We will either lead or be 
led."^ ^
However, for the most part, the Peace Corps assiduously sought 
to avoid association with any form of cultural irnperialy.sm. In his 
Report to the President. Sargent Shriver had stressed that the Peace 
Corps would contribute to America's education in other cultures, "This 
must be a truly international and mutual venture," he told Kennedy,
"Our aim must be to learn as much as we teach.Shriver's background 
in the Civil Rights movement made him acutely conscious of the need to 
overcome white America's attitude of cultural superiority. "There are 
some things we do not want in the Peace Corps," he wrote in March, 196I. 
"We do not want to send people abroad who think they are carrying the 
'White man's burden' to civilise the rest of the world in their image." 
Emphasising that the Peace Corps would not tolerate discrimination - 
racial or cultural - Shriver stated: "A Volunteer must be committed
to the ideal of equal rights for all men and he must be willing to put 
these ideas into practice by working and living on equal terms with all
62peoples of all races."
Inevitably, some individual Volunteers were guilty of acting in (X.. 
self-righteous, supercilious manner. Besides, in some of the more 
sensitive of the developing nations, the slightest non-native act - 
like eating tinned food - could be regarded as a form of cultural 
imperialism. However, for most Volunteers, their overseas 
experience led to an awareness and a serious questioning of their o’wn 
customs and beliefs. In effect, the Peace Corps took young Americans 
away from American values. Puzzled by the different mores of a 
mysterious culture. Volunteers were often forced to ask themselves 
whether they had any right to attempt to change it. One Volunteer in 
East Pakistan described the problem:
"If you're going to do the job right, it often means being 
insubordinate. But by being insubordinate you can be accused 
of cultural imperialism because you’re trying to change the 
system towards something that seems obviously right to you, but 
may seem only 'American' to them. On the other hand, if you just 
fit yourself into their way of doing things, you feel guilty 
because you don't think you're contributing much to them or to the 
Peace Corps. So you end up doing a little of each." 63
The Peace Corps originated in a culture which placed greater importance 
on social .responsibility, efficiency and material well-being than the 
cultures of the emerging nations. To varying degress, Volunteers were 
bound to reflect these values overseas. This left them open to the 
charge of cultural imperialism. Yet, as Charles Peters argued, "The 
cultures of the world are so far along the road to getting nixed up 
with one another that the relevant question is not should this happen, 
but how can we help the best values win out.*.The point is that there 
are different ways that our culture and our hosts' are superior to 
one another and our aim should be to see that the exchange we encourage 
is of the best elements in each,"^ '^
Kevin Lowther and C* Payne Lucas accused the Peace Corps'
community development programmes of tampering with another society’s 
community dynamics* "Community development epitomized the Peace Corps 
at the height of its imagined power to remake the world," they wroke*^^ 
Sargent Shriver and Prank Mankiewicz totally disagreed* They argued that 
since there wo.s a huge mass of people in the underdeveloped countries 
in dire need, it was legitimate to help them in any way possible* Of 
course, this assistance sometimes triggered off or influenced changes 
in native attitudes* However, Mankiewicz stressed there was absolutely 
no coercion involved in community development* The host peoples* views 
on what were their "felt needs" always held priority over the Peace 
Corps'* Besides, the ultimate objective: of community development was to 
help people help themselves and thereby increase their sense of dignity 
and independence - the opposite of cultural imperialism* 7/hen the ' 
natives of Yicos in Peru asked the Peace C®rps to leave their community 
in 1964» Mankiewicz claimed a great victory* He believed the Volunteers 
had helped inspire the natives to take democratic action on their own 
initiative and he was genuinely ecstatic:
"They threw the Peace Corps out - lock, stock and barrel* They 
got together and had a vote - out I All the 'gringos*' People 
who - took a short range view thought that the-Vico£ >-vets was a 
great defeat for the Peace Corps. I think it was a great 
triumph for community development, Where else in Latin 
America will the rative population vote out, vote out 
’gringos'?" 66
Another persistent criticism of the Peace Corps was that it served 
as an instrument of American political imperialism. In the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council in I96l,the So'^ riets made much of the 
Gold War context in which Kennedy had proposed the Peace Corps and tney 
constantly attacked this "army of ill-prepared youngsters engaging in
67nefarious activities in far-off places*" In later years, Lowther and 
Lucas claimed Kennedy's Peace Corps was > representative of an up-dated 
version of "manifest destiny," Sam Brown, Director of ACTION (the
Federal umbrella agency in which the Peace Corps was placed in the 
1970’s) provoked deep rancour when he said, "The missionary zeal that 
gave us the Peace Corps is not so far from the zeal that gave us the 
Vietnam war-" In the most extreme interpretation, Marshall Windmiller 
cited the Peace Corps as part of America’s attempt to "police the world 
to protect its interests and to establish a sort of Pax Americana over 
the Third World.«.The Peace Corps (made) Pax Americana seem legitimate 
and benevolent.It was counter-insurgency in a velvet glove.
The confluence of idealism and self-interest in foreign policy 
has been a perennial American conundrum. By tradition, Americans have 
always believed it self-evident that other countries would benefit from 
the application of their democratic form of government. Xet, although 
the Peace Corps exhibited an element of this messianic spirit, it was 
never aimed at interfering with the internal political systems of 
Third World nations. Indeed, Sargent Shriver took very careful steps to 
ensure that, despite the inevitable accusations of imperialism, the Peace 
Corps would-remain free of any narrow political interest. In a letter 
of June, 1961, to Walt Postow (Deputy Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs) Shriver defended the Peace Corps against the charge 
that it was forcing itself on the Third World.- Shriver explained that 
if people had the impression thousands of young Americans were about to 
invade the developing countries than "they did not get it from 
anything the Peace Corps or the President has stated. From the 
beginning, we have emphasised that Peace Corps operations this year would 
be pilot and experimental." Giving specific examples of the Third 
World’s interest in the Peace Corps, Shriver told Rostow thao the first 
Volunteers were going to Ghana and Tanganyika because both countries had 
invited them. Nkrumah called the Peace Corps "a bold, splendid idea," 
said Shriver, and Nyerere expressed his "strong support for the Peace 
Corps’^’ Stressing that the Peace Corps did not wish to become involved 
in foreign policy manoeuvres, Shriver concluded that he was determined
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"not to press anything but to try to respond to any feasible proposals."
In a telegram to Dean Rusk in July.^  1961, Ambassador Greene in Nigeria
emphasised there would be "no question of Nigeria’s sovereign rights
as an independent nation being infringed" by the Peace Corps. Nigerian
government officials ware consulted at "all stages of negotiations,"
they decided where Volunteers were needed and they ensured that the
"full employment" of native peoples would not be endangered. Greene
assured Rusk that the Peace Corps venture was a "general partnership
70between the two governments."
In some countries, the Peace Corps "invited the invitation" to 
begin a programme, but this was mainly because Third World leaders had 
no idea what the new agency was or how it could help solve their 
development needs. There was no question of political force being 
exerted. While explaining how the Peace Corps functioned to Sekou 
Toure of Guinea, Shriver made it clear;
"The-Peace Corps would go only where needed and wanted: it 
would be imposed on no one. If it was not wanted, the 'Inited 
States’ feelings would not be hurt. The objective of the Peace 
Corps would be to provide skilled men and women to work with the 
people under the direction of their government.Volunteers would 
not be diplomatic personnel. They would be responsible for their 
v/ork. to the neonle of Guinea and to their Government
71
Sensitive to the fears of newly-independent states, "Shriver declared
that the Peace Corps was "not a part of any new colonialism, imperialism
1?  ■or attempt at Americanization," " Service to the host nation was the 
principle on which all Peace Corps programmes were based, "Our activity
is not imperialism" wrote Charles Peters, "because the purpose is to
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strengthen not America, but our host countries,"
The Peace Corps’ community development projects ran the highest 
risk of becoming involved in internal politics. Prank Mankiewicz's 
claim that the Peace Corps was a "revolutionary force" was subject to 
much misinterpretation. First and foremost, community development 
aimed at social reorganisation - informing people of their democratic 
rights and encouraging them to take the necessary action to secure 
them. On occasion, this had political consequences; for instance, the 
shake-up of the privileged aristocracy in various regions of Latin 
America, However, the principal role of the Volunteer #as not in leading 
a revolt against the mayor or the alcalde, but rather to advise and teach 
about the means available for community action. Unavoidably, some 
political apple-carts-were overthrown in the process, "Our job," 
wrote Mankiewicz, "is to give them an awareness of where the tools are to 
..enable them to assert their political power. By that I don’t mean 
register them to vote, obviously - we don't mean to say that the way to 
a better life is through the Christian Democratic Party or the Socialist 
■ Party or 'the Conservative Party or v/iato-’ar it may be,' When I talk 
about political power I am talking about the ability to. be noticed 
and to be taken into account,
Volunteers were strictly forbidden to engage in .my kind o.f 
political proselytising or subversive activity overseas. The Peace 
Corps was meticulous in its avoidance of the slightest involvement 
in local political or military affairs. For example, when evaluator 
Richard Richter discovered that a political science course taught by 
Volunteers in an Ethiopian university was being taken by native 
military and diplomatic personnel, he recommended it should be
immediately discontinued, "We must avoid any association with the
75things of wax," he wrote. Moreover, in an unequivocal statement in 
June, 1963, Shriver reiterated that the Peace Corps had no truck with 
imperialism of any kind:
"The Peace Corps Volunteer goes to a foreign country to 
work within the country's system; he helps fill their 
needs as they see them; he speaks their language; he 
lives in the way they live and under their laws; he 
does not try to change their religion; he does not 
seek to make a profit from conducting business in 
their country; he does not interfere in their 
religious, political or military affairs,
Of course, despite its high intentions the Peace Corps could not 
avoid all political difficulties overseas. Indeed, part of the 
problem stemmed from political innocence. Young Americans came 
from a political environment based on consensus. Fundamental views 
on property, social structure, language, foreign policy and so forlh 
could usually be taken for granted and election issues generally 
devolved safely upon questions of degree, detail.and personality.
By contrast. Third World nations were seething cauldrons of sharply 
defined political antagonisms, Nothing or nobody was without 
political significance. However, since Peace Corps/Washington 
intended Volunteers to be "above politics", training programmes often
did not go into any great detail on local political conditions.
Therefore, it came as something of a shock to Volunteers when they 
arrived overseas and found they had to contend with tension-filled 
situations arising from indigenous political conflicts. For 
instance, Peace Corps teachers in Ceylon discovered that all 
educational matters were the subject of intense political deDate,
"The newspapers are filled by controversies over teachers politicking 
or being victimised by politicians," reported evaluator Arthur 
Dudden, "Banishments to rural areas are political punishments meted 
out to teachers and school administrators alike. Promotions and 
better assignments are more likely to come from interfering M.P.’s than 
from within the educational system," To the Volunteers’ astonishment 
they discovered that, despite their non-political stance, they became
77the subject of a ministerial and parliamentary controversy* As
evaluator John Griffin noted, most Volunteers tended to see themselves
as "some sort of free souls armed with a mission to teach and tied to
78the U,S* only by financial support," To their chagrin, they soon 
realised that Peace Corps life was not that simple.
Peace Corps officials hoped that Volunteers would circumvent 
the fixities of Cold War armaments, diplomacy and foreign aid. Yet, 
once overseas. Volunteers could not help but be affected by tensions 
created by a.country’s Cold War, anti-colonial or non-aligned position. 
Volunteers were seen by the Third World as part of a larger mec:.-nism - 
American foreign policy and its world-wide interests. In some countries 
Volunteers were welcomed as prestigious tokens of the government’s 
friendly relationship with the United S b a t e s I n  hyc.saland (which 
was to become the independent Malawi in I964 )» evaluator Richard 
Elwell reported that "Politically, the project has been a smash,"
The timely arrival of the Peace Corps in 1965 gave a dramatic boost 
to Dr. Banda’s hopes for nationhood. He pointed to the Volunteers
as proof that an independent Malawi could get assistance outside
79the sphere of the British Colonial Office. On the other hand, 
President Kaunda refused to invite Volunteers to Zambia because he 
feared they would be taken as a sign that he had committed himself 
in the East-West struggle. Revealingly, he did accept British 
V.3,0, workers.
The Cold War presented the Peace Corps with its most serious
problems. Since the Third World was the effective battleground
between East and West, Volunteers often found themselves being
treated as political symbols or issues by their hosts. The
Tanganyikan government sometimes criticised the Peace Corps because
it wanted to make an anti-American statement which would appease the'
Soviets and ensure that'aid would continue to flow from East as well
as West, Likewise, in Indonesia, the Peace Corps was attacked by
the local communist party not because it was unpopular or inefficient
but because it was American and thus by implication, "imperialist."
Evaluator John Griffin predicted that, such were the Cold V/ar
pressures being brought to bear on Sukarno, "We may even get kicked
00out of here for reasons unrelated to our effcrtsi," This in fact 
happened in I964»
' Afghanistan, with its government intent on playing the U.3.3,R 
off against America, was another country where the Peace Corps found 
itself in a delicate political position. Certainly, it was not 
looked upon quite..a.s suspiciously as the official U.S. Mission. 
Evaluator Thorbum Reid noted, "Nobody yet h._s accused us of having 
engineered the recenr change in government - which by and large is 
looked on as a further shift West." All the same. Volunteers were 
subjected to very close scrutiny» There was a highly developed 
grapevine system in Kabul which meant that nearly everyone knew who 
the Volunteers were. For instance, as a Volunteer was cycling to
work, he was astounded to overhear one of a group of lounging camel
drivers on a street comer remark to another, "Oh, he's one of the
Americans teaching here now," A policeman was assigned to each
street where Volunteers lived - presumably to see and report on all
Peace Corps activities, "One slip," said evaluator Thorburn Reid,
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"and the Peace Corps may be through in Afghanistan,"
In Pakistan, America's provision of military assistance to 
neighbouring enemy India in 1962, led to Foreign Minister Bhutto's 
decision to move the government tovrards China and the Soviet Union, 
Despite Pakistan's almost total dependence on U.S. economic and 
military aid, by I963 America was regarded as a major foe. The 
Peace Corps was caught in this Cold War cross-fire. In 196I,
Pakistan had requested over a thousand Volunteers; two years 
later, the number had dropped to a. handful. The Volunteers already 
there were labelled "spies". They were watched carefully, their 
mail was intercepted, read, and crudely resealed, Pakistani suspicion 
was strengthened by the innocent but ill-advised curiosity of a few 
Volunteers during the communal strife between Moslems and Hindtls in 
1969. •IVo Volunteers 'in East Pakistan left their posts to look into 
rumours of communal fighting near the Indian border. Shortly after 
their return from this reconnaisance trip, they were abruptly trans­
ferred by the provincial f/ovemment» For a time, all Volunteer 
nurses were forbidden to go to India on leave - the Pakistanis feared 
that they would inform enecpies (Indian or American) about the wholesale 
slaughter of Hindus which was taking place in and around Dacca, As 
tension reached fever pitch, one Volunteer's house was burned down.
The local police implied it had been serving as a weapons arsenal - 
although there was absolutely no evidence to substantiate this.
When evaluator Timothy Adams visited the Volunteers in 1964;, his 
report back to Washington was bleaks
"Pakistan, perhaps the most difficult country for the Peace 
Corps even when the political winds were blowing sweetly, is now 
in a period of increasing hostility with the United States. The 
future looks gloomy both for U.S.-Pakistan relations and for the 
Peace Corps in Pakistan. We have entered what one Volunteer 
aptly called the ’Era of Active Non-Cooperation' and it can be 
felt at many levels of the govendnerit. , from President Ayub Khan 
down to the Sub-Divisional officers, principals y hospital 
administrators, and other supervisors for whom our men and women 
work.0.55 per cent of our troubles are attributable to the mutual 
disenchantment between Pakistan and the U.S....The more frost 
there is in the air, the less Volunteers are able to do. The 
less they are able to do, the less they try to do. And the less 
they try to do, the more we are blamed for poor performance. It 
is a knot that gets tighter and tighter." S2
Ghanaanother country where the Cold War atmosphere was intense. 
Kwarae Nki’umah was intent on straddling the fence between East and West.
He viewed his importation of Russian teachers and technical experts to 
match the Peace Corps Volunteers as a brilliant ideological coup.
However, his brushes with the United States over issues such as the 
Congo, Portuguese Africa and South Africa made him appear to Americans 
as being Bloc-oriented. Certainly, Nkrumah was suspicious of the United 
States.” He was convinced that the C.I.A. had assasÿnated Patrice 
Lumumba, leader of the Congo, in 19Ô1. (interestingly, he also blamed 
the C.I.A. for the death of President Kennedy in I963). Evaluator 
Richard Richter warned tnat if there was a serious altercation between 
Nkrumah and the American government then "he may need a scapegoat, and 
he may have to turn on the Peace Corps." For the Volunteer in Ghana, 
pors0voran.ce meant shrugging off the question,"You ' re not a soy, ar 3 
you?" Native students attending the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute 
were told to beware of "neo-colonialist nations" (Nkrumah's euphemism 
fo.r America and Britain) because their real purpose was to gather 
information. Volunteers were regularly vilified in the local, daily 
newspapers» "The chances for any improvement in the political climate 
are exceedingly slim," reported Richard Richter in 1964. His wa,rn.ing 
was underscored by the comment of the American ambassador in Ghana,
William Mahoney, that "there should be no more than two hundred Volunteers 
in Ghana because any more than that would make the Peace Corps
conspicuous
Flash-points in the Gold War provided Peace Corpsmen with some 
of their most uncomfortable moments. During the Cuban Missile Crisis 
in October, 1962, Volunteers all over Latin America were taunted as 
"imperialists" by students who had been listening to the latest 
developments over Radio Havana» When a Peace Corps staff member 
visited Ayacucho, Peru, at the height of the crisis, a mob gathered 
outside his hotel chanting "Peace Corps, War Corps," and, "Cuba, Yes I 
Yanquis, Nol"^^ Of course, a few Volunteers were zealots who believed - 
like a couple of characters in Honduras - that "After all, we’re down 
here to beat communism aren't we?" Evaluator Richard Elwell dismissed 
these misguided youths as "knuckleheads,"^^
Most Volunteers resented being included in the dialogue of the
Cold.iWar. "We're not here to plant the flag and give democracy a hard
sell," protested one Volunteer in Tanganyika. Yet, despite the
beneficial work which they performed, Volunteers were often associated
with the United States and its backing of anti-communist but reactionary
and highly unpopular governments, In some countries, Volunteers
became much more radical in reaction to militaristic, repressive regimes
which had the official blessing of the United States. Iran was an
outstanding example, "Some of us feel we are in an ambiguous position
because we are not convinced that our government is pursuing a morally
justified policy," a Volunteer told evaluator Charles Caldwell. "Ine
U.S. government supports the Shah, yet most of the teachers and doctors
I work with are very dissatisfied with the Shah's policies." The
Soviet Union's powerful local radio station exploited this situation
87and tied the Peace Corps to America's sanction of the Shah,
Not all the Peace Corps' political difficulties were linked to the 
Gold War. For instance, in Arab lands - because of the highly emotional 
climate surrounding all initiatives by the American or any other non- 
Moslem government - the Peace Corps was involved in politics from the v@r
startJewish Volunteers, in particular, encountered deep hostility, .
In Africa, residual colonial influences presented political problems
when Volunteers were confronted by resentful British and. French
expatriates. Also, the newly-independent nations were
extremely sensitive to the slights lack of political tact» For
instance, two bemused Volunteers in Tanganyika found themselves
arrested for leaning against a fence during the playing of the 
88national anthem. Throughout Latin American, local communist
parties and revolutionary groups generally slowed up the Peace
Corps' progress. In Guatemala, Sargent Shriver tried to overcome
communist hostility by persuading the self-exiled guerrilla
89Leader, Arevalo, to endorse the Peace Corps, Had Arevalo's
confidence been gained, it would certainly have put a different
connotation on Frank Miahkiewicz' s claim that the Peace Corps was
a "revolutionary force".
The Peace Corps also had some minor problems with American
political agencies overseas. In Ecuador, the IJoS» Embassy gave
Volunteers stacks of anti-Castro leaflets to distribute before
Sargent Shriver put a stop to it. American diplomatic officials
in Guinea tried unsuccessfully to elicit information from Volunteers
on local politico-economic situations. In the only recorded case
of attempted C.I.A. infiltration, there were some uneasy-days -in
Thailand vhen a volunteer was sounded out by an agent for militayy
intelligence „ However, Peace Corps Rep Glenn Ferguson immediately
90
sent a cable to Shriver and no further approaches were made.
Inevitably, several individual Volunteers were guilty of political
indiscretion. One young man in Ceylon was sent home for actively 
participating in a local election campaign. When a female Volunteer in 
a Latin American country became romantically involved with the Reader 
of a local political faction, an enemy group attacked the Peace Corps.
The girl's service was t e r m i n a t e d I n  Ethiopia, a few Volunteers became 
sympathetic to Eritrean separatism and engaged in criticism of the 
official church and government. In the Philippines, Eugene Burdick
and Wil].iam Lederer noticed that some Volunteers, shocked and frustrated
at the injustice prevalent in a society dominated by the land-owning
aristocracy, were in danger of falling under the influence of professional
9 2Marxist organisers. Of course, sometimes Volunteers had no choice but to 
play active parts in political imbroglios. At one time or another, a few 
Volunteers in Tanganyika, North Borneo and the Dominican Republic were 
taken prisoner by local rebel gangs - although all were later freed unhurt. 
Peace Corps Reps always had to be aware of the possible political consequen­
ces of elections, assasânations and revolutions. Accordingly, most 
prepared tentative evacuation plans for the Volunteers. Fortunately , 
few ever had to be implemented.
In March, I964, the Peace Corps was'obliged to leave Cyprus when war 
broke out between Greece and Turkey. It was the first time Volunteers had 
been forced out of a countiy. Military or political, pjcessures pushed them, 
out of Ceylon, Indonesia and the Dominican Republic within the next year. 
However, in the vast majority of countries, the Peace Corps survived every 
kind of political tergiversation and retained its unique identity. The 
Peace Corps could not avoid entanglement in all political snares but, 
simultaneously, was never regarded as a run-of-the-mill American foreign 
policy initiative-even by the most over--sensitive Third World govemmeaits , 
In Guinea, evaluator Philip Cook reported Sekqu Tours's "special interest 
in the Volunteers," There was intense criticism of the A.I.D. programme, 
but not of the Peace Corps. Volunteers were allowed à remarkable amount of 
freedom and Toure requested an increase in numbers because, "Volunteers 
comport themselves properly....(and) behave themselves well in political 
matters." In Togo, despite a government coup and the as sa station of 
President Olynipio (who had e^ rtended the original invitation 00 the Peace 
Corps) Volunteers managed to maintain a neutral course. "The Togolese 
confide in them," wrote Cook, "but do not insist that they take sides or 
become involved." Ironically, in terms of political impact. Cook reckoned 
the Peace Corps to be "the most welcome and commendable U.S. activity 
in Togo n" Even in Ghana where political nerve-ends were extremely
frayed, the local peoples genuinely liked the American Volunteers and
seemed to prefer them to the rather unemotional and aloof Russian
technicians. Moreover, Richard Richter insisted that "For all his
irrationality, Nkrumah likes the Peace Corps." Although prone to
frequent anti-American outbursts, Richter noted that the CSianaian
leader never hinted at expulsion of the Peace Corps, "Its contribution
is fully realised," he wrote. "The people realize the importance of
education. They realise they've gotten their money's worth from the 
93Peace Corps."
To Sargent Shriver, the Peace Corps was the best Example of John P, 
Kennedy's "new politics of peace]^^ Certainly, the new agency was one 
of the President's outstanding political successes - at home and abroad. 
There was some criticism on the domestic front from extreme idght-wing 
groups like the John Birch Society who claimed the Peace Corps was "soft 
on Communism," In an angry riposte, Kennedy fought fire with fire :
"If they (the John Birch Society) really want to do something about 
Communism.... they will encourage their children to join the Peace Corps 
America's general response to the Peace Corps was overwhelmingly favourable. 
"The Peace Corps is in high gear," Harris Wofford wrote to Kennedy in 
January 1962.''It, is. doing a good job overseas - and wil'd, do a great job 
of political education for us at home. It can be a big thing going for us 
politically in the years ahead," Indeed, keeping Kennedy's re-election 
prospects in mind, Wofford noted, "By I964, it can yield a real political 
harvest o'*
Of course, the Peace Corps' greatest impact was overseas. Again, it 
was the politically astute Wofford who pointed out to Kennedy - in July, 
1961 “■ that the Peace Corps would restore the sparkle to a foreign policy 
badly tarnished by the Bay of Pigs fiasco. "You may underestimate the 
degree to which doubts have been building up since Cuba," wrote Wofford. 
"There is a growing feeling...that there is little new, aside from the 
Peace Corps and our position on Angola, and that the Democratic foreign 
policy is in danger of becoming, merely a more elegant-version of
97Foster Dulles’s»" Wofford advised Kennedy, "much more needs to be
said and done....(but) the Peace Corps strikes the note the developing
98nations are waiting for."
In 1961 a Bolivian government official characterised the Peace Corps
as "the point of the lance" in America's attempt to win a new image
99and a new respect in countries long neglected by her. In 19oOy
Third World peoples viewed America as monolithic rather than pluralistic,
Most Americans they had seen were either intelligence agents or soldiers.
Peace Corpsmen gave an indication of the diversity of American life »
This had a tremendous effect. For example in Gabon, natives living
in remote eastern towns - where newspapers and radio were not available -
asked government official when the Americans would, arrive to help them
build schools. At a different level, the Minister of Education was
'Overheaid at a government reception telling President Mba about the
Volunteers he had seen "swinging machetes and carrying heavy loads."
In the Dominican Republic in I964 evaluators contragpted the popularity
of the Peace Corps with the rampant anti-American sentiment they had
encountered in 1962. "There is little doubt," they reported, " that
having personable,hard-working Volunteers scattered throughout the
Republic has favorably and significantly influenced the attitude of the
Dominican people towards the
The Peace Corps was not always responsible for such sweeping changes
in the attitude of Third World peoples towards the United States,, With
America represented overseas by the State Department, the military and
the C.I.A, as well as the Peace Corps, it was inevitable that she would
present a composite image to the world. The Peace Corps was seen as a
distinctive part of this composition. This was rather ironically
exemplified during the anti-American'.riots in Panama in January, 1964
Natives protected Volunteers in their homes because they were regarded as
101"gringos who are different," Of course, the step from liking these 
individual Americans to accepting U.S. foreign policy as a whole, was a
long one. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps did at least indicate to 
suspicious, non-aligned countries that the United States was capable 
of idealism, Thanat Khoraan, Foreign Minister of Thailand, expressed 
his surprise that,
"this important idea, the . most powerful, idea in recent time, 
of a Peace Corps, of youth mingling, living working with youth, 
should come from the mightiest nation on earth, the United States» 
Many of us»,, thought of this great nation as a wealthy nation, 
a powerful nation endowed with great material strength and many 
powerful weapons » But how many of us laiow that in the United States 
ideas and ideals are so powerful?102
In 1961, Ambassador Galbraith in India told Shriver that the Third 
World would welcome the Peace Corps as "an affirmation of American 
idealism. It is particularly important in rubbing out the impression
TAX
that we are excessively prone to military solutions,"  ^ A young 
Volunteer relayed a similar message to Shriver from Tunisia in I962:
"The Peace Corps » »..exhibits to the world the fact that the U,S. is 
interested, and in a personal, direct and humanitarian v/ay,"^ *^ ^
To young Volunteers, their Peace Corps sar/ice was a 
declaration of their faith that they could ea'.cape becoming pawns in 
the Cold War, David Crozier, the first Volunteer to die while serving 
■■overseas (he was killed in a. plane crash in Colombia in. 1962), set 
forth this belief in a letter to his parents » "Should it come to it," 
he wrote, "I had rather give my life trying to help someone than to have
105to give my life looking down a gun barrel at them," It was
this idealistic spirit which allowed the Peace Corps to transcend 
the often murky waters of international politics. For it was almost 
universally recognised that the Peace Corps had less to do with 
governments and their- foreign relations than peoples and their- human 
relations. It was a point well taken by John Kennedy in his 
discussion of the development needs of the Third World and their 
political consequences, "In the end," he said, in his State of the 
Union address in January, 196.3 "the crucial effort is one of purpose, 
requiring the fuel of finance but also a torch of idealism.
And nothing carries the spirit of this American idealism more erieciiveiy 
to the far comers of the earth than the Peace Corps.
The Peace Corps emerged in part from America’s intense feeling of
competition with the Soviet Union in the early I960’s. In this
sense, it was a Cold War creatioh. However, it was not narrowly
anti-Russian and it had no specifically political purpose.
Neither President Kennedy nor the American foreign policy establishment
attempted to mould it or push it an a particular direction,
Volunteers were not sent overseas as "agents" of American imperialism.
They did not proselytise or seek to impose their beliefs in any way
whatsoever. Yet paradoxically, because the Peace Corps engaged
in no such activities, it became a uniquely significant political
asset to the United States, By treating local people according to
their own needs and customs, without undue reference to their political
importance, the Peace Corps built the kind of goodwill that did, in the
and, have condiderable political effect. Speaking before the United
States Foreign Policy Association in New York, Sargent Shriver asked,
this world of the Gold War and many little hot wars, of the
hydrogen bomb, the'At!.antic Alliance and the Sino-Soviet .split,
what room is there for a Peace Corps?" In an editorial entitled
"’Idealism At Work" (written on November 21,1963 - the day before
.President Kennedy’s assassnation), the New Yo.rk Times gave Shriver
his answer: "In a little over two years, the Peace Corps has coma to
be recognised as the most idealistic arm of our foreign effoit and one
107of its most successful expressions."
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
TO LEAVE SOMETHING BEHIND
J
" Vblxmteers joined the Peace Corps to shape, teach, influence 
and help other people and especially, they joined to leave 
something behind.»... * .It is in the nature of man to want to 
leave some monument, however small, however insignificant, 
however intangible »"
- BILL MOYERS -
(Memorandum To Warren 
Wigg.ins, August 17, 1963)
Sargeat Shriver compared the effects of the Peace Corps to a
series of widening circles - "like the expanding rings from a stone
thrown into a pond «" To Shriver, the inner circle represented
the immediate accomplishments overseas in terms of social and
economic development, education, skills imparted and the physical
improvements achieved. The second ring was the impact the returning
Volunteers had on American society, " on institutions and people,
on the creation of a new sense of participation in world events,"
Shriver's last circle was more intangible than the other two but
nonetheless important - " a declaration of the irresi.siCb(ji.strength
of a universal idea connected with human dignity, hope, compassion
and freedom,"^ Very roughly, Shriver's analogy of the expanding
rings corresponded with the Three Aims of the Peace Corps Act: to
provide the developing countries with trained manpower, help promote a
better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served
and help increase American knowledge of other cultures » "The
Peace Corps touched many lives and made them better," claimed
Hubert Humphrey, "yet critics ask what visible lasting effects there
are, as if care, concern, love, help can be measured in concrete
and steel or dollars or ergs," Humphrey contended that "education,
whether in mathematics, language, health, nutrition, farm
techniques,-, or peaceful coexistence may not always be visible,
2
but the effects endure »" The impact of the Peace Corps was
(and probably always will be), the key question concerning the entire
experiment; the difficulty is that it is almost impossible to quantify.
Not everyone agreed with Shriver and Humphrey's wide-ranging, 
positive assessments of the Peace Corps' effects* In 1962, the
■journalist Eric Sevareid argued that while Volunteers may have
been responsible for "some spot benefits in a few isolated places," 
the American taxpayer might well wonder what Volunteers had to do 
with the "fundamental investments, reorganizations and reforms upon 
which the true and long-term economic development of.backward countries 
depend." Peace Corps evaluators could be equally sceptical of Volunteers’ 
efforts* In Sierra Leone in 1962, David Gelman wrote that, as far as 
certain Volunteers were concerned,they might just as well "go home and 
file the whole thing in memory, like the two abortive years in the 
army or navy." In later years, Henry Pairlie referred to the Peace 
Corps sneeringly as "a lamentably frivolous experiment» ’’ Fairlie 
deemed the Volunteers extraordinarily presumptious in their belief 
that they could "make a serious contribution to the countries to 
which they momentarily journeyed»" Perhaps the most damaging 
criticism came from C. Payne Lucas (one of the agency’s first 
administrators and an overseas Rep) in his scathing work on the 
Peace Corps, Keeping Kennedy’s Promise» As Lucas saw it, "There 
was no overall purpose to the Peace Corps* presence in a countryJ' 
Moreover, in a wholesale condemnation of the agency’s achievement in 
the Kennedy years ha concluded, "Thousands of Volunteers were 
committed to-vaguely conceived and marginal projects.that had
3little or no impact on people's lives or on national development."
Shriver and .his colleagues disagreed with Lucas’s rather extreme 
view that Peace Corps service did not affect people’s lives. By the 
summer of 1963, Siririver claimed the Peace Corps had brought learning 
to "tens of thousands of children, opened up new worlds .for hundreds 
‘of villages, brought new meaning and perspective in so the lives of 
thousands of Americans and showed the face of an America which many 
never dreamed existed»"^ As Doug Kiker, Chief of Public Information 
recalled, "There was lots of idealism and lots of mistakes»"
However Peace Corps administrators were not innocents. Indeed, it 
was with failures - as well as accomplishments in mind - that Bill 
Josephson described the Peace Corps to a prospective staff member as 
"simultaneously the most exciting and discouraging place in Washington,"5
4/J.
Besides, Charles Peters and his evaluators ensured that the Peace 
Corps was constantly confronted■with its fallibility. In a 
typically frank and honest memorandum of July, 1963, Peters outlined 
the Peace Corps’ most obvious weakness:
"You Imaow, one of the sad things about the Peace Corps is 
how resistant many of us were to admitting we started out 
as the blind leading the blind» P,D,0. people felt they had 
to act like they knew something about Peace Corps programming; 
training people that they knew something about Peace Corps 
training; I, about Peace Corps evaluation. If we had only 
been willing to cheerfully acknowledge our ignorance, we would 
tiave been so much more receptive to constructive suggestions 
from each other» Much is still to be gained by the leadership 
encouraging an attitude of ’we’re still learning and don’t 
have to be afraid of admitting our mistakes»’ The thing we 
really have to fear is, not our mistakes, but failing to learn 
from them*"6
Involved in the humbling task of helping to satisfy the Third
World's development needs, Peace Corpsmen were well aware of their
limitationso All the same, they deeply resented being treated as
wholesome, but essentially insignificant, do-gooders. The Peace
Corps paid a great deal of attention to its "first aim" - supplying
trained manpower, "Our relevance to the world is not that we are
a nice bunch of people offering low-paying overseas fellowships,"
7said Warren Wigginso Objective, academic reports reinforced 
Wiggins’î3_-statemento For instance, a survey of Peace Corps impact on 
the Philippines conducted by the Social Research Institute of the 
University of Hawaii reported:
"Cur research teams found palpable evidence of the Volunteers* 
impact. Thus in 92% of these places our interviewers established 
tiiat educational facilities and new teaching techniques had 
Indeed been introduced» In 53»1% of the Peace Corps 
communities, scholarships had been instituted and material aid 
given to help the residents improve themselves one way or 
anothero Slightly smaller percentages of communities showed 
other Peace Corps innovations; community development projects 
(31.3%); voluntary organizations of various kinds (4-2.3%); 
and recreational facilities (38o9%)»"
Thus the social scientists concluded, "The Volunteers had definitely
g
made a difference to their communities*"
Unfortunately, very few Peace Corps programmes lent themselves
to this type of rigidly defined analysis* A Volunteer in Senegal
claimed there was no way of quantifying whatever benefits he may
have brought by "con^/incing a mother to give protein foods to her
child, taking someone with inflamed eyes to a hospital to get his
possible trachoma diagnosed and operated-on, or-giving a shot that 
g
saves a life." Most Volunteers and officials agreed that it was
- almost impossible to gauge statistically the impact of their
programmes on host societies* Indeed, according to Frank Mankiawica,
only one irreducible fact emerged; "That is, that the people who
lived in those villages to which Volunteers were assigned were
better off at the end of the two years in which the Volunteer was
10there than if the Volunteer had not comeo"
The value of the Peace Corps * contribution varied with the
country, project and individual Volunteers concerned* When,
at end of term conferences. Volunteers were asked what effect they
had had on the economic, cultural or social development of their
host countryy. their answers were often vague or non-committal* As
evaluator Richard Elwell concluded in 1963, "Most Volunteers do not
11have a quantitative-idea of what effect they have," Some 
Volunteers said it would be years before they could even begin to 
judge their contribution. Many felt they had had more impact on 
their place of work than the native community in general. Others 
said their contribution was marginal or .intangible, resulting 
primarily from their mere presence in the community and nhsir 
example of initiative, application, cleanliness and so forth. Some 
Volunteers suggested that whatever effect they had would be lost unless 
another Volunteer replaced them in their host community. Several 
claimed that because of the great diversity of Peace Corps activities 
in any one country it was impossible to gauge general impact» Others 
said it depended upon whether the Peace Corps’ effects were judged in
terms of helping the host peoples or helping to build a favourable image
for the United States in the Third World. Indeed, at the end of the
day, most Volunteers shared only one feeling in common - guilt that
they had gained much more than they had given. Yet, although
highly self-critical, most Volunteers did eventually agree with a
colleague in Senegal who concluded, "Gradually it will dawn on
you that you’re doing something for your country, for their
12country and also for yourself»"
In the sphere of economic development, the Peace Corps
contribution proved almost impossible to measure. Although 75 per cent
of the first thousand returning Volunteers felt they had been
responsible for small improvements in a country’s economic condition,
it was difficult to define what these were* In a rather typical eval.uation
of a. programme (in the Dominican Republic), Dee Jacobs and Philip
Hardberger found the Peace Corps’ efforts "impressive, but often
fragmented or, in the long run, irrelevant to any real economic 
13development." Most cost-effective studies of the Peace 
Corps concluded that its people-to-people approach helped alleviate, in 
some way, the poverty of the local communities in which it worked; but 
- they failed to find any .evidence, of its leading to a. growth in the t
national economy. For , this reason, the Peace Corps always preferred
to articulate its goals in terms of human, rather than economic, 
development. ''Sargent Shriver often pointed out that "we coilLd send 
five hundred Volunteers into Borneo and do a good job and the Gross National 
Product (G.N.P.jmight still go down."^^ Certainly, when he appeared 
before Congressional committees, Siiriver could rhyme off an impressive 
list of material accomplishments - 6 inland fish farms begun in logo,
200 miles of road laid in Colombia, a 1,790-foot pipeline built in 
Morocco, a million eggs produced in four poultry cooperatives in India,
17 bridges erected in Sierra Leone - but even with these in mind, he 
admitted, "The Peace Corps’ contribution has been less in direct
economic development than in social developments health, education, 
and commun!by organization*"
Again, figures could be produced as evidence of the Peace Corps' 
positive contribution to social services in the Third World, The 
Volunteers working at the Magburaka hospital in Sierra leone enabled 
its medical clinic to double its out-patient load from 42,000 cases in 
1962 -to 95,000 in 1963; in Bolivia, two Volunteers in the Alto Beni 
region administered penecillin to about 6OO Mosetene Indians and 
gave 590 tuberculin tests in the Cochabamba area; Volunteers in 
Colombia helped establish over a thousand juntas; in a remote village in 
Panama, a Volunteer initiated a home sanitation project which in five 
months resLilted in the construction of 71 latrinesHowever, 
although the communities in which Volunteers worked may have been 
physically cleaner and healthier than they were two years beforehand, 
the effect on the overall condition of a country was questionable.
This was not to say that the Peace Corps' impact was insubstantial, but 
rather that it was more local than national*
Perhaps the only Peace Corps activity which could be said to have 
had a major national effect was the one in which most Volunteers were 
'engaged - education.' The Peace Corps' achieveuent in-this sphere was 
momentous- In Africa especiallythe presence of nearly 3,000 
Volunteers in nineteen countries greatly increased educational 
opportunities in that continent* In Liberia, the 280 Volunteers 
teaching in elementary and secondary schools were in daily contact with 
nearly 15,000 students* Mso, in Nigeria, 450 Volunteers were teaching 
over 40,000 pupils - 35 per cent of all Nigerians in secondary schools. 
Volunteers increased Nyasaland's secondary school teacicing force by 26 
per cent; and in Somalia they carried 50 per cent of the teaching load» 
In the Cameroons, the infusion of Peace Corps Volunteers permitted 
the doubling of secondary school enrollment and in Ethiopia, they 
comprised approximately one-third of all secondary teachers in the
country» In Ghana, evaluator Richard Richter reported that' Peace
Corps teachers were in danger of becoming too successful. With
Volunteers in 64 per cent of Ghanaian secondary schools reaching
some 43 per cent of all native ptudents, Richter suggested that
behind criticism in the press lay an increasing awareness by
politicians that the educational system had become too dependent
17upon the Peace Corps.
Nor was this impact on Third World education limited to Africa
or secondary schools. For instance, in /ifghanistan in 19&4, Volunteers
were teaching 50 per cent of the country's university students. However,
in many ways, the Peace Corps' most valuable contribution was to give .
tens of thousands of Third World children the chance to go to school.
Moreover, evaluator Robert lystad estimated that Volunteer teachers
would leave behind "a reasonably good, possibly superior education of
the students with whom they have worked, improvements in curricula
18and texts and a large reservoir of goodwill," As the economist
Barbara Ward Jackson pointed out, the Peace Corps was a "valuable effort
to provide in underdeveloped countries the massive number of teachers
19needed to carry out modernisation," '
Furthermore, taking education in its broadest sense, the Peace 
Corps' contribution was by no means limited to the classroom* Sargent 
Shriver often argued that the Volunteers' people-to-peopie approach had 
immeasurable educational value - no matter the job they were doing - and 
that this should not be regarded as a "fringe benefit»" Evaluators 
agreed that, even where projects were unsuccessful or collapsed after 
the Volunteers left, "they had accomplished something merely by
20introducing, enunciating and clarifying ideas for the first time*"
By working at the very roots of societies. Volunteers did influence them — in
countless ways. For instance, in nutrition projects in Latin
America, children were required to wash their hands before they were served
any food, line up in an orderly fashion (giving respect to others in the 
queue), wash their plates after dining and store them. Thus, Volunteers not 
only gave the children one square meal a day but taught them basic 
hygiene and organisational discipline. Despite the inertia and 
carelessness rife in many Third World hospitals, evaluator Tim Adams 
felt "our nurses will leave behind new attitudes, new techniques and a 
markedly higher level of nursing care," Volunteers in Somalia 
irrigated the land around -^ moud and gave the city its first electricity; 
yet, Richard Richter felt the most "indelible Peace Corps imprint" 
would be the running-track, libraries and other recreational
oi
facilities created by the Volunteerse*"
Time and again, evaluation reports strc-ssed that the Peace Corps' 
greatest impact was on people's attitudes* Objective observers tended 
to agree. When anthropologists from Cornell University évalua.ted the 
impact of the Peace Corps on the villages of the Peruvian ilndes, they 
noted the afforestation of eucalyptus trees, the potato-graders built, 
the agricultural extension projects carried out, the athletics 
programmes devised and the introduction of a brass band. Yet, their 
main conclusion did not differ substantially from those of the Peace 
Corps' own evaluators :
"The principal contribution Volunteers made has not been in 
establishing new institutions and materially increasing the 
scale of the social system* It has been rather in reinforcing 
the modern institutions established during the previous 
decade and in helping to lay the groundwork for others in the 
future."22
In general. Volunteers did not expect to change countries' social, 
economic or educational systems overnight, A young Volunteer in East 
Pakistan told Tim Adams that he was not too disappointed with his two years 
work* "In my estimation, I have accomplished one change," he said, "I have
23gotten the kids to ask questions; for this, I am happyo"
Most Volunteers found they could only judge their impact in
these somewhat nebulous, but deeply personal and meaningful ways®
In Peru, a Volunteer saw the greatest indicator of his success in
''the happy faces of the children being fed by our nutrition projects*"
Another Volunteer in Liberia felt .his major contribution had been to
persuade his pupils to wear shoes - thus helping to reduce the incidence
of worms acquired by barefoot children* In Honduras, a Volunteer sensed
he was making an impact when the people of his campesino offered to
share their one egg of the week with him* For a Volunteer in Sierra
Leone, the greatest feeling of achievement came when a native stood up
at a village meeting and told him he was the only white man ever to shake
hands with him and speak in his tongue* For another, it was a little
2/
boy saying "thank you" at the end of every lessono Lilce Volunteers,
evaluators also tended to describe the Peace Corps’ effects in a personal, 
emotional manner* For instance, in Peru in 1963, Herb Wegner assessed 
the Peace Corps’ contribution in terms of3
"The small people, the endless parade of the impoverished 
ones, the little old ladies who came to the meeting on the 
wrong day at Galda, the kids on the Volunteer-made swings 
at Ghimbote, the radical Uniwrsity student at Cuzco who 
wanted to meet me, the Vicosinos, who call a girl Volunteer 
’Momita* the waiter who often serves Volunteers at a little 
hotel in Huarez, a police captain who rode in, the back of a 
pick-up truck with me after the bus broke down, a taxi-driver, 
the five little kids who sang songs for us in guechua and 
many others who had one message - 'V/elcomei * "25
As far as the "second aim" of the Peace Corps Act i-/as concerned - 
helping to promote a better understanding of Americans on the para of 
the peoples served - Volunteers had an unprecedented impact overseas.
Quite apart from supplying "trained manpower" and the concrete achievements 
accompanying it. Peace Corps Volunteers succeeded, by and large, in 
projecting a new image of North Americansp For the first time. Third 
World peoples learned that there were Americans who were not wealthy.
bigoted or afraid to work with their hands* For many, the stereotype
of the rich Yanqui tourist on vacation went crashing; Volunteers were not
only willing to speak their language but also take an interest in them
as human beings* " We have sent 8,000 Americans to 46 countries speaking
40 languages," said Sargent Shriver in December 1963o "What's more,
we have been very successful in almost eliminating that phrase ’Yankee
ÿo home’ from the countries where we go."^^
Again, this effect was more a matter of perception than
quantification* Yet^ there could be no doubt the Peace Corps was seen
as a new direction for I^merica. "They came to live with our people not in
hotels, not in sumptuous houses," exclaimed Thanat Khoman (Foreign
Minister of Thailand), "they lived in our farmer’s huts, sharing their
food and the roof." In Asmara, Ethiopia, where (thanl^ to the G.I«
influence) the average American was treated to a greeting of *Euck
you Joe," Volunteers came to be addressed with the more respectful
"Good evening, teacher." Volunteers in Tanganyika recalled that they
were often complimented - albeit in a back-handed fashion - by natives
28
telling them "We like you much better than the British*" likewise,
Nigerian journalist Tai Solarin estimated that "the lubrication of our
teaching force with the Peace Corps is a greater service to this country
than Britain did in a hundred years with all the epaulleted and sword-
carrying governors who ever ruled this country," In India, Volunteers
were told by local educationalists that they were more valuable than
Fulbright professors "because Volunteers are always eager for more work,
29
not less * " A tribal chief in Sierra Leone claimed that the %ace Corps 
showed his people "a world we never knew existed» We had never seen
people from the outside who wanted to help us. We had heard of
30America but now we know what it means*" To a young Volunteer in 
Indonesia, this understanding of who anâ what Americans were, was the
Peace Corps* most important effect. "Five years from now
these people probably won’t remember much of what I taught," he said,
"That will get lost»... but I want them to say, * I know about America
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and Americans - one of them is my friend
Of course, to President Kennedy and most other Americans this
"second aim" of the Peace Corps was crucial. The great need to be
"understood"- and liked - overseas had been one of the burning issues
of the i960 campaign. "The Peace Corps has already erased some
stereotyped images of America," Kennedy told Congress in July 1963,
"and brought hundreds of thousands of people into contact with the first
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Americans they have ever known personally." Ambassadors all over the
Third World praised the Peace Corps* positive contribution to cross-cultural
relations. "Above all, I have found this is no experiment," said
Ambassador William Mahoney in Ghana, " this is a working outfit; it is
producing and I am immehsely;proud of it," likewise, in Colombia,
Ambassador Fulton Freeman reported to Shriver that "the vast and
overwhelming-majority of public and private opinion concerning
the work of the Volunteers has been of a highly laudatory and almost
completely uncritical nature," In retrospect. Assistant Secretary of •
State, Philip Coombs felt that "these well-motivated young people
contributed something unique that older people and ’officials*
could not possibly have contributed," More succinctly, Vice-President
Johnson told^Shriver that, as far as improving America’s image was
concerned, "It appears we are not only getting a collar’s value for a
dollar spent with the Peace Corps, but two dollars value for every 
33one spent."
In many ways, America’s investment in the Peace Corps was most 
profitably returned through the effects the experience had on the 
Volunteers* Of course, these effectsfwere deeply personal and again, 
impossible to quantify* However every pollj» questionnaire and 
conference on the impact of Ibace Corps service suggested overwhelmingly.
that returned Volunteers felt they had undergone a radical change
overseas® On coming home they felt different from their peers -
in having a broader outlook on the world, being more mature and
understanding and having greater sensitivity to cultural variety.
(APP52IDIX XV) "Until one ha.s had the experience," wrote Neil Boyer,
a returned Volunteer from Ethiopia, "one cannot realise how
34important two years can be in a lifetime," For Volunteers, the 
Peace Corps was as much a process of self-discovery as discovery of 
others. Yet, understandably, they found it difficult to articulate 
the extent and quality of the Peace Corps* Impact upon themselves.
There was always the possibility they would be accused of bragging or 
being self-righteous® Highlighting this problem, evaluator 
Thorburn Paid sent to Washington a transcript of a question-and -answer 
session oh "personal impact" which he had. conducted with a Volunteer 
in SI Salvadors
He ids "How will you describe your* Peace Corps experience?" 
Volunteer; Well. -I won't sell it*" (Pause)
Reid; "What will you say?"
Volunteer; "I'll tell them what it was like *" (Pause)
Reid; "Such as?"
Volunteer; "The best goddam experience a young man can have, 
Worth four years :f college," 35
From the very beginning. President Kennedy stressed this "third 
aim"of the .Peace Corps Act and claimed t:iat "the Volunteers will learn 
themselves far more than they will teach and we will therefore have
>h6another link which binds us to the world around us* In later years, 
it became something of a cliche to say that the Peace Corps had more 
effect on the Volunteers than the peoples served. Too often, cynical 
commentators neglected the other two aims of the Peace Corps and the 
positive accomplishments overseas* However, there was no doubt that
Peace Corps service did have a profound effect on those participating* 
Although, for most returning Volunteers, it raised more questions
than answers* Their personal encounter with other civilisations
was painful and unsettling as well as enlightening^ Many
Volunteers experienced a "Re-Entry Crisis" on going home and found
it exceedingly difficult to accept the old ways» The founders of the
Peace Corps had expected that Volunteers would gain a useful familiarity
with the Third World; they had not anticipated that many would undergo
an intense personal experience that would profoundly alter their view of their
own society. "This past year has given me a chance to see America
and the American way of life the way others see it," wrote a
Volunteer in Niger* " But the picture many times has been an ugly
one."37
Most Volunteers came home more radicallywninded, more concerned with 
the problems of others and more prepared to take action to solve them 
than they had been two years previously* A massive 85 per cent of 
returned Volunteers in 1964 saw racial inequality as America's most 
glaring domestic weakness. Poverty in general was listed second.
(appendix XVI) As far as foreign problems were concerned, the immediate 
priority of most returned Volunteers was to persuade the United States 
to withdraw her troops from Vietnam* However, dn second place, they felt 
the needs of the Third World and the inadequacies of America's 
foreign aid methods to meet them, required urgent attention°
(APPENDIX XVII) Perhaps even more Importantly, 96 per cent of returned 
Volunteers indicated that they would be williug to '■ participate" 
in achieving these ends. Of course, the level of this commitment 
differed with each Volunteer; however, 68 per cent said they would 
take part In a,demonstration and 47 per cent claimed they would, if 
necessary, participate in ci'/il disobedience* (APPENDIX XVIII)
To Volunteers, the Peace Corps was a way of becoming involved in the 
issues of their time * That involvement continued after their return 
from overseas. Significantly, many former Volunteers committed 
themselves to the Civil Rights struggle in the 19oO*s and the 
Committee of Returned Volunteers (formed in I964) was in the
van.gua.rd of protest against .American military presence in Vietnam*
Moreover, some of the most severe criticism of Inerican policies, domestic 
and foreign, was heard on those cainpuses which, in the Kennedy days, 
iiad supplied large numbers of Volunteers - tlarvard, Berkeley,
Michj.gan and so forth.
However, the effect of returned Volunteers on American society
cannot be gauged solely in terms of protest movements and visible
commitments to causes* Most returned Volunteers made their mark in
qjaieter, often less perceptible ways* "The thing about the Peace
Corps experience," said, one former Volunteer, " is that it
38doesn’t end after two years - it lasts a life-time*" Newell Flather,
a Volunteer in the first teaching programme in Ghana, claimed that the Peace
Corps opened many young Americans’ minds to the possibility of
change* " The Peace Corps got people at a very formative age and
gave them new ideas," he recalled* "for many it was the opening of a
New Frontier of the psyche * " Incidentally, Flather (who admitted .he .bad
gone to Ghana a rather serious and reserved graduate student) came bac.k to
help found the Committee of Returned Volunteers and picket the White
House over American policy in Vietnam* He later became Oiiairman 
39of Oxfam.--America*' "When we fcog.^ n organizjng' the Peace Corps," 
said Warren Wiggins, "we thought that it would prove the capacity of 
American youth for idealism and service*" Yet, as he later noted,
"I believe we misjudged the Peace Corps’ effect - this experiment is
not really displaying our latent capacities, it is creatine:
them*
M ny returned Volunteers took up positions in American society 
where change could be most readily affected* Encouraged by 
President Kennedy’s signing of Executive Order 11103 in April 
1963, (which pro-^ /ided for the non-competitive Federal appointment of 
former Volunteers) some 13 per cent of returnees took up positions with 
government organisation at home and overseas - thus realising
Kennedy’s hope that the Peace Corps would provide a steady flow of
experienced personnel to the Foreign Service, the State
Department and so on» (APP.ëNDIZ XIZ) Of course, these newcomers to
the traditional agencies of American foreign policy started
out at a very low level.. However, as they gained promotion, it was
hoped they would add a new tone to the actions of United States
policy-makers* In this sense, former Volunteers working in overseas
government organisations might, ultimately, be of more value to the
Third World than they were during their service»
A further 4 per cent of returnees went into local or state
government. Using their skills in inter-cultural communication
and cooperation they proved particularly helpful in dealing with members
of America's own "forgotten subcultures" - blacks, American Indians,
Hispanics and many others. In 1978, Paul Tsongas became the most
visible embodiment of former Volunteers’ participation in political
life when he was elected as a United States senator from Massachusetts»
Tsongas claimed that his two years with the Peace Corps in Ethiopia shaped his
view of the world; moreover, he cited the experience as "the most
influential factor in my decision to enter public life*
. . Perhaps the most exciting potential contribution of returned
Volunteers lay in the area of education. Dean John Ffonro of Harvard
rated two years in the Peace Corps "as significant as a Rhodes 
42scholarship." He saw Volunteers as a national educational resource 
of untold value. In fact, 16 per cent of returnees went into school- 
teaching and 36 per cent sought to further their own education.
Envisaging tens of thousands of these intelligent, motivated young people 
permeating all sectors of America’s educational community, Eargent 
Shriver predicted they would become some of the most significant 
shapers of the nation's character* Indeed, by 1963, the Peace Corps 
had ’come to see itself as an "educational" as well as an "overseas
service" institution. Or, as Harris Wofford termed it, "a kind of
I 3
university in dispersion,"
In a broader interpretation of "education", returned Volunteers
helped to take a lot of the mystery and fear out of the American view
of the Third World, In the early 1960’s, it was considered
rather dangerous to send young, white people to what was still known as
"Darkest Africa»" Photographs of Volunteers feeding and teaching black
children had a tremendous psychological impact on Americans back home.
On a slightly more sophisticated level, returned Volunteers were able
to impart the lessons they had learned overseas - that language is bound
up with society and politics, that one culture is not qualitatively
superior to another and so on. Thus, as returned Volunteers taught and
participated in their own society, they contributed to a much better
informed American public opinion, and eventually foreign policy* As
two former Volunteers put it, "In the Peace Corps, all Americans are
getting a very special kind of education at a bargain price »
Yet, for all these benefits. Volunteers who went into the Peace
Corps expecting to see tangible results were usually disappointed*
"The irony of the Peace Corps' work," wrote evaluator Meridan Bennett,
"is that so frequently it will live to see almost everything it has done
swept away in blood and chaos; everything done by the 'North Americans'
may be destroyed come the next revolution*Ultimately, the Volunteers'
impact was dependent upon the quality of the association between them
and the peoples served* In that sense, their long-term achievements
were mostly intangible® "The important thing we are doing here is not
that which can be measured with a camera," said a girl in the Philippines*
"Who can photograph the mind of a c h i l d ? A t  the end of their terra
of service. Volunteers could do little more than suggest, or hope, that they
load achieved somethijig concrete* "Maybe five years from now, cne of my
pupils will say ‘Oh, teacher Fred taught us that'," said a young Volunteer.
in Liberia* Another hoped for no more than that "when I leave, somebody
47will go out and dig a latrine,"
A^lthough difficult to quantify, there were suggestions that soma
of the long-term effects of the Peace Corps went beyond the Volunteers *
modest hopes© On a personal level, there were several instances
of former Volunteers returning to their host community to find that the
locals had adopted the techniques they had been shown years before.
One such Volunteer, who had done some chicken-farming in India, had
finished his term of service feeling he had accomplished little.
However, when he went back ten years later (in his capacity as a U,S,
foreign aid administrator) he was astounded to discover tens of
thousands of chickens in the area where he had worked ~ the project had been
carried on by natives© "We do not have a catalogue of what happened.
ten or fifteen years later," said a former Peace Corps Director,
Carolyn Payton, "but I believe it is anecdotes like this that
tell the real Peace Corps story© Not onJ.y technical lessons survived
the years, but personal relationships too. In the 1970’s Paul Tsongas
returned to Ghion in Ethiopia to meet some old friends there© When,
in 1978, Joe Walsh returned to Guatemala, where he had been a Volunteer
in the early 1960*s, he found that a native friend of his had died,
leaving a young son to fend for himself. Walsh adopted the boy and
took him back with him to ,America© Many other Volunteers kept up
correspondence or visited their former counterparts over the years.
In this respect, the Peace Corps had a continuing iLmpact down the years -
/g
for Volunteers and their hosts©
On a larger scale, it might be suggested that the Peace Corps acted 
as a catalyst for renewed worldwide interest in voluntary service 
organisations. By the mid-1960's, nearly fifty Peace Corps-type 
programmes had been started in various Europe,an - and perhaps more 
significantly - Third World countries© Inspired by the Peace Corps 
International Secretariat, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Panama, Bolivia,
Pakistan, El Salvador and Honduras were among the many countries 
involved© As Sargent Shriver told Me George Bundy in February 
1963, "The imitation of the President’s idea by other countries is the
50sincerest form of flattery." Moreover, U Thant, Secretary 
General of the United Nations, foresaw a time when "the average 
youngster - and parent and employer - will consider one or two years of 
work for the cause of development, either in a faraway country or a 
depressed area of his own community, as a normal part of one’s 
e d u c a t i o n . N o t  the least important imitation came at home in the 
shape of the "domestic Peace Corps" - Volunteers In Service To America 
(V.I.S.T.A.), Suggested by Kennedy and established by Joimson, it had 
200,000 members by 1970* This enthusiasm for voluntary service 
confirmed Shriver‘s belief that the Peace Corps was not just an 
American idea but a "universal" one. Moreover, as "evaluator David Ge-lran 
told him in 1965, "We are still at the very barest beginnings 
of the Peace Corps as an American experience and as a world movement*",,52
"A Peace Corps Volunteer has to be an idealist," said Hubert
Humphrey, "You have to believe that one person can make a difference
53to what happens in this world." Although, John F. Kennedy and Sargent 
Shriver agreed with Humphrey’s optimistic sentiment, neither had any 
illusions about what the Peace Corps might accomplish© At the most, 
Kennedy hoped "In some small village. Volunteers will lay a seed which 
will bring a rich harvest for us all in later days©"  ^ The "richness" 
of the yield depended very much on how and when it was measured© In 
terms of national socio-economic development, the Peace Corps’ 
impact was, to say the least, problematical* Nevertheless, Shi'iver 
claimed that, considering no one had heard of Schumacher’s Small 
Is Beautiful theories in 1961, the Peace Corps’ concentration on local 
communities rather than G.N.P. was both prophetic and - judged by those 
standards - effective© In later years, John Kenneth Galbraith concurred
that "the test of the Peace Corps was whether it helped some people
55live better in lass pain - and i thinic it did©" There was no doubt 
that the Peace Corps contributed a great deal to cross-cultural 
understanding. Indeed, by 1965jSorae staffers claimed that Volunteers 
had reached "indirectly" some 25 million people©^^ Certainly, 
the Peace Corps broke down numerous physical and psychological 
barriers that had grown up between America and the Third World© In 
particular, returning Volunteers had a powerful effect on the education 
of American,society. In these various ways, the Peace Corps made its 
impact felt or, as Bill Moyers put it, "left something behind," Yet, 
notwithstanding the three aims of the Peace Corps Act and the many 
statistics that can be produced to argue either for, or against, 
the Volunteers* fulfilment of them, there remained many intangibles.
At the end of the day, Sargent Shriver saw the peace Corps as America’s 
attempt to rejoin - after a long absence - "the world’s majority; the young 
and raw, the colored, the hungry and the oppressed©" Shriver argued 
that because human development was the Peace Corps’ ultimate aim, 
its ultimate impact could not be quantified in statistical terms.
Quoting l^blo Casals’s remarks on the Peace Corps, Shriver 
concluded;
"It is new and it is also very o l d W e  have come from the 
tyranny of the enormous, awesome, discordant machine, back 
to the realization that the beginning and the end is man - 
that it is man who is important, not the macJriine^  and that 
it is man who accounts for growth, not just dollars and 
factories© Above all, that it is man who is the object of 
all our efforts ©"57
EPILOGUE
KENFTEDY'S. GHILDRM
"I feel a particular satisfaction because tbis is the most 
immediate response - the Peace Goips - that the country 
has seen to the whole spirit which I tried to suggest in 
my inaugural about the contribution which we could make to 
our country. "
- JOPIT ?. KE^ TNEDY -
(Remarks to The First Group 
Of Peace Corps Volunteers Before 
Their Departure For Ghana And 
Tanganyika, August 28, 1961)
"This generation of Americans, your generation of Americans,"
John F. Kennedy told a group of students, "has a rendezvous with 
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destiny, " Through the Peace Corps, he sought to giLve young Americans
an opportunity to meet that "destiny" in a personal way. To Kennedy,
the Peace Corps was not merely a political gimmick or a weapon in the
Cold War, Rather, it was an expression of his special feeling for
young people. He believed they had something unique to offer their
society. Basically, he took the risk of establishing it ~ and there
was a considerable political risk involved - because he liked, and
had faith in, young people, "It was crazy to send ten or fifteen
thousand Americans, most of them just out of college, off to thousands
of different locations in the schools and villages of Asia, Africa
and Latin America, " said Karris Wofford. "It was crazy to think of
turning such people loose, on their own, to teach and learn and organize;
it was crazy and full of pitfalls." Yet, he concluded, "it worked
better than all the other systems of assistance or partnership in
2
world education and development yet tried,"
The Peace Corps went through its own particularly intense grief 
on the death of John Kennedy, The seven thousand Volunteers then in 
service witnessed, at first hand, the unprecedented and pe.rple-d.n- 
phenomenon of Kennedy’s universal popularity as a figure of hope among 
the world’s forgotten and destitute. In a letter to Peace Corps/Washington, 
a Volunteer described the reaction to Kennedy's assassination in a small, 
isolated T^illage of North Borneo: .a
"Living in a community where the native people live in relative 
seclusion, and know only smatterings of world affairs, I was surprised 
to look up and find several local boys standing at my door saying that 
they had heard on a radio that ’my President and dear friend had been 
shot and they were sorry for me because they 'mew I would be sad* ’ A 
mourning party was arranged.... and the natives living in the Borneo 
interior were reminded that John F. Kennedy was more than an important 
President and world leader in some faraway capital; he will be remembered 
as the man who sent his nersonal representative to live and teach in 
their village and who showed them some concrete evidence of the American 
Yfillingness to is^rove the universal dignity of man."
The press in Ethiopia stressed Kennedy’s commitment to Civil Rights 
at home and abroad and eulogised him as "the Second Emancipator, " 
Volunteers everywhere were reported as feeling that they had suffered 
a personal loss, Frank Mankiewicz, Rep in Peru, noted that his Volunteers 
felt the Peace Corps "won’t be the same without President Kennedy." Some 
Volunteers wanted to come home, ^
As Bill Josephson wrote, on November 27, 1963, "The President’s
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death has thrown the Peace Corps into a state of considerable confusion." 
In many ways, the Peace Corps was never to recapture the vigour and 
enthusiasm which characterised it in the Kennedy era. Certainly, it 
continued; moreover, it doubled in size. Yet, somehow, it did not seem 
as potent a force. However, there was no doubt Kennedy had interested 
the younger generation in politics and ~ largely through the Peace 
Corps - made them aware of the possibilities of personal action. "My 
three years in the Peace Corps taught me that you can never know when 
your individual effort will make a difference, " said Senator Paul
6
Tsongas in 1979, "I have re-learned the lesson many times since then,"
Throughout the 1960’s there was strong evidence of a desire by
the generation of Americans in their early twenties, to "participate"
.in the great issues of their time - whether through the War on Poverty,
the Civil Rights crusade or the anti-war protest. Collectively, they
added up to a movement among America's young people, //hile Kennedy
provided much of the inspiration behind the -ovement, the Peoca d.jiys
was in its Vanguard, As the political journalist Jack Newfield put it:
"Kennedy liberated energies bottled up for a decade,... he provided a
friendly umbrella for the New Left to grow under and held up a vision
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of social idealism, represented by the Peace Corps,"
The Volunteers of the years 196.1-3 became symbols of the young
President and what he had promised. In this sense they truly were -
as the natives of the Dominican Republic called them - Kennedy's Children.
"It was probably the best thing we’ve done overseas since the beginning," 
said William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
"symbolically representing change and innovation rather than 
bolstering up an old status quo." Kennedy’s Under Secretary of 
State, Chester Bowlee, agreed that "Even with all its imperfections,
I think the Peace Corps is one of the two or three really creative, 
positive things we have done in foreign affairs in the last generation."
Some critics - like the revisionist historian Marshall Windmiller -
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claimed that the agency's name was pretentious and misleading. Certainly,
the Peace Corps did not act as a mediator between combatants or bring
about cease-fires. In fact, it was policy not to assign Volunteers to
any countries where there was a "shooting war." Yet, only by the
narrowest definition of "peace" - the mere absence of war - could it
be argued that the Peace Corps contributed little to it. Volunteers
mgde an effort to bring justice, education and a general spirit of
well-being to thousands of underprivileged communities. They sought
to break down the barriers of race, colour, culture, class and ideology.
Instead, they attempted to create lasting friendships on a personal
basis. Although perhaps not immediately discernible, this concentration
on social construction did contribute to peaceful change. As Bradley
Patterson, the Peace Corps’ first Executive Secretary explained it:
"The entire objective....was slowly to build behind the 
defensive shields, little threads of contact and fri.endship.
One little Mary from Massachusetts going to one little place 
in the Philippines builds halfway round the world a little 
thread. And many of these threads, of course, are fragile, 
and maybe some of them are only short-lived and so forth; b'.ib 
if, over the long period of time and the long development ,;f 
American foreign policy, there are enough threads built and 
rebuilt and twisted together around the world.,..there will 
come a day when the threads of trade, commerce, culture, 
films, books and person-to-person visits will hold the world 
together so that it can’t blow apart, I always tho:ght of that 
33 a very beautiful metaphor, not only in describing the 
fundamental long-range objectives of foreign policy, but in 
particularly showing how the Peace Corps fits into things,"
Inspired by President Kennedy, the Peace Corps was the beginning of
a new generation's war on poverty and its corollaries of ignorance,
disease and inequality. Moreover^ it was a step towards the ideal
of world community. As Harris Wofford advised Kennedy in 1962, the
integration of rich with poor, and white with non-white, was the key
not only to America’s future, but the world's, "The American Negro is
going to make it, sooner or later; he has the strength - and has on his
side the Constitution, the Federal Government and the national conscience,"
wrote- Wofford. "But the greater problem of integration is our integration
into this largely colored world.... whether we, the Western minority,
make it in this new world is the more interesting question. That is
11
the big integration, "Of course, the problem of integrating the rich
with the poor nations remains the world’s most pressing need. Moreover,
as the Brandt Commission on International Development Issues argued in
1960, the integration of the affluent northern half of the globe with
the poverty-stricken south is, ultimately, mankind's only hope of 
1 2
survivals Twenty years before, Kennedy's Peace Corps took a first,
modest step in that direction. "Most important of all, " Sargent
Shriver told the Foreign Policy Association in 1963, "these Volunteers
will bring back home not only skills and experience, but the same ideals
they carried overseas - ideals of world community and sen/ice to common
needs which we have too often forgotten or neglected in pur rush to
■1Cpower and affluence^"
THS END:
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(Published by ACTION), P. 11 '     '
'John Monro quoted in The Volunteer magazine, February 
196 3. Unfortunately no detailed research has been undertaken 
on what became of Volunteers after their Peace Corps service - 
it would make an interesting subject for a future doctoral 
dissertation.
■'Sargent Shriver, Point of The Lance (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1964), p.87; and Harris Wofford, "The Future Oi The 
Peace Corps," The Annals (May, 1966), P.129
4 4David Hapgood and Meridan Bennett, Agents of Change: 
A Close 1,0ok At The Peace Corps (Boston: Little, Brown &
Co, 1968], PC 2^0 '
'^Meridan Bennett, Evaluation Report on Colombia, 19 64, 
P.86, P.C.A.
^^Volunteer quoted by Sargent Shriver, "I Have The Best 
Job In Washington,” New York Times magazine, June 9, 1963
^"^Volunteers quoted by Kev.^n Delany and David Gelman,
Evaluation Report on Liberia, 1963, P.30. P.C.A.
^^Statement of Carolyn R.Payton, Director of the Peace 
Corps, Before the Committee on International Relations Sub­
committee on International Development, February 14, 1978.
4 9The author held conversations with many returned 
volunteers. The given examples are drawn from Personal 
Interviews with Paul Tsongas, May 19, 1979, Boston and Joe Walsh, 
May 1, 1979, Boston.
50Sargent Shriver memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, February 
12, 19 63, National Security Files Boxes 2 84-90, J.F.K.M.L..
The International Peace Corps Secretariat was established in 
19 63 to foster voluntary organisations in other countries. 
Congress limited its power to providing personnel (_no_t money)
but nevertheless, it was quite successful in promoting the "Peace
Corps" idea.
51U Thant quoted in Harris Wofford, "The Future Of The
Peace Corps," The Annals (May, 1966), P.118.
5 9
“David Gelman and Patricia MacDermott, Evaluation 
Report on Recruiting, May 19 6 5, P . 91.. P.C.A.
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(Published by ACTION).
^^John F. Kennedy, "Ren.iarks In Bonn At The Signing Of 
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1963; Public Papers/Vol III, P.503
Personal Interviews with Sargent Shriver, October 10, 
1978, Washington D.C., and John Kenneth Galbraith, March 16, 
19 79, Boston.
^^This figure is calculated by Gerald Bush in his 
unpublished doctoral ' dissertation The Peace Corps," '  ^ ■ 
1961-65: A Study In Open Organisation (Northern 111inois
University, Department of Political Science, 196 6)
57Sargent Shriver, "Two Years Of The Peace Corps,"
Foreign Affairs _(July, 19 63), P.707,
63:
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of Costa Rica," March 20, 19 63. Public Papers, Vol. Ill,
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3
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'William Josephson letter to Stephen E. We ill,
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APP32IDTX I I I
Cost  P e r  V o lu n te e r
P o 3 ta elee bi on :
1. Transportation :
United States -------  ^ 200
Inte rna ti •: nal  ---------  1,200
-'.ravei. AXiovance-------- —  33
’’Home Leave’' a’’P_owanc0  6o
2. Project equipment and supplies 7S0
3. Vehicles------------------  750
4. Housing--------------------- 1 ; 240
5. Medical kit---------------  25
o. Personal supplies---------- 25
7, Overseas orientation------- 100
S. Readjustment allowance  1,630
9» Settling-in allowance  125
10.. Living in allowance-------- 2,625
l3,» Lea^'"’e ?. a. . ?■ -/ anc e—-— ■ — . ~ . 2 73
12.. Clothing allowance  ...  200
13» In—count.-rv trave 1.—  ---- 2<.p
14- I'ledical Care------ ---- - --  3 13
15. Medical evacuation/emergency leave 210
Subtotal-------  10,024
Total direct cost for 
2 y ears o f serofice - 13,3 3 6
Congressional Record, Uovember 1 c. lyo't
'th Cosgross,
bdV
APPM 0IX IV
OPPOSITION TO IH3 FSAC5 CORPS IV SZVAIS, 1961 
SENATE
(Based on the Hickenlooper Amendment, August 25, 196I; 32 - 59)
Derg oc rats a gains t the Peace Coro 3 :
Byrd (Va. )■> Pulbright (Ark,), Holland (Pla, ), Lauscha (Ohio), 
Robertson (Va.), Russell (Ga,), Stennis (Miss,) and Hiuroond (S.Car.)
Republicans against the Peace Corns:
Allott (Colo,), Bennett (Utah), Boggs (Del..), Bush (Conn.),
Butler (Md, ), Capehart (Ind.), Cotton (N.H.), Curtis (ileb,),
Dirks en (I11, ), Bworshak (Idaho), Goldv/ater (Az, ),
Hickenlooper (lowa), Hruska (Neb.), Kuchel (Calif.), Miller (Iowa), 
Morton (Ky. ), Mundt (S. Dak,), Prouty (Vt. ), 3 allons tall (M.oso, ), 
Schoepel (Kansas), Smith (Maine), Tower (Texas), Uilliams (Del,) 
and Young (N. Dak,),
TOTAL : 32 (o Democrats; 24 Republicans)
APPENDIX Ü
OPPOSITION TO THE PEACE CORPS IN THE HOUSE; 1961
HOUSE
(Based on the roll-call vote on the Peace Corps hill, September 14, 
1961; 288 - 97)
Democrats against the Peace Corpss
.Andrews ( Ala„ ) Al.ford (Ark., ), Gathings (Ark®), Norrell (Ark«)j 
Haley (Fla„ ) ^ Matthews (Fla? ) « JIG* Davis (Ga-^. ) 5 .Flyrit ( Ga« ),
Passman (La*)* Abernathy (M.iss„)^ Colmer (Mlssc)^ Whitten (Miss,. ), 
Williams (MisSo), Winstead (Miss,,) 3 Baring (Nev,, ) Ashmore (S. Car*), 
Dorn (5<n Car*), Me Millau (S^ Gar*), Murray ( Tenn* ) ^ Casey (Texas), 
Burleson (Texas), Dowdy (Texas), Fisher (Texas), Kilgore (Texas),
Poage (Texas), Teague (Texas), Abbitt (Va»), Smith (Va»), and 
Tuck (Va„)«
Republicans against the Peace Corps;
Rhodes (Az»), Hiestand (Calif»), Hosmer (Calif®), Lipscomb (Calif»), 
Rousselot (Calife), Smith (Calif»)  ^ Hoffman (111»), Derwinski (111»}, 
Bruce (Ind»)^ Wilson (IncU), Gross (lowa)^ Kyi (Iowa), Avery (Kansas), 
Dole (KtUisas), Me Vey (Kansas), Shriver (Kansas), Garland (Maine),
Me Intire (Maine), Benne t (Mich®);, Cederberg (Mich®), Hoffman (Mich, ) , 
Johansen (Mich®), Knox (Mich®), Header (Mich,), Battin (Mont®)^
Beermann. (Neb®), Cunningham (Neb®), Martin (Neb»), Auchincloss (N4J*)% 
Glenn (N® J» ) , Osmers Becker ( N » Y » ) , Derounian ( N * Y » ),
King (N®Y®), Fillian (N,Y,), Taber V/harton (N»Y. ), Ray (N,Y,),
Jonas (N4 CAr® ), Nygaard (N® Dale» ), Short (N. Dak® ) Ashbrook (Ohio),
Betts (Ohio), Harsh a (Ohio), Min stall (Ohio), Seberer (Ohio)c,
Belcher ( O k a ^  Norbla I ( Ore ® , Gevin (It..,. .) . Scyl re (?a-, r, Clancy (Pa.) 
Berry (S® Dak^), Reifel (S.Dak®), Baker (Tenu»), Reece (Tenn,),
Pelly (Wash®), Moore ( W® Va® ), Harrison ( Wyg. ), Burns ( V/is, )
Laird (Wis®)^ 0'^ Kinski (Wis® ) » Schaedlberg (Wis®)* Thomson ( .V: s® ) 
and Van Pelh (Wis®)o
TOTAL; 97 (29 Democrats; 68 Republicans)
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APPENDIX IX 
PEACE CORPS APPLICATIONS
QUESTIONNAIRES RECEIVED MARCH 1961 THROUGH MARCH 1963 !
I  1963 3 MONTH AVERAGE 3602/MG.
4,000 -
TOTAL 0,805
3,000
1962 12 MONTH AVERAGE =  2180/M0.
X TOTAL 26,155
2,000
1,000
TOTAL 11,578
1961 MONTH AVERAGE == 1,2
‘1
JAN. FEB. MAR. APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.
APPENDIX X
DISTRIBUTION OF yOLUNTEERS BY STATE OF LEGAL RESIDENCE AS OF APRIL
ALilBiVM 36 ÎDSBRISIU 47
ALASKA 3 NEVADA 7
ARIZONA 39 NEW HAMPSHIRE 35
ARKANSAS 30 NE,7 JERSEY 179
CALIFORNIA 739 NEW MEXICO 21
COLORADO 111 NEJ YORK 524
COMSGTICTJT 95 NORTH CAROLINA 76
DELAWARE. 15 NORTH DAKOTA 29
DISTRICT OP COLmiBXil 46 OHIO 224
FLORIDA 120 OKLAHOMA 51
G-EORCIi\ 4b OREG-ON 82
HAWAII 13 PEiRISYLVANIA 275
IDAHO 22 RHODE ISLAND 24
ILLINOIS 314 SOUTH CAROLINA 17
INDIANA. 83 SOUTH NIKOTA 23
IOWA 90 TENNESSEE 4-1
M'lSAS 65 TEXAS 151
KENTUCKY 39 UTAH 30
LOUISIANA 35 VERMOÎÎT 17
NAINE 22 VIROIHXA 63
MARYLAND 77 WASHINGTON 1 29
ILASSACNUSLTTS 20b HAST Vi:,,rI.;iA 1 ;
NICHKLTN 184 WISCONSZ' 1 34
t ^ j 1 » » -1  ^ ^ 160
« . _I_ iD  .k-.f. «L. 12 i ' T  -"i; , ' .V,- .w / lA  A  4 '  . I  A - V  V 32
MISSOURI 108 VIRCBJ ISLANDS 1
HONTAia 33
Prom^ Peace Corps Con,a:res3ional Presentation» Piscal Y e a r  1964, Volume III, ?as5 71
APPENDIX XI
TUS MOST POPULAR IIESPONSES^ OP PmC E  CORPS. APPLICANTS TO...QUESTION::. ''WHI'
DID IOÏÏ JOIN THE PHA.GE CORPS?"'
Is To help peopleÿ huiüanity
2« To improve international relatione^ represent the U«S*-^  promote 
internatlonal understanding
3* Gain inter cultural experience
To vSer^ e or strengthen 17*8»; become a better U»S. (ox* wox'ld) citizen 
Belief in the Peace Corps as an organization^ or instrumen't of change
6* To work for peace or against war
7o To giro of oneselfserve,, work hax*d
Learn or gain general or specific experience
9o To teach (general)
10 To apply specific skills or kr^ ovrledge
11 General personal satisfaction 
Previous relevant experience
13 To help a specific geographic area 
Develop or impx’ove as an individual
15 Further career or vocation
16 To work with people, help them help themselves 
General moral or ethical considerations
18 Person-to-person contact
Identification with something bigger than self 
Sense of duty or guilt ■
21 To build a better world, encourage internaiional brotherhood
22 To spread or promote freedom and democracy; to fight tyrnony 
To help other countries
To correct past --mist ices" in U,3, foreign policy 
travel or -ad'/enture
26 To fight coiinnuiiism
FROM: Suzanne Gordon and Nancy K„ Sizer, Why Peoole Join The Peace Core 
(Washington D.G, Institute for International Serrioes, I963)
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APPENDIX XVII
RETURNED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS' VIEW OF FOREIGN PROBLEMS
VOLUNTEERS RETUfôlING IN I96U
Vietnam 68
Wi thdraw tro ops 39
Let Vietnamese take over 7
Other 22
Fpreis]i_âld
Help with knowledge and technical skills 6
Increasej make more effective 6
Need better knowledge. of needs 1
Less selfish 4
Other 16
1*3» as World Protector 32
Should not police world 14
Should uphold right to self-determination 8
Leave developing economies alone 6
Other 4
Cnternational Relations 14.
Foreign policy should be redefined 6
Need cross-cultural programs 3
Other 3
American Image 12
TjoSrt projects itself badly
Need better foreign representatives 6
Other 2
liddle .East Problem I3,
Ive'^ population 11
lore Dialogue v^th Communists 10
fuclear Arms Position 3
Stop escalation 7
Other ‘I
Era d e P ro bl ems 7
NOEi; - Louis Harris Associates, A Survey Of Returned Peace, /•.P?.rrVn" pntear: 
N e '.V Y 0 rk, i 9 6 9 ®
APPENDIX XII
VCLUNTE2RS BY PHCG-RAMME (JUNE 30. 1964)
LATIN .AMERICA
Agricultur al Extension » r. = » j>35 
Rural Comm oui ty Action » j. 1 339 
Urban Community Action.» ». ». « 769 
Piementary Educa-tion»- 24
Secondary Education - . -..    - 2A2
University Education.» » 
V0 oa tional Aduca ti on >..
Physical Education.
Heal Fh
CAO
■ 63 
21 0 
600
AFRICA
A.gricultural Extension.., .., 117
Rui'al C oïamuni ty Action ...... 284
Elemen tary Education......... 577
Secondary Education........ 2569
University Education......... 95
Vocational Education....... 14
Pliysical Education......... 44
Health A . . . . . . . .
Publac .1 orlcs............
Xj (XyT vezü.................
187
Public j .dministro,tion..... « 37.C ,
NEAR EAST AND SCUTr ASIA 
Agricul-^'-ura-l Extension.,.,». 201 
Rural Community Action,,..,.. 142 
Secondary E d u c a t i o n. 385 
îjnioersity E d u c a t i o n . ........ 19
Vocational E d u c a t i o n X A -
11 e0,11.l i i 5
1:1 ulti-purpose 7
X' U O u I L C  wOXt.,u s . » , ->.5» / ’•'
PiAlic XEp'inistration...... 52
Elementary E d u c a t i o n . . 245 
Secondary Education,„ 4 7 7  
Université E d u c a t i o n . 72
Vocation,".! _,uuo".ticn. . no
Pliysico/i Education « 35
X.ealth.
APPENDIX XIII
VOLUNTEERS BY COUNTRY (JUN'S 30. 1964,)
LATIN AMERICA
IN
TRAINING- OVERSEAS 
ol-u \m,a 6o ». » « » * I np C amBroon •»>«<>»,«
o r*a* Â> I * * * » » , 0 6 » * w c* A » " 1 0
British H o n d u r a s .,, «4-0 ». » ® », »1 3 
G h r i o 9,0*40oiJo,,,,,,io6
2?0„ o o ., 4  ,561
^^*** o o n » • * * o 5
Dominican Rep,,,, *— - „,.., ,17*1
Ecuador » A o o o « . * * « ,  203 *  *  » ,  «  *2j3
SI S a l v a d o r , . „ », » *49
4-2o..op»106 
J
Ool^ m^'bia, *, » 
Costa Rica,*,»
Guatemala 
Honduras, 
lam a i c a * »**•,,
panama,
P e r u ,  . . . . »,
St * Lucia» 
U r u g u a y , ,. 
Yenesuela,
4k ÿ> f|l u C* u
4-0 
62
—  "11/ <5 <►<-<?*/ O
240,.**.,293
H 7
0  #  # »  »  *  I /
4 », » 20
“' * » i p 6 , 7
idvcnced training
(not yet assigned) 1 5 6 , n,»,»--
::A\R EAST AND SOUTH ASI A
:i t r .iuna .jtan » » * » »o<-
2 . i l i . ,  _L ; 4  n «  p" A *  { ' t" A ^  u .  <) Î  ^ ^  o V tt *  e ' .  ^7 
X S>ü (ffrl /
I  Ts X *  A « a 4 * i > f  * 0 « t t 4 k  #  O A •» ■
J? * * * ^ A A  ^1^
TOTa\L* , , ♦ * « *  o ^  A *  A *  *652
G-RAIiD TOTAL: IN THAIL'INO OVSNSSAS 
NOI5 b067
Ü V> O <*«»<» d
»  »  p  X* f, ^
ljjflXOJ)ici * o o a »
(x S'ID 0Î1 a*Q-&t>#P*t)
Crhc^'jflct
G-uinea.,,
Ivory Goa 
L i b e r i a , , *. 
jîi a iawzL »»,,»»,*»»**
LI OX'OCCO ÿan-prf a » * * *
Niger,
N r g e n a  , » , * , * »  *  »  *  »
S e n e g a l » * » » , , * * ? » *
Sierra L e o n e ,»*»»»
Somali Republic » , . * ,74» » ».- * »- -
Ta n g a n y i k a »,».»,»».,64..*.».129
T o g o »— —
T u n i s i a    »i 2p
A d v a n c e d  training 
(not yet assigned) 133
APR:
IN
IN IN G O'VERSî
t *^~Y Û a » »  *  0 o3
J)21f,^  * , , » ,402
*» ,»70
I- r> LL* ^  A * , .  , 1  36
» 5 2
»  » * ,  51
a s g . . . ,272
k 0 3 0 ft t* • . . . . 9 7
-714,» . .  ,1 02
, . 3 9 . . .
.252» ,. , . ,5 0 8
►, p 0 0, , . . . . 6 2
01» C ^ B , . . . 1 5 9
»59
.48
FAR EAS'
Indonesia^. * » 
Yalog'sia, »,, 
Philippines, 
T h a i l a n d , . ».
,,31
,92..... 245
TOTAL,,» 78»--- .392
APPEMDIX XIV Ô48
PR0BÎ,EA3 CF PEACE CORPS VOLWTEERS IN O^ /ERSEAS SERVICE 
1 o Activity of host country nationals in helping themselves
2, Frustrating work experiences
.3» Support from host country officials 
A* Effective working counterpart 
Ability to see results 
6» Support from Peace Corps officials in host coimtrj''
7a Peace Corps policies
89. Keeping the problem Volunteers in the country 
9® My ability to communicate in the local dialect 
10, Giving all you could to the whole job of being a Peace Corps Volunteer 
11 , Transportation
12» Image of the Peace Corps held by host country nationals
13, My technical skills for the job
14» Interest of host country in Peace Corps work
15» Dating
16» Living allowances ,
17» Health
18, Humber of visits from the staff
19® Relationships with other Peace Cotos Volunteers
20, Food
21 , Absence of challenge in. the role o;f Peace Corps Volunteer
22. Excess ive social 2"/ r^ ost couEu;, us hlcn Jx.,
2.3, Isolation in living or work situation
2 4 Housing-livjng arrangements 
2-. E.onship v.itii other expatn...tes
26, Under-friendliness of the local people 
27 « Medical care
28, Variation skills of Peace Corps Volunteers in this g;coup
29, Physical .hardships
FROM: Michigan Stats University (Computer Institute For Social Science Research)
August, 1964»
APPENDIX X7
HOY RETIRIVD PEACE CORPS VCIu:I?EEPS FELT .DIFFERENT FRCH THEIR PEERS
TOTAL VCLULTISRS
E.roader outlook on ?/orld 23
Ho.re malun-e/rcopcnsible '17
More sensitive to cultural differences 17
More understanding dX others 14
More aware of world probleuis 14
Different set of values 12
Able to 'view U*S. more objectively 11
More concerned a.nd knowledgeable
about for&ogn affairs 8
Inowledge of povertyj. hardship C
All others 1 p
FRCM: Louis Harris and Associates, A Surt/ey Of Returned .Peace Corns 
Yolunteei’s, New York, I969»
APPENDIX XVI
RETURNED PEACE CORPS VGLÜUTEERS' VIEW OF DCYFoTIC FROBLE’S
VOLUNTEERS RSTUPHIUG IÎI 1964
Race
Integration
More oppox’tmiities
Enforce civil rights
Accept black power
Need true equality, not tokenism
Other
.85
4-1
15
6
6
4-
13
Poyerty
More and better job training 
More and better jobs 
Better welfare program 
Gaiucanteed annual wage 
More spent on poverty 
Red!stribution of wealth 
Other
PA
Ï2
11
7
10
5
6
2
Campus and Youth Protest 
Support students
Improve communications between generations 
Pro-autho ri ty 
0 ther
10
13
-overniTient economy 
Decrease milito,ry spending and use for domestic areas 
Control inflation 
Make taxes more equi.table 
Other
26
lo
Matural resources 
Control pollution 
Consezve resources 
Control overiiiopulation
Urban ni-oblems
16
" ’ Ï Ï
5
3
1 6
Education 
More 
Other
schools, better school
lime Slid 1-V.7 enforcement
1tricter endorcement 
Other
lovernment
Government and business too big and close 
Corruption in government
VÎ orality 
Breakdown in ethical values 
Other
17 
13
ROM: Louis Karris and Associates, A Survey Of Returned Peace Corps Volunteers, 
New York, 1969.
APPSriDIX XVIII
RZVjHIilD PZACZ ::CIPS ‘vCIIIIIIRS ' 'VILLIIG-IIIS 10 002IICIPII3
VGLuiTiiHS izrui:ii;o ii io6l
illirLK Oo:
Sign petition Jo
Participate in doronstration 60
Join picket line 59
.Risk losing secnrity clearance 3d
Violate the lav/ 3d
G-o to jail Ri
Participate in civil disobedience 1-7
.PRCM: - Louis Harris Associates. A Survey Of Returned Peace Corns 
Volunteers „ IT
APFSIDIX XIX
CXRZXR 3I-XXJ3 OX IIHSI 5,400 RSTURX3D yOLlXiTZIRG
TCTAI VGLV^IBIRS
C on I. j.nuing education 
Graduate school 
Undergi'aduate education 10
5'ederal government 
State & local government 
Job Corps & War on Poverty 
Teaching
Business à profit-making organisations 
1, on-pi'of it organ! cations
3d
13
1.
16
ether
fRCi.iÎ - The Annals Of The American Academy Cf Political And Social 
Science  ^ "'The Peace Corps'" ^ (da-r 1966) Page 112,,
QBIBLIOGRAPHY M B  SOURCES
IjlBLB OF COHTFHTS
1. GUTBRAL WORKS ON JOHN F, Ï3NNBDY A:?B HIS TirES
2. CUTERAL WORIÏS ON BRACE CORPS
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS
4. HISTORICAL MATERIALS AVAILABLE IN THE JOHN F.
KENNEDY MEMORIAL LIBRARY
5, HISTORICAL TIATERIALS AVAILABLE IN THE LYNDON B.
JOHNSON MEMORIAL LIBRARY
6„ HISTORICAL MATERIAL AVAILABLE IN THE PEACE CORPS
.(ARCHIVES, WASHINGTON B,C,
7* NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS
LETTERS TO AUTHOR.
553
GÏTTSÎLiL WORKS ON
JOHN F, KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES
ARGON SKY, NIARTIN, (ed J  Let Us Begin: The First Hundred
Days “Di^Tha Kennedy Ac.rin.ist rat: ion, 
(New York:Sicion & Schus-Her, 'TUoTT~
A!"T DERS 0 N , P AT RICH, The President ' s Men, ( i.‘ e w York: 
Doubleday & Go. Ltd,, 1969*)
ASS.EZ.ŒLY. THE AMSRIOAIT, (adminiskered by) Goals For Americans 
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